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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

1951

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

VOLUME IV

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

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PROJECT TROY
REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

VOLUME IV
ANNEXES 19 - 26

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IONOSPHERIC MATTERS

1. Introduction

The ionosphere is the means whereby all long-distance wireless communication has been achieved. To be able to communicate at all times of day, it is necessary to use either a very low frequency or a high frequency. The possibility for much development of low-frequency communication is severely limited by the small total bandwidth available and the extensive interference range, which limit the frequency-sharing possibilities. Additional difficulties of a purely engineering nature come from the high external noise levels and the difficulty of building efficient antennas for low frequencies; very high transmitter powers are therefore required. In the useful part of the high-frequency spectrum, the total bandwidth available is several orders of magnitude greater, and antenna problems are much simpler.

The variable nature of signals received via the ionosphere poses many problems. In the case of waves of low frequency, the wavelength approaches the physical separation between the lowest region of the ionosphere (the region responsible for low-frequency communications) and the earth. This gives rise to a very long, and at times awkward, fading cycle, and is responsible for considerable and often troublesome anomalies in the received field intensities, particularly during the dusk and dawn periods. In the case of high-frequency communication, the higher, and much more variable ionospheric layers play the dominant roles. Their moment-to-moment variation, when superposed on the irregularities of their day-to-day and season-to-season variations, imposes some very practical conditions on the ways of securing fairly regular communication.

Without elaborating on the mechanism of reflection and attenuation, it is sufficient to call attention to the necessity of choosing operating frequencies with considerable care. Furthermore, long experience has demonstrated that the greatest continuity of service is obtained by use of a frequency somewhat below the optimum at any given moment, in order that as long a period as possible of continuous service

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may be obtained without having to suffer interruption for frequency changing, despite the moment-to-moment and hour-to-hour fluctuations and the regular variations in the ionosphere parameters which determine the instantaneous optimum frequency.

2. Possibilities for Improved Voice of America High-Frequency Broadcast Operations by Utilization of Special Ionosphere Techniques

One of the greatest advantages Russian jammers have, besides a very extensive territorial area from which to operate, is their knowledge that the broadcasts they desire to nullify are confined to certain broadcast bands and that, in general, they use frequencies well below the instantaneous optimum. This practice comes about from the effort to have as much potential listener coverage as possible, and from an effort to avoid forcing listeners to change frequencies too often. These are commendable objectives for conventional broadcasting, but unfortunately they tend to favor jamming operations.

This situation can be improved by the additional use of higher frequencies, but care must be taken not to choose frequencies so high that a critical listener target is placed in the skip zone. Standard predictions of monthly ionospheric characteristics can assist in planning what frequencies are likely to be required in general, but cannot at present assist much in the detailed actual operations, since detailed predictions have thus far proved utterly unfeasible. The advantage of using a frequency which puts the listener just beyond the edge of the skip zone is that it imposes more strain on the jamming system. Many nearer and stronger jammers, particularly in the important evening period, will find the listeners in their own skip zone, and will therefore be ineffective. More-distant jammers, intended for other jamming purposes and subject to greater inverse distance attenuation, would have to be brought into action in a more exigent manner. Geography favors broadcast originating to the westward of evening listeners, since higher frequencies will be usable by the broadcasters than can be used by jammers located at comparable distances from listener targets because the evening drop in critical frequencies is not so far advanced toward the west where the local time is earlier.

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Pulse techniques have long been in use in connection with studies of ground and ionosphere scatter. By sending out a series of short pulses on a high frequency in a particular direction determined by the antenna in use, and by observing the time delay of the first energy returned by scatter (usually from rough terrain), it is possible to calculate the ground distance to the edge of the ship zone. The classic paper on this subject is by Eckersley,* but his conclusion that E-region scatter is predominant has recently been revised in favor of ground scatter. To get good results on the position of the edge of the ship zone in a particular direction, it is necessary to use good antennas and to know their characteristics.

It is entirely worth while to do some experimentation along these lines with Voice of America broadcast operations in mind. For example, it is believed that suitable instrumentation can be rapidly devised to permit the pulses to be inserted in a fairly inconspicuous manner in gaps in broadcast programs. Alternatively, the probing pulses could be sent out on some very slightly different frequency that is relatively clear of interference as determined by the operator at the particular moment. The train of pulses can be so short as to sound to listeners like transient interference. Measurements on several frequencies simultaneously and at frequent intervals would permit some very detailed control of broadcast operations, based on definite knowledge, of the transmitter and frequency resources to give the most satisfactory possible coverage of listener targets. Furthermore, flexible operations of the type employed by such a program would impose additional severe strain on the jamming system.

Our lack of detailed knowledge of the ionospheric characteristics over the U.S.S.R. can be remedied in other ways. Every on-off keyed transmitter on Russian territory that can be heard at available external bases not more than perhaps 1800 to 2300 miles distant can be utilized to give useful information on the instantaneous characteristics of the ionosphere at the point midway between the transmitter and the receiving point. The principles of the method for accomplishing this were worked out in some detail, in connection with a special problem of U-boat warfare, by the

*"Analysis of Effect of Scattering in Radio Transmission", Eckersley, Journal of Institute of Electrical Engineers, 86, 543 (1940).

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British during World War II. At that time the problem receiving attention was: given detailed knowledge of the ionosphere along the path, and direction, determine the position of the transmitter being observed. A detailed description of the techniques used is, owing to classification, available in the literature but can be obtained or rederived if required. Use of the dot-lock DF techniques is involved, and a DF network must be available to locate with reasonable accuracy, the transmitter to be made a subject for study. Such a program, based on, say, Turkey, Persia, and India or Pakistan, could provide actual evidence on specific occasions of atmospheric conditions of a particular nature that are known to occur during the winter months when it would be virtually impossible to jam evening Voice of America programs directed from the west to parts of European Russia and the satellites, except by local ground-wave jamming. Such information could be very useful.

It is suggested that signal-intercept units under the service departments or the Central Intelligence Agency should be approached in this matter, for they undoubtedly could help with sites and personnel, and the results found would be of direct benefit to intercept operations. It is, in fact, to be hoped that there may be activities of this sort going on at present.

The most severe objection to exploiting this proposal consists of its suspected limited returns, and the difficulty of passing rapidly to and making effective the important information at Voice of America operation control centers.

Despite the rather low upper-frequency limitation in high-frequency receiving equipment likely to be available to listeners in the U.S.S.R. - a consideration that probably limits severely the usefulness of the two proposals just made - it is nevertheless recommended that the Voice of America engineers give careful thought now to their implementation. The reason for this recommendation lies in recognizing that during the next few years the solar activity will be declining, with the consequence that the methods will be growing in usefulness as the skip zones of given frequencies increase under given seasonal and diurnal circumstances.

3. Extension of Voice of America High-Frequency Broadcasting into Northern Europe

The previous discussion has dealt with special techniques, the application of

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which is designed to offset our inability to predict or directly observe over the U.S.S.R. and satellites the basic ionospheric characteristics. Detailed and instantaneous knowledge resulting from systematic exploitation of these techniques would permit high-frequency broadcasting operations to function more flexibly and in a manner designed to reach listeners with less effective jamming interference. It is now necessary to consider another aspect of the ionosphere which up to now has been thwarting Voice of America efforts in various ways. This is the matter of the frequency of occurrence and severity of interruptions of high-frequency broadcasting services, particularly those for Europe originating in the United States. The present situation can only be expected to worsen in a general way during the next few years as solar activity continues to decline.

Before making specific suggestions, it seems worth while to review the present incomplete but not unhelpful state of our practical knowledge of high-frequency ionospheric-propagation in high latitudes.

Based on the early studies of Fritz, but significantly revised recently by Vestine, it is known that auroral activity in both polar regions can be represented by contours of frequency-of-occurrence which are concentric about a location not very different from the geomagnetic poles.* The auroral frequency increases, as is well known, with increasing latitude. What is not so well appreciated is the fact that there is a circular ring or zone about the geomagnetic pole along which auroral activity is a maximum. Within this zone, which has a radius of about 1600 miles, the auroral activity declines appreciably.

This is a general picture, a sort of statistical average, and it represents to a good approximation the occurrence of magnetic disturbances of which the aurora polaris is a manifestation. Now it is known that magnetic disturbances produce marked disturbances in the ionosphere. These disturbances in general have very serious consequences for high-frequency communication passing through the

*These are the poles of the dipole approximation to the earth's magnetic field, i.e., the poles of the magnetic field which are effective at considerable distances from the earth's surface.

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disturbed regions. Often the communication paths are completely shut down for periods lasting from several hours to several days. If they are not completely shut down, they are greatly reduced in information-passing capacity. While such disturbances are to some extent predictable, there is little that can be done during their course except to find other channels for communication. Frequency-changing sometimes helps a little, if the disturbance is not too severe, but often no high frequency will permit communication with any available transmitter power and antenna gain.

It has been noticed over the years that high-frequency communication is most difficult in the vicinity of the maximum of the auroral activity zone. Passing to the south of this maximum, disturbances grow less frequent and less severe. This is, of course, why the United States-to-Tangier circuits are more satisfactory than direct circuits to the United Kingdom and other points in Europe. During magnetically disturbed periods, the instantaneous ring of maximum magnetic (and ionospheric) disturbance and auroral activity seems to expand toward the equator. Simultaneously, the relatively quiet region inside the zone grows and spreads southward. Now the circuits from New York to the United Kingdom pass well to the south of the statistically determined zone of maximum auroral frequency, and during quiet magnetic conditions the services are good. However, the path lying well to the northward of the Tangier path is more frequently and more severely disturbed by magnetic storms. A path from New York to Europe by some relay point still further south in Africa or South America would be even more free of disturbance than the Tangier path, and would have certain additional advantages in terms of frequencies required for operation. The British, for example, relay their traffic from Montreal automatically via Ascension Island when the direct service falls below certain adopted standards. The French are building a relay station in Martinique, and the British relay to Australia at certain times via Barbados. In general, the need for high-frequency relay for North Atlantic traffic is greatest in the winter half of the year during years of declining and minimum solar activity.

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A further fact has emerged in connection with the use of radio in high latitudes? It is that the region of the ionosphere causing the disturbance is usually confined to a fairly narrow range of latitude in a given longitude at a given time. Paths beginning and ending outside the auroral zone but passing along part of it or parallel to part of the zone, though normally outside it, suffer much more severely than paths entering the zone at right angles. The WWV transmissions, and during the night various United States medium-frequency broadcasting stations, are received well at points inside the auroral zone in northeastern Canada and at Thule in northwestern Greenland. British Broadcasting Company high-frequency broadcasts on certain frequencies are received well at Fairbanks, Alaska. On the other hand, paths to Iceland from the eastern United States are rather poor, and direct high-frequency communication from Washington or New York with Alaska is impossible as a practical matter. Freak occasions of "good" reception must, of course, be discounted.

Based on this general account, which is well known, but not often discussed in print, it is possible to make certain suggestions with regard to Voice of America operation:

- (a) The extensive and ever-increasing use of Tangier as a relay point is excellent. The development of alternative high-frequency relay points somewhat further south should be considered, as well as the exploration of other possibilities for communication or program transmission to Europe (see Annex 22 on transoceanic relays).
- (b) The possibilities of high-frequency broadcasts beamed to northern Europe and in particular to the northern parts of the U.S.S.R., both European and Asiatic from northeastern Alaska, should be given careful consideration (see Fig. 1). The available evidence is that they would be moderately successful and probably worth while. Care should be taken to avoid twice crossing the zone of maximum disturbance even at right angles, and broadcast points from southern Alaska should therefore be avoided. There are other, and probably propagation-wise better

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northern sites to be considered should the suggestion be adopted in principle. Special care will be necessary in the choice of operating frequencies, but considerable assistance on this matter can be given by the Bureau of Standards which operates an extensive classified Arctic research program on ionospheric matters in cooperation with the Canadians.

Dana K. Bailey

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
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SCALE OF MILES
0 1000 2000 3000



- ZONE OF MAXIMUM AURORAL FREQUENCY
- - - VERY DIFFICULT HF COMMUNICATION PATHS
- LESS DIFFICULT HF PATHS

A POSSIBLE PLAN FOR
TRANSPOLAR HF
BROADCASTING (CROSSING
THE AURORAL ZONE ONLY
ONCE AT NEARLY NORMAL
INCIDENCE)

Fig. 1

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HIGH POWER BROADCASTING

1. Introduction

The Voice of America will be heard through jamming if, and only if, the radio wave that carries it is more intense than the jamming radiation, at the antenna of the receiving set. This statement is not precisely accurate - when the broadcast signal and the jamming signal are not much different in strength there may be more or less intelligibility, depending on various other factors. But the qualification is not essential to our purpose here. Any substantial advantage over the jammer can be gained only by achieving a substantial superiority in signal strength. This Annex is addressed to the question: given the restrictions under which the Voice of America must operate, and given some large but finite sum to invest in broadcasting facilities, how can we best reach a large number of listeners with a very strong signal? or to put it another way, how shall we use our own resources to cause the jammer the greatest difficulty?

Certain physical limitations are unavoidable. We have to broadcast on a frequency to which the listener's receiver can be tuned. This at once excludes frequencies below 150 kc/sec, and above 18 Mc/sec. In fact, many of the cheaper Soviet short-wave receivers do not tune about 13 Mc/sec. The largest number of receivers can be reached, putting other considerations aside, in the long- and medium-wave bands (150 kc to 1500 kc).

The distances are great. If Western Russia is our target, the distance from our transmitter to our target may be from several hundred to more than one thousand miles. Over such distances, ground-wave attenuation is prohibitively high at all but the lowest frequencies. At the present time we rely on high-frequency (short-wave) broadcasting to span these great distances. But there would be important advantages in broadcasting in the medium- and long-wave bands if adequate signal strength could be maintained: (1) the potential audience is larger because receivers for these bands are cheaper and more widely distributed; (2) sky-wave transmission is more reliable in this frequency range than it is in the short-wave band; (3) it appears possible to reach a fairly large region by low-frequency ground wave which would provide a very clear, reliable signal; (4) diversion of the main Soviet jamming effort to low and medium frequencies would lessen the potential military usefulness of their jamming facilities. We shall therefore direct our attention here to long- and medium-wave broadcasting. In fact, most of the discussion will be centered on long-wave transmission, although the new methods to be proposed should be applicable to medium-wave broadcasting also, as will be explained subsequently.

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
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Broadcasting versus Jamming: Some Elementary Considerations

A commercial broadcasting station is ordinarily designed to serve all parts of the surrounding region, all the time. It would not do to concentrate the radiated energy in a narrow beam; this would strengthen the signal received by a fraction of the audience but would leave the rest of the audience without service. The problem of reaching an audience through jamming is essentially different. Our first requirement is a signal strong enough to override jamming in some part of the target area. Second, we must be able to shift our broadcast to other parts of the area in turn. It is much less important to be able to speak simultaneously to our whole audience, and to do so 24 hours a day. The Voice of America's main task is to provide concentrated information, not a long evening's entertainment. Even now, programs for Russia on the Voice of America are repeated many times a day in the hope that occasionally something will get through. But mere repetition will not defeat jamming; we need concentration of power.

A simple example will illustrate the argument and will also serve to bring out some of the economic factors in the contest between the broadcaster and the jammer. Figure 1 shows a country X whose people we are trying to reach from a transmitting station at T. Country X protects its populace by a distribution of jamming transmitters $J_1, J_2, \dots$ etc., each of which needs only be powerful enough to blanket the area assigned to it with a signal stronger than that coming from T. (What we have sketched corresponds roughly to a network of "ground-wave" jammers.) In Fig. 1(a) our transmitter is attempting to broadcast to the whole country at once. In Fig. 1(b) the same total power is concentrated in a narrower beam; the beam covers only one-fifth of the target, roughly, but, if it can be swung to the other parts when desired, all the audience can be reached in a series of five broadcasts. Each jamming station now has to be five times as powerful as before. Of course, each jammer can be idle 80 per cent of the time, but that is not much of a saving, for the cost of electric energy is a relatively small part of the expense of a radio transmitting station.

One can make a rough but conservative estimate of the jamming power required in the simple situation sketched in Fig. 1. For a given field strength of the broadcast wave, a jamming transmitter such as J_2 must radiate an amount of power that varies directly proportionally to the area it is required to cover when that area is small, and increases more rapidly when this area is large. Suppose that E is the minimum field strength in millivolts/meter that the jamming station must create at the fringe of the area assigned to it. (E will be roughly the same as the broadcast signal strength in that region.) If r is the distance in miles from the jamming transmitter to the edge of its area of effectiveness, this area being $A = \pi r^2$, then the jammer must radiate at least



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


Fig. 1

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P_j watts where

$$P_j = 0.0092 AE^2 \quad (1)$$

This formula applies when the distance r is short enough so that the ground wave from the jamming transmitter is propagated without serious attenuation (field strength inversely proportional to distance). For greater distances, the power required is more than Eq. (1) would predict. The graph in Fig. 2 shows this behavior for a few typical cases.

Suppose, for example, that our own transmitter is capable of creating a field of strength of 20 millivolts/meter anywhere within a region of area one million square miles, at 200 kc. To match this, the total jamming power would have to be at least $0.0092 \times 10^6 \times (20)^2$ watts or 3700 kilowatts; and if the jamming stations were as much as 150 miles apart ($r = 100$ miles, say), this figure would rise to $0.03 \times 10^6 \times (20)^2$ or 12,000 kilowatts.

The situation treated here is obviously much oversimplified. We should not expect the Soviet authority to react by establishing a uniformly distributed network of jamming stations. Rather, we must expect at first a concentration of jamming power in heavily populated centers. But any such concentration necessarily leaves other areas unprotected, unless the total jamming installation is much more powerful than the estimate just given.

We have to reckon with the possibility that the jammers themselves may eventually adopt steerable beams. This would not completely nullify the advantage we gain in concentrating all our power in one beam, for they would still require several jamming stations, and in any case would need a considerable period for their development.

These considerations lead us to several important conclusions: By concentrating our own broadcast power in a controllable beam, we could greatly increase the total effort required of the jamming system. This is the principle of the concentrated attack against a distributed defense. If we can achieve field strengths in the target area, of some tens of millivolts per meter, we can confront the jammer with a formidable challenge. The cost of the whole jamming operation will rise roughly proportionally to the square of our broadcast field strength, even though we achieve part of our increase in field strength by narrowing the beam.

3. Transmitter Economics: Antenna Gain vs. Transmitter Power

There are two ways to improve the strength of a radio wave received at some remote point: the power radiated by the transmitting antenna may be increased; and

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


Fig. 2. The total jamming power required for a region of area A square miles is given by $P = CAE^2$, where E is the minimum field strength in millivolts/meter, P is in watts. The factor C depends on the size of the region assigned to each jamming station, as shown above. Only the ground wave from the jamming transmitter is here considered. The curves are strongly dependent on ground conditions; those above correspond to a ground conductivity intermediate between "poor" and "good".

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the directivity or "gain" of the antenna may be increased. To be sure, small improvements in the efficiency of a radiating system are often possible and there are tricks of modulation (single side-band, clipping, etc.) that substantially improve the wave as a carrier of information; we shall assume that these possibilities have been exploited and concern ourselves only with the radiofrequency field strength.

High directivity and high power are both costly. High directivity can be attained only by a large antenna - large, that is, compared to the wavelength of the radiation.* If we take a transmitter of fixed power and proceed to increase the intensity of the radiation in a given direction by enlarging the antenna, it will turn out that the cost of the antenna structure and associated feed lines rises nearly in proportion to the power gain of the antenna. This is most nearly true for medium- and long-wave antennas, in which increased gain is achieved mainly by extending the antenna structure horizontally - any significant extension in height beyond the quarter- or half-wave height of a simple radiator being usually impractical. (If both height and horizontal extent are increased, the cost goes up more rapidly than the power gain.) If G is the gain of the antenna (expressed as a power ratio) and C_a is the cost of the antenna including the land it occupies, we may assume $C_a = K_a G$, where K_a is a constant.

An important part of the cost of a broadcasting station is approximately proportional to the power output P . This includes the cost of the prime power equipment if the station is self-powered, and the cost of the output tubes and associated high-power circuits. Let this cost be represented by $C_p = K_p P$ where K_p is again a constant. Finally, the total cost of the station will include a part substantially independent (over moderate ranges) of the power output and antenna size. The fixed cost C_f covers the low-power equipment, monitoring devices, housing facilities for personnel, and the like.

The field strength E in the radiated beam, is proportional to $\sqrt{GP}$. It is easy to show that under the above assumptions, if we have a fixed total sum $C_a + C_p + C_f$ to invest in the station, E is maximum when $C_a = C_p$ - that is, we ought to spend about equal amounts on the antenna installation and on the high-power equipment. High-power stations now in use do not in general conform to this rule; usually less is spent on the antenna than on the transmitter. The reason for this, of course, is that wide coverage is normally required, and high antenna gain is necessarily associated with a narrow beam. But our problem, as already explained, is essentially different; we conclude that we should be guided by the approximate rule $C_a = C_p$, and build bigger antennas.

* The so-called "super-gain" antenna is an exception to this statement, but it is practically realizable only for relatively low gains and is, for other reasons, not feasible for long wavelengths.



If we now could increase both P and G indefinitely, keeping $C_a = C_p$, and if the costs of transmitter and antenna continued to rise linearly, as assumed, the field strength E would increase in direct proportion to $C_a - C_p$. Actually, we cannot pursue this course very far by simply spending more money on conventional transmitting equipment and antennas, for the following reasons: (1) at a certain power level we pass the limit of existing standard transmitter tubes and enter a range where the power is so high that new engineering problems arise in handling the power and feeding it into an antenna; (2) conventional high-gain antennas do not permit easy, quick control of the beam direction, an essential requirement if we are to exploit the advantages of the beam technique.

From considerations to be given later in more detail, it appears that a limit is reached near a power level of one megawatt, beyond which it is not profitable to increase the power of a single transmitter and correspondingly increase the gain of its antenna. Fortunately, there is a way of proceeding almost indefinitely beyond this point, while achieving both the advantage of an easily controllable beam and a field strength nearly proportional to the total dollar investment. The method consists in multiplying the number of transmitting stations and operating them as a group, with controlled radio-frequency phase relation among them. The essential features of the scheme are described in the following section.

4. The Coherent Transmitter Array

Consider a group of similar radio transmitters $T_1, T_2 \dots T_N$, which are clustered in a small region, as in Fig. 3. Each of these transmitters is said to be a self-contained radio station with an antenna of relatively low directivity. The N stations are to operate on the same frequency and radiofrequency phase relations among them are to be maintained at prescribed values - that is, the radiation from this cluster of radiators is to be coherent. This can be achieved by sending out to each transmitter, from a central control station, a master radiofrequency signal of low power. Each transmitter then acts as a power amplifier for the master signal it receives. Phase control could also be established by a closed-loop servo system, in which the current in each antenna would be continuously monitored and compared in phase with a master signal, the error signal being used to bring about the required phase correction. Since the radiofrequencies here considered are in the low- or medium-frequency range, the distribution of the radiofrequency master signal to stations of the group is easy. It could be done by ultra-high-frequency carrier, by microwave carrier, or by coaxial cable. Thus, the maintenance of any desired phase relationship among the transmitters presents no serious technical problem.

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One can now assign relative phases in such a way that, at some remote spot P , the waves radiated from each transmitter arrive in phase. The field strength E_N at P , due to the N transmitters, will then be NE_0 , where E_0 is the field strength that one transmitter alone would have produced at P . Two important assumptions have been made: (1) the radiation pattern of each station, and the amount of power it radiates, are unaffected by the presence of the others; (2) the relative phase relations prevailing at the transmitter are not destroyed by irregularities along the path of transmission. Each of these assumptions needs careful criticism and will receive it presently. For the moment, let us assume that both are valid and see what we can gain by operating N transmitters as a coherent array or cluster.

The field strength at the target is directly proportional to N , the number of transmitting stations, and therefore directly proportional to our total investment in facilities. The extent of the region over which this high field strength prevails is determined by the size of the transmitter cluster. We have, in effect, a single large array radiating a beam* whose angular width, in radians, is approximately λ/d_t if d_t is the maximum transverse dimension of the cluster. Indeed, for any single set of phase adjustments, the system is equivalent to a single antenna, made by connecting all the antennas of Fig. 3 together, fed by a source of power output NP_0 , where P_0 is the output of one of the transmitter units. It is more economical than such a system, for we do not require the high-power transmission lines to distribute the energy to the antennas, and we avoid the problem of coupling a number of very-high-power oscillators into the same load. To swing the beam into a new direction is a fairly simple matter, requiring only the adjustment of a number of phase-shifters in the low-power control circuit.

The basic unit of the array, a transmitter of power output P_0 coupled to an antenna of gain G_0 , should be about as large as we can build without encountering excessive costs per kilowatt or per unit of antenna gain. In designing this unit, we should aim to keep the costs for high-power equipment and the cost of the antenna installation roughly equal, as suggested by the considerations of Section 3 above, unless this would lead to an antenna whose radiation pattern would be too narrow to cover the whole target area. The economic relations here, considerably oversimplified of course, are shown in the graph of Fig. 4. The solid curve gives the relation between cost and effective radiated field strength, for a single station of optimum

*This is not quite true if d_t is so large that $d_t^2/\lambda \gg R$. In that case the target area lies within the Fresnel region of the diffraction pattern, rather than the Fraunhofer region, and the strong illumination is confined to an elongated patch, rather than a sector. We are not at present interested in so extreme a situation.

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


Fig. 3

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


Fig. 4




Fig. 5

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design, as described in Section 3. The downward-curving dotted extension of the curve corresponds to powers too high to be economically generated and radiated by a single unit. The dashed curve applies to a number of stations operated as a coherent array.

5. Relative Phase Stability Along the Transmission Path

The phase stability problem is illustrated in Fig. 5, for the case of single-hop sky-wave transmission. B_1 and B_N are the equivalent points of reflection for waves emitted, respectively, by transmitters T_1 and T_N at the extremes of the array. It is necessary, if the coherent array is to work as we hope, that the electrical lengths of the paths T_1B_1P and T_NB_NP remain equal within a fraction of a wavelength. If, for example, the effective height of the reflecting layer at B_1 were to differ by Δh from the effective height at B_N , the geometrical paths shown would differ in length by $2\Delta h \cos \theta$, and one would expect trouble if this amounted to more than, say, $\lambda/4$. The horizontal separation of the reflecting points is half d_1 , the transmitter separation which, anticipating the discussion in the next section, may be as much as several wavelengths. Thus we are in effect requiring that the reflection heights h_1 and h_N not differ by more than a small fraction, perhaps $1/10$, of their horizontal separation.

Direct experimental evidence on this question, for frequencies between 150 and 400 kc, is provided by the recent measurements of E. F. Florman and A. Tait of the Central Radio Propagation Laboratory, National Bureau of Standards. They investigated phase coherence at two receiving points 2.5 miles apart, using various low-frequency transmitting stations as sources of radiation. Their records show that, except under unusually disturbed ionospheric conditions, the relative phase stability is good enough to meet our requirements. The separation used, 2.5 miles, should be enough to accommodate a cluster of ten transmitters, even at 150 kc. Whether an even larger spread of the cluster will be allowable remains to be determined by further propagation experiments which are now in progress. We have no corresponding data in the medium-frequency band. It is perhaps not unreasonable to expect adequate phase stability there also since, at the higher frequencies, the transmitters can be grouped in a correspondingly smaller cluster. It must be clearly understood that we require here only relative, not absolute, phase stability.

So far as low-frequency ground-wave propagation is concerned, there seems to be little reason to doubt that the phase stability will be adequate, but experimental data on this question are also desirable.

6. The Spacing of Units in the Cluster

It is not necessary to arrange the units of the array in a regular geometrical

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pattern, because the phase of each radiator can be set at the value required to give constructive interference in the desired direction. The distribution of units can be governed by other considerations, such as the geography of the site. The nominal distance between the units, however, is a parameter that requires careful study, for there are several conflicting requirements which must be reconciled. If the units are widely spaced, their mutual interaction is small, which is desirable. On the other hand, it makes the total area covered by the installation large, increasing not only the cost of the site but the problem of maintaining physical security. It has one further disadvantage: if the spacing between units is about one wavelength or more, the minor lobes of the radiation pattern become rather strong, which is objectionable if these lobes happen to point toward friendly areas where an intense beam would only cause annoyance and interference.

If the spacing between units is decreased, a smaller area is required for a given number of units and, at the same time, the width of the main lobe increases, which is desirable.* But, if the units are too close together, the interaction of their antennas will lower the apparent radiation resistance of each, making it more difficult to couple the transmitters properly to the antennas, and may complicate the problem of phase adjustment.

A preliminary study of this problem indicates that a spacing between one-half and three-fourths λ may be a satisfactory compromise. With this spacing, the interaction should not be severe and the minor lobes can be kept fairly weak if the primary radiators themselves are designed to suppress radiation in directions far away from that of the target area.

Other things being equal, an "end-fire" arrangement of the array is more desirable than a broadside arrangement, since the main lobe is wider in azimuth, for the same gain. The interaction problem will probably be worse with the end-fire disposition, however, if the primary radiations are dispersed to radiate mainly forward. Further calculations and experiments are needed before the best disposition of units can be determined.

7. Use of Phase Modulation

Among the unique advantages of the coherent array is the possibility of

* Note that the power gain of the array does not vary as the spacing is changed, although the width of the main lobe does. This is because the number of radiations, and the power radiated by each, remains the same. Narrowing of the main lobe is accompanied by a corresponding increase in the intensity of the minor lobes.

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applying audio modulation by simply phase-modulating half the transmitters- that is, all transmitters are run at a constant power output, and half of these operate simply as continuous-wave oscillators with no modulation whatever. The other transmitters, by means of the central phase control, are phase-modulated. The effect is to swing the beam back and forth at the audio frequency, which, so far as any single receiver is concerned, amounts to amplitude modulation. The advantage of this scheme is that it enables all output tubes to run as Class C amplifiers - with the attendant improvement in efficiency - and that it reduces the average cost of modulating equipment per unit. A modulation scheme of this sort was tested about 1940 at Station WHO in Des Moines by John Byrne, and found to be satisfactory.

8. High-Power Vacuum Tubes

In this and the following sections, we consider various components of a high-power low-frequency transmitting unit, in order to arrive at some rough specifications for the basic unit of a coherent array. We are interested not only in the present state of the unit but in developments that might be brought about in the near future, if sufficient effort were applied.

If no artificial restrictions are imposed (such as the requirement of sealed-off tubes or especially low voltages, the power that vacuum tubes can be designed and built to produce is practically unlimited. Designs have been explored by one of the authors, in connection with classified projects, for power of the order of 50 megawatts continuously from a single tube. There are no obvious difficulties in building such tubes and the associated circuits for their use as amplifiers. In fact, the design of high-power tubes that are physically large makes the problem of electron focusing mechanically simple, as is illustrated in the half-megawatt RCA tube. This permits the use of high gain in the final stage even if it is desirable to use a grid circuit for stability or other reasons. If it should be desirable to use a linear amplifier (Class B), the electron loading produced in the input circuit by the plate current gives a steady input impedance to the stage, regardless of whether it draws grid current or not, so that linearity is easily preserved over a wide range of amplitudes. In such tubes having good electron focusing from the cathode, the grid current is exceedingly low in any case. The small grid current in proportion to the plate current that can be achieved in a modern high-powered tube makes possible Class C amplifiers in which the amount of gain is actually limited by the excellence of the shielding that can be introduced between the input and output of the stage. The RCA tube mentioned above is commonly used with a power gain of 250 times.

The 50 megawatt designs here referred to require rather high plate voltages

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(about 100 kilovolts) in order to reduce the power required for filament heating. At this power level it may be difficult, at low frequencies particularly, to build output tank circuits with a low enough characteristic impedance to meet the requirements of efficient operation. Moreover, the considerations of Section 3 indicate that it is not economical to use transmitters whose unit cost is large compared to the associated antenna, as would be the case for a 50-megawatt transmitter in connection with a reasonable antenna of a few towers. In addition, the difficulties of radiating as much as 50 megawatts from restricted antennas are considerable, and may be insurmountable because of the extremely high voltages that would be generated in parts of the antennas.

Suitable sealed-off tubes now exist for the generation of powers of the order of one megawatt. At the low frequencies of interest here, there is no difficulty in operating these tubes at maximum output and efficiency. RCA #5831 is the example cited above. This tube was originally made more powerful than the versions now offered for public sale. The original version was felt by the RCA sales department to be so large that it would not be useful, and hence a smaller version was made by leaving out some of the filaments. The original version of this tube would be very suitable for the purposes proposed here. Two of these original tubes operated in parallel would give one megawatt output with approximately 76 per cent anode efficiency and with only 10 kilovolts plate voltage, at 130 amps average plate current to the pair. This arrangement has the advantage that the output impedance into which the tubes work most efficiently is about 40 ohms. This low impedance, although it may involve slight additional difficulties in the design of a tank circuit, has the advantage of greatly reducing the required transformation ratio between the amplifier and the antennas, thus making it possible for the system to operate at the lowest Q for which the tubes can operate efficiently. An operating Q of approximately 12 gives a tank circulating current of approximately 2000 amperes. A coil and condenser of reasonable size can be designed for this operation. The advantages of low voltage, particularly in field operations, seem obvious.

Similar operation could be obtained by the use of the Machlett type NL 5682 tube. This tube has an operating voltage of about 16 kv, and 20 amperes plate current per tube. Four of these tubes in parallel would do the job adequately. The grid and cathode structure, however, are of an older design, and therefore produce higher grid currents. This limits the gain that can be obtained in a single tube considerably below that of the RCA tubes. There is some greater difficulty also in designing an amplifier using four tubes. The tubes discussed here all require water cooling. It seems likely that this will be the case for power levels such as those discussed.

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Design for such low frequencies is very straightforward in spite of the power used. Aluminum or aluminum-lined cabinets will be required because of the high radio-frequency currents involved in such a high power level. Accidental parasitic frequencies should normally be so far away from the desired frequency as to be easy to control as a matter of design. The tubes can, of course, be used in push-pull, and such a design will certainly reduce the expense of the condensers required by reducing the load on blocking condensers, etc. This expense must be balanced against the requirements of a higher transformation ratio between the transmitter and the antenna. The fact that tube designs now exist suitable for one-megawatt power levels makes this the power level at which watts of radiofrequency power are cheapest, and for this reason it is recommended that transmitters be used in one-megawatt units for the coherent array.

9. Circuit Elements

The design of output circuits for low-frequency high-powered radio transmission is old in the radio art. However, one megawatt or more of power at 150 to 300 kc, with Q's compatible with voice modulation, presents new problems, particularly if it is desired to keep the main tank circuit of the final amplifier of such low impedance as to permit a small transformation ratio between it and the antenna. Large currents are involved - in the case of two tubes in parallel, 2000 amperes of circulating current or more. Fortunately, condensers have recently been designed and are in quantity production that are admirably suited to this work. For example, the 2000 μ fd all-copper vacuum condensers produced by the Jennings Condeser Company of San Jose, California, in both variable and fixed styles, have low inductance, exceedingly low loss, and good heat conductivity for removing heat losses. The normal current ratings of these condensers are far beyond the requirements of the frequencies considered here. Also, the General Electric Company of Schenectady, New York, has recently been manufacturing oil-cooled condensers for this frequency range. The cooling due to the natural convection circulation would probably be adequate, but could be easily enhanced if desirable. Thus, modern condensers do not suffer from the inability to dissipate even the small amount of heat produced, which plagued old-style mica condensers at these power levels and frequencies.

About 320,000 μ fd might be required for the tank circuit at 150 kc. This requires 160 of the Jennings condensers which could be disposed in an array of 10 x 16 condensers or about 5 x 8 feet. This is large but not unreasonable considering the size and frequency of the transmitter. The extremely low inductance of these condensers should make it reasonably easy to design a circuit with the tuning inductance which would

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insure uniform current distribution through the condenser bank. Of course, only one-fourth this capacity would be required for a push-pull circuit and would no doubt be correspondingly easier to arrange. A roughly similar condenser would be required as a plate blocking condenser in a single-ended circuit such as that requiring the 320,000 μ fd.

Heretofore, the design of inductances for frequencies in the 100-kc range has relied on litz wire. The use of litz wire is in a way equivalent to increasing the skin depth in copper without increasing its resistivity. This effect is highly desirable in that it considerably increases the intrinsic Q of a coil of a given size ($Q_0 = \omega L/R$).

The use of litz has one undesirable feature when used at high power levels. Even in a coil of high Q, some power is dissipated and must be radiated or conducted from the coil within the limits of a temperature rise tolerable to the materials used in its construction. Litz wire consists of fine strands of copper which must be electrically insulated from each other. Since electrical insulating materials are also essentially heat insulators, the ability of litz to get rid of excess heat is exceedingly poor. Coils of litz for high power must therefore be made much larger than would be necessary from the standpoint of the intrinsic Q required for efficiency, in order to reduce the heat developed to the extremely small amount which they can tolerate. These considerations lead to bulky designs particularly uneconomical of space and requiring litz of expensive size where large currents are involved.

High-powered coils of conventional construction have also required a shielded volume several times the coil volume because of the large amount of stray magnetic field surrounding such coils.

A new type of coil construction is recommended here which is not only free from these difficulties but also has the advantage of maintaining a uniform current distribution over the surface of its solid conductors.

The coil here recommended is a new toroidal type devised as an improvement on a suggestion of F. E. Terman* - see Radio Engineers' Handbook (Terman), page 83. The toroidal form of coil has the advantage of confining most of its magnetic field to its interior. Such a coil is particularly good in this respect if the spaces between the conductors are small compared to the space occupied by the conducting surface.

*F. E. Terman, Proc. I.R.E., 23, 1069 (1935)

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The coil proposed here is not wound with wire but is made by cutting small slots around a conducting surface. This surface is like a short section of coaxial transmission line with solid ends. Such a coil is shown in the accompanying Fig. 6. The filling in of the surface with conductors results in a much higher Q than a similar wire-wound coil because all the inner surface is utilized. This comes about because the magnetic flux lines produced in the coil are everywhere smooth and tangent to the conducting surface. The foregoing condition is a requirement for uniform current distribution in a conductor carrying radiofrequency current, as can be seen from examination of the field conditions and current distribution in a coaxial transmission line.

The additional important design factor emphasized here is that the slots that make the coil must make it in two halves in parallel which go around the inner space in opposite senses and terminate on opposite sides of the toroid. This arrangement makes the coil appear externally as two opposed half-turns with equal current, while internally, it consists of two equal multiturn coils aiding. There are two important advantages besides the consequent further reduction of external magnetic field: first, the terminals are widely separated so that high voltages can be applied to the coil; and second, the gaps between the turns each have an equal small portion of the electric potential across the coil, as is ideal in holding high voltages across insulators.

The equations giving the inductance and resistance of such a coil are simple and of considerable accuracy as used practically.

The inductance $L = 2N^2 h \log_e r_1/r_2 \times 10^{-9}$,
 where L is in henries,
 N is the number of turns in either half,
 h is the height in cm,
 r_1 is the outer radius,
 r_2 is the inner radius.

Similarly R , the radiofrequency resistance of such a coil, is given by


$$R \text{ (ohms)} = \frac{N^2 \sqrt{f}}{24} \left[\frac{h}{r_1} + \frac{h}{r_2} + 2 \log_e \frac{r_1}{r_2} \right] \times 10^{-6} ,$$

where f is the frequency in cycles per second and the other symbols are as above. About five microhenries of inductance is needed for the tank coil for a one-megawatt amplifier with the tubes in parallel at 150 kc.

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Such a coil designed on the foregoing basis might have the following dimensions

$h = 1$ meter;

$r_1 = 1$ meter;

$r_2 = 1/2$ meter;

$N = 6$ turns.

Then $L = 5.0 \times 10^{-6}$ henries approximately,

$R_{150} = 2.54 \times 10^{-3}$ ohms, $Q = 1850$.

At 2000 amperes of circulating current, the loss in this coil is about 10 kw, a reasonably small proportion of 1000 kw and requiring only a little air cooling considering the external area of the coil. The form of the coil and the absence of external magnetic field makes it possible to solder on an external set of water tubing around the turns if water cooling is desired. The needed water is easily bled from the tube water jackets.

10. Antennas

The problem of designing an adequate and appropriate antenna system for a high-power transmitter in the frequency region between 150 and 300 kc is made difficult by the long wavelength. Since the cost of antenna masts varies approximately as the square of their height, it appears that half-wavelength towers are certainly not feasible and probably quarter-wavelength ones are unreasonably expensive. The advantage of these lengths for radiators is well known to the broadcasting art. However, the intelligent use of somewhat shorter towers can give excellent results. A guyed tower 1000 feet high, such as that indicated schematically in Fig. 7, can be built for about \$100,000 (Blaw-Knox estimate). Such a tower can be used quite effectively by means of top inductive loading. This arrangement, which will be described in more detail, produces an almost uniform current distribution along the tower as compared to the current distribution on an ordinary isolated tower, which falls to zero at the top. This improvement in current distribution results in a four-fold increase in radiation resistance and in a reduction of vertical angle of radiation, which leads to several db increase in the received signal.

The equipment required for top inductive loading consists of an inductance mounted at the top of the tower associated with an appropriate trim, a condenser for tuning purposes, and a capacity hat which may consist of an insulated section of the top guy wires, or of an array of sweeps around the top of the antenna, or of an additional vertical section of the tower. The resonance of the coil at the top of the antenna produces enough voltage to maintain a current to the capacity of the antenna hat equivalent to the current in the base of the tower. A corresponding current therefore

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


Fig. 7

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flows at the top of the tower, and in this way the current distribution is maintained approximately uniform throughout the tower.

The circuit shown in Fig. 8 is an equivalent schematic circuit of a top-loaded tower and base-completing inductance. The top-load inductance is L_1 . The capacity from the loading hat to the tower is C_1 , which also includes any trimming capacity that may be necessary for tuning. C_3 represents the capacity of the loading hat to ground. C_2 is the capacity between the tower and the ground, and L_2 is the feed inductance at the base of the tower. This arrangement obviously consists of two complete circuits in which the coupling capacity is the capacity to ground of the loading hat, C_3 . This circuit has two modes. In one mode the voltages across the two inductances are in the same phase. This is the high-frequency resonance, because the polarity on both sides of C_3 is the same and no energy is stored in C_3 . The low-frequency mode is the interesting one. In this mode the two inductances are in opposite phase and a voltage equal to the sum of the voltage across the inductances appears across C_3 . This produces a current in C_3 , determined by its reactance and the sum of these voltages, and a corresponding current in R which represents the vertical section of tower and the radiation resistance of the antenna. In this mode, the two inductances L_1 and L_2 with their shunt capacity C_1 and C_2 have inductive reactance in series equal to the reactance of C_3 . The Q of this system will be given by the ratio of the impedance of C_3 to the radiation resistance of the antenna. The capacity of an isolated disc in μfd is given by $C = 0.0345 D$, where D is the diameter of the disc in centimeters. The impedance of such a disc is, of course, $1/\omega C$. The radiation resistance of a vertical tower with uniform current distribution is given by

$$R = 60\pi^2 H^2 / \lambda^2 \text{ ohms,}$$

where H is the height of the antenna tower and λ is the wavelength in the same units. A 1000-foot tower is approximately 300 meters in height; the wavelength at 150 kc is 2000 meters. These figures give a radiation resistance of approximately 13 ohms. If an antenna loading hat 100 meters in diameter is used, consisting of fairly closely spaced wires, its capacitance will be approximately 3000 μfd . This has an impedance of about 500 ohms. The Q of this system is approximately 38, giving a bandwidth for this antenna of about 4000 cycles, assuming a perfect ground. Even the best ground is not perfect, and with a good ground situation, an additional ground resistance is reflected into the radiation resistance so that probably the practical Q of this system is about 25 with a correspondingly broader bandwidth. At a higher frequency within this band, the radiation resistance increases as the square of the wavelength, and the impedance of the capacity of the hat goes down proportionally to the wavelength, so that the Q decreases very rapidly as the frequency increases. Some of this advantage could be used to reduce the size of the loading hat needed. The amount

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of current carried by the loading inductances is, of course, the antenna current multiplied by the Q . This makes necessary an inductance of rather high current-carrying capacity, assuming ground resistance to increase the apparent radiation resistance to 17 ohms. The antenna current required is approximately 600 amperes with a Q of approximately 25. 600 amps are required in the loading coil. Although this current is at one-third the current required in the tank, the inductance required is considerably higher than that for a one-megawatt transmitter. However, a perfectly practical inductance can be designed for the required current and inductances using the same principles outlined under circuit elements. It is required to design two coils, one for the base and one for the top loading of approximately 265 microhenries each, capable of carrying 699 amperes and capable of standing a voltage of approximately 150,000 volts each. These coils must also have a high intrinsic Q , preferably sufficiently high so that their losses at this power level can be taken care of by ordinary air cooling.

The size of such a coil is 300 centimeters high and 300 centimeters in diameter; with a ratio of R_1 to R_2 of 2, 26 turns are required. The resistance of this coil would be approximately 8×10^{-2} ohms. Its losses in operation would be approximately 29 kilowatts which the large area of this coil should radiate quite easily. If desired, a slightly larger coil could reduce these losses considerably. The Q of the coil given here is about 3000. A larger coil is certainly practical if it is desirable to reduce the losses still further. This may seem large, but is compatible in size with the structures with which it is used. Of course, this problem is much simpler at higher frequencies since all the parameters involved are more favorable.

Considerations involved in the multiple use of a number of such antennas with their own transmitters working in phase together, as is suggested in this Report, leads to the conclusion that each one-megawatt transmitter should supply two towers such as described above in order to eliminate transmission in a direction opposite to the desired transmission. Since this would reduce the power in each tower to one-half, the voltages and currents would be reduced by $\sqrt{2}$, and the dissipation required of the loading coils would be reduced to half the values given here. Two towers approximately one-quarter wavelength apart, operating together in appropriate phase, will give a cardioidal pattern of radiation with a null in the direction of the line joining the towers. These towers could be operated essentially in series so far as the transmitter is concerned, and thus might be matched more or less directly across the tank circuit of the transmitter.

An alternative proposal has been made by A. J. Poté, consultant to the Project. The antenna proposed in a 1200-foot tower of uniform triangular cross section, 12 feet on a side without top loading. At 150 kc the electrical length of this tower is 69° , so that

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the base impedance has a capacitive component. The radiation resistance is 16.5 ohms, and, making allowance for ground and other losses, the input impedance at the base is 20-j112. The Q of the antenna, when resonated, is 13.3. Two RCA 5831 tubes, operated in parallel to give one-megawatt output, can be coupled to this antenna through a simple inductive network, which might advantageously use coils like those described above. The coupling network is shown in Fig. 9. Besides eliminating the tank condenser, this circuit provides a d-c ground for the antenna. This technique has already been successfully used in low-frequency (180 kc) Loran.

If two towers are used as the basic antenna, a coupling circuit of this type could be used to drive the transmission lines to the towers. Alternatively, one might drive only one tower, by the circuit of Fig. 9, and use the other tower as a parasitic radiator with considerable simplification of the installation.

A transmitter such as envisioned here would cost, it is estimated, about \$100,000. One of these towers will cost \$150,000; it will cost \$50,000 to erect and possibly \$25,000 for the building and erection of the loading arrangements. In addition to the towers, an elaborate ground system is required which should be a mat of radic wires under each tower, at least quarter-wavelength in radius. Such a ground system for two towers would cost about \$25,000 for wire and another \$25,000 for installation. Thus, the antenna system envisioned here would cost about \$500,000, including erection. It, therefore, seems like a reasonable system to go with an \$800,000 transmitter.

11. Primary Power Sources

One of the major problems in the operation of high-power long-wave radic transmitters in the field may be the requirements for primary power. A one-megawatt transmitter may require approximately two megawatts of 60-cycle or other low-frequency power for complete operation of the site. This will not usually be available from local power mains. The possibilities of operation are greatly extended if some reasonably portable power source is made available. In the past, heavy diesel-engine generators have been used, particularly where unloading facilities make possible the bringing up of this equipment of specially constructed railroad cars. The need for availability and ease of transportation of fuel oil for such power sources is fairly obvious. However, a diesel-engine power plant is exceedingly heavy and, in spite of this, requires considerable maintenance. It seems appropriate to point out here that certain new possibilities are now available. The development of internal combustion turbo-propeller aircraft engines has excellent possibilities. Turboprop engines now exist generating more than 2 HP per pound including gear necessary to bring the propeller speed to the neighborhood of 1800

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


Fig. 8




Fig. 9

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rpm. This rotational speed would be very satisfactory for driving a 60-cycle multiphase generator. These engines are available in 2500-HP units which might be about right to supply one transmitter. Some development may be required to build the appropriate generator and mounting arrangement; however, such a unit would be light enough to mount on an ordinary motor truck. High-octane fuel is not required and good-quality furnace oil could probably be used. In case larger units are desired, a 22,000-HP turboprop engine is under development at the Pratt and Whitney Company. Since its main rotor shaft revolves at only 8000 rpm, it seems quite possible that a modern light-weight multiphase alternator could be designed to run directly at this speed and produce a frequency in the neighborhood of 400 to 1000 cycles. The use of this frequency would save considerable weight in the radio transmitter itself, and in the rectifier, transmitter, and filters. The saving in weight of the primary generator would be considerable. This engine itself, with the reducing gears, would probably give at least 3 HP per pound. Thus, even a unit that could operate possibly a complete array of one-megawatt transmitters might be held on a single truck or trailer. Also available, having completed its development, is a fuel-oil turbine engine designed and built by the General Electric Company for locomotive use. This unit generates about 2500 HP and is already connected to a generator that might be suitable. It is a heavier equipment than those suggested above, but is a great deal lighter than similar diesel units.

It is strongly recommended that, should this project be pursued, the development of appropriate power sources be considered an important part.

12. Summary of the System Proposed

As the basic unit of a low-frequency coherent array we recommend a one-megawatt transmitter, and an antenna consisting of two vertical towers. Further engineering study is needed to determine whether both towers should be driven, and whether top-loading tricks should be employed. Obviously, there are many other points that will require careful investigation if the most economical and practical design is to be achieved. The basic units should be uniform in design, and emphasis should be put on simplicity, reliability, and ease of installation. The equipment should be, so far as possible, transportable, and should be patterned after military equipment rather than commercial broadcasting equipment.

A sketch of one embodiment of these ideas for a 200-kc array is shown in Fig. 10. For this example, the simplest two-tower antenna has been chosen - one driven radiator and one parasitic. The plan view shows the layout of a 10-unit cluster,

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


Fig. 10

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with a separation between units that is probably more than would actually be required. Allowing for losses in the ground or antenna structures, this cluster should have an effective radiated power of at least 100 megawatts in the main lobe. The width of the main lobe would be about 30° and it could be directed anywhere within a 120° arc. The night sky-wave field strength at 1000 miles would be about 20 millivolts per meter, and about 10 millivolts per meter at 1400 miles. Over good ground, the ground-wave field strength would fall to 20 millivolts per meter at about 500 miles.

We have not discussed the transmitter-antenna problem for the broadcast band. Suffice it to say that, if propagation measurements show adequate sky-wave phase stability for the application of the coherent-array technique in the medium-frequency band, the design of a one-megawatt unit for that range does not appear to present any unusual engineering problems.

E. M. Purcell

W. W. Salisbury

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RECEIVERS

Short-wave radio receivers and the medium-wave receivers with which we are familiar use vacuum tubes and electric power. The vacuum tubes have a limited life, but this is less serious than the fact that they use power. If the power is drawn from the domestic electric supply, the receivers can be used only in areas where domestic power is available. If the power comes from batteries, the batteries soon run down and either the receiver becomes useless or the batteries must be replaced.

The problems of tube life and especially of battery life can be partly overcome by using transistors rather than vacuum tubes in radio receivers. The transistor is a small device with amplifying properties similar to those of a vacuum tube, but with no hot filament or cathode. Since the power used in heating the filament of a low-power vacuum tube is the major power required, batteries would last much longer in a transistor set than in a tube set. Further, transistors last for years. Present transistors are suitable for medium-wave and long-wave receivers but not in short-wave receivers. Perhaps transistors could be developed that would work in short-wave receivers.

In a crystal receiver, batteries are entirely dispensed with. This means that a crystal receiver lasts until it is physically damaged. Crystal receivers are simple to make and operate. The two most expensive components of a crystal receiver are the phone and the crystal. These together can be bought in small quantities for less than \$2.00, and they would probably cost around \$1.20 in large quantities. A crystal receiver including the earphone could be the size of a pack of cigarettes, and it could use around 20 feet or less of wire as an antenna.

Crystal receivers are ideal for [REDACTED] and for distribution in backward areas (the Far East, for instance).

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The signal you hear with a crystal receiver is only the weak power picked up by the antenna. One listens to a rather faint signal with an earphone. Thus, it is very important that a crystal receiver be made as efficient as possible, so that it gives the loudest signal that it can, or, conversely, so that it requires the least

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possible signal to hear. How good a crystal receiver can be made is discussed in a later section.

. Even the most efficient crystal receivers require quite a strong signal. In many cases, however, a very strong signal must be supplied anyhow, to flight jamming. A cluster of high-power long-wave transmitters such as those described elsewhere in the Report could easily be received at a distance of 500 miles in the daytime and 1000 miles at night.

Transistors

A transistor is an amplifying device consisting of a piece of germanium and two point contacts. It has three leads and is roughly comparable to a triode vacuum tube in capabilities.

Transistors with various properties can be made. Some models are being manufactured by the Western Electric Company. Useful knowledge of transistors and transistor circuits can be obtained from:

"Some Circuit Aspects of the Transistor", R. M. Ryder and R. J. Kircher, Bell System Technical Journal, Volume 28, pp. 367-400, July, 1949;

- Third Quarterly Progress Report, "Transistors", Army Project No. 3-19-03-031, Signal Corps Project No. 27-323A-1, Contract W36-03°SC44497, Western Electric Company.

A particular transistor that is now being developed at the Bell Telephone Laboratories and that might be of some interest is M1725 (or M1734, a model capable of operation at somewhat higher frequencies). This will operate at 6 volts and 1 to 2 milliamperes. We should compare this with the 0.7 or 1.4 volts and 15 milliamperes needed to heat the filament of a small vacuum tube. Further, vacuum tubes generally require in addition a small current at a higher voltage than is needed for transistors. Four large flashlight cells would supply one milliampere at the required voltage to an M1725 transistor for 4000 hours.

It is possible that a transistor could be developed which would operate on a single flashlight cell.

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The M1725 transistor will give a gain of around 18 decibels as an amplifier. The noise figure is around 27 db at 100 kilocycles and 18 db at 1000 kilocycles.

It should be possible to make a simple sensitive receiver by using a transistor in a regenerative circuit. However, a regenerative receiver tends to radiate a signal while it is being tuned, and this might betray a covert listener. A receiver using a non-regenerative circuit would be less sensitive than a regenerative receiver, but more sensitive than a crystal receiver. Increased sensitivity could be obtained at the expense of battery life by using two or more transistors.

By using several transistors and higher voltages and currents, a loudspeaker could be operated. However, a loudspeaker is probably the last thing one wants for clandestine listening; one or more earphones would be better.

We feel that work should be done toward making simple medium- and long-wave transistor receivers for possible use where the signal is not strong enough for crystal receivers.

Crystal Receivers

1. Performance

A crystal receiver using a vertical wire 10 meters (33 feet) high and operating at 180 kilocycles requires only 1.4 millivolts/meter to receive a good signal. With an antenna 1.5 meters (5 feet) long, it would receive a good signal at 20 mv/meter.

A loop antenna would have to be 6.5 meters (21 feet) on a side to be as effective as a vertical wire 10 meters (33 feet) tall, or one meter (3-1/2 feet) on a side to be as good as a wire 1.5 meters (5 feet) tall. Thus, straight antennas are preferable to loop antennas.

Some other figures for the field strength required for a crystal receiver with a 10-meter antenna at various frequencies are shown below.

<u>Frequency (kilocycles)</u>	<u>Wavelength (meters)</u>	<u>Field (millivolts/meter)</u>
150	2000	1.7
300	1000	0.83
500	600	0.50
1000	300	0.25

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Elsewhere in this Report (Chapter 2 and Annex 20) it is shown that a cluster of ten coherent transmitters, of one megawatt power each, is capable of producing a sky-wave field of the order of 10 to 20 millivolts per meter at 1000 miles. The figures above show that such a signal can be received with a crystal receiver and a very modest antenna.

2. Data and Equations

Tests made with a single Western Electric U-1 ring armature telephone receiver showed that clipped speech (standard for Voice of America) with a peak amplitude corresponding to 10^{-9} watts for a sine wave was perfectly intelligible in a noticeably noisy room. This is a very sensitive receiver; 10 or more times this power might be required for other receiver types. Since the crystal is a square-law device, this means that using a poor receiver instead of a good receiver might require 100 or more times the radiofrequency power required with a good receiver. Thus, it is quite possible that improper choice of a receiver would necessitate a 100-times increase in transmitted power in order to be heard.

Some measurements made on crystals indicated that to obtain an audio power of 10^{-9} watts with sine-wave modulation, a peak carrier power of around 10^{-7} watts would be needed, and this figure has been assumed in the calculations. Some crystals are much better than others at low signal levels; the Western Electric 400 A germanium diode is quite good.

An adequate bandwidth for speech reception must be provided. An audio band of 3000 cycles was assumed, corresponding to a radiofrequency bandwidth of 6000 cycles. Thus, the loaded Q of the tuned circuit was assumed to be given by

$$6000 = \frac{f}{Q}, \quad Q = \frac{f}{1000} \quad (1)$$

(Here f is the frequency of the transmitter.) Thus, at a frequency of 180 kilocycles, the loaded Q would be 30; and at 600 kilocycles the loaded Q would be 100.

It is desirable that the unloaded Q be considerably higher than the loaded Q, so as to put the power into the crystal and not into coil losses. Measurements on small dust-core coils indicate that unloaded Q's of 200 to perhaps 500 are attainable.

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In the calculations quoted, it has been assumed that the coils are lossless (unloaded Q infinite). It is also assumed that the losses of the antenna plus ground system are negligible. This would be true for a vertical wire above a perfectly conducting ground plane, but impedance measurements should be made on typical antenna-plus-ground systems before receivers are designed. It is further assumed that the stray capacitance of the coil is zero.

In the case of a short vertical antenna of length h above ground, the antenna capacitance C provides the chief component of impedance. Let R be the effective load resistance in series with the antenna. Then, with Q as given by (1):

$$R = \frac{1}{\omega C Q} = \frac{3,000}{\pi f^2 C} = \frac{\lambda^2}{3 \times 10^{13} \pi C} \quad (2)$$

where λ is the wavelength in meters.

The voltage V induced in the antenna is

$$V = E h / 2, \quad (3)$$

where E is the field strength in volts/meter and h is the antenna length in meters.

If R is entirely due to the useful load (coil and other losses neglected), then the power P into the load is

$$P = \frac{V^2}{R} = \left(\frac{Eh}{2} \right)^2 \frac{3 \times 10^{13} \pi C}{\lambda^2} \quad (4)$$

Whence

$$E = \frac{\lambda}{h} \frac{(4P)^{1/2}}{(3 \times 10^{13} \pi C)} \quad (5)$$

The antenna capacitance in farads is given by

$$C = \frac{2\pi\epsilon h}{\ln(2h/a)} \quad \text{farads,} \quad (6)$$

$$\epsilon = 8.85 \times 10^{-12}$$

Here a is the radius of the wire. In the results quoted earlier, it was assumed that

$$\begin{aligned} P &= 10^{-7} \text{ watts} \\ h &= 10 \text{ meters} \\ a &= 0.016 \text{ inches or } 4 \times 10^{-4} \text{ meters (20-gauge wire).} \end{aligned}$$

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In the case of a loop antenna S meters square and $s/10$ meters wide, having n turns, the inductance is approximately

$$L = 2 \times 10^{-6} S n^2 \text{ henries.}$$

If Q is to be given by (1), the effective load impedance R should be

$$R = \frac{\omega L}{Q} = 12 \times 10^3 \pi L \quad (7)$$

The induced voltage V is

$$V = \frac{2\pi S^2 n}{\lambda} E. \quad (8)$$

Neglecting losses, the power will be


$$P = \frac{V^2}{R} = \frac{10^3 \pi S^3 E^2}{6\lambda^2} \quad (9)$$

or

$$E = \frac{\lambda}{S^{3/2}} \frac{(\delta P)^{1/2}}{(\pi \times 10^3)} \quad (10)$$

3. Cautions about the Design of Crystal Receivers

The basic circuit assumed for a crystal receiver is that shown below.



The coil and the antenna capacitance should resonate at the operating frequency. The tap on the coil should be adjusted to give the desired loaded Q (for 6000 cycles radiofrequency bandwidth; see Eq. 1).


A given crystal at a given power level operates most efficiently into a particular load impedance. For the crystals tested, this best load impedance ranged

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from a few thousand ohms to a few tens of thousands of ohms. Even with the best load impedance, some crystals are better than others. Thus it is important to choose (a) a good crystal (b) a crystal whose optimum load impedance is near the audiofrequency impedance (not the d-c resistance) of the headphone used.

The equivalent radiofrequency circuit of the crystal receiver is shown below.



At a given frequency, the loaded Q is fixed by Eq. (1). For a given antenna, V and C_a are fixed. It is assumed that the inductance L is adjusted to give resonance, and the load resistance R is adjusted to give the required loaded Q .

The power P into the resistance R is

$$P = \frac{V^2}{R(1 + R_L/R)^2 (1 + C_L/C_a)^2} \quad (11)$$

Now the loaded Q is

$$Q = \frac{1}{\omega(C_a + C_L)(R + R_L)}$$

$$Q = \frac{1}{\omega C_a R(1 + C_L/C_a)(1 + R_L/R)} \quad (12)$$

Thus, we can eliminate (R) from Eq. (11) by using Eq. (12) and obtain

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$$P = \frac{V^2 \omega C_a Q}{(1 + R_L/R)(1 + C_L/C_a)} \quad (13)$$

If we let Q be the loaded Q and Q_0 be the unloaded Q of the coil, then

$$P = \frac{V^2 \omega C_a Q(1 - Q/Q_0)}{(1 + C_L/C_a)} \quad (14)$$

We see that to get the most power under the given conditions (V , ω , C_a and Q constants), we want

(a) a low coil loss: $R_L \ll R$, $Q_0 \gg Q$;

(b) a low added capacitance, stray or otherwise, across the inductance.

This indicates the desirability of permeability tuning rather than condenser tuning.

The term $(1 - Q/Q_0)$ in the numerator of Eq. (14) may give a false impression. It has been assumed that the loaded Q is adjusted to a value that gives a particular bandwidth given by Eq. (1). If Q_0 is equal to this assigned Q ($Q = Q_0$), then no useful load can be added and P as given by Eq. (14) is zero.

If, on the other-hand, we start with a coil of a given unloaded Q , Q_0 , and adjust the loaded Q so as to obtain maximum output, we find from Eq. (14) that we should make

$$Q = -\frac{Q_0}{2} \quad (15)$$

and, in this case, Eq. (14) gives

$$P = \frac{V^2 \omega C_a Q_0}{4(1 + C_L/C_a)} \quad (16)$$

In this case, however, we accept a radiofrequency bandwidth equal to $2f/Q_0$.

The above calculations have been made by assuming an antenna Q much higher than the loaded Q given by Eq. (1). Short antennas of the lengths considered, made of copper wire and above a perfectly conducting ground, would have a sufficiently high Q so that antenna resistance could be neglected. However, it seems very desirable to make impedance measurements on the sort of antenna-plus-ground systems that a listener might actually have before designing a crystal receiver. The effect of antenna loss can be evaluated by letting Q_0 in Eqs. (14), (15), or (16) be the unloaded Q of the antenna plus the coil.

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Annex 22

BROADBAND TRANSOCEANIC COMMUNICATION

1. Introduction

It is doubtful whether, at any instant during favorable ionospheric conditions, the total spectrum space available and usable between North America and Europe, taken together with low-frequency channels and cable facilities, greatly exceeds one megacycle each way. This estimate, though rough, is intended to include all United States use, government and private, as well as Canadian and Mexican. The North Atlantic communication path is of enormous importance to national security, and its development and use to date represent an enormous investment in money and manpower and require constant maintenance efforts of many kinds, besides the purely equipmental. The North Atlantic is, nevertheless, a rather unsatisfactory communications path, not merely because of the severe disturbances to which it is subject (see Annex 19), but because of interference problems, and the general spectrum crowding that makes any significant expansion of facilities almost out of the question.

The advent of new policy in the U.S.S.R. and the available evidence on the rapidly growing and skillfully developing jamming effort there bring with them new and sinister threats to such of our national security as is dependent upon good communications across the North Atlantic in time of war. It seems fairly certain that our high-frequency communications to Europe will, in the event of open hostilities, be subjected to an all-but-obliterating jamming effort. We might well find ourselves listening, helpless to make intelligible reply, to the cries of Europe being engulfed. The North Atlantic communications may be thought of as the Achilles tendon of organized Western power.

This prospect, described above in perhaps unduly dramatic but not unrealistic terms, has led to much thought and several quite specific proposals for the establishment of new and much less vulnerable (to jamming, at any rate) means of transatlantic and transoceanic communications. For the most part, the proposals that follow (and cost is likely to be the least difficulty if any can be implemented), have another advantage besides restoring some security to our communications: they make it possible to consider releasing a number of high-frequency channels, now in heavy transatlantic use, for other indispensable uses, including, it would be hoped, Voice of America broadcasts.

2. Cables

The construction of broadband submarine cables with repeaters included is now a very real possibility. Indeed, such a cable already exists for the relatively short distance from Miami to Havana. Very high-level policy decisions would probably be required to bring such a cable or set of cables into being in the next two or three years, but one hundred million dollars - not a large item in terms of the

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national budget - should probably buy us a very respectable and useful cable or two. This matter will not be further discussed now in view of the special vulnerability of cable and in view of some other and more attractive possibilities.

3. Relay Systems

Study of the map of the North Atlantic shows that any broadband communications capable of reaching three hundred miles in one jump can reach the United Kingdom (see dashed line in Fig. 1) via the Arctic. The investment in equipment and bases would be fairly heavy, and, in the event of the loss of the British Isles, would leave no means of communication with, say, North Africa. On the other hand, an ideal relay system would seem to be one that could bridge gaps of 1000 to 12000 miles in one hop. In the latter case (see solid line in Fig. 1) much more satisfactory relay stages can be found to the United Kingdom, and in addition it seems probable that the South Atlantic could be bridged and communications brought toward Europe either via the African continent, or the offlying islands. Should such an ideal system be capable of shipboard operation, it should, with probably at most two ships, be possible to bridge the Pacific. For sure and uninterfered-with broadband operation, it is a requisite that operation be on frequencies not in and probably well above the conventional high-frequency band.

4. Ground-Wave Relay

Before breaking ground in new fields, it was thought advisable to give some thought to the possibility of overwater relaying utilizing the very favorable ground-wave propagation characteristics of salt water. A carefully considered proposal for a 3-megacycle, 700-mile relay has been drawn up at the request of this Project by H. Friis of the Bell Telephone Laboratories, and is attached as Appendix 1 to this Annex.

The system considered by Friis is sufficiently conventional to leave little doubt as to its feasibility, particularly for voice channels. Despite very careful antenna design it may nevertheless be expected to involve serious problems in connection with conventional high-speed telegraphy, since it is almost certain that sky wave at night cannot be completely eliminated. Furthermore, the system will not be very secure and may not offer much protection against jamming, particularly by night. It will undoubtedly cause much interference at night. The most formidable obstacle of all, of course, will be obtaining spectrum space for it. This last difficulty may be regarded as making the proposal academic, unless the United States and other North Atlantic countries can be persuaded to alter drastically their present positions relative to frequency allocations and assignments in this part of the spectrum.

The above comments are not intended to constitute any final evaluation of this proposal, which has, indeed, many attractive features.

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5. Scattering Mechanism Relays - Tropospheric Scattering

From the earliest times, scattering in the lower atmosphere or troposphere has been observed in various forms in the case of electromagnetic waves in the visible-light region of the spectrum. As a mechanism for the transmission of energy, scattering is exceedingly inefficient. It may nevertheless provide, in the case of radio waves, the only means of communication under certain conditions. The key to the exploitation of the scatter mechanism for communication lies in the availability of very great transmitter power.

The anomalies of very-high-frequency and microwave propagation were subjected to intensive study during World War II. For the most part, these studies, utilizing transmissions of relatively low power, were concerned with the spatial distribution of field intensity as controlled by the characteristics of the troposphere, with particular reference to matters of range of good reception and ranges of radar sets. In other words, these studies were, at heart, studies of classical radio transmission as modified by special meteorological and terrain conditions. It was only in a few cases toward the end of the war that signals were observed at sufficient ranges, and with characteristics that suggested that the scatter mechanism was playing a part.

Booker and Gordon* have provided a highly significant theory based on the existence of turbulence in the troposphere to account for the observational material at their disposal. Still more recently, Megaw** has reviewed the subject in a rather general fashion, though less satisfactorily and less concretely as to detail for the proposals that follow.

The success at observing what are now interpreted as scatter signals on a wavelength of 9 cm at a distance of about 175 miles in the Caribbean by Katzin and his co-workers, and certain other observational material, leads to the recommendation that, with the Booker and Gordon theory as a guide in planning experimentation, a program be set up to develop a broadband communications system utilizing turbulent scattering in the troposphere. It should be the objective of this program to arrive at a system capable of giving the maximum possible reliable ranges under specific terrain and meteorological circumstances. By further development of high-power sources, it is believed that ranges of the order of 300 miles can be attained before the scattering volume reaches too great a height. The program would have two parts: (a) an initial propagation observational program using the most powerful obtainable sources (further development of sources will certainly be required), followed by (b) development of an over-all system comprising the broadband terminal equipment, the antennas, and primary power sources, and paying special attention to the techniques for transmitting intelligence.

*"A Theory of Radio Scattering in the Troposphere," Proc. I.R.E., 38, pp. 401-412, April 1950.

**"Scattering of Electromagnetic Waves by Atmospheric Turbulence," Nature, 166, pp. 1100-1104, 30 December 1950.

It is thought that the spectrum between about 300 and 3000 megacycles per second ought specially to be studied for its suitability for this proposal.

6. Scattering Mechanism Relays - Ionospheric (E-layer) Scattering

Ionospheric scattering from the E-layer has been intensively studied on wavelengths in the conventional high-frequency band by Eckersley,* who used existing commercial short-wave transmitters as his sources. It has been customary to regard ionospheric scattering (one of the principal causes for the continued reception of powerful stations after they have passed into the skip zone for the receiving location) as a troublesome phenomenon. For one thing, the intensity of scattered signals is always very weak compared to regularly reflected signals (for which terminal equipment is designed); when (rarely) they are strong enough to seem useful, they exhibit multipath characteristics that render them worthless for high-speed telegraphy.

The essence of the proposal that follows is to attempt, by choosing frequencies on which regular ionospheric transmission is very seldom possible, to utilize E-layer scattering as a means of communication. It appears that frequencies much below about 40 megacycles per second will be unsuitable owing to their regular layer-reflection possibilities -- both by sporadic E- and by regular F2-layer. On the other hand, the efficiency of the scatter mechanism as measured by intensities of scattered signals is known to decrease rapidly with increasing frequency. Eckersley has suggested that the intensity should vary inversely as the fourth power of the frequency.

In July 1950, Booker, in a paper presented at a symposium held at the Pennsylvania State College, applied some of the ideas contained in his work on turbulent scattering in the troposphere to the problems of the E-layer, and in particular to the very unmanageable problems of sporadic E. It was decided therefore to invite Booker to visit Project TROY as a consultant on the problem of utilizing the E-layer at very high frequency as a means for communication. An appendix to this Annex (Appendix 2) contains the results of this consultation, both in a general form, and as an analysis of the possibilities of establishing a 1000-mile communication path via the E-layer scatter on 50 megacycles per second with a transmitter of one megawatt and utilizing a one-megacycle-per-second band. High-gain antennas are assumed at each terminal. Although cosmic noise would undoubtedly limit a system of this kind -- rather than thermal noise, as is assumed in the calculations -- there seems every reason according to the theory, and with the assumptions made, to suppose that a relay system utilizing E-layer scatter has real possibilities. It should be pointed out that frequency modulation and television transmissions at present cannot be expected to be observed by E-layer scatter because of their relatively low powers and inefficient antennas (for point-to-point operation).

*Analysis of the Effect of Scattering in Radio Transmission," Journal of the I.E.E., 86, pp. 542-567, June 1940.

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Unlike the troposphere, whose maximum useful height can scarcely be more than three or four miles, the height from which E-layer scatter takes place is in the vicinity of 60 to 65 miles. This means that a common scattering volume can be found for a transmitter and receiver separated by as much as 1000 to 1200 miles. Such a relay distance is enormously more valuable than the 300 miles or so believed maximum for the tropospheric scattering proposal. Indeed, not only can the North Atlantic be crossed with ease (in several ways via the Arctic), but crossing the South Atlantic is also within the realms of possibility.

It is believed that frequencies between about 40 and about 100 megacycles per second are the most suitable for utilization of E-layer scatter. Since essentially forward scatter is required, it is further believed, owing to the rapid increase of the scattering angle involved for communications over shorter distances, that this system should be most useful for relaying over distances from 600 to 1200 miles. By using antenna directivities which are particularly sharp azimuthally, scattering from points well to the side of the great circle connecting the transmitter and receiver, and having serious multipath delay possibilities, can be avoided.

Postscript

Project TROY considered the proposal to utilize E-layer scatter at very high frequency as a means of establishing broadband transoceanic relaying of such potential importance (high capacity, reliability, immunity to jamming) that it initiated a "rush program" to test the proposal experimentally. Haste was particularly necessary as it was suspected that there might be a fairly strong seasonal effect which would result in poorest signals during the winter nights. Failing to get some results during the winter of 1950-1951 might necessitate waiting till the following winter to obtain critical observational data.


A week of somewhat interrupted operation was obtained before the end of January 1951, during which time the signals never failed during transmission, not even during one fairly intense SID (Dellinger-type fadeout). Transmission was on continuous wave with 40 kilowatts at 50 megacycles per second. Very large rhombic antennas of special design were used at both terminals. The transmission path was just under 800 miles in length with transmission from Cedar Rapids, Iowa (by the Collins Radio Company) and reception at Sterling, Virginia (by the Central Radio Propagation Laboratory of the National Bureau of Standards). The receiver was designed to have a low noise figure and receive in a band of 100 cycles per second, but the signals were so strong and relatively steady (except for meteor whistles and fading) that a nominal 3-kilocycles-per-second band was used throughout for the recording program.

It must be emphasized that these experimental results are of a highly preliminary nature. Observations through an intense magnetic storm have not yet been made, though it is to be hoped that an ionospheric storm will not seriously affect the communications. It has not yet been conclusively shown that the steady component of the signal heard is, in fact, received by E-layer scatter, though this seems fairly likely, and should soon be established. Experiments with modulation have not yet been initiated.

D.K. Bailey

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Fig. 1



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ANNEX TWENTY-TWO

APPENDIX I

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Appendix 1

(Annex 22)

A MEDIUM-WAVE TRANSATLANTIC CIRCUIT

A three-link transatlantic radio repeater system from Labrador to Greenland to Iceland to Scotland is analyzed in this memorandum. Each link in this path is about 700 miles in length, and most of the stations are located near the Arctic Circle where static from local thunderstorms may be neglected. It is assumed that a 3 ± 0.35 megacycles per second frequency band is or can be made available for the system. This band is wide enough to accommodate 80 two-way speech channels; it is below the "short-wave" frequencies used for long-distance transmission via F-layers, and it is above the 2 Mc band used for the North Atlantic Loran system.

The power required is calculated on the basis of ground-wave transmission over sea water. At this frequency, sky-wave transmission is not usually present during daylight hours. This means only ground-wave signals and local noise will be received. At night, sky-wave propagation occurs, which brings in noise from distant sources and at the same time much stronger signals. The analysis indicates that repeaters with one-kilowatt transmitters and 15-db gain antennas should give excellent ground-wave transmission in the daytime.

Attenuation per Link (MKS)

The attenuation between two isotropic antennas in free space is

$$F.A. = 10 \log_{10} \frac{d^2 \lambda^2}{A^2} = 10 \log_{10} \frac{d^2 \lambda^2}{(\lambda^2 / 4\pi)^2} = 10 \log_{10} \frac{d^2}{\lambda^2} + 22 \text{ db.}$$

For the distance $d = 1.12 \times 10^6$ meters (700 miles) and the wavelength $\lambda = 100$ meters (3 Mc), $F.A. = 103 \text{ db.}$

A perfect plane conductor through the centers of the isotropic antennas does not change the fields, e.e., the attenuation between isotropic antennas bisected by a perfectly conducting plane ground is still $F.A. = 103 \text{ db.}$

For an imperfect ground, the increase in attenuation is

$$10 \log_{10} \left[\frac{2 + p + 0.6p^2}{2 + 0.3p} \right]^2 \text{ db, } \lambda \gg 3 \text{ m (sea water), where } p = \frac{2\pi d}{120\lambda^2 g}.$$

For sea water, the conductivity g is 4 and $p = 0.0131 d/\lambda^2$.

For $d = 1.12 \times 10^6$ and $\lambda = 100$, $W.A. = 6 \text{ db.}$

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The increase in attenuation caused by a curvature of radius a of the ground is

$$S.A. = 6.08 \chi \cdot 10 \log_{10} 2.405 \chi \text{ db.}$$

where

$$\chi = \left(\frac{2\pi a}{\lambda} \right)^{1/3} \frac{d}{a}.$$

For a = 4/3 times the radius of the earth,

$$\chi = 4.43 \times 10^{-5} \frac{d}{1/3}.$$

For d = 1.12×10^6 and $\lambda = 100$,

$$S.A. = 51 \text{ db.}$$

The total attenuation is then

$$F.A. + W.A. + S.A. = 103 + 6 + 51 = 160 \text{ db.}$$

Signal Output

We will assume 15-db gain antennas and a transmitted power of 100 watts per channel. The output power of the receiving antenna is then

$$20 + (2 \times 15) - 160 = -110 \text{ dbw.}$$

Noise Output

The noise output of the receiving antenna may be obtained approximately from curves given in "Ionospheric Radio Propagation" (NBS Circular 462). Figures 8.1 to 8.4 show that our paths are located in noise zone "1-1/2". Figures 8.5 to 8.10 give the following values for the required field intensity, $\mathcal{E}$ in db above $\mu\text{V/m}$ to give a signal-to-noise power ratio of 15 db in a 6000-cycle radiofrequency band, or 18 db in a 3000-cycle band when the receiver is connected to a non-directional antenna.

Local Time:						
$\mathcal{E}$ (db above $\mu\text{V/m}$):	0400	0800	1200	1600	2000	2400
Winter	+19	-17	-26	-10	+24	+23
Summer	-4	-22	-26	-17	+3	+16

For a signal field of $\mu\text{V/m}$, the power flow is

$$\frac{(1 \times 10^{-6})^2}{120\pi} \text{ watts/meter}^2,$$

and at 3 Mc ($\lambda = 100$), the output power of a bisected dipole antenna over perfect ground is

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$$\frac{(1 \times 10^{-6})^2}{120\pi} A_{\text{eff}} = \frac{(1 \times 10^{-6})^2}{120\pi} \frac{\lambda^2}{16} = 1.66 \times 10^{-12} \text{ watts} = -118 \text{ dbw}.$$

The noise output of a small nondirectional antenna located in zone "1-1/2" is, therefore, for a 3000-cycle band,

$$(\xi - 118 - 18) \text{ dbw}.$$

It is assumed that our high (15 db) gain antennas will have about the same output noise, i.e., we have not allowed for noise reduction by antenna pattern discrimination for any of the receiving antennas in the system. Since the received signal power is -110 dbw, we expect for one link a signal-to-noise ratio of

$$S/N = -110 - (\xi - 118 - 18) = 26 - \xi \text{ db},$$

where ξ is read out of the table above. The table below lists the values of the signal to noise ratio to be expected at various times and seasons.

Local Time:						
(S/N (db))	0400	0800	1200	1600	2000	2400
Winter	7	43	52	36	2	3
Summer	30	48	52	43	23	10

A three-link circuit would reduce the S/N values 4.8 db.

The high noise and low ground-wave signal-to-noise ratios at night are due to noise from distant sources arriving via sky waves. When sky waves are active, large signals will also be received, probably via E-layer sky waves. This is indicated by the curves of Fig. 5.1 on page 121, MIT Radiation Laboratories Series book on Loran. This figure shows the measured one-hop E sky-wave field about 6 db below the free-space field at 700 miles for a frequency of 2 Mc. Since the ground-wave signal-to-noise ratios given above are based on a received field 57 db below free space, it is apparent that one-hop E-layer sky waves considerably lower than the measured values for 2 Mc will provide satisfactory telephone circuits. Further studies of Loran experience with respect to noise level and sky-wave transmission should yield more exact information on these points.

Total Power Required for 80 Speech Channels

Curve A in Fig. 7, p. 638 of Holbrook and Dixon's paper "Load Rating Theory for Multi-Channel Amplifiers" (B.S.T.J., Oct. 1939) indicates that a one-kilowatt amplifier is required to handle eighty 100-watt speech channels.

15-db Gain Antennas

A detailed study of the antennas has not been made. An array of some 20 one-quarter wavelength high (80 feet) insulated towers fed with coaxial lines may be the

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solution. The 2 λ inverted V antennas also look attractive (require 400-foot masts). It may be preferable to design the receiving antennas for higher gains than the transmitting antennas because of transmission-line losses. In order to get the assumed total of 30-db antenna gain, some type of multi-unit array will probably be required at this frequency. The units may be arranged in line to obtain vertical directivity, or broadside to obtain horizontal directivity. This flexibility will permit optimum arrangement at each station; changing the directivity to suit transmission conditions may also be possible.

The one-hop E sky wave will arrive at an elevation of about 7.5° , while the two-hop E reflection will arrive at an elevation of about 21° at a distance of 700 miles. Any F-layer reflections will arrive at still higher angles. The relative delay of the one-hop E and ground wave is 0.1 millisecond or less, so that serious selective fading in the audio band is not anticipated from these two waves even during transition periods when the field strengths are comparable. The two-hop E-layer ground wave is delayed about 0.26 millisecond with respect to the ground wave, and this wave together with the F-layer waves could cause selective fading when comparable with the ground wave or the one-hop E wave. These disturbing waves can be substantially reduced by antenna directivity.

Note on S.F. Improvement

Around midnight when traffic is expected to be light, several of the 3000-cycle channels may be used for one speech circuit to improve the signal-to-noise ratio. If multipath interference occurs, diversity improvement can be obtained in this way.

Note on Frequency Plan

The frequency plan used in microwave relay systems can be applied to the proposed circuit. In this plan, the available frequency band is divided into two sub-bands, f_1 and f_2 . A repeater station is arranged so that it receives from both east and west on one frequency and transmits both east and west on the other frequency. There is no danger of overreach with the ground wave. The angles between the repeaters on the proposed route are such that antenna directivity in the horizontal plane will be effective against unwanted E- and F-layer reflections.

January 9, 1951

H. T. Friis
D. H. Ring

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APPENDIX 2

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Appendix 2

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FORMULAS FOR E-LAYER SCATTERING

We start from the formula for the scattering cross section per unit volume, of an inhomogeneous dielectric, given by Booker and Gordon.*

$$\sigma = \frac{\left(\frac{\Delta\epsilon}{\epsilon}\right)^2 \left(\frac{2\pi\ell}{\lambda}\right)^3 \sin^2\chi}{\lambda \left[1 + \left\{\frac{4\pi\ell}{\lambda} \sin \frac{\theta}{2}\right\}^2\right]^2}$$

where

- σ = cross section, per unit volume, for scattering into unit solid angle in direction θ with direction of propagation;
 ℓ = "scale" of turbulence;
 $\sin^2\chi$ = polarization factor, henceforth ignored;
 $\left(\frac{\Delta\epsilon}{\epsilon}\right)^2$ = mean square variation in dielectric constant.

We are interested (we think) in the case

$$\frac{4\pi\ell \sin \theta/2}{\lambda} \gg 1$$

for which the formula becomes

$$\sigma = \left(\frac{\Delta\epsilon}{\epsilon}\right)^2 \frac{1}{32\pi\ell \sin^4(\theta/2)}$$


For frequencies much higher than the critical frequency for the layer, $\epsilon - 1 \ll 1$,

and

$$\left(\frac{\Delta\epsilon}{\epsilon}\right)^2 = \left(\frac{\lambda}{\lambda_c}\right)^4 \left(\frac{\Delta N}{N}\right)^2$$

where λ_c is the vertical-incidence critical wavelength, and $\Delta N/N$ is the fractional variation in ion density from the average.

Hence



* Proc., I.R.E., 38, 404 (1950)


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If P_t is the total power in the transmitter beam passing at angle $\theta/2$ through a slab of thickness b , the scattered power is $\frac{P_t \sigma b}{\sin(\theta/2)}$

per unit solid angle. (Remember that σ is cross section per unit volume.) In the direction $\theta/2$, therefore, the scattering power per unit solid angle,

$$P = \left(\frac{\lambda}{\lambda_c}\right)^4 \left(\frac{\Delta N}{N}\right)^2 \frac{b}{32\pi \ell \sin^5(\theta/2)} P_t.$$

We now apply the formula to a transmission path of 1000 miles length, with scattering at the midpoint in a layer of vertical thickness b . Transmitting and receiving antennas are assumed similar; each has an effective area A , or a gain $G = 4\pi A/\lambda^2$ relative to an isotropic radiator.



The ratio of received to transmitter power

$$\frac{P_r}{P_t} = \left(\frac{\lambda}{\lambda_c}\right)^4 \left(\frac{\Delta N}{N}\right)^2 \left(\frac{Ab}{D^2 \ell}\right) \frac{1}{8\pi \sin^5(\theta/2)}$$

If we assume, for example

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} A = 100 \text{ sq. meters} \\ \lambda = 6 \text{ meters} \\ b = 5000 \text{ meters,} \\ \lambda_c = 200 \text{ meters,} \\ \ell = 100 \text{ meters,} \end{array} \right\} \quad G = 33, \text{ or } \sim 15 \text{ db,}$$

$$\left(\frac{\Delta N}{N}\right)^2 = 10^{-4},$$

then

$$P_r/P_t = 4 \times 10^{-17}, \text{ or } -164 \text{ db.}$$

With 10^6 watts transmitted power, $P_r = 4 \times 10^{-11}$ watts, which is 40 db above $kT\Delta f$ for a one-megacycle band. (The field strength at the receiving antenna is about 12 microvolts per meter.)

E. M. Purcell

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Annex 23

THE APPLICATION OF FREQUENCY MODULATION TECHNIQUES

I. Introduction

One of the most serious handicaps that confronts the Voice of America operators is the poor quality of transmission normally provided by the transatlantic relay. Experience indicates the effect of multipath selective fading will cause serious distortion of the message quality a sufficient percentage of the total transmission time to make scheduling of programs requiring high fidelity - i.e., music or dramatic programs extremely risky. In fact, it appears to us that the ionosphere often garbles up the relayed program more than does the Russian jamming.

Improvements in the existing relay equipment such as single sideband operation, better receiving antennas, diversity reception, etc. would undoubtedly make a substantial improvement in the service. The Facilities Branch of the International Broadcasting Division is undertaking a program of development directed towards making these changes in the relay facility. However, even after the equipment has been modernized, continuing difficulty, resulting from selective fading, will be encountered. The utilization of frequency modulation in conjunction with diversity reception and special receivers offers promise of greatly improving the fidelity of the relay. The same technique can be employed to minimize the effect of multipath transmission on the performance of the relay system discussed elsewhere in this Report.

II. The Problem

Most of the distortion encountered in an ionospherically propagated radio signal occurs because of the existence of several transmission paths. Since the time of transmission for each of the several paths is different - and, in fact, varying - the received signal varies greatly in amplitude as the relative phases between the signals vary with time, thereby introducing noise and distortion. If it were possible to select only one of these signals, the situation would be greatly improved. This is what one attempts to do with diversity reception. If the signal is frequency-modulated instead of amplitude-modulated, some additional tricks are possible.

It is well known that wideband frequency modulation is able to discriminate against common-channel interference, provided only that the desired signal has a somewhat greater amplitude than does the interference. In a sense, the signals from the undesired paths constitute common-channel interference, and we should expect to be able to treat them by the same methods as those with which we treat common-channel interference.

Actually, there are some differences between the two situations; in particular, the multipath signals carry the same audio signal so that distortion, rather than conventional interference, results.

Conventional FM receivers require a signal-to-interference ratio of approximately six db to provide proper interference rejection. Since the two path signals may often differ by much less than this amount (a voltage ratio of two to one), it is clear that no real advantage can be obtained if better receivers cannot be made. An analytical analysis by L. B. Arquimbau⁺ has shown that this commonly stated limitation

⁺ See Research Laboratory of Electronics, M.I.T., Quarterly Progress Reports (July 1947 to date); L. B. Arquimbau and John Grandlund, "The Possibility of Transatlantic Communication by Means of Frequency Modulation", Proc. NEC, Chicago (November, 1947); and L. B. Arquimbau and John Grandlund, "Sky-Wave FM Receiver", Electronics, (December, 1949).

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need not hold and that, in fact, in theory the ratio of desired-to-undesired signal which the receiver can discriminate can be made very close to unity by proper receiver design. A laboratory receiver capable of operating with a 0.5 db amplitude ratio has been designed and tested on a 20-megacycle transatlantic circuit. It should be noted that under certain conditions, when more than two paths exist, no individual signal will be larger than the sum of the other signals. When this happens, disturbances of the audio signal occur. Special equipment is now being built to overcome this difficulty.

III. Transatlantic Frequency Modulation Performance

During the winter of 1949-1950, a broadband FM circuit was operated between New York City and London, England. The transmitter operated at a frequency of 2 megacycles and employed a deviation of ± 75 kilocycles. At times, a narrowed deviation was employed. Three types of modulating signals were used: voice, radio waves, and music.

Generally, the reception fell into one of two categories: good or bad; that is, the information was faithfully received, or it was inextinguishably bad. When it was good, one signal predominated over the others, and the transmission compared favorably with local broadcasting. During the bad periods, no one path controlled, and intense noise resulted.

The results of these tests may be summed up as follows:

- (1) 20% of the transmissions were essentially perfect;
- (2) 70% of the transmissions were good enough for rebroadcasting but somewhat noisy;
- (3) 10% were intelligible but suitable for rebroadcast only under emergency conditions.

Preliminary narrowband tests indicate that the deviation can be reduced considerably, and further testing with ± 5 kc deviation will be undertaken.

IV. Current Research Program

A new receiver which should function well even when one path does not predominate has been completed. This will be tested this winter (1950-1951), together with a compressor-expander circuit which should improve the over-all signal-to-noise ratio. Because of the real estate problem involved, diversity reception has not been employed during these tests. However, it would be desirable to include this feature in an operational system. If the present tests are hopeful, the existing circuit can be made available to the International Broadcasting Division for a short period of time.

V. Application of FM to the Voice of America Relay Problem

If the current narrowband experiments are successful, it should be possible to convert the present Voice of America relay transmitters for FM operation. The system described above places rather severe amplitude response requirements upon the transmitter output circuits, the transmitting antenna, and the receiving antenna; but it is probably possible to meet these requirements by means of the proper modifications of the existing equipment. New FM receivers will be required for this operation, as will expanders and compressors. These units are all small, and their procurement should not be difficult.

This technique will have limited value if it is determined that wideband operation is necessary for satisfactory results since it is unlikely that many 200-kilocycle-wide channels can be obtained. Possibly one such circuit might be justified. The wideband feature will not be so serious a restriction on the relay system discussed elsewhere

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Chapter II

Annex 24

RADIO INTELLIGENCE


Introduction

One of the serious handicaps that has confronted the Facilities Branch of the International Broadcasting Division throughout its effort to counter the Russian jamming -- and one that has handicapped Project TROY considerably in its attempt to evaluate the magnitude and potential of the Russian jamming effort -- has been the almost complete lack of data on the Russian jamming system: its magnitude, its flexibility, its rate of growth, etc. Such information as exists about the Russian jamming network has been deduced from monitoring operations carried out by the British, and the few direction-finding tests made by the United States Navy and the Voice of America staff. The lack of adequate information is probably more serious when we attempt to plan future operations, with no good knowledge of the number of Russian jamming transmitters, their frequency range, the rate at which they are increasing, whether they are primarily jamming transmitters or transmitters that would be used for other purposes in the eventuality of a crisis, etc. We can only stand on the outside and listen to them, try to draw them out by maneuvering our own transmitters, and guess what they are. This is serious, not only because it makes planning for the Voice of America operation difficult, but also because we do not have the data necessary to judge how completely this same jamming network could interfere with our international communications should the Russians choose to use it for this purpose.

 Data obtained by listening, direction-finding, etc., will obviously make a minor contribution to settlement of these questions. Nonetheless, in the absence of real intelligence data, listening and direction-finding data are all that we have. We should make a more determined effort to plot the location of their stations, characteristics of their emissions, etc. The ordinary direction-finding equipment normally used in these operations has certain serious limitations when it is employed for monitoring jamming; an alternate system is described in the next section. When it is realized that a good direction-finding network will cost millions of dollars to install and operate, and that it could be rendered unnecessary if we could get the proper amount and kind of direction-finding, we can see that one well-informed source of information -- i.e., one good defector -- literally is worth many millions of dollars.

Direction-Finding

In order to obtain an accurate estimate of the magnitude and character of the Russian jamming effort, it is necessary to have better monitoring and direction-finding data than have existed to date (provided it is not possible to obtain the data by more direct intelligence means, as has been the case up to the present time). Some data have been obtained from signal-monitoring equipments which exist for other purposes. In general, however, the equipment has been poorly located for the present job, is not available continuously enough, and is not really suitable for providing all the information that is necessary. At the present time, the effort is being made to establish a more suitable intelligence network; however, it is being set up with more or less conventional direction-finding equipment, and we do not believe it is capable of providing all the desired information. Certain new techniques appear to have merit for this specialized problem, and these we shall discuss briefly.


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The Russian jamming network that we desire to study is a well-coordinated, dispersed system capable of employing a large number of transmitters at different locations to jam a single high-frequency broadcast transmitter. The jamming transmitters exhibit a variety of modulating signals, noise, tones, shrieks, etc. The presence of a great many jamming transmitters, plus the Voice of America unit, on one frequency has made direction finding against the jammers somewhat difficult. The present technique is to attempt to do the direction finding immediately before our transmitter comes on the air, when the jammers have begun to warm up, or to pull our transmitter off the air suddenly and then to direction-find and count the jammers before they have had a chance to shut down. It would be desirable to be able to investigate the location of the jamming transmitters and their signal characteristics during broadcast. A combination of direction-finding technique known as inverse Loran and crosscorrelating techniques can be employed to do this if the number of jammers is not too large. The principle of inverse Loran is a method which can be used for the location of non-cooperating transmissions. Here one applies essentially the principles of acoustic ranging to electromagnetic radiation. An understanding of the principle involved can be gained if we assume for the moment that we are trying to obtain the location of just a single transmitter and that in addition the transmitter is sending out very-short pulses. If the pulse rate is slow and if by means of very accurate clocks it is possible to measure the time of arrival of the transmitted pulses at three or more receiving locations, a set of interesting hyperbolas can be obtained, from which the location of the transmitter may be determined. If, instead of sending pulses, the transmitter broadcasts continuous program information, the relative times of arrival may be measured by means of a cross-correlating device. Furthermore, if several transmitters are operating on the same frequency, the crosscorrelation output data will provide the generating information for a large number of hyperbolas. Intersections of pairs of these will determine locations of the individual transmitters. It is possible with such a system that a certain amount of confusing data and ambiguous information will result. Additional receiving points will allow this to be resolved -- by requiring higher-order intersections for the establishment of a location. In addition to providing the position information, the recorded data necessary to provide crosscorrelation information will be useful in the spectrum analysis of the signal.

A careful investigation of the ionospheric propagation conditions that normally prevail, indicates that this technique should allow location precision of the order of 20 miles and distances of 1000 to 1500 miles, and greater errors at longer ranges. This should be compared with the normal 50- to 100 mile-error generally obtained with conventional direction-finding equipment.

In order to operate such a system, it is necessary to provide accurate time clocks or timing signals and a wide-band recording system (25 kc). The most serious technical problem is presented by the requirement of high-precision time standards for the various stations. However, since the rate of flow of information for this is small, it should be possible to meet the requirement. It has been suggested that signals from WWV or some other standard broadcast be received and used for stabilizing the time source. An alternate method of providing synchronization would require the transmission of synchronizing pulses between each of the fixing stations. This method is a fundamentally simpler conception, but provides a system that would be more difficult to operate. In addition to the development of the precise quality referred to above, it will be necessary to develop a stable magnetic or photographic recording equipment on which to record the timing signal and the transmissions to be analyzed. As indicated above, an audio bandwidth between 10 and 25 kc would be necessary, depending on precision of fix desired and the amount of modulation information one would want to obtain.

The operating procedure would be as follows. By pre-arrangement the signals to be studied would be received at the various direction-finding locations and recorded simultaneously with the appropriate time markers. The recordings would then be taken to a central location where they would be placed back in synchronism through

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crosscorrelating equipment that would determine the difference in transmission times from each of the various jamming transmitters to the various receiving locations. These relative time delays would be used to establish a hyperbolic grid. The number of hyperbolas drawn would depend on the number of stations in the receiving network and the number of transmitters we have investigated. The intersection points of a hyperbolic situation would determine transmitter locations. It could be possible to replace the drawing operation discussed by pre-computed charts similar to those used for SS Loran computation. This would greatly facilitate the determination of fixes.

J. B. Wiesner

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Annex 25

MOON RELAY

1. Introduction

High-frequency radio waves travel in straight lines, more or less. If A and B are two points in the earth, fairly far apart, radiation from A can get to B only by being reflected, somehow, around the intervening bulge of the earth. For frequencies below 30 megacycles/second, roughly (wavelengths greater than 10 meters), the ionosphere provides a useful, if imperfect, reflector (Fig. 1). Waves of higher frequency, and even, under some conditions, of frequencies as low as 10 megacycles/second, pass through the ionosphere without reflection.




Fig. 1

At ultra-high and microwave frequencies especially, (300 Mc/sec and above), the influence of the ionosphere is utterly negligible. One way to circumvent the bulge of the earth, at these frequencies, is to bounce the radiation off the moon.




Fig. 2

If the returning radiation were strong enough to be detected, we could by this means establish communication between any two points within the hemisphere facing the moon. That is, two stations such as A and B can communicate by moon relay for a certain number of hours per day, varying from a maximum of nearly twelve hours per day (yearly average) if A and B are rather close together, to zero if they are antipodally situated.

Two aspects of the international broadcasting problem drew our attention to the moon-reflection scheme: first, the shortcomings of the high-frequency ionospheric circuits upon which we now depend for transmission of programs to our European relay centers; second, the need for new radio methods to reach the interior of the U.S.S.R. This Annex is therefore addressed to two questions:

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(1) Is it now possible to transmit, from one station to another, via the moon, an audio signal of good quality? Such an operation we call moon relay.

(2) Is it feasible to create, by reflection from the moon, a downcoming wave strong enough to be received easily by any ordinary very high frequency or ultra high frequency receiver, using a simple antenna? Such an operation we call moon broadcast.

Moon relay is much easier than moon broadcast, for the receiving station is under our control and we can afford to equip it with elaborate amplifiers and a very large antenna. Moreover, we are free to select the most favorable wavelength for the transmission, whereas it does no good to broadcast on wavelengths that no one in our audience can receive. The analysis outlined in this Annex leads to the conclusion that moon broadcast is not now feasible but that moon relay is feasible. However, in view of certain more attractive possibilities for transoceanic communications that have come to light during our study (see Annex 22) we do not recommend further action on moon relay at this time.

2. Previous Work and Basic Information

Radio echoes from the moon were first demonstrated at the Camp Evans Signal Laboratory in 1946.* What was essentially a rather long-wave radar set (110 megacycles per second) was made to transmit pulses toward the moon and receive and detect the echo at the appropriate delay. Since that time, similar experiments have been performed elsewhere. No microwave pulse echo experiments have been reported although at least one laboratory is equipping itself for such experiments. On the other hand, a number of microwave measurements of the black-body radiation from the moon have been made. These confirm the expected transparency of the earth's atmosphere, including the ionosphere, and tell us, rather indirectly, something about the moon's surface. We do not yet know what fraction of the incident microwave energy the moon would reflect, nor do we know how rough the surface is. The long-wave radar echo experiments indicated (but with considerable uncertainty) that the power reflection coefficient in power is 5 to 10 per cent at that frequency. Reliable information on these points should be available before long.

The proposal to communicate by moon relay is not new. The development of the microwave art during the past war has brought moon relay near enough to feasibility to warrant careful evaluation. The most thorough published study of the problem is an article by Grieg, Metzger, and Waer, Proc. I.R.E. 36, 652 (1948). This article is a good introduction to the subject, and it presents some of the relations in a very convenient graphical form. On one important question,

*Detection of Radio Signals Reflected from the Moon, John H. Dewitt, Jr., and E. K. Stodola, Proc. I.R.E. 37, 229 (1949). -

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a reduction of audio bandwidth by straggling, the treatment of Grieg, Metzger, and Waer is oversimplified and gives quantitatively misleading results. Also, these authors appear not to understand the fluctuation of the sum of random vectors, a problem that is of peculiar importance in moon-relay communication.

The features of the earth-moon system that may be involved in our problem, one way or another, are the following:

Distance from earth to moon	222,000 miles (perigee); 253,000 miles (apogee)
Diameter of moon	2,160 miles
Diameter of earth	7,920 miles
Period of moon's revolution	27.3 days
Maximum relative speed of center of moon and center center of earth	127 miles per hour
Peripheral speed of point in earth's equator	1,020 miles per hour.

Descriptions of a Relay System, and the Problems Involved

It is pretty obvious that the radiation transmitted from station A should be confined to a cone at least as narrow as the moon, if possible, since energy that misses the moon is wasted. This requires a very large antenna, or a very short wavelength, or both. Let us assume for simplicity a paraboloidal reflector of diameter d . Then if most of the radiated energy is to fall on the moon, d/λ must be about 100, or greater. Likewise, the receiving antenna should be large enough to intercept as much of the returning radiation as possible. Having due regard for the Law of Reciprocity, one should not be surprised to find that the diameters of the transmitting and receiving antennas appear in the final formulas, and symmetrically. It will usually be most economical to make the receiving and transmitting antennas equal in size, and we shall assume that this is the case.

It is advantageous to make the beam even narrower than $1/100$ radian for two reasons: (a) the ratio of the power received, P_r , to the power transmitted, P_t , is thereby increased, as we shall see below; and (b) by confining the echoing area to the very "front" of the moon, we reduce the spread in echo times, or straggling, which might otherwise seriously limit the bandwidth of the channel. We are thus led to consider wavelengths of a few centimeters and antennas of dimensions 50 to 100 feet. The antenna must, of course, be kept trained on the center of the moon's disk with an accuracy consistent with the sharpness of the radio beam.

In what follows we shall assume that each of the antennas is a paraboloidal reflector of diameter d , pointed at the center of the moon's disk. A particular gain function is assumed, for each of calculation - one fairly representative, except for minor lobe structure, of what can actually be achieved with a paraboloid of given diameter.

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The transmitter may be frequency- or amplitude-modulated; the receiver will be a microwave superhetrodyne receiver automatically tracked in frequency by well-known techniques. The system is shown in Fig. 3. Whether such a system can be useful turns now on several other questions: (a) what transmitter power is required for adequate signal-to-noise ratio at the receiver? (b) what is the effect of echo straggling? (c) what is the character of the fading due to multiple reflections?

4. Transmission Loss

Let P_t denote the power radiated at the transmitter and P_r the power available at the receiver. To estimate P_r/P_t , we shall have to make some assumptions about the reflection coefficient, and the smoothness of the moon's surface. Now a mineral of ordinary density - indeed, any substance of density greater than 3 gm/cm^3 - can hardly have a dielectric constant less than 4, at microwave frequencies. Corresponding to $\epsilon = 4$, the power reflection coefficient $(\sqrt{\epsilon} - 1)^2 / (\sqrt{\epsilon} + 1)^2$ is $1/9$. If the material on the surface is a loose slurry powder, its effective dielectric constant will be lower; if half the volume is void, the positive dielectric constant is reduced to 0.05. It seems unlikely that the surface layer is as porous as this, and we shall assume a reflective coefficient of 0.07.

It is hardly to be hoped that the moon will behave like a polished spherical reflector for microwaves, although patches here and there may be smooth enough to do so. The most pessimistic assumption we can make is that it is "perfectly" rough in the sense that energy incident on any surface is scattered diffusely and incoherently in all directions. We adopt this assumption with the minor qualification that the scattered energy shall be distributed in direction according to a cosine law (Lambert's Law).

With these assumptions, a simple calculation shows that if the beam is narrow enough to illuminate only the central portion of the moon - the case of most interest - the transmission loss is:

$$\frac{P_r}{P_t} = \frac{0.07 \times 0.69d^2}{4D^2} = 0.75 \times 10^{-20} (d^2/D^2). \quad (1)$$

where d is the antenna diameter in feet and D is the earth-moon distance. The wavelength is involved only implicitly in the assumption that the beam is narrow. Since there are other reasons for wanting the wavelength short, we shall take $\lambda = 3 \text{ cm}$, this being about the shortest wavelength not subject to atmospheric attenuation. If we further assume, for illustration, that $d = 60$ feet, we have $P_r/P_t = 2.7 \times 10^{-17}$. The beam width between half-way points is $4\lambda/\pi d = 4/\pi \times 1/600$ radians $= 0.12^\circ$, equivalent to about one-fourth the moon's diameter.

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It is worth noting that P_r or P_t would be only about 4 times greater if the moon were perfectly smooth. In that case, Eq. (1) has to be replaced by

$$P_r/P_t = \frac{0.07 \times .069d^2}{4D^2} \frac{\pi dR^2}{4\lambda D} \quad (2)$$

The factor by which Eq. (2) differs from Eq. (1) is just the square of the ratio of the moon's radius to the width of the beam at the moon. Thus for beams comparable to the moon in width, the total power reaching the receiver is about the same for a perfectly rough and a perfectly smooth moon, and it cannot be much different for an intermediate condition. The character of the signal is very different in the two cases, for a smooth round moon would act as a single reflector while the echo from the rough moon must be made up of a multitude of echoes from different points, randomly related in phase and arriving at considerably different times.

5. Straggling

If the returning signal is a composite of many echoes, some of them delayed slightly with respect to others, the effect will be to smear out the modulation impressed on the original wave. The effect is that of a low-pass filter, so far as the modulation frequencies are concerned. It can be formulated precisely in certain cases, a sufficiently representative one being the following. Assume that the gain function of each antenna has the form

$$G = G_0 e^{-ae^2}$$

that each antenna has a diameter d and that its illumination factor is f . If the moon is rough and if only a relatively small patch on the moon is illuminated, a very short transmitted pulse would be received as a signal whose envelope would be of the form shown in Fig. 4. The envelope of this received signal has the form e^{-bt} , where

$$b = \frac{\pi^2 f d^2 c R}{2\lambda^2 D^2} \quad (3)$$

and R = radius of moon, c = speed of light, and D = distance from moon to earth. If now the transmitted signal is a wave amplitude-modulated at angular frequency p , with modulation coefficient m , it can be shown that the wave received will have a smaller modulation coefficient m' , given by

$$m' = m \left[1 + (p/b)^2 \right]^{-1/2} \quad (4)$$

(There will be some phase shift and distortion as well, but these effects are of lesser importance.) For $d = 60$ feet, $\lambda = 0.1$ feet, and $f = 0.7$, b has the value 4000 sec^{-1} . In that case, according to Eq. (3), the modulation amplitude is reduced by one-half at a modulation frequency of 1100 cycles per second. This would not be satisfactory for a voice channel; we should like a band at least 4 times as wide, which according to Eq. (3) requires doubling the diameter of the antenna, to 120 feet. But this calculation is probably too pessimistic; any departure from the assumed "perfectly" rough conditions will improve the situation. Also, amplitude modulation is probably not the best method to use on a circuit of these characteristics. The "straggling" effect is not unlike the multipath effects encountered in

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ionospheric transmission, and there is reason to suspect that wide-deviation frequency modulation, using the receiving system mentioned in Annex 23, can alleviate it.

6. Fading

The interference of multiple echoes will give rise to fading. The fluctuations in the resultant intensity, as the various components shift phase relative to one another, will probably occur at a rate of 10 to 50 times a second, for $\lambda = 3$ cm. This estimate was made by considering the relative motion of the various parts of the reflecting region. If it is correct, the effect ought not to be serious.

7. Noise Figure and Power Requirements

Let us assume that we operate the system at 10,000 Mc/sec ($\lambda = 3$ cm), frequency-modulated, with ± 50 kc deviation. We assume further a 17 db noise figure for the receiver, which leads to a noise power of 2×10^{-14} watts in the 100-kc wide band. If 5 kilowatts of power can be radiated at the transmitter, a not-unreasonable expectation, the signal-to-noise power ratio in the rf band would be 7. The signal-to-noise ratio in an audio band 5 kc wide would then be $3 \times 7 \times (50 \text{ kc}/5 \text{ kc})^3 = 21,000$, or 43 db approximately. This ought to be adequate.

8. Antenna

The system just described requires at each end a parabolic mirror 60 feet in diameter, accurate in figure to about 0.1 inch, capable of following the moon's position in the heaven. Although these are fairly stiff requirements, there is no doubt that they can be met. In fact, a 50-foot paraboloid of accuracy exceeding the requirements here laid down has already been built for the Naval Research Laboratory by the Collins Radio Company. There are several relatively simple methods that might be used to control automatically the position of the antenna.

9. Conclusions on Moon Relay

It appears feasible, without waiting on any basic development, to establish a voice channel between a station in the United States and a station in Europe by the moon-relay method. A more accurate and more reliable estimate of the requirements can be made after the completion of microwave moon-echo studies which are to be carried out at the Naval Research Laboratory using the mirror referred to above. As a very rough guess, the facilities required at each end of such a link might cost between two and five million dollars. This would provide several voice channels each way.

The chief disadvantage of the system is that it works somewhat less than half the time; the moon must be above the horizon at both ends of the path. In view of the very promising results of the recent tests of the E-layer scattering method (Annex 19), we recommend that no action be taken in moon relay at this time.

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10. Moon Broadcast

In discussing moon broadcast we must recognize that the Soviet listener cannot be expected to provide himself with a microwave receiver. On the other hand, the shortest wave that can be received by the standard Soviet high-frequency receiver is already too long to be usable for this purpose; at 20 meters wavelength, the transmitting antenna would need to be several kilometers in extent, and although the beam might penetrate the ionosphere, it would be seriously refracted in so doing. There is nevertheless some point in considering moon relay at wavelengths of one or two meters. A radio amateur or technician could build out of fairly standard parts a receiver for these wavelengths. The antenna would be small enough to carry about by hand with the receiver. The quasi-optical propagation of meter waves would make complete jamming of a large area difficult.* One could receive signals from the moon while being shielded from the jammer by a hill or large building.

Let us assume that a field strength of 100 microvolts per meter would provide an adequate signal in such a receiver. If the transmitting antenna is so large that all the power radiated strikes the moon, if the moon is rough as assumed before, and if the reflection coefficient is 10 per cent in power, then we require 250 megawatts from the transmitter. The transmitting antenna, if a parabolic mirror, would have to be about 500 feet in diameter for a wavelength of one meter.

Neither of these requirements is completely fantastic. If the result to be achieved were of overriding national importance, they would probably be met by a major technological effort. Such an effort does not seem warranted now. The coherent transmitter proposal in Annex 20 affords a more certain, more effective, and probably less expensive means of reaching more people through jamming. Nevertheless, the possibility of moon broadcast should be reviewed from time to time, in the light of developments, as new knowledge about the reflecting characteristics of the moon and about the situation within the target area accumulates. Other factors may change also. The development of a tiny sensitive receiver for meter waves, for example, would alter the prospects. There may develop military applications for moon broadcast that would justify effort in this direction. Finally, moon broadcast is the only known method for getting very-short waves into Europe from America.

E. M. Purcell

*Of course, nothing is to prevent the jammer from directing his power at the moon; to jam by this means requires equipment at least as large and powerful as ours; his physical proximity to the receiver gives him no advantage.

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



Fig. 3

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
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
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B. Broadcasting Operations

General Notes about Voice of America Operations

Because of the policy-control problem of Voice of America broadcasts, and necessity for coordination with day-to-day policy, most of the current programming originates in New York. This makes it convenient to establish new policy on short order and to monitor the operation thoroughly. However, this method of operation imposes two serious limitations on the programming staff. First, the relatively poor quality of the relay to the overseas transmitters limits the variety of program materials and speaking voices that can be successfully employed. Even within these limitations, the relay often causes serious distortion of the signal with a resulting deterioration of intelligibility. Second, the remoteness of the target area from the program-originating point makes it difficult for the programming staff to be responsive to the mood and interests of its audience. It is our belief that overseas origination of program should be attempted. This could be done in two ways.

In the beginning, script material could be written and translated in New York and sent to the overseas bases by teletype where it then could be voiced by local talent, thus eliminating the relay distortion. In addition, this method of operation would materially reduce the transmission facility necessary to get the programs abroad. Such an operation would not, of course, take care of the more serious problem - the remoteness of the originating point from the target areas.

We believe that experience with the teletype operation would eventually allow system of overseas policy control to be developed which would ultimately allow the program origination to be placed entirely in the hands of overseas staffs. Policy control would still be located in New York or Washington, and the daily policy decisions -

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instead of scripts - could be transmitted to the overseas bases.

This latter technique would free so much relay facility that it would be possible to transmit any questionable material back to the United States for approval, via the teletype network. The importance of having some such operation in Europe can be judged by an examination of the success of RIAS, the Army-operated station in Western Berlin.

If we are to fight a more aggressive political war, it will be important to have our broadcasts into the satellites and Russia itself much more timely, direct, and to-the-point. It will be very difficult to provide close support for such an operation by means of programs originating in the United States.

2. Utilization of European National Groups

We should encourage the participation of various European national and refugee groups in the information program. It is just as important for the French, Belgians, Dutch, Italians, Germans and others to participate in this effort as it is for them to build up military divisions. Up to the present time, the French and Germans have not participated actively in these efforts. The French in particular have always pleaded lack of facility with which to carry out an informational program. We should provide them - and others willing to participate - with the equipment they require. The aid the State Department has given Radio Free Europe is an example of what could be done to help other groups desiring to carry out broadcasting campaigns.

We should make better use of existing facilities. We should attempt, for example, to buy time on Radio Luxembourg. This has so far not been done, not because it is a poor facility or because it would not be useful, but because of the opposition of the European nations who would object if we provided a source of revenue to that station.

It is important to obtain the participation of all the Western Powers, because these countries can say many things which it is either inappropriate for the Voice of America to say or which cannot be said with much conviction by the Voice of America. For example, encouragement of defection, listing of NKVD agents in the various towns,

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generation and spreading of rumors - true or untrue - are not appropriate operations for Voice of America. For this reason, plus the greater faith that listeners often put in the credulity of the European stations, it is desirable that groups other than the Voice of America carry the burden of the grey operations which are sure to be an important part of aggressive political warfare activity.

W. W. Salisbury

J. B. Wiesner

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WHEN ANNEXES D & E
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DOC. NO. PSB D-30
DATE August 1, 1952
COPY NO. 4

PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD

Washington

STATUS REPORT ON THE NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFORT AND
FIRST PROGRESS REPORT OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD

Submitted to the President and the National Security
Council by the Psychological Strategy Board

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PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD

Washington

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WARNING

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, U.S.C.; the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

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August 1, 1952.

STATUS REPORT ON THE NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFORT
AND FIRST PROGRESS REPORT OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD

Submitted to the President and the National Security
Council by the Psychological Strategy Board

pursuant to the following documents dated 29 May 1952
received from Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary
of the National Security Council: (1) "Memorandum for
the Director, Psychological Strategy Board - Status of
United States Programs for National Security", and
(2) "Outline for Progress and Status Reports by the
Psychological Strategy Board to the President and the
National Security Council".

This report consists of:

- (1) A statement on the status of the national psychological effort as of 30 June 1952 in relation to objectives contained in approved national policies. This section considers both the implementation of approved objectives, policies and programs by the departments and agencies concerned, and salient developments in the psychological situation abroad.
- (2) Progress of the Psychological Strategy Board from its inception through 30 June 1952 in formulating and promulgating over-all national psychological objectives, policies and programs, and other activities.

I. STATUS OF THE NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFORT.

The Board presents below a statement on the status of national psychological programs as of 30 June 1952. In submitting this statement the Board desires to emphasize the following general conclusions:

1. To be fully effective, psychological planning at the strategic

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1. To be fully effective, psychological planning at the strategic level should ideally be based on an agreed overall strategic concept for our national psychological programs. While efforts to date underline the difficulties of formulating such a concept, some progress has been made in achieving agreement on certain broad criteria to be utilized in establishing relative priorities within existing capabilities. Further progress toward the development and implementation of an agreed strategic concept for our psychological effort can take place only in conjunction with a corresponding development of capabilities and resources and an accompanying adjustment of basic national policy.

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2. The United State is not making significant progress in the psychological field toward its objective of reduction and retraction of Soviet power as laid down in NSC 20/4. In considering the total cold war position of the United States as contrasted with that position a year ago, it is evident that in certain areas, such as Western Europe, our position has been strengthened by the good progress recorded under NATO. However, there has been some deterioration of strength in certain other areas, notably in the Near East. But this should not necessarily be attributed to superior effectiveness of Soviet propaganda.

3. A major handicap in psychological operations outside of the Iron Curtain derives from growing resentment in parts of Asia and throughout much of Europe to a "made in America" label on part of our psychological output. Of even graver significance is the increasing reaction against the military character of some of our political and economic activity. Programs designed to have a deterrent effect on the Soviet Union are distorted and exploited by communist or anti-American propaganda and thus are occasioning resistance, neutralism, and charges of aggressiveness to the detriment of our psychological effort.

The statement which follows is based on an analysis of current reports of the Department of State and the Department of Defense, of a report by field staff representatives of the Mutual Security Agency, and of a report by the Central Intelligence Agency concerning their activities related to the national psychological effort during the fiscal year ending 30 June 1952.*

This statement is not presented as a full evaluation of the national psychological program during the period in question, the Board having decided that such an evaluation is not possible at this time. However, the reports on which it is based throw significant light on some aspects of the existing "cold war" situation. There emerges from them a picture of some substantial progress, mixed with many problems and obstacles which hinder a more complete achievement of our psychological objectives.

A. Outside the Iron Curtain

The general psychological situation in the non-Soviet world is not bright, but progress has been made in some areas.

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In Western Europe the picture is spotty. On the one hand, progress is reported in containing Soviet communism and in the development of unity and readiness to build indigenous military strength in the area. On the other

* For the text of the report of the Department of State to the NSC, and summaries of the other three reports mentioned, see Annexes A, B, and C, and specially classified Annex D.

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hand there are disturbing reports of the growth of neutralism and anti-Americanism in France and Britain, if not in Western Europe as a whole.

In the Middle East, irresponsible nationalism is the current major threat to free world interests. United States capabilities for effective psychological action have declined though some slow progress is reported in certain sections of the Moslem world.

In Africa, intensive communist efforts to gain control over the colored races are having some success. A modest start has been made at laying the groundwork for future activities aimed at checking them.

In Latin America, there has been a recent increase in our capabilities for effective psychological action, and some indication of substantial progress in combatting anti-American feeling in certain countries.

In South and Southeast Asia, anti-colonialism and associated racial resentments have been far more important elements in the psychological developments in the military struggle against rebel forces in the area. On the other hand, communist electoral gains in India have forced the Nehru Government to modify perceptibly its former position of neutrality in the East-West conflict.

In Formosa and Japan, some gains are reported as a result of United States psychological activities.

In addition to the above comments on specific areas, the following general observations on the non-Soviet world, drawn from the departmental reports, may be warranted.

1. A steady operational trend toward the use of indigenous groups for propaganda purposes reflects a recognition that in many areas overt propaganda bearing the United States label is meeting with increasing indifference or resistance. Further development of non-attributed psychological methods, together with a de-emphasis of overt channels,

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1. A steady operational trend toward the use of indigenous groups for propaganda purposes reflects a recognition that in many areas overt propaganda bearing the United States label is meeting with increasing indifference or resistance. Further development of non-attributed psychological methods, together with a de-emphasis of overt channels, appears to be logical in this situation.

2. In underdeveloped countries some progress has been made in developing psychological approaches which appeal to local aspirations and emphasize local participation and initiative. Such approaches are particularly relevant in these areas, where the memory or actuality of

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domination by the white man is a far greater psychological reality than the Soviet menace.

3. The overriding abhorrence of another possible war in some areas, particularly Western Europe, constitutes an important psychological liability for the United States. This attitude tends to inhibit actions which may seem to involve any increased risk of war, and manifests itself in neutralism, anti-Americanism, and extreme sensitivity to occasional warlike statements by leading Americans. The spread of this attitude makes possible the continued effective use of "peace" as a leading theme in Soviet psychological aggression.

4. Certain national policies of the United States are psychologically damaging in various areas of the non-Soviet world. In the Moslem world this is true of United States policy toward Israel; in areas under European domination it is true of United States identification with its NATO allies which makes it difficult for the United States to avoid the psychological effects of the colonial policies of those allies; in Britain and elsewhere it is true of United States policy toward China.

The same may be said of certain primarily domestic matters. For instance, efforts to counteract communist exploitation of the race relations problem in the United States have not been fully successful. Likewise, the restrictive immigration policy of the United States, most recently embodied in the McCarran Act, has damaging psychological repercussions abroad. Finally, United States tariff laws severely hurt the ability of foreign countries to export to this country and thus are seen abroad as running directly counter to United States policy of building up economic stability in the free world by expanding international trade.

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E. Behind the Iron Curtain

The Soviet grip in the Communist-dominated areas of Europe and of the Far East appeared to be even firmer at the end of the fiscal year 1952 than at the beginning. There was no evidence of progress toward achievement of the basic objectives set forth in NSC 20/4, namely, the reduction and retraction of Soviet communist power. Moreover, short-term possibilities of any improvement in this respect appeared so slight as to be negligible. In this area of the world our national psychological effort, both overt and covert, must continue for some time to emphasize long-term objectives and the discovery of means to build up resources and capabilities.

[Among the many problems incident to this buildup, one in particular may be mentioned. Our capabilities for effective action against the communist regime in China are limited in part by the absence of a stable and more universal rallying point outside China to which overseas Chinese could look for political and psychological leadership, and by the related need for a thorough-going reform of Nationalist Chinese military and political institutions.]

In the overt information field behind the Iron Curtain, the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe clearly emerge from the reports as the only significant remaining programs which effectively reach the people of either or both the USSR and the Satellites. The reports are equally clear, however, as to the need for making the Voice still more powerful. Meanwhile there are ominous indications that we may be falling behind in the electro-magnetic war.

[Some good use has been made of defectors and escapees from behind the Iron Curtain during the year, both on the programs of the Voice and America and

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in non-attributable activities of other agencies. Results point to the desirability of a still more highly organized effort in this direction.

C. Related Activities

[Certain related activities of a highly restricted nature are not covered in the body of this report. For an evaluative summary of these activities, reference is made to the specially classified Annex D.

D. Organizational Progress

An improvement is noted in the effectiveness of policy guidance during the period covered by this report. In part, the improvement has resulted from closer cooperation of the departments and agencies involved. Quicker and more effective action both in Washington and in the field, and a consequent improvement in the coordination of our psychological effort, has resulted from a number of forward steps in organization. The reports make it clear, however, that much still remains to be done.

II. PROGRESS IN FORMULATING AND PROMULGATING OVER-ALL NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL OBJECTIVES, POLICIES AND PROGRAMS

During its first year of operation the Psychological Strategy Board has taken a number of steps to carry out its responsibility "for the formulation and promulgation, as guidance to the departments and agencies responsible for psychological operations, of over-all national psychological objectives, policies and programs, and for the coordination and evaluation of the national psychological effort." The major effort has been in the planning field. The chief steps taken are as follows:*

A. Plans completed and in effect:

[(1) Psychological Operations Plan for the Reduction of Communist Power in France - designed to encourage and support French Government efforts to reduce communist power in their country to a point where it

* For a more detailed report on planning activities, see specially classified Annex E.

will no longer threaten United States national objectives in the area. Under this Plan and the parallel Plan for Italy (see below), the initiative for the most important actions lies with the indigenous governments. Supporting actions by the United States are under the control of the Ambassador. Progress in France has been considerable during the past two months and prospects for the future appear good.

(2) Psychological Operations Plan for the Reduction of Communist Power in Italy - parallel to the above plan for France. Although progress in Italy is less substantial than in France, the Italian Government is actively considering further effective action in this field.

(3) Psychological Operations Plan for Soviet Orbit Escapees (Phase "A") - designed to provide care and resettlement for current escapees and facilitate their use by CIA and the Armed Forces. Reception, supplemental care, and resettlement operations have already begun on a small scale and will be considerably expanded within the limits of the 4.3 million dollars made available to the Department of State for this activity by the Director for Mutual Security.

B. Plans and guidances completed but not yet being executed:

(1) Plans for immediate execution: None

(2) Stand-by plans:

a. General war:

- i. A plan for the conduct of psychological operations in the event of general war has been submitted by the Board to the National Security Council and was under study by them as of 30 June 1952.*

* This plan was approved by the President on 25 July 1952.

ii. A national overt propaganda policy guidance for general war has been approved by the Board and serves as guidance for current operational planning on this subject in the Government.

b. Korean Armistice Negotiations:

Two psychological operations plans have been promulgated. One is partly operational at present and provides for further actions in the event that an armistice is achieved. The other plan provides for the contingency that armistice negotiations are conclusively broken off and full hostilities are resumed.

C. Plans and projects authorized and in process of development involve most of the critical areas in the world struggle.

A plan for national psychological strategy with respect to Germany, nearly completed, is to deal with the integration of the Federal Republic into Western Europe, the reduction of Soviet capabilities in Western Germany, the problem of German unification, and the role of a unified Germany in the unification of Europe.

Psychological strategy plans to advance national objectives in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Japan are in earlier stages of preparation. With respect to the Soviet Union a psychological operations plan for exploiting Stalin's passing from power has been drafted and is receiving further staff study.

Other plans and papers in preparation, not confined to any geographic area, include:

- (1) an over-all strategic concept for the national psychological effort;

- (2) a plan for stimulating and utilizing defection from the Soviet Orbit beyond the existing flow of escapees (this plan will supplement the "Phase A" plan mentioned in A. (3) above);
- (3) an inventory of "cold war" instrumentalities, some of them novel, with a view to harassment and retaliation against the USSR and the Soviet Orbit;
- (4) an analysis of communist "germ warfare" and other "hate America" propaganda and the psychological problems arising therefrom; and
- (5) a plan designed both to gain greater acceptance in the free world for United States economic security objectives vis-a-vis the Soviet Orbit, and to capitalize on and obstruct Soviet economic exploitation of captive Europe and Communist China.

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Annex A
August 1, 1952

THE FOREIGN INFORMATION PROGRAM

Status Report for Fiscal Year 1952

Prepared by the Department of State.

1. TASKS. In performance of the mission, the tasks of the Department of State's foreign information and educational exchange programs, carried on by the International Information Administration, continued to be those set forth in Annex V to NSC 114/2, in order of priority as follows:

(i) "The first task is to multiply and intensify psychological deterrents to aggression by Soviet Communism, whether in the form of outright action by the armed forces of the Soviet Union, of Communist China or of the satellites of the Soviet Union, or in the form of the subversion of existing free governments by civil forces acting on behalf of Soviet Communism."

(ii) "The second task is to intensify and to accelerate the growth of confidence in and among the peoples and the governments of the free world, especially in Western Europe, including Western Germany, in their capability successfully to deter aggression of Soviet Communism or to defeat it should it nonetheless occur and to inspire concrete international, national and individual action accordingly."

(iii) "The third task is to combat, particularly in the Near and Middle East and South and Southeast Asia, extremist tendencies threatening the undermining of the cohesion and the stability of the free world and the withdrawal of governments and peoples into neutralism."

(iv) "The fourth task is to maintain among the peoples held

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(iii) "The third task is to combat, particularly in the Near and Middle East and South and Southeast Asia, extremist tendencies threatening the undermining of the cohesion and the stability of the free world and the withdrawal of governments and peoples into neutralism."

(iv) "The fourth task is to maintain among the peoples held captive by Soviet Communism, including the peoples of the Soviet Union, hope of ultimate liberation and identification with the free world and to nourish, without provoking premature action, a popular spirit disposed to timely resistance to regimes now in power."

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(v) "The fifth task is to maintain among peoples and governments traditionally linked with the United States, particularly in Latin America, a continued recognition of mutual interdependence and to promote national and individual action accordingly."

2. BUDGET. The budget available to the Department of State for information programs for fiscal year 1952 was:

	<u>Requested by the President</u>	<u>Allocations of Congressional Allowance</u>
Facilities	None requested	(\$36,001,160)*
Operations		
International Press Service	\$11,952,304	\$ 8,465,815
International Motion Picture Service	13,074,035	10,194,554
International Broadcasting Service	25,164,655	19,872,864
Information Service Centers	7,133,909	4,647,780
Exchange of Persons Service	10,652,960	6,515,802
Field Operations:		
NEA \$6,038,231		
FE 5,360,673		
AFA 3,291,311		
EUR 5,793,877	27,329,737	20,448,504
Policy and Program Direction	2,226,552	2,203,146
Administrative Support	<u>17,465,848</u>	<u>14,226,535</u>
Total	\$115,000,000	\$86,575,000
Iranian program (PL 861)		106,219

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Total	\$115,000,000	86,575,000
Iranian program (PL 861)		106,219
Finnish (PL 265)		298,697

*Carry-over available for obligations during FY 1952.

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	<u>Requested by the President</u>	<u>Allocations of Congressional Allowance</u>
Austria	\$ 2,024,650	\$ 1,879,800
Germany	14,653,381	13,675,020
Japan (Army Transfer, PL 375)		1,565,800

3. PLANS IN OPERATION.

A. Substantive.

1. During fiscal year 1952, the following actions were taken in accordance with plans for every country and with special plans as noted, to intensify psychological deterrents to aggression and subversion by Soviet Communism:

(a) The growing strength and unity of the free world were projected, primarily by broadcasts of the IBS, to the peoples and governments of nations dominated by the Soviet Union. This involved exploitation particularly of

(i) the progressive development of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Special Information Guidance No. 83, March 16, 1951, NATO);

(ii) the impetus given to the creation of ready defensive capabilities among the free nations of Europe under the leadership of the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (ibid);

(iii) the economic and military assistance extended to free nations by the United States (Special Information Guidance No. 91, May 23, 1951, Mutual Security Program);

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(iii) the economic and military assistance extended to free nations by the United States (Special Information Guidance No. 91, May 23, 1951, Mutual Security Program);

(iv) the maintenance by the United Nations Command of a strong military position in Korea;

(v) the increasingly successful resistance to subversive forces in Indochina and Malaya;

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(vi) the development of new weapons by the United States and other free nations;

(vii) the progress achieved in establishing an effective mobilization base in the United States;

(viii) the repeated warnings given by the United States, Great Britain, and France that they will protect West Berlin against aggression.

(b) The friendly disposition and the peaceful intentions of the United States were concurrently projected. This involved exploitation particularly of

(i) the proposal put forward by the United States, the United Kingdom and France at the Sixth General Assembly of the United Nations for study of the limitation and balanced reduction of arms and armed forces (Special Information Guidance No. 104, October 24, 1951);

(ii) the letter addressed by the President of the United States to the President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR expressing the friendship of the people of the United States for the people of the USSR (Emergency Plan for Psychological Offensive (USSR), April 11, 1951);

(iii) the patience of the United Nations Command in seeking an armistice in Korea on honorable terms (Special Guidance No. 106, December 17, 1951, Korean Armistice Negotiations), and

(iv) special efforts in Germany to strengthen democratic youth and women's group, and development of democratic educational

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(iv) special efforts in Germany to strengthen democratic youth and women's group, and development of democratic educational activities and community life.

(c) Aggravation of the internal weaknesses of Soviet Communism was sought, in accordance with Emergency Plan for Psychological Offensive, by exposition particularly of..

(i) the ways in which the Soviet Union exploits its satellites and its own people for the benefit of the regime;

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(ii) the ways in which the people of China are impoverished and ordered to war in the interest of a foreign power (Special Information Guidance No. 98, August 10, 1951, Friction Between Peiping and Moscow);

(iii) the steady reduction, because of the requirements of adventurous imperialism, of the standard of living in areas controlled by Soviet Communism;

(iv) the contrast between conditions in those areas and conditions in the free world as testified to by defectors from Soviet Communism;

(v) the treatment meted out to racial and religious minorities within areas controlled by Soviet Communism;

(vi) the attempted destruction by Soviet Communism of the national traditions and the cultural heritages of peoples falling under its sway;

(vii) the refusal of the majority of the prisoners of war in the hands of the United Nations Command in Korea to agree to voluntary repatriation (Special Information Guidance No. 109, February 5, 1951, Exchange of Prisoners of War);

(viii) the Congressional inquiry into the massacre at Katyn in 1943.

(d) Particularly in areas not under the domination of the Kremlin, exposing the myths surrounding and inspired by Soviet Communism, minimizing the fears as to the strength of Fifth columns acting on its behalf and recalling the fate of free peoples whose governments have attempted to collaborate with Soviet Communism.

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(i) countering the allegations that the United States employed bacteriological warfare in Korea by seeking to compel the USSR to accept or reject competent, impartial inquiry into the charges;

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- (ii) challenging the pretensions of peace of the USSR (Special Information Guidance No. 50, July 27, 1950, The Betrayal of Peace, Special Information Guidance No. 96, July 31, 1951, International Youth Festival; Special Information Guidance No. 66, November 13, 1950, Second World Peace Congress);
- (iii) exposing the nature of the Moscow Economic Conference (Special Information Guidance No. 112, March 17, 1952, The Moscow Economic Conference);
- (iv) exploiting evidence of the decline of membership in the Communist Party outside the USSR and of the diminished effectiveness of its activities, (Special Information Guidance No. 76, February 2, 1951, Communist Strength in Western Europe; Special Information Guidance No. 81, March 10, 1951, Communist Fallibility;
- (v) keeping alive in the minds of others the fate of the satellites of Eastern Europe.

2. The following actions were taken to accelerate the growth of confidence in the free world in its capability to deter aggression or to defeat it should it nonetheless occur.

(a) Convincing the peoples and the governments of the free world of the need for continued building of ready military capabilities as a deterrent to war and of the progress made in achieving them. This involved

- (i) continuous interpretation of the problems facing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the progress made in solving them. (Special Information Guidance No. 83, March 16, 1951,

Betrayal of Peace, Special Information Guidance No. 96, July 31, 1951, International Youth Festival; Special Information Guidance No. 66, November 13, 1950, Second World Peace Congress); (iii) exposing the nature of the Moscow Economic Conference (Special Information Guidance No. 112, March 17, 1952, The Moscow Economic Conference); (iv) exploiting evidence of the decline of membership in the Communist Party outside the USSR and of the diminished effectiveness of its activities, (Special Information Guidance No. 76, February 2, 1951, Communist Strength in Western Europe; Special Information Guidance No. 81, March 10, 1951, Communist Fallibility; (v) keeping alive in the minds of others the fate of the satellites of Eastern Europe.

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(i) continuous interpretation of the problems facing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the progress made in solving them. (Special Information Guidance No. 83, March 16, 1951, The Crisis of Confidence; Special Information Guidance No. 102, September 11, 1951, NATO Meeting, Ottawa; Special Information Guidance No. 110, February 6, 1952, Psychological Approach to NAC, Lisbon);

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(ii) exploitation of the development of security arrangements in the Pacific (Special Information Guidance No. 100, August 28, 1951, Peace Treaty with Japan.)

(b) Developing understanding of the advantage of and the necessity for the participation of Japan, Germany, Yugoslavia and Spain in the common defense of the free world (Special Information Guidance No. 65, November 16, 1950, Aid to Yugoslavia; Special Information Guidance No. 68, November 30, 1950, German Participation in the Defense of Western Europe; Special Information Guidance No. 78, February 2, 1951, Germany and Europe Defense; Special Information Guidance No. 100, August 28, 1951, Peace Treaty with Japan.)

(i) "neutralism and neo-Nazism in Germany".

(c) Encouraging the peoples and governments of Europe in the development of common institutions for mutual welfare and defense. This involved demonstrating the interest of the United States in

(i) the Schuman Plan (Special Information Guidance No. 77, Schuman Plan Signing; Special Information Guidance No. 85, March 27, 1951, Germany and the Schuman Plan).

(ii) the European Defense Community (Special Information Guidance No. 101, August 28, 1951, The German Defense Contribution).

(iii) the Council of Europe (Special Information Guidance No. 86, May 8, 1951, The Concept of Europe).

(d) Maintaining confidence in the peaceful intentions, the consistent policies and the reliable leadership of the United States and minimizing differences with its allies. This involved

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(i) developing understanding of the responsible policies of the United States in conducting, as United Nations Command, the war and the armistice negotiations in Korea (Special Information Guidance No. 106, December 17, 1951, Korean Armistice Negotiations; Special Information Guidance No. 110, February 5, 1952, Exchange of Prisoners of War; Special Information Guidance No. 113, March 25, 1952, Chinese Irregular Troops in Burma).

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(ii) seeking to reduce points of friction and differences with allies (Special Information Guidance No. 92, May 31, 1951, US and NATO Posts Overseas; Special Information Guidance No. 93, June 11, 1951, Danger Signals to Anglo-American Cooperation; Special Information Guidance No. 107, December 29, 1951, Mr. Churchill's Visit to United States).

(iii) explaining policies of United States deeply affecting other countries (Special Information Guidance No. 91, May 23, 1951, Mutual Security Program; Special Information Guidance No. 94, June 16, 1951, Trade Act Extension; Special Information Guidance No. 83, March 16, 1951, NATO-MDAP; Special Information Guidance No. 63, October 27, 1950, U.S. Economic Mission to Philippines).

(iv) exploiting the demonstrated willingness of the United States to seek to relax existing international tensions by peaceful negotiation, as at the meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers in Paris, March-June 1951, and in proposing at the Sixth General Assembly an inquiry into the limitation and balanced reduction of armaments.

3. The following actions were taken, largely as the result of daily and weekly guidance and country plans, to combat, particularly in the Near and Middle East and South and Southeast Asia, extremist tendencies, nationalistic and religious, threatening to undermine the cohesion and stability of the free world (Special Information Guidance No. 89, May 21, 1951, South Asia).

(a) Demonstration of the continuing interest of the United States in the achievement of the legitimate national interests on

93, June 11, 1951, Danger Signals to Anglo-American Cooperation; Special Information Guidance No. 107, December 29, 1951, Mr. Churchill's Visit to United States).

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(a) Demonstration of the continuing interest of the United States in the achievement of the legitimate national interests on terms of safeguarding the security of the free world. This involved

(i) exploitation of technical assistance by the United States and other free nations to underdeveloped areas;

(ii) exploitation of other assistance to free governments (Special Information Guidance No. 82, March 19, 1951, U. S. Grain to India);

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(iii) exploitation of private efforts to improve conditions in underdeveloped areas.

(b) Encouraging the peaceful settlement of disputes threatening stability and order. This involved

(i) projection of the efforts of the United Nations to promote a settlement of the dispute over Kashmir (Special Information Guidance No. 103, September 18, 1951, Kashmir Dispute);

(ii) putting into correct perspective the attitudes and the actions of the United States with regard to situations in Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco.

(c) Encouraging the nations involved to take positive steps to develop their own capabilities for defense.

(d) Increasing general knowledge of the aggressive intentions of Soviet Communism and its hostility to national independence, established religious and local cultures.

4. The following actions were taken, largely in accordance with Special Information Guidance No. 105, November 14, 1951, The Soviet Satellites of Eastern Europe, to maintain, without provoking premature deeds, hope of ultimate liberation among the peoples held captive by Soviet Communism:

(a) Making plain that the United States looks to the establishment in nations dominated by Soviet Communism of governments commanding the confidence of their peoples, freely expressed through orderly representative processes. This involved exploitation particularly of

(i) statements of responsible public officials and private citizens of the United States condemning the Sovietization of

(b) Encouraging the peaceful settlement of disputes threatening stability and order. This involved

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(i) statements of responsible public officials and private citizens of the United States condemning the Sovietization of those nations and expressing the conviction that freedom will be regained by them.

(ii) statements and actions by emigres of a responsible character reflecting an undiminished interest in and a steady preparation for the restoration of national sovereignty;

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(iii) actions taken by the United States to safeguard the legitimate interests of its citizens subjected to illegal persecutions by the governments in power.

(b) Promoting faith that the present situation in the world is not permanent and that freedom will ultimately triumph through the exploitation particularly of

(i) evidence of the illegitimacy and hence the impermanence of existing regimes;

(ii) the actions listed in 2 above.

(c) Keeping alive national traditions and values linking captives with the free world through the exploitation particularly of

(i) the literature, the music, the cultural and scientific achievements of the captive peoples in the past and by nationals of captive nations now living and working in the free world;

(ii) evidence of appreciation of these achievements by the peoples of the free world;

(iii) national and religious holidays, particularly those the celebration of which is discouraged or prohibited by regimes now in temporary power;

(iv) the growth for the development of communities of free nations built upon traditions and values shared by the captive peoples (Special Information Guidance No. 86, May 8, 1951, The Concept of Europe).

(d) Keeping the captive peoples accurately informed of the situation in the free world as a source of hope and a guide to timely

persecutions by the governments in power.

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(d) Keeping the captive peoples accurately informed of the situation in the free world as a source of hope and a guide to timely action through

(i) the wide dissemination of facts about the policies and actions of the nations of the free world and of the reckless acts and policies of the USSR; and

(ii) sober interpretation of both the news of the free world and of Soviet Communism.

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5. The following actions were taken, largely in accordance with country plans and daily guidance, to maintain among peoples and governments, particularly in Latin America, traditionally linked with the United States a continued recognition of mutual interests;

(a.) Fostering conscious public support of the principles of Pan-Americanism. This involved

- (i) sustained exploitation of the American Foreign Ministers Meeting, March 1951 (Special Information Guidance No. 84, March 27, 1951, American Foreign Ministers Meeting);
- (ii) exploitation of the signing of bilateral military assistance treaties with seven nations of Latin America;
- (iii) exploitation of visits exchanged between leading personalities of nations of Latin America and the United States.
- (iv) numerous special occasions to emphasize democratic and historic solidarity of the hemisphere.

(b) Demonstration of the continuing interest of the United States in the achievement of legitimate national aspirations. This involved

- (i) exploitation of bonds of interest between labor in United States and labor in Latin America;
- (ii) exploitation of themes and developments as stated in 3(a) above.
- (iii) the signing of Point IV agreements, and 10th Anniversary of beginning of IIAA programs in Latin America.
- (iv) exploitation of efforts and achievements of private U.S. capital to help social and economic development in other Ameri-

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 - (iii) the signing of Point IV agreements, and 10th Anniversary of beginning of IIAA programs in Latin America.
 - (iv) exploitation of efforts and achievements of private U.S. capital to help social and economic development in other American republics.
- (c) Development of awareness of dangers of Soviet Communism.

This involved

- (i) concentrated program in Panama of exposure of myths surrounding Soviet Communism, emphasized by visit of ship-mounted radio transmitter "Courier."

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- (ii) exposure of myths as set forth in 1(d) above.
- (iii) exploited participation of Colombian troops in Korea.
- (d) Development of confidence in leadership of the United States.

This involved

- (i) exploitation as set forth in 2(d) above.
- (ii) use of Puerto Rican example to show U.S. devotion to principle of free determination of peoples.

B. Operational

The following represent major plans put into operation during Fiscal Year 1952.

Administration

1. The United States Information and Educational Exchange Program was reorganized into the United States International Information Administration.
2. Integration of informational operations was begun with the Mutual Security Administration in MSA countries.
3. World-wide integration of informational operations was achieved with the Technical Cooperation Administration.
4. Training:
 - (a) Selected overseas local personnel were brought to the United States for indoctrination and intensive training. This program, begun before Fiscal Year 1952, was continued during the year under review.
 - (b) Orientation courses and media training for American personnel newly joining, the IIA program, and on-the-job re-training were reorganized and strengthened;

(d) Development of confidence in leadership of the United States.

This involved

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(b) Orientation courses and media training for American personnel newly joining, the IIA program, and on-the-job re-training were reorganized and strengthened;

(c) Coordinated training abroad of local personnel, especially in American library techniques, was made a regular feature of the United States Information Service (USIS) operations in France and Italy.

5. Take-over of the Public Affairs Program in Germany and Austria on June 30, 1952, was planned and put into effect on the target date.

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6. Take-over of the Civil Information and Education program operated by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan, was planned and put into effect on the coming into force of the Peace Treaty between the United States and Japan on April 28, 1952.

General

7. Decentralization of operations was accelerated, marked by

(a) Increased local radio programming abroad,

(b) Increased production of press and publications abroad — now amounting to 80% of the total output — from raw materials and pilot models supplied from Washington,

(c) local production of moving pictures, carrying a propaganda message, in twelve countries,

(d) increased translations of American books, totalling 163 titles in 23 languages.

8. Greater emphasis was placed on working with and through indigenous groups and channels, to achieve greater audience acceptability of the United States propaganda message, and to encourage greater participation by those groups in spreading that message.

9. A plan was adopted to increase the acceptance of American troops overseas and combat communist propaganda against them.

10. "to offset the Soviet "Hate America campaign" and the bacteriological warfare charges".

11. An outstanding example of sharper country planning was the "geographic concentration" program devised by USIS-Italy, calling for intensified and tailored USIS efforts in area of special political importance in the forthcoming national elections. This program has been under way

put into effect on the coming into force of the Peace Treaty between the United States and Japan on April 28, 1952.

General

7. Decentralization of operations was accelerated, marked by

(a) Increased local radio programming abroad,

(b) Increased production of press and publications abroad -- now amounting to 80% of the total output -- from raw materials and pilot models supplied from Washington,

(c) local production of moving pictures, carrying a propaganda message, in twelve countries,

(d) increased translations of American books, totalling 163 titles in 23 languages.

8. Greater emphasis was placed on working with and through indigenous groups and channels, to achieve greater audience acceptability of the United States propaganda message, and to encourage greater participation by those groups in spreading that message.

9. A plan was adopted to increase the acceptance of American troops overseas and combat communist propaganda against them.

10. "to offset the Soviet "Hate America campaign" and the bacteriological warfare charges".

11. An outstanding example of sharper country planning was the "geographic concentration" program devised by USIS-Italy, calling for intensified and tailored USIS efforts in area of special political importance in the forthcoming national elections. This program has been under way since the beginning of the period under review.

12. United States participation in international trade fairs was furthered by the collection made by the Department of Commerce with IIA support, of an industrial exhibit which will be shown first at the Izmir Fair and later in Asia and Europe.

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13. A working committee was established to coordinate IIA programming and to stimulate output of special materials for the Middle East, which will reflect United States interest in and understanding of Islamic peoples for other than military or political reasons.

14. A plan was adopted to counter communist influences in Indian universities and intellectual circles, where 20% are regarded as being communist. According to the plan, a USIS officer will visit each university twice annually, prominent Americans will make lecture tours throughout India, and Indian professors and students will receive special mailings, including follow-up letters.

Broadcasting Service

15. IIA now operates 62 land-based transmitters, of which 38 are located in the United States and 24 at various points overseas, programming in 46 languages. In addition, some British Broadcasting Company transmitters are used to re-transmit the programs of IBS. One sea-borne transmitter, the Courier, was built and completed in its shakedown cruise; at Fiscal Year's end it was preparing to proceed to its station at Rhodes. The Munich programming center began during the period under review to broadcast in five languages: Russian, Hungarian, Lithuanian, Estonian and Polish.

16. The planned use of defectors from the Soviet area is now a frequent feature on radio programs directed to the Soviet Union and satellite countries.

17. Work is continuing on the following projects of the Radio Construction Program, for which Congressional approval has been received and appropriations obtained: Jade (in Okinawa), John (in the Philippines), Dog, Cast and East (all based overseas) and Baker 1 and Baker 2 (land based in

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18. The primary responsibility for USIS television activity was assigned the Broadcasting Service in close collaboration with the Motion Picture Service (IMS) through the mechanism of the IBS-IMS Television Board; IMS was made responsible for contacts with the film industry in procuring films for TV use.

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Press Service

19. The Press Service was reorganized along regional instead of media lines.

20. A series of background and action kits was planned and thirteen were issued during the year for the use of USIS overseas missions, as follows: Essentials of Peace (exposing the communist peace offensive), Freedom or Slavery (the fate of man under communism), Peace of Reconstruction (the treaty with Japan), Pattern for Aggression (Soviet strategy in North Korea), Minorities (a progress report on minorities in the United States), Warmongers! Imperialist! (the United States record and the Soviet record), NATO's third anniversary (the purpose, progress and purely defensive character of NATO), the United States elections (explanation of the United States political system), Credo for a Free Country (the faith that lies back of the United States fight for liberty), Partnership for Peace (the United Nations), Where all Americans Stand (the nature of bi-partisan legislation), The Truth about BW (bacteriological warfare), Communism and Sports.

21. Seven new magazines were planned and launched during the year, including three in Europe where none had been published before,

22. Several interpretive news columns were planned and started to supply the interpretation and perspective often lost through strict "news" treatment.

23. Publication of AMERIKA magazine in Russian was given careful review because of mounting Soviet restrictions.

Motion Picture Service

24. Planned production for the Fiscal Year under review was to

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Motion Picture Service

24. Planned production for the Fiscal Year under review was to service 87 countries with 470 reels of new material produced or contracted for, 4,439 foreign language reels in 40 languages with an estimated 92,000 print reels prepared for distribution. This planned production was exceeded, with over 5,000 language reels and over 92,000 print reels completed by Fiscal Year's end.

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25. A weekly newsreel unattributed to USIS was inaugurated during the year. It is now distributed in the Middle and Far East in 20 language editions to 16 countries.

Information Center Service

26. A book publishing corporation, including on its board of directors distinguished American publishers, was organized with a capital furnished by IIA, of \$750,000. Its first area of attention will be translations into Arabic.

27. Utilization of books to achieve psychological objectives was expanded through:

- (a) a presentation program totalling 2,010,000 volumes;
- (b) greater use of loan collections in government offices, universities and other community centers;
- (c) circulating packet libraries.

28. The number of information centers operated by USIS overseas was increased during the year by 38, for a total of 193 centers.

Educational Exchange Service

29. The selection of grantees was sharpened to focus greater psychological impact on established high priority target groups. Special efforts are being made by overseas missions to keep in touch with grantees in their return to their native lands.

Evaluation

30. The central Evaluation staff was made directly responsible to the Administrator of IIA to increase its objective viewpoint by removing it from planning and programming operations.

31. A series of evaluation studies and surveys have been completed.

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32. Extensive surveys into communication habits and their relation to political and social motivations are being conducted in several countries, notably Brazil, Mexico, India and Panama.

C. Progress Towards Objectives

The degree to which a series of specific actions have contributed to the creation of a given psychological situation can not be measured. The broadcasts, news files, pamphlets, posters, exhibits, motion pictures, translations, library facilities and leader and student exchanges sponsored by the United States Government constitute only a small part of the sum of influences affecting the attitudes of an individual, a group or the government of another agency. Moreover, the official propaganda of the United States is itself only a projection of decisions taken and measures executed in the other fields of national and informational activity — political, diplomatic, economic, military. Propaganda can seek to put these decisions and actions in the best light, but it can not far exceed their inherent limitations. Neither can it shut out from the minds and the emotions of other peoples the influences directed at them from other sources. An estimate as to how nearly a psychological task has been carried out and to what extent a series of planned actions contributed must therefore be highly qualified.

4. PLANS COMPLETED TO DATE

A. Plans awaiting execution.

(a) Substantive

1. Plans to deal with the special problems in the relationship between United States troops in Germany and the German civilian population.
2. Plans for fairs and congresses in Berlin.
3. Plans to increase the power of the RIAS station in Berlin.

(b) Operational

1. The portion of the Radio Construction Program approved by the Congress but for which appropriations have not been made includes the following tentative projects carrying the code names of: Negate, Vagabond "B", Vagabond "C", George Ocean, Peter, Mike, King and Tare.

2. The following ten projects prepared in accordance with NSC Action No. 575-A, and approved by the Bureau of the Budget for submission to Congress, but for which the necessary funds were not authorized.

(i) Support for a book publishing and export house. As reported in 3.B(25) above, the corporation has begun to prepare Arabic translations. World-wide use of the book corporation awaits further monies to be authorized by the Congress.

(ii) A four-fold mass communication project involving several media divisions. It was to consist essentially of:

(aa) travel and study grants to popular writers from 30 priority countries,

(bb) an exchange involving some ninety individuals in the field of radio from 30 priority countries.

(cc) an exchange involving some 150 individuals in the field of press and publications, on the working level,

(dd) bringing four-man teams to the United States

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(cc) an exchange involving some 150 individuals in the field of press and publications, on the working level,

(dd) bringing four-man teams to the United States from countries where the motion picture industry is either non-existence or poorly organized.

(iv) Feature films produced in and for countries of the Middle and Far East to combat neutralism and addressed to youth.

(v) Establish 17 positions throughout the Far and Middle East, to work to convey our psychological message principally through folk customs, folk-tales and folklore.

(vi) Special publication of 78,000,000 cartoon books with a propaganda message, directed at priority target groups in Latin America, and 6,000,000 copies of "An Outline of American History."

(vii) Exhibits of democracy, consisting mainly of four truck-mounted traveling exhibits and sponsored exhibits at 25 major fairs.

(viii) Interchange of local employees between IBS in New York and local employees overseas.

(ix) Research and technical developments in the field of electro-magnetics, better to equip IIA's radio operations in the "electro-magnetic war" with the Soviet Union.

(x) Financial support to implement the plan to increase popular acceptance of American troops abroad.

3. Establish two regional press and publication centers: one in the Middle East, tentatively scheduled for Beirut, the other in Latin America, tentatively scheduled for Panama.

B. Stand-by Plans

(a) Substantive

1. Two plans for psychological operations with reference to Korean armistice negotiations.

(b) Operational

1. A plan to provide for psychological actions should the Soviet Union increase its efforts to isolate Berlin.

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5. PLANS IN PREPARATION OR STUDY

A. Substantive

1. Psychological operations in the event of war.
2. The concept of freedom.
3. The role of labor and free trade-unionism in a free society.
4. Colonialism and its relation to evolution of non-self-governing peoples.
5. The nature and function of land reform as an element in the evolution of non-self-governing peoples.
6. American culture as a factor making acceptable abroad the leadership role of the United States.
7. Free enterprise as a significant element in American society, history and development.
8. Racial problems as a factor in propaganda.

B. Operational

1. To further improve the training of personnel in the field of psychological operations.
2. To use nationals of third countries to carry the United States psychological message to a given country. The problems are legal as well as financial.
3. To use the Buddhist monastic orders to carry the United States psychological message in countries where Buddhism is significant, including China.
4. To improve the conditions under which foreigners visit the United States. There are some indications that the exchange of persons program is nearing saturation under the present statutory limits on per diem allowances, the present immigration legislation governing the issuance of visas and the present internal revenue regulations which levy tax on earned incomes of trainees.

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5. To develop further the use of folk songs, folklore, folk tales, itinerant story-tellers, and other non-literate and pre-literate folk media to carry our message.
6. To supply newsprint to friendly publishers abroad.
7. To bridge the gap in understanding between Asia and the rest of the world, Europe included.
8. To determine use of three dimensional moving pictures in the media operations of IIA.
9. To incorporate the findings of evaluation into operations.
10. To aid the appropriate German governmental agencies to prepare courses in troop indoctrination, and to prepare a democratic citizens army.
11. To meet the problem presented, should the Soviets raise troops in East Germany.
12. To use unconventional media and techniques in special situations.
13. To determine the influence of quantitative or qualitative food deficiencies on group attitudes.

IN THE FORTHCOMING NATIONAL ELECTIONS, THIS PROGRAM HAS BEEN UNDER WAY

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SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

The Department of Defense in its first status report to the Psychological Strategy Board outlines its obligations and responsibilities within the national program and describes the activities that have been undertaken. The Department of Defense notes that in the President's directive creating the Psychological Strategy Board and in the request of the National Security Council for Department of Defense participation in the preparation of a progress report, there is a clear indication that the Defense Department has a role in psychological operations beyond that of war planning or support for other agencies in the psychological operations field as requested by them. The Department of Defense notes, however, that a detailed delineation of the responsibilities implied has required a substantial amount of new and preliminary planning. It notes also that detailed responsibilities in some areas of cold war psychological operations are still in the stage of development and have not been entirely defined at the present time.

It follows, therefore, that the Department of Defense in outlining its activities, has placed greatest emphasis upon war planning and supporting operations.

Responsibilities

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Responsibilities

The Department of Defense responsibilities in the conduct of psychological operations are cited in NSC 127, 59/1, 10/2, 10/5, and the Presidential Directive of April 4, 1951. NSC 127 states that "the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in conformity with established national policy and PSB guidance.....shall be responsible for planning and

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execution of U. S. psychological operations in military theaters of operations" except in "...territory of a government which exercises civil authority and to which a U. S. diplomatic mission is accredited..." The Department of Defense under the requirements of the other references cited is assigned a coordinating or membership responsibility in the several interdepartmental committees and organizations established in connection with psychological operations. Under these provisions, the Deputy Secretary of Defense serves as a member of the Psychological Strategy Board along with a representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as principal military adviser. The Department of Defense participates in the activities of the Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee. The Department of Defense is represented on the consultant committees established under the provisions of NSC 10/2 and 10/5.

Beyond this participation in the policy and planning activities of psychological operations, responsibility for which is generally vested in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the defined functional responsibilities of the Department of Defense relate principally to war-time activities or war planning, and are divided into the following categories: (1) psychological warfare, and (2) unconventional warfare, including covert operations.

Responsibilities within the Department for the above functions have been allotted to the following: (1) Joint Chiefs of Staff, (2) Commanders under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and (3) the Services.

A joint agency set up within the Joint Staff under the direction and control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is responsible in general for the coordination of the psychological warfare plans and preparations of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The commanders under the Joint Chiefs of Staff are responsible for the actual conduct of psychological warfare operations by their forces. The commanders are specifically

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enjoined to conduct propaganda and informational campaigns so as to influence neutral or friendly groups in such a way as to promote the accomplishment of the objectives of the United States and its allies.

The functions of the Services in psychological warfare include such operations as preparing equipment and supplies for the prosecution of PW; providing the necessary intelligence; organizing, training and equipping forces for joint operations, etc. Specific responsibilities within their respective fields of interest have been assigned to the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force.

[Unconventional warfare (which is divided into guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, and subversion against hostile states) is to be conducted by the nation's armed establishment in active theaters of war where U. S. forces are engaged, whether or not a formal state of war exists.]

[The planning and strategic direction of unconventional warfare is the responsibility of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In time of peace they cooperate with CIA/opc by providing guidance and assistance in the development of its plans for wartime covert operations, and reviewing projects for the conduct of wartime covert operations to determine whether they are consistent with and complementary to approved joint war plans. In the event of war they will plan and direct covert operations in active theaters of war where the U. S. forces are engaged and coordinate the planning of all covert operations.]

[Similarly, in time of peace, the commanders operating under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, are preparing, in coordination with CIA/opc representatives, unconventional warfare plans, including requirements for covert operations in support of approved war plans. Commanders are also undertaking to establish mutually acceptable mechanisms with CIA/opc so

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that the military commander can keep informed of CIA peacetime plans and operations to the extent necessary to ensure that they do not interfere with the accomplishment of his mission.]

Current Operations

The Department of Defense through the JCS Commander for the Far East has engaged in psychological warfare activities under the provisions of present policy in Korea. It has concluded that psychological warfare in Korea has effected substantial savings in manpower and material.

It has participated in the development of psychological operations support activities under the Department of State for the Korean truce negotiations, and has achieved a significantly increased acceptance of tactical psychological warfare on the part of the combat arms. PSB plans "SHANKILL," "TORRENTIAL," and "AFFILIATE" have been used by the Department of Defense as guidances in the preparation of its plans for psychological warfare in Korea. A series of operational contingency plans have been prepared by the Commander-in-Chief in the Far East (CINCFE) in support of the PSB plans. The Department is also providing support for approved programs for covert operations, including facilities, personnel and materiel. Overt propaganda activities are utilizing a radio broadcasting and leaflet group, a loudspeaker and a leaflet company and for air support a special flight. Jet aces of the Korean war have been successfully exploited for psychological purposes.

In addition to actual psychological warfare operations in Korea, the Department of Defense is engaged in preparing psychological warfare and unconventional warfare plans in support of strategic war plans in other areas in accordance with national policies. In connection with this work, representatives of the Department are participating in inter-departmental and international planning in the NATO organization.

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Examination and implementation of Department of Defense capabilities in connection with support of psychological operations in the cold war is also under way.

Psychological operations plans of the Department in time of war call for the activation and employment of eight radio broadcasting and leaflet groups, eleven loudspeaker and leaflet companies and seven air resupply and communications wings, of which three radio broadcasting and leaflet groups, four loudspeaker and leaflet companies and two air resupply and communications wings are at present activated.

Orientation in psychological operations is being given in war colleges and command and staff schools. In addition, selected personnel for psychological operations assignments are given further training in Service schools designed for that purpose.

Comments: Deficiencies of the National Psychological Program

The Department of Defense believes that the developing national psychological strategy should clarify the role and obligations of the military establishment in psychological operations, and should provide for more effective psychological operations support to necessary military programs.

Specifically, the Department of Defense suggests that the national psychological program should include provision for more extensive support of the national military effort through the development of programs which will consider:

- (1) fostering abroad a psychological attitude which will endorse

Support of the Chinese Nationalist Government on Formosa is described as

Examination and Implementation of Department of Defense Capabilities

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- (1) fostering abroad a psychological attitude which will endorse or at least accept the use of all types of new weapons when they are required;
- (2) exploiting the psychological effects of atomic tests; and
- (3) establishing national objectives and clarifying department and agency responsibilities governing psychological operations during the cold war.

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The Department of Defense considers that the nation's military establishment can render more effective support to the national psychological program if its wartime potentials are exploited to the maximum during the cold war period. In addition to providing needed training for psychological warfare activities of the Services, such participation could make a significant contribution at the present time. Included in such participation could be provisions for appropriate show of force in the form of military demonstrations, utilization of existing psychological warfare units, for cold war operations, and additional support for covert operations.

The Department of Defense stipulates that its programs and activities both at home and abroad are designed primarily to achieve military ends. It notes, however, that many, if not all, of these activities have an inherent psychological impact. While certain planning designed to maximize the advantageous psychological effect of such programs has been undertaken, and certain planning has been completed designed to minimize the adverse psychological effect of necessary military activities, more consideration of these aspects is indicated.

groups, or political parties. Some substantial results in combating pro-

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SUMMARY OF A REPORT BY
FIELD STAFF REPRESENTATIVES OF
THE MUTUAL SECURITY AGENCY

Western Europe

This report places its major emphasis on the psychological reaction, particularly in Western Europe, to the shift in the main purpose of United States aid from economic recovery and development to military defense. This shift is considered to have had a number of important psychological results, generally adverse to United States interests. Certain conclusions concerning operations are drawn from analysis of the changed psychological situation, notably that United States propaganda operations are too conspicuously identified as such, and that, accordingly, development of covert propaganda is indispensable.

Chief among the psychological changes reported are the following:

(1) The closely related attitudes of political neutralism and anti-Americanism have increased in strength, particularly in France but also in the United Kingdom and other parts of Western Europe. Some of this sentiment reflects resentment over the presence of American troops and military bases; some of it reflects anxiety over the supposed "belligerency" of United States policy. It is pointed out that more Europeans this year than last (though still a minority) believe that, if a third World War occurs, America rather than Russia will be the aggressor.

(2) Whether sincerely or not, Europeans tend to attribute their current economic dislocations to United States rearmament policy, and increasingly question the ability of the European economy to sustain a

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(2) Whether sincerely or not, Europeans tend to attribute their current economic dislocations to United States rearmament policy, and increasingly question the ability of the European economy to sustain a further rearmament burden.

(3) The involvement of the European unity movement with the rearmament program, primarily through the EDC project, has become the main psychological obstacle to further progress toward European unification. In particular, it has directly contributed to the delay in implementation of the Schuman Plan.

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(4) In the United Kingdom, a powerful Bevanite minority has emerged in the Labor party opposing the alleged subjection of Britain to United States foreign policy. Among its chief arguments are that the defense effort conflicts seriously with the social services, and that rearmament (particularly as applied to Western Germany) is likely to provoke war.

In summary, it is held that the European response to the rearmament policy constitutes a psychological obstacle to the purposes of United States aid to Europe and reduces the effectiveness of United States support of European unity. It is felt that many Europeans tend to ignore the basic purpose of the rearmament policy -- namely, to create a framework of security for the development and expansion of European economic and social standards begun under the Marshall Plan.

Operational measures taken to meet this situation include:

- (1) a reorientation of the MSA information output to give primary emphasis to NATO and military defense (including a special program in support of EDC ratification);
- (2) a great increase in the proportion of MSA informational activities which are channeled through European governmental and private groups (now as much as 80 or 90 per cent);
- (3) extensive MSA support of the NATO information program;
- (4) considerable progress toward the goal of full integration of MSA information operations with those of USIS in Europe, on both country and regional levels.

The report suggests the desirability of further steps along the following lines:

- (1) Full recognition among United States officials that the change from ECA economic aid to MSA defense aid has resulted in a change in the psychological climate in which United States aid operations must be carried out;

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(2) Further development of the trend away from United States information activities overtly identified as such, and corresponding development of covert propaganda activities.

(3) Efforts to strengthen the propaganda effort of NATO, to the extent that the reluctance of European member governments permits this.

Soviet Orbit in Europe

Although no MSA activities are directed specifically at the Soviet Orbit, some MSA-supported radio broadcasting and other information activities in Western Europe reach into the Orbit countries.

The report suggests that the Marshall Plan had considerable psychological impact behind the iron curtain, where people appeared to feel that the "grass was growing greener on the other side of the fence" and communist propaganda had to combat this view. On the other hand, the shift of emphasis to military can be used by communist leaders as "confirmation" of their long-standing charge that the Marshall Plan masked aggressive intentions. However, the same signs of growing military strength may reassure those people in the Orbit countries who yearn for liberation.

Near East and Africa

MSA information activities in this area are limited to contributions to the work of the Franco-American Committee, which operates under the supervision of the Embassy. No evaluative comments on this activity are made in the report.

Southeast Asia and Korea

The chief obstacles to public acceptance of the United States and its objectives in these areas are listed as:

ment of covert propaganda activities.

(3) Efforts to strengthen the propaganda effort of NATO, to the extent that the reluctance of European member governments permits this.

Soviet Orbit in Europe

Although no MSA activities are directed specifically at the Soviet Orbit, some MSA-supported radio broadcasting and other information activities in Western Europe reach into the Orbit countries.

The report suggests that the Marshall Plan had considerable psychological impact behind the iron curtain, where people appeared to feel that the "grass was growing greener on the other side of the fence" and communist propaganda had to combat this view. On the other hand, the shift of emphasis to military can be used by communist leaders as "confirmation" of their long-standing charge that the Marshall Plan masked aggressive intentions. However, the same signs of growing military strength may reassure those people in the Orbit countries who yearn for liberation.

Near East and Africa

MSA information activities in this area are limited to contributions to the work of the Franco-American Committee, which operates under the supervision of the Embassy. No evaluative comments on this activity are made in the report.

Southeast Asia and Korea

The chief obstacles to public acceptance of the United States and its objectives in these areas are listed as:

- (1) the history of the white man in Asia;
- (2) current United States commitments;
- (3) the unpopularity of some elements supported by the United States;
- (4) communications difficulties; and
- (5) illiteracy.

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These factors increase the difficulty of identifying the United States with local aspirations, rather than with imperialism. The United States is reported to be regarded generally as a defender of the status quo.

MSA and TCA social and economic aid programs are believed to generate some favorable opinion. On the other hand, it is felt that military aid is likely to have the opposite effect unless it is properly presented. As in Europe, communist propagandists in Asia have gained some credibility for their accusations by exploiting United States military aid programs.

The report makes the following suggestions:

(1) The United States psychological effort in this area should place greater emphasis on specific local problems, primarily social and economic; and should explain United States policies (including military aid) in terms which correspond closely to the immediate aims of the peoples involved.

(2) High priority should be given to public participation in national development, so that the masses become understanding and responsible participants rather than mere spectators.

(3) Aid in the area should be offered only on reasonable conditions to which adherence should be demanded. The importance of the East-West conflict should not result in adoption of the principle of "aid at any price".

(4) Equal emphasis with anti-communism should be given to positive democratic values, and firm criticism should be made of those in the area who abuse such values. No concessions should be made to the chauvinism and xenophobia of immature nations.

(5) United States propaganda in the area should not over-emphasize cultural affairs at the expense of political warfare.

(6) America's ability to "deliver the goods" should be emphasized, in contrast to the inability of the U.S.S.R. to do so.

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SUMMARY OF A REPORT FROM THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

There has been some progress in achieving the national objectives set forth in NSC 10/2 and 10/5. This progress, however, has been slow and in most areas severely restricted, partly by the limited nature of available resources and capabilities, but even more by time limitations. It takes a long time to develop the apparatus and the trained personnel for covert activities and the development of concepts and doctrine of the kind discussed in this report. The United States has been engaged in covert activities for too brief a period, and therefore present developments fall far short of ultimate potential.

EUROPE

In France and Italy, CIA reports that Soviet power and influence apparently are being contained. Increased and more effective covert psychological operations in Western Europe may account for the increasingly violent and indiscriminate nature of the Soviet and indigenous Communist propaganda barrage against the anti-Communist organizations in that area.

CIA's support of activities related to the French national election of June 1951 was credited by the U. S. Ambassador to France at that time with having contributed materially to the success of the Central parties and the slight reduction of the Communist national vote. In the Italian administrative elections of May 1952, CIA influence was generally instrumental in

against the Communists within the last two months. However, this is --

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In Western Germany CIA has in the past year developed capabilities for influencing youth, labor, and political splinter parties through the utilization of political action groups with widely diversified enrollment. Future effort in this field will concentrate on promoting anti-Communist trade union movements, and support for European unity. CIA also influenced the successful ratification of the Schuman Plan by the Bundestag and its popular acceptance by the West German people. Activities are now being continued to bring about Bundestag ratification and popular acceptance of the contractual agreements and of EDC.

In Eastern Europe, Soviet power and influence have not been reduced to any measurable extent. However, U.S. capabilities for future covert operations have increased, particularly in Poland and East Germany. Recent covert operations have revealed that the Communist authorities do not have complete control of the situation in these countries, and that the area can be successfully penetrated. Thanks to much valuable experience gained in the techniques of covert psychological warfare and political action in Eastern Europe, CIA now possesses capabilities for influencing large segments of labor, youth, refugees, persecutees, women, religious groups, and political parties.

In the satellite countries of Southeastern Europe, CIA capabilities for psychological operations have increased considerably, though Soviet power and influence have not been reduced in the area.

The power and influence of the Kremlin within the USSR has not been affected by U.S. covert activities, and short-term possibilities in this direction are so slight as to be insignificant. CIA's effort in this area is now being focused on progressively developing capabilities for long-term exploitation.

Pointing out that present policy provides for U.S. support of anti-regime resistance of the Great Russians, CIA sees a definite need for resolving the

hopeful than it has been for a long time, but we are awaiting positive results.

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policy question of the extent to which it will be permitted to support clandestinely and exploit operationally any group or individual actively interested in the destruction of the Bolshevik regime.

MIDDLE EAST

A decline in U.S. capabilities throughout most of the Middle East is noted, though this is felt to be only temporary. To some extent, the decrease in U.S. covert capabilities in the Middle East is attributed to the policy conflict arising out of U.S. support for the maintenance of France's position in North Africa, which has psychological repercussions throughout the African, Arab, and Asian worlds. Similarly, an impediment to U.S. capabilities in the area is found in the disparity of our attitudes toward Israel and the Arab States despite a stated policy of impartiality.

In the particularly important field of the Moslem world, some progress has been achieved along the following lines:

1. In utilizing nationalist forces for our own purposes, by endeavoring to direct them away from their more destructive tendencies and into channels which will be relatively compatible with U.S. interests; namely, to endeavor to turn the force of nationalism against the Communists, to direct it against political corruption, to focus it upon demands for social reform and economic progress.

2. In stimulating an increased awareness among the religious hierarchy of the threat of international Communism;

3. In increasing the degree of understanding of the status of Moslems living inside the Soviet orbit; and

4. In laying the groundwork for further expanded activities along similar lines. Progress will continue to be slow in this field because of the most delicate and dangerous aspect of Near Eastern affairs from the point of view of foreign intervention.

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FAR EAST

Support of the Chinese Nationalist Government on Formosa is described as the most significant program now being undertaken by CIA in the Far East, where the Agency is also actively supporting the military authorities in Korea, and laying the groundwork for penetration of Manchuria and North China.

While, on balance, the U.S. has achieved some psychological gains in the overt field (Treaty of Peace with Japan, Pacific Military Alliances, etc.), Soviet power has not been measurably reduced in the Far Eastern areas under its dominance, and that progress toward our objectives in the field of covert activities has been negligible, except in Japan. There, CIA's activities directed toward discrediting Soviet Russia, Communist China, the Japanese Communist Party, and Communism in general, are having some success.

KOREA

CIA regards coordinating machinery between civilian and military authorities in the field of psychological warfare as inadequate in certain respects. A coordinating mechanism (CCRAK) was set up, for example, but failed to include the operations of USIE services in Korea. Close cooperation with the military exists in the field on intelligence and tactical psychological warfare measures. However, a completely effective coordination of two major strategic plans with respect to Korea has not been realized with respect to coordination of command and logistical support, but steps are being taken to remedy this situation. These are expected to result in some modifications of CIA's responsibilities to ensure that CIA does not commit itself to actions which are beyond its present or anticipated capabilities.

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LATIN AMERICA

Despite evidence that the Soviet Union is now placing greater emphasis on its covert mechanisms in Latin America, U.S. covert capabilities have substantially increased there, through the expansion of personnel and facilities during the past year. Such expansion, it is planned, may increasingly turn toward the formation or support of indigenous, nationalistic, free-enterprise

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groups, or political parties. Some substantial results in combating pro-Communist and anti-American influences have been achieved through covert means in Chile, Brazil, Uruguay, Mexico, and Panama. It is to be noted that Latin America is an area unique for the United States, because of the overt Good Neighbor and non-intervention policies of long standing, and in the powerful reasons necessitating these overt policies. The security of covert operations and the further development of policy and management systems which protect such security both in Washington and in the field are of peculiar importance for this area. Therefore, CIA capabilities have been developed to be operative only under special conditions.

AFRICA

In Africa a beginning has been made in laying the groundwork for future activities to check Communist efforts to get control over the colored races; but this work has so far been purely preparatory and no progress toward actual achievement in that field is recorded.

GENERAL

In general, CIA emphasizes the importance of setting up increased capabilities, particularly in the form of thoroughly-trained American and indigenous personnel and long term cover mechanisms. An apparent need exists for establishing at all possible points radio broadcast facilities capable of reaching the USSR.

CIA's capabilities need to be reinforced for building up an apparatus capable of long-term exploitation against the Chinese Communist regime. For the shorter term CIA has had only very limited success in the penetration

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CIA points up the vital importance of VOA as constituting at present the only effective means the U.S. possesses for conducting psychological operation within the confines of the USSR. Covert penetration has been carried out

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primarily for the purpose of procuring intelligence, and because of the rigid controls impeding the movement of agents inside that country, no psychological warfare under present conditions can be undertaken in the USSR by any other medium except radio.

Through its covert channels CIA has discovered that VOA broadcasts have been audible in the USSR throughout 1950 and 1951. Although Soviet jamming has considerably reduced the audibility of these broadcasts, nevertheless information obtained from returning German prisoners of war and Soviet refugees and defectors indicates that considerable segments of the Soviet peoples continue to listen to VOA broadcasts despite technical difficulties and personal risk. Some of these refugees have criticised the VOA broadcasts for not being sufficiently forceful and for devoting a considerable portion of the programs to irrelevant matters not bearing directly on the current East-West struggle. Furthermore, ethnic groups such as the Ukrainians have complained that the broadcasts are not sufficiently representative of the desires and aspirations of the minority groups within the USSR. But when all this is said, the fact remains that information obtained by CIA indicates that the VOA broadcasts do play an important role in reminding the peoples of the Soviet Union that there is an alternative way of life, and in providing them with hope of ultimate liberation.

Despite a marked increase in the amount of radio propaganda indirectly aimed at encouraging Soviet defectors, there was no increase in the number of said defectors over the past year. Greater emphasis on the psychological utilization of defectors, particularly as the core of covert activist cadres would

objectives during general hostilities. This plan shall be executed upon

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Despite a marked increase in the amount of radio propaganda indirectly aimed at encouraging Soviet defectors, there was no increase in the number of said defectors over the past year. Greater emphasis on the psychological utilization of defectors, particularly as the core of covert activist cadres would be desirable.

In Western Europe especially, there was marked progress in CIA's efforts to work through various anti-Communist groups - both urban and rural. At the same time, there have as yet been no very tangible results from attempts

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to penetrate indigenous Communist parties. On the other hand, efforts to combat Communist influence in the labor unions, particularly through encouraging anti-Communist labor organizations, have met with considerable success, primarily in France and Italy so far, and the view is expressed that capabilities in this direction should be increased.

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PLANNING ACTIVITIES OF
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
THROUGH 30 JUNE 1952

1. PLANS COMPLETED AND BEING EXECUTED

A. Psychological Operations Plan for the Reduction
of Communist Power in France. (PSB D-14/c).

This plan and the corresponding one for Italy (Paragraph 1B) were developed by the same PSB planning panel and actions under both plans are being coordinated by the same group. Both plans resulted from extensive inquiry during the summer and fall of 1951, as a result of which the Board concluded that the French and Italian communist apparati, the two most powerful in Western Europe, constituted a serious threat to American foreign policy and to NATO plans for defense of Western Europe. In consequence, the Board prescribed specific courses of action for reduction of communist power in both France and Italy.

Upon approval of both plans on February 21, 1952, a Washington inter-departmental coordinating committee was established under the chairmanship of a member of the PSB staff, and comparable panels were established in Paris and Rome. These groups are in communication with each other with respect to implementation of the plans.

Analysis of the communist position in both France and Italy resulted in the conclusion that in both countries the primary source of communist power was in their organized control over trade unions. Therefore, the main emphasis in both plans is devoted to reduction of communist power over trade unions and the encouragement of the free trade union movement. The most important actions that can be taken in both countries are for the government to

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With regard to the French plan, progress toward achieving the major objectives appears hopeful under the present Pinay Government. Unlike its

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predecessors, the Pinay Government has demonstrated far more courage and affirmative leadership, and on its own initiative, has been moving vigorously against the Communists within the last two months. However, this is no guarantee of stability. The government has given us assurances that it will continue this campaign and that it intends to take specific action to reduce communist power in the trade union field. While making known to the government our continuing interest in this problem, we have withheld more affirmative participation and are watching the French initiative with hope in its promise for the future.

B. Psychological Operations Plan for the Reduction
of Communist Power in Italy. (FSB D-15/b).

As stated in connection with the similar plan for reduction of communist power in France reported in the previous paragraph, this plan was approved by the Board on February 21, 1952. Development of the plan, which was in conjunction with the development of the French plan, is reported on in the previous paragraph.

With regard to progress concerning the achievement of the objectives of the Italian plan, since September 1951 we have made high level representations expressing our concern over the continued strength of communist power in Italy and the DeGasperi Government has repeatedly assured us that it intends to take vigorous measures to reduce the strength and influence of the communist movement. Up to the May 1952 elections, the government had done very little along these lines and, particularly, had not moved against the main sources of communist power in the trade union field.

The local elections throughout Italy in 1951 and 1952 indicated no diminution and perhaps a slight increase of electoral support for the communist-left socialist bloc. Since the 1948 national elections when this bloc

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Since the May elections we have received renewed and more positive assurances that the government means to move against the communists and there

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have been indications of formal action. The government will put its main reliance on new legislation. The situation now appears more promising and hopeful than it has been for a long time, but we are awaiting positive results. Since the communists appear to be avoiding the provocation of the Italian Government, we are hopeful that the latter will take positive action on its own initiative.

C. Psychological Operations Plan for Soviet
Orbit Escapees - Phase "A" (PSB D-18a).

This plan, approved by PSB December 20, 1951, includes programs to care for and resettle current escapees, and envisages maximum possible utilization of escapees in CIA programs and under Public Law 51 (Lodge Amendment), which permits recruitment of escapees into the U.S. Armed Forces. For discussion of Phase "B" see paragraph 3A.

On April 7, pursuant to approval by the President, \$4.3 million dollars were made available by the Director of Mutual Security to the Department of State, which had been given responsibility for the program.

The time since funds were made available has been used to build the organization and staff for the continuing administration of the program; and to identify and care for the most urgent immediate needs of escapees.

Organization. Small staffs are being established and activities have begun in each of the countries which border the iron curtain. A regional office in HICOG and a policy and coordination unit in the Department of State have been established.

Resettlement and Supplemental Care. A general contract was signed on June 16, 1952, with the Provisional Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe (PICMME, an international body organized in November, 1951) for the overseas

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Projects have been authorized to care for urgent immediate needs of escapees resident in Greece, Germany, Austria, Turkey and Italy, such as

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food, clothing, shoes, repair and decontamination of barracks, medical treatment and the like. In every country of operation the immediate needs of the escapees are being met.

Propaganda Utilization. No general propaganda utilization of the plans and activities of the escapee program is now contemplated by State Department. Newsworthy projects and assistance to key individuals will be used in media reaching iron curtain areas when appropriate. When the program has greater accomplishments to point to, the State Department plans more general treatment. Similar policies govern domestic information activity.

Funds. Of the initial authorization of \$4,300,000 an estimated \$1,500,000 was obligated during the fiscal year 1952. An additional \$1,460,500 is being requested to cover an increase in the estimated number of escapees already requiring assistance.

Accomplishment of Other Purposes. As requested under this phase of the plan the Department of Defense has somewhat liberalized the conditions under which escapees may be recruited under the authorization of the Lodge Amendment. Of 5194 applications, 3916 have been rejected, 295 have been accepted (262 on active duty) and 982 are being processed.

The program has not proceeded far enough to make a significant number of referrals to CIA for use in its programs.

D. Public Statements with Respect to Certain Weapons. (PSB D-17d)

In February 1952, following a series of conflicting statements by public officials as to atomic and related developments, the PSB approved and forwarded to the Executive Secretary, NSC, recommendations for a guidance to appropriate agencies on public statements with respect to certain weapons. On 9 May 1952

a memorandum on this subject was issued by the President setting forth the

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2. PLANS COMPLETED BUT NOT YET BEING EXECUTED - STAND-BY PLANS

A. Psychological Operations Plan Incident to
Korean Cease-Fire Negotiations (PSB D-7c).

Approved by the Psychological Strategy Board on October 25, 1951.

This plan is designed to establish special psychological objectives to be implemented toward our allies as well as our adversaries, with respect to the Korean conflict. Some of the desired courses of action are at present in effect, but the majority of the recommended actions are directly related to the progress made in connection with the cease-fire.

The operational planning is substantially complete. An alert network has been established among the affected agencies so that the appropriate action can be put into effect without delay as developments make this necessary.

B. Emergency Plan for Breakoff of Korean Armistice
Negotiations (PSB J-19d).

Approved by the Psychological Strategy Board on September 18, 1951

This plan endeavors to establish for governmental departments and agencies engaged in psychological operations courses of action for application in preparation for, and in the event of, a breakdown in the Korean armistice negotiations.

The operational planning is substantially complete. The receipt of certain assurances from the Far Eastern Command with respect to logistical support is necessary in order that the affected agencies can establish the appropriate contingent plan without delay, should developments make this necessary.

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Negotiations (PSB J-19d).

Approved by the Psychological Strategy Board on September 18, 1951

This plan endeavors to establish for governmental departments and agencies engaged in psychological operations courses of action for application in preparation for, and in the event of, a breakdown in the Korean armistice negotiations.

The operational planning is substantially complete. The receipt of certain assurances from the Far Eastern Command with respect to logistical support is necessary in order that the affected agencies can establish the appropriate contingent plan without delay, should developments make this necessary.

C. Plan for Conducting Psychological Operations
During General Hostilities (PSB D-8b).

This project was approved by the Board on February 21, 1952 and submitted to the National Security Council as NSC 127.

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This plan was designed in order that the proper agencies would be able to conduct psychological operations in pursuance of prescribed national objectives during general hostilities. This plan shall be executed upon Presidential proclamation in the event of war or at such time as the President may direct.

D. National Overt Propaganda Policy Guidance
for General War (PSB D-11/b).

Approved by the Board on November 15, 1951.

This plan sets forth the objectives which will govern the national overt propaganda effort in a general war forced upon the United States by the USSR or any of its satellites. The objectives and tasks which should be followed by the United States with respect to the world as a whole, the USSR and its satellites, our allies and friends, and neutral nations are set forth.

This guidance has been distributed to the various departments and agencies for their use. The Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee (POC) has established an X-Day Committee which is concerned with the inter-departmental coordination of policies and operations in the event of war. This guidance is being used in the implementation of their planning.

3. PLANS AUTHORIZED AND IN PROCESS OF DEVELOPMENT

A. Psychological Operations Plan for Soviet
Orbit Escapees - Phase "B" (PSB D-18a/1)

This project is concerned with the stimulation of defection and examination of the psychological and subsidiary military advantages which would result from the proper utilization of these escapees. Phase A, concerned

with the care, resettlement, and possible utilization of current

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B. Inventory of Instrumentalities for Countering
Soviet Orbit Blackmail Tactics (PSB D-19/1).

The Board has had prepared an "Inventory of Cold War Weapons" consisting of a list of certain agencies and instrumentalities (some of which are of a

novel character). The Board has further directed study toward the feasibility of harassment and retaliation against the Soviets by use of appropriate instrumentalities.

C. Psychological Operations Plan Prescribing Specific Courses of Action with Respect to Germany (PSB D-21a)

This plan is designed to prescribe certain courses of action with respect to: (a) the integration of Western Germany into Western Europe, (b) the reduction of Soviet capabilities in Eastern Germany, (c) the achievement of German unity, and (d) the role of a unified Germany in the unification of Europe.

D. Psychological Strategy Planning for the Middle East (PSB D-22).

This plan is to devise by means of coordinated psychological operations a national psychological plan, taking into account both long-range and short-range considerations, in order to overcome or prevent instability within this area which would threaten Western interests. It seeks to prevent the extension of Soviet influence and at the same time to strengthen Western influence and to establish within the community of nations a new relationship with the states of the area that recognizes their desire to achieve status and respects their sovereign equality.

E. Psychological Strategy Planning for Southeast Asia (PSB D-23)

This plan is designed to assist by means of coordinated psychological operations in preventing the free countries of Southeast Asia from passing into the Communist orbit and in developing in these countries the will and ability to resist Communism from within and without, and to contribute to the strengthening of the free world.

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F. Psychological Operations Plan for the Exploitation
of Stalin's Passing from Power (PSB D-24).

This plan is designed to study the actions the United States should take to develop the maximum psychological results at the time of Stalin's death.

G. Preliminary Analysis of the Communist B.W.
Propaganda Campaign (PSB D-25).

This study concerns itself with the psychological problems which the current "Hate America" communist propaganda campaign have presented.

H. Statement of U.S. Aims in the Cold War
("Princeton Statement" - PSB D-26)

This paper was designed to devise the maximum psychological effect which could be achieved by a statement of high U.S. or foreign officials relative to the liberation of peoples now under Soviet Communist control.

I. Psychological Strategy Plan for the
Pro-US Orientation of Japan (PSB D-27)

This plan is designed to develop a psychological strategy for coordinated psychological operations to strengthen Japan and other non-communist power in Asia. It would promote Japan's economic and military capacity to contribute to collective security, assure Japan's continuing commitment to close association and joint action with the U.S. and would assist in restoring Japan to a position of strength in a cooperative endeavor to secure the non-communist nations of Asia from communist subversion or attack.

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J. Psychological Strategy for Economic Security
Vis-a-vis the Soviet Orbit (PSB D-28)

This plan is designed to prepare national psychological strategy and specific courses of action with respect to the psychological aspects of U.S. economic security programs concerned with the Soviet orbit by increasing the

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degree of acceptance in the Free World of U.S. economic security objectives vis-a-vis the Soviet orbit. It also seeks to weaken Soviet control over the orbit countries by capitalizing on and obstructing Soviet economic exploitation of captive Europe and China through psychological operations.

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25. A weekly newsreel unattributed to USIS was inaugurated during the year. It is now distributed in the Middle and Far East in 20 language editions to 16 countries.

Information Center Service

26. A book publishing corporation, including on its board of directors distinguished American publishers, was organized with a capital furnished by IIA, of \$750,000. Its first area of attention will be translations into Arabic.

27. Utilization of books to achieve psychological objectives was expanded through:

- (a) a presentation program totalling 2,010,000 volumes;
- (b) greater use of loan collections in government offices, universities and other community centers;
- (c) circulating packet libraries.

28. The number of information centers operated by USIS overseas was increased during the year by 38, for a total of 193 centers.

Educational Exchange Service

29. The selection of grantees was sharpened to focus greater psychological impact on established high priority target groups. Special efforts are being made by overseas missions to keep in touch with grantees in their return to their native lands.

Evaluation

30. The central Evaluation staff was made directly responsible to the Administrator of IIA to increase its objective viewpoint by removing it from planning and programming operations.

31. A series of evaluation studies and surveys have been completed. Many of these were contracted for with private research organizations which operate in foreign countries through indigenous research groups and individuals.

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32. Extensive surveys into communication habits and their relation to political and social motivations are being conducted in several countries, notably Brazil, Mexico, India and Panama.

C. Progress Towards Objectives

The degree to which a series of specific actions have contributed to the creation of a given psychological situation can not be measured. The broadcasts, news files, pamphlets, posters, exhibits, motion pictures, translations, library facilities and leader and student exchanges sponsored by the United States Government constitute only a small part of the sum of influences affecting the attitudes of an individual, a group or the government of another agency. Moreover, the official propaganda of the United States is itself only a projection of decisions taken and measures executed in the other fields of national and informational activity -- political, diplomatic, economic, military. Propaganda can seek to put these decisions and actions in the best light, but it can not far exceed their inherent limitations. Neither can it shut out from the minds and the emotions of other peoples the influences directed at them from other sources. An estimate as to how nearly a psychological task has been carried out and to what extent a series of planned actions contributed must therefore be highly qualified.

4. PLANS COMPLETED TO DATE

A. Plans awaiting execution.

(a) Substantive

1. Plans to deal with the special problems in the relationship between United States troops in Germany and the German civilian population.
2. Plans for fairs and congresses in Berlin.
3. Plans to increase the power of the RIAS station in Berlin.

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(b) Operational

1. The portion of the Radio Construction Program approved by the Congress but for which appropriations have not been made includes the following tentative projects carrying the code names of: Negate, Vagabond "B", Vagabond "C", George Ocean, Peter, Mike, King and Tare.

2. The following ten projects prepared in accordance with NSC Action No. 575--A, and approved by the Bureau of the Budget for submission to Congress, but for which the necessary funds were not authorized.

(i) Support for a book publishing and export house. As reported in 3.B(25) above, the corporation has begun to prepare Arabic translations. World-wide use of the book corporation awaits further monies to be authorized by the Congress.

(ii) A four-fold mass communication project involving several media divisions. It was to consist essentially of:

(aa) travel and study grants to popular writers from 30 priority countries,

(bb) an exchange involving some ninety individuals in the field of radio from 30 priority countries.

(cc) an exchange involving some 150 individuals in the field of press and publications, on the working level,

(dd) bringing four-man teams to the United States

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(cc) an exchange involving some 150 individuals in the field of press and publications, on the working level,

(dd) bringing four-man teams to the United States from countries where the motion picture industry is either non-existence or poorly organized.

(iv) Feature films produced in and for countries of the Middle and Far East to combat neutralism and

addressed to youth.

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(v) Establish 17 positions throughout the Far and Middle East, to work to convey our psychological message principally through folk customs, folk-tales and folklore.

(vi) Special publication of 78,000,000 cartoon books with a propaganda message, directed at priority target groups in Latin America, and 6,000,000 copies of "An Outline of American History."

(vii) Exhibits of democracy, consisting mainly of four truck-mounted traveling exhibits and sponsored exhibits at 25 major fairs.

(viii) Interchange of local employees between IBS in New York and local employees overseas.

(ix) Research and technical developments in the field of electro-magnetics, better to equip IIA's radio operations in the "electro-magnetic war" with the Soviet Union.

(x) Financial support to implement the plan to increase popular acceptance of American troops abroad.

3. Establish two regional press and publication centers: one in the Middle East, tentatively scheduled for Bierut, the other in Latin America, tentatively scheduled for Panama.

B. Stand-by Plans

(a) Substantive

1. Two plans for psychological operations with reference to Korean armistice negotiations.

(b) Operational

1. A plan to provide for psychological actions should the Soviet Union increase its efforts to isolate Berlin.

5. PLANS IN PREPARATION OR STUDY

A. Substantive

1. Psychological operations in the event of war.
2. The concept of freedom,
3. The role of labor and free trade-unionism in a free society.
4. Colonialism and its relation to evolution of non-self-governing peoples.
5. The nature and function of land reform as an element in the evolution of non-self-governing peoples.
6. American culture as a factor making acceptable abroad the leadership role of the United States.
7. Free enterprise as a significant element in American society, history and development.
8. Racial problems as a factor in propaganda.

B. Operational

1. To further improve the training of personnel in the field of psychological operations.
2. To use nationals of third countries to carry the United States psychological message to a given country. The problems are legal as well as financial.
3. To use the Buddhist monastic orders to carry the United States psychological message in countries where Buddhism is significant, including China.
4. To improve the conditions under which foreigners visit the United States. There are some indications that the exchange of persons program is nearing saturation under the present statutory limits on per diem allowances, the present immigration legislation governing the issuance of visas and the present internal revenue regulations which levy tax on earned incomes of trainees.

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5. To develop further the use of folk songs, folklore, folk tales, itinerant story-tellers, and other non-literate and pre-literate folk media to carry our message.
6. To supply newsprint to friendly publishers abroad.
7. To bridge the gap in understanding between Asia and the rest of the world, Europe included.
8. To determine use of three dimensional moving pictures in the media operations of IIA.
9. To incorporate the findings of evaluation into operations.
10. To aid the appropriate German governmental agencies to prepare courses in troop indoctrination, and to prepare a democratic citizens army.
11. To meet the problem presented, should the Soviets raise troops in East Germany.
12. To use unconventional media and techniques in special situations.
13. To determine the influence of quantitative or qualitative food deficiencies on group attitudes.

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SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

The Department of Defense in its first status report to the Psychological Strategy Board outlines its obligations and responsibilities within the national program and describes the activities that have been undertaken. The Department of Defense notes that in the President's directive creating the Psychological Strategy Board and in the request of the National Security Council for Department of Defense participation in the preparation of a progress report, there is a clear indication that the Defense Department has a role in psychological operations beyond that of war planning or support for other agencies in the psychological operations field as requested by them. The Department of Defense notes, however, that a detailed delineation of the responsibilities implied has required a substantial amount of new and preliminary planning. It notes also that detailed responsibilities in some areas of cold war psychological operations are still in the stage of development and have not been entirely defined at the present time.

It follows, therefore, that the Department of Defense in outlining its activities, has placed greatest emphasis upon war planning and supporting operations.

Responsibilities

The Department of Defense responsibilities in the conduct of psychological operations are cited in NSC 127, 59/1, 10/2, 10/5, and the Presidential Directive of April 4, 1951. NSC 127 states that "the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in conformity with established national policy and PSB guidance.....shall be responsible for planning and

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execution of U. S. psychological operations in military theaters of operations" except in "...territory of a government which exercises civil authority and to which a U. S. diplomatic mission is accredited..." The Department of Defense under the requirements of the other references cited is assigned a coordinating or membership responsibility in the several interdepartmental committees and organizations established in connection with psychological operations. Under these provisions, the Deputy Secretary of Defense serves as a member of the Psychological Strategy Board along with a representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as principal military adviser. The Department of Defense participates in the activities of the Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee. The Department of Defense is represented on the consultant committees established under the provisions of NSC 10/2 and 10/5.

Beyond this participation in the policy and planning activities of psychological operations, responsibility for which is generally vested in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the defined functional responsibilities of the Department of Defense relate principally to war-time activities or war planning, and are divided into the following categories: (1) psychological warfare, and (2) unconventional warfare, including covert operations.

Responsibilities within the Department for the above functions have been allotted to the following: (1) Joint Chiefs of Staff, (2) Commanders under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and (3) the Services.

A joint agency set up within the Joint Staff under the direction and control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is responsible in general for the coordination of the psychological warfare plans and preparations of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The commanders under the Joint Chiefs of Staff are responsible for the actual conduct of psychological warfare operations by their forces. The commanders are specifically

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that the military commander can keep informed of CIA peacetime plans and operations to the extent necessary to ensure that they do not interfere with the accomplishment of his mission.

Current Operations

The Department of Defense through the JCS Commander for the Far East has engaged in psychological warfare activities under the provisions of present policy in Korea. It has concluded that psychological warfare in Korea has effected substantial savings in manpower and material.

It has participated in the development of psychological operations support activities under the Department of State for the Korean truce negotiations, and has achieved a significantly increased acceptance of tactical psychological warfare on the part of the combat arms. PSB plans "SHANKILL," "TORRENTIAL," and "AFFILIATE" have been used by the Department of Defense as guidances in the preparation of its plans for psychological warfare in Korea. A series of operational contingency plans have been prepared by the Commander-in-Chief in the Far East (CINCFE) in support of the PSB plans. The Department is also providing support for approved programs for covert operations, including facilities, personnel and materiel. Overt propaganda activities are utilizing a radio broadcasting and leaflet group, a loudspeaker and a leaflet company and for air support a special flight. Jet aces of the Korean war have been successfully exploited for psychological purposes.

In addition to actual psychological warfare operations in Korea, the Department of Defense is engaged in preparing psychological warfare and unconventional warfare plans in support of strategic war plans in other areas in accordance with national policies. In connection with this work, representatives of the Department are participating in inter-departmental and international planning in the NATO organization.

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Examination and implementation of Department of Defense capabilities in connection with support of psychological operations in the cold war is also under way.

Psychological operations plans of the Department in time of war call for the activation and employment of eight radio broadcasting and leaflet groups, eleven loudspeaker and leaflet companies and seven air resupply and communications wings, of which three radio broadcasting and leaflet groups, four loudspeaker and leaflet companies and two air resupply and communications wings are at present activated.

Orientation in psychological operations is being given in war colleges and command and staff schools. In addition, selected personnel for psychological operations assignments are given further training in Service schools designed for that purpose.

Comments: Deficiencies of the National Psychological Program

The Department of Defense believes that the developing national psychological strategy should clarify the role and obligations of the military establishment in psychological operations, and should provide for more effective psychological operations support to necessary military programs.

Specifically, the Department of Defense suggests that the national psychological program should include provision for more extensive support of the national military effort through the development of programs which will consider:

- (1) fostering abroad a psychological attitude which will endorse

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- (1) fostering abroad a psychological attitude which will endorse or at least accept the use of all types of new weapons when they are required;
- (2) exploiting the psychological effects of atomic tests; and
- (3) establishing national objectives and clarifying department and agency responsibilities governing psychological operations during the cold war.

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The Department of Defense considers that the nation's military establishment can render more effective support to the national psychological program if its wartime potentials are exploited to the maximum during the cold war period. In addition to providing needed training for psychological warfare activities of the Services, such participation could make a significant contribution at the present time. Included in such participation could be provisions for appropriate show of force in the form of military demonstrations, utilization of existing psychological warfare units, for cold war operations, and additional support for covert operations.

The Department of Defense stipulates that its programs and activities both at home and abroad are designed primarily to achieve military ends. It notes, however, that many, if not all, of these activities have an inherent psychological impact. While certain planning designed to maximize the advantageous psychological effect of such programs has been undertaken, and certain planning has been completed designed to minimize the adverse psychological effect of necessary military activities, more consideration of these aspects is indicated.

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SUMMARY OF A REPORT BY
FIELD STAFF REPRESENTATIVES OF
THE MUTUAL SECURITY AGENCY

Western Europe

This report places its major emphasis on the psychological reaction, particularly in Western Europe, to the shift in the main purpose of United States aid from economic recovery and development to military defense. This shift is considered to have had a number of important psychological results, generally adverse to United States interests. Certain conclusions concerning operations are drawn from analysis of the changed psychological situation, notably that United States propaganda operations are too conspicuously identified as such, and that, accordingly, development of covert propaganda is indispensable.

Chief among the psychological changes reported are the following:

(1) The closely related attitudes of political neutralism and anti-Americanism have increased in strength, particularly in France but also in the United Kingdom and other parts of Western Europe. Some of this sentiment reflects resentment over the presence of American troops and military bases; some of it reflects anxiety over the supposed "belligerency" of United States policy. It is pointed out that more Europeans this year than last (though still a minority) believe that, if a third World War occurs, America rather than Russia will be the aggressor.

(2) Whether sincerely or not, Europeans tend to attribute their current economic dislocations to United States rearmament policy, and increasingly question the ability of the European economy to sustain a

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(2) Whether sincerely or not, Europeans tend to attribute their current economic dislocations to United States rearmament policy, and increasingly question the ability of the European economy to sustain a further rearmament burden.

(3) The involvement of the European unity movement with the rearmament program, primarily through the EDC project, has become the main psychological obstacle to further progress toward European unification. In particular, it has directly contributed to the delay in implementation of the Schuman Plan.

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(4) In the United Kingdom, a powerful Bevanite minority has emerged in the Labor party opposing the alleged subjection of Britain to United States foreign policy. Among its chief arguments are that the defense effort conflicts seriously with the social services, and that rearmament (particularly as applied to Western Germany) is likely to provoke war.

In summary, it is held that the European response to the rearmament policy constitutes a psychological obstacle to the purposes of United States aid to Europe and reduces the effectiveness of United States support of European unity. It is felt that many Europeans tend to ignore the basic purpose of the rearmament policy -- namely, to create a framework of security for the development and expansion of European economic and social standards begun under the Marshall Plan.

Operational measures taken to meet this situation include:

(1) a reorientation of the MSA information output to give primary emphasis to NATO and military defense (including a special program in support of EDC ratification);

(2) a great increase in the proportion of MSA informational activities which are channeled through European governmental and private groups (now as much as 80 or 90 per cent);

(3) extensive MSA support of the NATO information program;

(4) considerable progress toward the goal of full integration of MSA information operations with those of USIS in Europe, on both country and regional levels.

The report suggests the desirability of further steps along the following lines:

(1) Full recognition among United States officials that the change from ECA economic aid to MSA defense aid has resulted in a change in the psychological climate in which United States aid operations must be carried out;

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(2) Further development of the trend away from United States information activities overtly identified as such, and corresponding development of covert propaganda activities.

(3) Efforts to strengthen the propaganda effort of NATO, to the extent that the reluctance of European member governments permits this.

Soviet Orbit in Europe

Although no MSA activities are directed specifically at the Soviet Orbit, some MSA-supported radio broadcasting and other information activities in Western Europe reach into the Orbit countries.

The report suggests that the Marshall Plan had considerable psychological impact behind the iron curtain, where people appeared to feel that the "grass was growing greener on the other side of the fence" and communist propaganda had to combat this view. On the other hand, the shift of emphasis to military can be used by communist leaders as "confirmation" of their long-standing charge that the Marshall Plan masked aggressive intentions. However, the same signs of growing military strength may reassure those people in the Orbit countries who yearn for liberation.

Near East and Africa

MSA information activities in this area are limited to contributions to the work of the Franco-American Committee, which operates under the supervision of the Embassy. No evaluative comments on this activity are made in the report.

Southeast Asia and Korea

The chief obstacles to public acceptance of the United States and its

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The chief obstacles to public acceptance of the United States and its objectives in these areas are listed as:

- (1) the history of the white man in Asia;
- (2) current United States commitments;
- (3) the unpopularity of some elements supported by the United States;
- (4) communications difficulties; and
- (5) illiteracy

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These factors increase the difficulty of identifying the United States with local aspirations rather than with imperialism. The United States is reported to be regarded generally as a defender of the status quo.

MSA and TCA social and economic aid programs are believed to generate some favorable opinion. On the other hand, it is felt that military aid is likely to have the opposite effect unless it is properly presented. As in Europe, communist propagandists in Asia have gained some credibility for their accusations by exploiting United States military aid programs.

The report makes the following suggestions:

(1) The United States psychological effort in this area should place greater emphasis on specific local problems, primarily social and economic; and should explain United States policies (including military aid) in terms which correspond closely to the immediate aims of the peoples involved.

(2) High priority should be given to public participation in national development, so that the masses become understanding and responsible participants rather than mere spectators.

(3) Aid in the area should be offered only on reasonable conditions to which adherence should be demanded. The importance of the East-West conflict should not result in adoption of the principle of "aid at any price".

(4) Equal emphasis with anti-communism should be given to positive democratic values, and firm criticism should be made of those in the area who abuse such values. No concessions should be made to the chauvinism and xenophobia of immature nations.

(5) United States propaganda in the area should not over-emphasize cultural affairs at the expense of political warfare.

(6) America's ability to "deliver the goods" should be emphasized, in contrast to the inability of the U.S.S.R. to do so.

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SUMMARY OF A REPORT FROM THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

There has been some progress in achieving the national objectives set forth in NSC 10/2 and 10/5. This progress, however, has been slow and in most areas severely restricted, partly by the limited nature of available resources and capabilities, but even more by time limitations. It takes a long time to develop the apparatus and the trained personnel for covert activities and the development of concepts and doctrine of the kind discussed in this report. The United States has been engaged in covert activities for too brief a period, and therefore present developments fall far short of ultimate potential.

EUROPE

In France and Italy, CIA reports that Soviet power and influence apparently are being contained. Increased and more effective covert psychological operations in Western Europe may account for the increasingly violent and indiscriminate nature of the Soviet and indigenous Communist propaganda barrage against the anti-Communist organizations in that area.

CIA's support of activities related to the French national election of June 1951 was credited by the U. S. Ambassador to France at that time with having contributed materially to the success of the Central parties and the slight reduction of the Communist national vote. In the Italian administrative elections of May 1952, CIA influence was generally instrumental in

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In Western Germany CIA has in the past year developed capabilities for influencing youth, labor, and political splinter parties through the utilization of political action groups with widely diversified enrollment. Future effort in this field will concentrate on promoting anti-Communist trade union movements, and support for European unity. CIA also influenced the successful ratification of the Schuman Plan by the Bundestag and its popular acceptance by the West German people. Activities are now being continued to bring about Bundestag ratification and popular acceptance of the contractual agreements and of EDC.

In Eastern Europe, Soviet power and influence have not been reduced to any measurable extent. However, U.S. capabilities for future covert operations have increased, particularly in Poland and East Germany. Recent covert operations have revealed that the Communist authorities do not have complete control of the situation in these countries, and that the area can be successfully penetrated. Thanks to much valuable experience gained in the techniques of covert psychological warfare and political action in Eastern Europe, CIA now possesses capabilities for influencing large segments of labor, youth, refugees, persecutees, women, religious groups, and political parties.

In the satellite countries of Southeastern Europe, CIA capabilities for psychological operations have increased considerably, though Soviet power and influence have not been reduced in the area.

The power and influence of the Kremlin within the USSR has not been affected by U.S. covert activities, and short-term possibilities in this direction are so slight as to be insignificant. CIA's effort in this area is now being focused on progressively developing capabilities for long-term exploitation.

Pointing out that present policy provides for U.S. support of anti-regime resistance of the Great Russians, CIA sees a definite need for resolving the

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policy question of the extent to which it will be permitted to support clandestinely and exploit operationally any group or individual actively interested in the destruction of the Bolshovik regime.

MIDDLE EAST

A decline in U.S. capabilities throughout most of the Middle East is noted, though this is felt to be only temporary. To some extent, the decrease in U.S. covert capabilities in the Middle East is attributed to the policy conflict arising out of U.S. support for the maintenance of France's position in North Africa, which has psychological repercussions throughout the African, Arab, and Asian worlds. Similarly, an impediment to U.S. capabilities in the area is found in the disparity of our attitudes toward Israel and the Arab States despite a stated policy of impartiality.

In the particularly important field of the Moslem world, some progress has been achieved along the following lines:

1. In utilizing nationalist forces for our own purposes, by endeavoring to direct them away from their more destructive tendencies and into channels which will be relatively compatible with U.S. interests; namely, to endeavor to turn the force of nationalism against the Communists, to direct it against political corruption, to focus it upon demands for social reform and economic progress.
2. In stimulating an increased awareness among the religious hierarchy of the threat of international Communism;
3. In increasing the degree of understanding of the status of Moslems living inside the Soviet orbit; and
4. In laying the groundwork for further expanded activities along similar lines. Progress will continue to be slow in this field because of the most delicate and dangerous aspect of Near Eastern affairs from the point of view of foreign intervention.

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FAR EAST

Support of the Chinese Nationalist Government on Formosa is described as the most significant program now being undertaken by CIA in the Far East, where the Agency is also actively supporting the military authorities in Korea, and laying the groundwork for penetration of Manchuria and North China.

While, on balance, the U.S. has achieved some psychological gains in the overt field (Treaty of Peace with Japan, Pacific Military Alliances, etc.), Soviet power has not been measurably reduced in the Far Eastern areas under its dominance, and that progress toward our objectives in the field of covert activities has been negligible, except in Japan. There, CIA's activities directed toward discrediting Soviet Russia, Communist China, the Japanese Communist Party, and Communism in general, are having some success.

KOREA

CIA regards coordinating machinery between civilian and military authorities in the field of psychological warfare as inadequate in certain respects. A coordinating mechanism (CCRAK) was set up, for example, but failed to include the operations of USIE services in Korea. Close cooperation with the military exists in the field on intelligence and tactical psychological warfare measures. However, a completely effective coordination of two major strategic plans with respect to Korea has not been realized with respect to coordination of command and logistical support, but steps are being taken to remedy this situation. These are expected to result in some modifications of CIA's responsibilities to ensure that CIA does not commit itself to actions which are beyond its present or anticipated capabilities.

LATIN AMERICA

Despite evidence that the Soviet Union is now placing greater emphasis on its covert mechanisms in Latin America, U.S. covert capabilities have substantially increased there, through the expansion of personnel facilities during the past year. Such expansion, it is planned, may increasingly turn toward the formation of support of indigenous, nationalistic, free-enterprise

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groups, or political parties. Some substantial results in combating pro-Communist and anti-American influences have been achieved through covert means in Chile, Brazil, Uruguay, Mexico, and Panama. It is to be noted that Latin America is an area unique for the United States, because of the overt Good Neighbor and non-intervention policies of long standing, and in the powerful reasons necessitating those overt policies. The security of covert operations and the further development of policy and management systems which protect such security both in Washington and in the field are of peculiar importance for this area. Therefore, CIA capabilities have been developed to be operative only under special conditions.

AFRICA

In Africa a beginning has been made in laying the groundwork for future activities to check Communist efforts to get control over the colored races; but this work has so far been purely preparatory and no progress toward actual achievement in that field is recorded.

GENERAL

In general, CIA emphasizes the importance of setting up increased capabilities, particularly in the form of thoroughly-trained American and indigenous personnel and long term cover mechanisms. An apparent need exists for establishing at all possible points radio broadcast facilities capable of reaching the USSR.

CIA's capabilities need to be reinforced for building up an apparatus capable of long-term exploitation against the Chinese Communist regime. For the shorter terms CIA has had only very limited success in the penetration either of either of Communist China or the USSR itself.

CIA points up the vital importance of VOA as constituting at present the only effective means the U.S. possesses for conducting psychological operation within the confines of the USSR. Covert penetration has been carried out

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primarily for the purpose of procuring intelligence, and because of the rigid controls impeding the movement of agents inside that country, no psychological warfare under present conditions can be undertaken in the USSR by any other medium except radio.

Through its covert channels CIA has discovered that VOA broadcasts have been audible in the USSR throughout 1950 and 1951. Although Soviet jamming has considerably reduced the audibility of these broadcasts, nevertheless information obtained from returning German prisoners of war and Soviet refugees and defectors indicates that considerable segments of the Soviet peoples continue to listen to VOA broadcasts despite technical difficulties and personal risk. Some of these refugees have criticised the VOA broadcasts for not being sufficiently forceful and for devoting a considerable portion of the programs to irrelevant matters not bearing directly on the current East-West struggle. Furthermore, ethnic groups such as the Ukrainians have complained that the broadcasts are not sufficiently representative of the desires and aspirations of the minority groups within the USSR. But when all this is said, the fact remains that information obtained by CIA indicates that the VOA broadcasts do play an important role in reminding the peoples of the Soviet Union that there is an alternative way of life, and in providing them with hope of ultimate liberation.

Despite a marked increase in the amount of radio propaganda indirectly aimed at encouraging Soviet defectors, there was no increase in the number of said defectors over the past year. Greater emphasis on the psychological utilization of defectors, particularly as the core of covert activist cadres would be desirable.

In Western Europe especially, there was marked progress in CIA's efforts to work through various anti-Communist groups - both urban and rural. At the same time, there have as yet been no very tangible results from attempts

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to penetrate indigenous Communist parties. On the other hand, efforts to combat Communist influence in the labor unions, particularly through encouraging anti-Communist labor organizations, have met with considerable success, primarily in France and Italy so far, and the view is expressed that capabilities in this direction should be increased.

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PLANNING ACTIVITIES OF
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
THROUGH 30 JUNE 1952

1. PLANS COMPLETED AND BEING EXECUTED

A. Psychological Operations Plan for the Reduction
of Communist Power in France. (PSB D-14/c).

This plan and the corresponding one for Italy (Paragraph 1B) were developed by the same PSB planning panel and actions under both plans are being coordinated by the same group. Both plans resulted from extensive inquiry during the summer and fall of 1951, as a result of which the Board concluded that the French and Italian communist apparati, the two most powerful in Western Europe, constituted a serious threat to American foreign policy and to NATO plans for defense of Western Europe. In consequence, the Board prescribed specific courses of action for reduction of communist power in both France and Italy.

Upon approval of both plans on February 21, 1952, a Washington inter-departmental coordinating committee was established under the chairmanship of a member of the PSB staff, and comparable panels were established in Paris and Rome. These groups are in communication with each other with respect to implementation of the plans.

Analysis of the communist position in both France and Italy resulted in the conclusion that in both countries the primary source of communist power was in their organized control over trade unions. Therefore, the main emphasis in both plans is devoted to reduction of communist power over trade unions and the encouragement of the free trade union movement. The most important actions that can be taken in both countries are for the government

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With regard to the French plan, progress toward achieving the major objectives appears hopeful under the present Pinay Government. Unlike its

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predecessors, the Pinay Government has demonstrated far more courage and affirmative leadership, and on its own initiative, has been moving vigorously against the Communists within the last two months. However, this is no guarantee of stability. The government has given us assurances that it will continue this campaign and that it intends to take specific action to reduce communist power in the trade union field. While making known to the government our continuing interest in this problem, we have withheld more affirmative participation and are watching the French initiative with hope in its promise for the future.

B. Psychological Operations Plan for the Reduction
of Communist Power in Italy. (FSB D-15/b).

As stated in connection with the similar plan for reduction of communist power in France reported in the previous paragraph, this plan was approved by the Board on February 21, 1952. Development of the plan, which was in conjunction with the development of the French plan, is reported on in the previous paragraph.

With regard to progress concerning the achievement of the objectives of the Italian plan, since September 1951 we have made high level representations expressing our concern over the continued strength of communist power in Italy and the DeGasperi Government has repeatedly assured us that it intends to take vigorous measures to reduce the strength and influence of the communist movement. Up to the May 1952 elections, the government had done very little along these lines and, particularly, had not moved against the main sources of communist power in the trade union field.

The local elections throughout Italy in 1951 and 1952 indicated no diminution and perhaps a slight increase of electoral support for the communist-left socialist bloc. Since the 1948 national elections when the

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Since the May elections we have received renewed and more positive assurances that the government means to move against the communists and there

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have been indications of formal action. The government will put its main reliance on new legislation. The situation now appears more promising and hopeful than it has been for a long time, but we are awaiting positive results. Since the communists appear to be avoiding the provocation of the Italian Government, we are hopeful that the latter will take positive action on its own initiative.

C. Psychological Operations Plan for Soviet
Orbit Escapees - Phase "A" (PSB D-18a).

This plan, approved by PSB December 20, 1951, includes programs to care for and resettle current escapees, and envisages maximum possible utilization of escapees in CIA programs and under Public Law 51 (Lodge Amendment), which permits recruitment of escapees into the U.S. Armed Forces. For discussion of Phase "B" see paragraph 3A.

On April 7, pursuant to approval by the President, \$4.3 million dollars were made available by the Director of Mutual Security to the Department of State, which had been given responsibility for the program.

The time since funds were made available has been used to build the organization and staff for the continuing administration of the program; and to identify and care for the most urgent immediate needs of escapees.

Organization. Small staffs are being established and activities have begun in each of the countries which border the iron curtain. A regional office in HICOG and a policy and coordination unit in the Department of State have been established.

Resettlement and Supplemental Care. A general contract was signed on June 16, 1952, with the Provisional Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe (PICMME, an international body organized in November, 1951) for the overseas

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Projects have been authorized to care for urgent immediate needs of escapees resident in Greece, Germany, Austria, Turkey and Italy, such as

food, clothing, shoes, repair and decontamination of barracks, medical treatment and the like. In every country of operation the immediate needs of the escapees are being met.

Propaganda Utilization. No general propaganda utilization of the plans and activities of the escapee program is now contemplated by State Department. Newsworthy projects and assistance to key individuals will be used in media reaching iron curtain areas when appropriate. When the program has greater accomplishments to point to, the State Department plans more general treatment. Similar policies govern domestic information activity.

Funds. Of the initial authorization of \$4,300,000 an estimated \$1,500,000 was obligated during the fiscal year 1952. An additional \$1,460,500 is being requested to cover an increase in the estimated number of escapees already requiring assistance.

Accomplishment of Other Purposes. As requested under this phase of the plan the Department of Defense has somewhat liberalized the conditions under which escapees may be recruited under the authorization of the Lodge Amendment. Of 5194 applications, 3916 have been rejected, 295 have been accepted (262 on active duty) and 982 are being processed.

The program has not proceeded far enough to make a significant number of referrals to CIA for use in its programs.

D. Public Statements with Respect to Certain Weapons. (PSB D-17d)

In February 1952, following a series of conflicting statements by public officials as to atomic and related developments, the PSB approved and forwarded to the Executive Secretary, NSC, recommendations for a guidance to appropriate agencies on public statements with respect to certain weapons. On 9 May 1952 a memorandum on this subject was issued by the President setting forth the criteria recommended by the PSB and directing compliance therewith. At present the PSB staff is reviewing the action which has been taken by the agencies and the effect of the application of the criteria.

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2. PLANS COMPLETED BUT NOT YET BEING EXECUTED - STAND-BY PLANS

A. Psychological Operations Plan Incident to
Korean Cease-Fire Negotiations (PSB D-7c).

Approved by the Psychological Strategy Board on October 25, 1951.

This plan is designed to establish special psychological objectives to be implemented toward our allies as well as our adversaries, with respect to the Korean conflict. Some of the desired courses of action are at present in effect, but the majority of the recommended actions are directly related to the progress made in connection with the cease-fire.

The operational planning is substantially complete. An alert network has been established among the affected agencies so that the appropriate action can be put into effect without delay as developments make this necessary.

B. Emergency Plan for Breakoff of Korean Armistice
Negotiations (PSB J-19d).

Approved by the Psychological Strategy Board on September 18, 1951

This plan endeavors to establish for governmental departments and agencies engaged in psychological operations courses of action for application in preparation for, and in the event of, a breakdown in the Korean armistice negotiations.

The operational planning is substantially complete. The receipt of certain assurances from the Far Eastern Command with respect to logistical support is necessary in order that the affected agencies can establish the appropriate contingent plan without delay, should developments make this

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C. Plan for Conducting Psychological Operations
During General Hostilities (PSB D-8b).

This project was approved by the Board on February 21, 1952 and submitted to the National Security Council as NSC 127.

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This plan was designed in order that the proper agencies would be able to conduct psychological operations in pursuance of prescribed national objectives during general hostilities. This plan shall be executed upon Presidential proclamation in the event of war or at such time as the President may direct.

D. National Overt Propaganda Policy Guidance
for General War (PSB D-11/b).

Approved by the Board on November 15, 1951.

This plan sets forth the objectives which will govern the national overt propaganda effort in a general war forced upon the United States by the USSR or any of its satellites. The objectives and tasks which should be followed by the United States with respect to the world as a whole, the USSR and its satellites, our allies and friends, and neutral nations are set forth.

This guidance has been distributed to the various departments and agencies for their use. The Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee (POC) has established an X-Day Committee which is concerned with the inter-departmental coordination of policies and operations in the event of war. This guidance is being used in the implementation of their planning.

3. PLANS AUTHORIZED AND IN PROCESS OF DEVELOPMENT

A. Psychological Operations Plan for Soviet
Orbit Escapees - Phase "B" (PSB D-18a/1)

This project is concerned with the stimulation of defection and examination of the psychological and subsidiary military advantages which would result from the proper utilization of these escapees. Phase A, concerned

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B. Inventory of Instrumentalities for Countering
Soviet Orbit Blackmail Tactics. (PSB D-19/1).

The Board has had prepared an "Inventory of Cold War Weapons" consisting of a list of certain agencies and instrumentalities (some of which are of a

novel character). The Board has further directed study toward the feasibility of harassment and retaliation against the Soviets by use of appropriate instrumentalities.

C. Psychological Operations Plan Prescribing Specific Courses of Action with Respect to Germany (PSB D-21a)

This plan is designed to prescribe certain courses of action with respect to: (a) the integration of Western Germany into Western Europe, (b) the reduction of Soviet capabilities in Eastern Germany, (c) the achievement of German unity, and (d) the role of a unified Germany in the unification of Europe.

D. Psychological Strategy Planning for the Middle East (PSB D-22).

This plan is to devise by means of coordinated psychological operations a national psychological plan, taking into account both long-range and short-range considerations, in order to overcome or prevent instability within this area which would threaten Western interests. It seeks to prevent the extension of Soviet influence and at the same time to strengthen Western influence and to establish within the community of nations a new relationship with the states of the area that recognizes their desire to achieve status and respects their sovereign equality.

E. Psychological Strategy Planning for Southeast Asia (PSB D-23)

This plan is designed to assist by means of coordinated psychological operations in preventing the free countries of Southeast Asia from passing into the Communist orbit and in developing in these countries the will and ability to resist Communism from within and without, and to contribute to the strengthening of the free world.

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F. Psychological Operations Plan for the Exploitation
of Stalin's Passing from Power (PSB D-24).

This plan is designed to study the actions the United States should take to develop the maximum psychological results at the time of Stalin's death.

G. Preliminary Analysis of the Communist B.W.
Propaganda Campaign (PSB D-25).

This study concerns itself with the psychological problems which the current "Hate America" communist propaganda campaign have presented.

H. Statement of U.S. Aims in the Cold War
("Princeton Statement" - PSB D-26)

This paper was designed to devise the maximum psychological effect which could be achieved by a statement of high U.S. or foreign officials relative to the liberation of peoples now under Soviet Communist control.

I. Psychological Strategy Plan for the
Pro-US Orientation of Japan (PSB D-27)

This plan is designed to develop a psychological strategy for coordinated psychological operations to strengthen Japan and other non-communist power in Asia. It would promote Japan's economic and military capacity to contribute to collective security, assure Japan's continuing commitment to close association and joint action with the U.S. and would assist in restoring Japan to a position of strength in a cooperative endeavor to secure the non-communist nations of Asia from communist subversion or attack.

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J. Psychological Strategy for Economic Security
Vis-a-vis the Soviet Orbit (PSB D-28)

This plan is designed to prepare national psychological strategy and specific courses of action with respect to the psychological aspects of U.S. economic security programs concerned with the Soviet orbit by increasing the

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degree of acceptance in the Free World of U.S. economic security objectives vis-a-vis the Soviet orbit. It also seeks to weaken Soviet control over the orbit countries by capitalizing on and obstructing Soviet economic exploitation of captive Europe and China through psychological operations.

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PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD

Washington

PROGRESS REPORT ON THE NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFORT
FOR THE PERIOD JULY 1, 1952, THROUGH SEPTEMBER 30, 1952

Submitted to the President and the National Security Council
by the Psychological Strategy Board

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PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD

Washington

PROGRESS REPORT ON THE NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFORT
FOR THE PERIOD JULY 1, 1952, THROUGH SEPTEMBER 30, 1952

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WARNING

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3 November 1952

Mr. James Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary
The National Security Council
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Lay:

I have the honor to transmit herewith to the President and the National Security Council a Progress Report on the National Psychological Effort for the period July 1, 1952 through September 30, 1952.

This is submitted in accordance with your "Memorandum to the Director of the Psychological Strategy Board - Status of United States Programs for National Security," dated May 29, 1952.

This Report was approved at the Sixteenth Meeting of the Psychological Strategy Board held October 30, 1952.

Sincerely yours,

Alan G. Kirk
Director

Enclosures;

PSB D-34, Copies 6 and 7

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PSB D-34
October 30, 1952

PROGRESS REPORT ON THE NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFORT
FOR THE PERIOD JULY 1, 1952, THROUGH SEPTEMBER 30, 1952

Submitted to the President and the National Security Council
by the Psychological Strategy Board

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* The Summary of the Report of the Central Intelligence Agency is
specially classified:

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I. SIGNIFICANT PSYCHOLOGICAL ACTIVITIES DURING THE PERIOD UNDER REVIEW

1. The Board presents below a brief evaluative summary of psychological activities during the reporting period on the part of the departments and agencies responsible for psychological operations.

Capabilities by Area

2. Some progress toward our psychological goals has been achieved in certain areas. Wide geographical gaps remain, however, in our capabilities for making an immediately effective psychological contribution to the reduction and retraction of Soviet power and influence. These gaps include the USSR itself, Communist China and most of the European satellites. In other areas there has been progress, especially in building capabilities for future development.

3. Radio broadcasting currently is the major active element being employed in the psychological field against the USSR. The Russian "jamming" continues to be a serious obstacle, and poses a problem in the whole field of communications. Insofar as Communist China is concerned, the situation is about the same but probably with less receptivity due to shortages of receiving facilities among the masses.

Anti-American Attitudes

4. In the free world and especially in Western Europe, specific grievances and generalized discontents continue to find expression in anti-American sentiments and resentments of overt United States propaganda and pressure. During the reporting period a substantial increase

was made

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present situation contains both favorable and unfavorable elements that make the future uncertain. In the area as a whole, little progress in the psychological field can be reported for the quarter toward the achievement of national policy objectives. A notable contribution to the national psychological effort in the area, however, was the airlift by the United States Air Force of some 3,800 Moslem pilgrims from Beirut to Jidda.

Far East

7. In Southeast Asia, awareness of United States aid was increased appreciably during the reporting period by the psychological impact of TCA and MSA agricultural, public health, and other aid programs. Psychological capabilities in Southeast Asia have been expanded, especially in the non-attributable field, but little increase in current effectiveness is reported. The tendency in the area to identify the United States with European colonial powers, and with indigenous leadership groups which are opposed by revolutionary nationalist movements, continues to present a psychological obstacle. [In Japan, certain non-attributable activities in the labor field continue to make progress.]

Korea

8. Aside from direct psychological warfare in support of hostilities, the psychological effort in Korea has exerted pressure on the communists for an armistice and has stressed the principle of voluntary repatriation of prisoners of war. This principle has gained widespread acceptance in the non-communist world.

"Hate America" Propaganda

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"Hate America" Propaganda

9. All the reporting departments and agencies have been concerned with combatting the Soviet-Communist "Hate America" propaganda campaign. A large volume of guidance and support material on this subject was provided for both overt and non-attributable propaganda channels. Emphasis was placed on the absurdity and evil purpose of the hate campaign. Special steps were taken to coordinate the release by the Department of Defense and its components of information on biological and chemical warfare. The effectiveness of these activities cannot be gauged in isolation from other United States operations.

Military Assets for the "Cold War"

10. A number of actions and programs of the Department of Defense and the military services during the reporting period, particularly in Western Europe and the Middle East, illustrate the type of contribution these services can make to the national psychological effort. However, it is noted that there remains an unexploited potential for the use of military psychological warfare assets in support of approved national peacetime programs; but that considerable difficulty is encountered in exploiting this potential in the absence of specific authority and missions upon which military psychological activities in peacetime may be based. The feasibility of making such a delineation is under study.

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II. THE WORK OF PSB

General Activities

11. A paper dealing with the problem of a strategic concept with special reference to cold war operations under NSC 10/5 was completed and submitted to the Board. Pending development of capabilities and situations which may make it possible to envisage a final solution of the cold war, it proposed continued effort in the direction of building capabilities and effecting cumulative retraction of Soviet power.

12. A revised text of a statement was approved by the Board with the understanding that it might be "worked into an early speech" in order to provide current psychological operations in Eastern Europe with needed support without implying any more ambitious programs there.

13. The Board decided that intra-agency and inter-departmental coordination for social science research in support of psychological operations should be further developed and agreed to continued PSB association with this study.

Planning

14. During the period under review, the first comprehensive area plan to be undertaken by PSB was completed and submitted to the Board for approval. This paper, entitled "A National Psychological Strategy with Respect to Germany", lays down basic guidance for U. S. psychological operations aimed at furthering the integration of the German Federal Republic into the Western European Community, and other national objectives.

15. [A similar basic plan for another critical cold war area — Japan — was completed in draft form during the Quarter and circulated to the departments and agencies concerned for final comments before submission to the Board in the coming Quarter.]

16. Apart from

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16. Apart from their immediate importance in providing guidance for national psychological operations in two vital areas, these two plans proved valuable in developing and clarifying the novel concept of national psychological strategy planning. On the basis of the lessons derived from them, the Director's staff began a study aimed at improving the PSB planning process as a whole.

Coordination

17. During the Quarter, the Board's coordination function with respect to field implementation of the approved plans for France and Italy was furthered in two ways. The U. S. Ambassadors to these countries took advantage of a meeting in London to discuss fully mutual problems in connection with the plan, thereby assuring an interchange of their experiences on the subject; and a comprehensive re-study of the two plans was initiated both in the field and in Washington, with a view to determining the main lines of approved action to be stressed in the near future.

18. In anticipation of Board approval of the German plan, the Office of the High Commissioner for Germany organized a coordinating panel for implementation of the plan in the field.

Evaluation

19. Some progress was made during the Quarter in meeting the Board's responsibility for "evaluation of the national psychological effort". At the Board's direction, the Director's staff, in collaboration with the departments and agencies concerned, has undertaken an evaluation of the national psychological effort directed at Italy. The staff has also undertaken, as part of a larger government-wide economic policy study, an evaluation of the psychological impact of U. S. foreign economic policies in the United Kingdom. These projects should contribute

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additionally to the establishment of valid criteria and workable approaches for future evaluation activity.

20. Following is a detailed report on PSB planning activities for the Quarter:

21. Plans Completed and Being Executed

- (a). Psychological Operations Plan for the Reduction of Communist Power in France (PSB D-14/c), and
- (b). Psychological Operations Plan for the Reduction of Communist Power in Italy (PSB D-15/b)

(1) During the Quarter under review, the Washington inter-departmental committee and its counterparts in Paris and Rome continued to coordinate U. S. activities under these plans.

(2) According to Embassies Paris and Rome, the French and Italian governments have in recent months shown a disposition to take vigorous action to reduce communist power in their respective countries. Therefore, our Ambassadors are agreed that the United States should continue to remain in the background, while making known to both governments our concern that vigorous anti-communist action be pursued. They are also agreed that principal liaison should remain at the prime ministerial level.

(3) The Quarter saw what may prove to be a basic shift in communist tactics, reflected in both France and Italy, i.e., away from a policy of militancy and non-cooperation with non-communist groups and toward a policy of "respectability" and cooperation with non-communists. If such a shift persists, the willingness and ability of the French and Italian governments to take vigorous anti-communist action might be impaired. In turn, the U. S. would find it more difficult to influence these governments and their people

in taking

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in taking a strong anti-communist position.

(c) Psychological Operations Plan for
Soviet Orbit Escapees--Phase "A"
(PSB D-18/a)

(1) Organization under this plan, which is administered by the Department of State, was completed during the period under review. Figures for eligible escapees have been revised slightly, and now total 20,995 in the countries of reception, plus estimated arrivals of 429 per month. Projects authorized or underway include language and vocational training courses, a visa opportunity search, and registration and documentation of escapees, in addition to care for their urgent immediate needs.

(2) Resettlement is now in progress. Voluntary agencies have requested transportation for 860 escapees under the program. Actual departures number 295, while 508 are awaiting departure for overseas. Propaganda utilization has been made of individual cases of resettled escapees, both by the Voice of America and domestic news media. The Department of State has under development a propaganda plan for exploiting the escapee program as such.

(3) Funds obligated to the program through fiscal year 1953 now total \$6,291,760. This includes an initial authorization of \$4,300,000 in dollars and \$1,991,760 in counterpart funds.

(4) Accomplishment of other purposes of the program has been slight. The Department of Defense reports implementation of the Lodge Amendment as follows: applications for recruitment, 6008; rejections, 4847; acceptances, 395; scheduled for processing, 108; under review by CIC, 655. The Department of the Army does not contemplate any further liberalization of the conditions under which escapees may be recruited.

(d) Staff Study

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- (d) Staff Study--Preliminary Analysis
of the Communist LW Propaganda
Campaign with Recommendations
(PSB D-25/b)

This study, which is connected with the current "Hate America" communist propaganda campaign, was approved by the Board on August 7. Responsibility for undertaking and coordinating operational planning to deal with the problems raised in the study was assigned to the Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee. At PCC direction, a Working Group on Hate America Propaganda has been assigned to the problem.

22. Plans Completed But Not Yet Being Executed--Stand-By Plans

- (a) Psychological Operations Plan Incident
to Korean Cease-Fire Negotiations
(PSB D-7/c), and
- (b) Emergency Plan for Break-off of Korean
Armistice Negotiations (PSB J-19-d)

The first of these plans is designed to establish special psychological objectives with respect to our allies as well as to our adversaries, to be implemented in the event of successful cease-fire negotiations. The second plan endeavors to establish for government departments and agencies engaged in psychological operations courses of action in preparation for, and in the event of, a breakdown in the Korean armistice negotiations. Overt operational planning under both plans is substantially complete. Covert operational planning is currently being revised.

- (c) Plan for Conducting Psychological
Operations During General Hostilities
(PSB D-8/b), and

- (d) National Overt Propaganda Policy
Guidance for General War (PSB D-11/b)

Both the plan and the guidance have been distributed to the
various

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various departments and agencies for their use, and have been integrated by the military services with their war planning. Planning on inter-departmental problems relating to psychological policies and operations in the event of war is currently being accomplished by an X-Day Committee under the Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee.

23. Plans Authorized And In Process Of Development

(a) Psychological Operations Plan for
Soviet Orbit Escapees--Phase "B"
(PSB-D-18a/1)

This phase of the plan is concerned with the psychological and subsidiary military advantages which would result from the stimulation of defection together with the proper utilization of such escapees. Progress in drafting the final plan will be largely dependent on a decision as to what use will be made of the funds available under Section 101 (a)(1) of the Mutual Security Act. Phase "A", concerned with the care, resettlement and possible utilization of current escapees, is reported on above (see paragraph 21-c).

(b) A National Psychological Strategy
with Respect to Germany (PSB D-21)

This plan will prescribe certain desirable psychological courses of action in respect to: (1) supporting the achievement of German unity; (2) the role of a unified Germany in the unification of Europe; (3) actions designed to reduce Soviet capabilities in Eastern Germany.

(c) Psychological Strategy Planning for
the Middle East (PSB D-22)

(1) This plan will provide a national psychological strategy, designed to prevent the extension of Soviet influence and at the same time to strengthen Western influence in the Middle East, and to insure that the

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that the resources of the area are available to the United States and its allies for use in strengthening the free world. It will seek to accomplish these objectives by psychological measures aimed at overcoming instability within these countries, strengthening the will and ability of these countries to resist aggression, and establishing a new relationship with these states which will recognize their desire to achieve status and respect for their sovereign equality.

(2) Annexes covering the basic factors and considerations are now being developed in order to aid in crystallization of the psychological strategy concept and selection of the psychological objectives and tasks.

(d) Psychological Strategy Planning for
Southeast Asia (PSB D-23)

This plan is designed to assist by means of coordinated psychological operations in preventing the free countries of Southeast Asia from passing into the Communist orbit and in developing in these countries the will and ability to resist Communism from within and without. Difficulties in policy interpretation are being resolved and Board approval is expected during the next Quarter.

(e) Program of Psychological Preparation
for Stalin's Passing from Power (PSB D-24)

The participating agencies are now in the process of clearing a Revised Draft.

(f) Psychological Strategy Plan for the
Pro-U.S. Orientation of Japan (PSB D-27)

Following the adoption by the National Security Council of NSC 125/2 "United States Objectives and Courses of Action with

Respect to

Respect to Japan", the Panel agreed to a draft of a plan which is designed effectively to assist, by means of coordinated psychological operations, in carrying out the objectives of NSC 125/2 necessary to maximize Japan's contribution to the attainment of U. S. objectives in Asia.

(g) Psychological Strategy for Economic
Security Vis-a-Vis the Soviet Orbit
(PSB D-28)

The plan is designed to provide a national psychological strategy and specific courses of action with respect to the psychological aspects of U. S. economic security programs concerned with the Soviet orbit by increasing the degree of acceptance in the Free World of U. S. economic security objectives vis-a-vis the Soviet orbit. Suggested courses of action to be developed will be governed by the Economic Defense Advisory Committee's decision as to what should be U. S. policy in informational statements to foreign governments with respect to trade in goods which are not covered by the Battle Act and other Security Lists.

(h) Doctrinal (Ideological) Warfare
Against the USSR (PSB D-33)

The Board has accepted a recommendation that a panel be created to examine the field of ideological warfare specifically directed against Soviet doctrine, and to make recommendations as to how the United States can gain superiority in this field.

(i) Western Europe

In consultation with member agencies, particularly the Department of State, a preliminary study is being undertaken to determine the most fruitful approach to a psychological strategy plan for Western Europe.

(j) East

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(j) East German Youth

On instructions from the Board, an inquiry was carried out by the Director's staff which concluded that a program for utilization of young East German escapees would be of definite psychological value. However, it was impossible without answers to specific questions to weigh the psychological desirability against the cost of overcoming physical obstacles to such a program in Germany. At the suggestion of the Director the Department of State has undertaken a survey in Germany to determine the advantages and disadvantages which would result if such a program were inaugurated.

24. Planning Procedure

An analysis was made of the difficulties which have been encountered in developing PSB plans. Recommendations were developed for an improved format for national psychological strategy plans.

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III. SUMMARIES OF DEPARTMENTAL AND AGENCY REPORTS FOR THE PERIOD UNDER REVIEW.

A. Summary of the Report of the Department of State on the Foreign Information Program*

During the period under review the tasks of the Foreign Information and Educational Exchange Programs of the Department of State continued to be those set forth in NSC 114/2, namely, to multiply and intensify psychological deterrents to aggression by Soviet Communism; to intensify and accelerate the growth of confidence in and among the peoples and governments of the free world; to combat extremism and neutralism; to maintain among the peoples held captive by Soviet Communism the hope of ultimate liberation; and to maintain particularly among the peoples and governments of Latin America continued recognition of mutual interdependence.

The report lists the principal actions taken by the Department of State in endeavoring to carry out these tasks. They include:

1. Projecting to the peoples and governments of nations dominated by Soviet Communism the growing strength and unity of the free world. This involved exploiting in the programs of the International Information Administration such policies, activities and events as "OPERATION MAINBRACE", joint NATO maneuvers on the European continent, the AMZUS Conference, the development

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2. Projecting

* The full text of the Department of State report is appended as ANNEX A.

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2. Projecting the peaceful intentions of the U. S. through exploitation of our disarmament efforts, of our patient attempts to reach an armistice in Korea, and of the justice of the UN Command's refusal forcibly to repatriate prisoners of war. Particular emphasis was put on exposing the manifest absurdity and evil purpose of the Soviet hate campaign, including the bacteriological warfare charges.

3. In its continuing attempts to aggravate internal weaknesses of Soviet Communism, the Information Program endeavored to exploit such items as the strengthening of the tyranny of the Kremlin over the peoples of the USSR implied in plans for the Communist Party Congress; the purges of Communist Party leaders in the satellites and in France and Italy, and the implications of the refusal of large numbers of Chinese captured in Korea to return to China.

4. Convincing peoples and governments of the free world of the need and the possibility of building up adequate military strength as a deterrent to war. This involved exploitation of "OPERATION MAINBRACE" and other maneuvers in Europe; it included also encouragement of moves toward European integration, including the exploitation, largely through indigenous means, of the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Authority, of developments within the Council of Europe, and of progress toward the European Defense Community.

5. Maintenance of confidence in the peaceful intentions and reliable leadership of the U. S. included

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special efforts to give a balanced understanding of developments, especially those affecting foreign policy, growing out of the Presidential election. Special efforts were made in the Information Program to explain the motives of the U. S. when differing with the United Kingdom in the Iranian crisis and with France on the North African problem. The program also placed special emphasis on projecting a greater understanding of the cultural maturity of the United States. Examples of this were the European tour of "Ozgy and Hess", the participation of American artists in the Venice UNESCO Conference, and presentations of typical artistic creations at the Congress for Cultural Freedom in Paris.

6. Combatting neutralism through exposing its dangers as a means of safeguarding individual liberty and freedom and as a subversive device of Soviet Communism.

7. Combatting instability and extreme nationalist tendencies, particularly in the Near and Middle East. The report notes that exploitation of the USAF airlift of pilgrims from Beirut to Mecca was left largely to indigenous channels, but was the subject of a pictorial pamphlet produced by the U. S. Information Services in

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8. Maintaining hope of ultimate liberation among the peoples held captive by Soviet Communism. Largely through the Voice of America and by RIAS in Berlin, efforts were made to explain statements in the Presidential campaign concerning U. S. policy towards the

satellites;

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satellites; to interpret the significance for the satellites of the Nineteenth Communist Party Congress; to expose the "Hate America" campaign; to portray the Sino-Soviet meeting in Moscow in a light calculated to raise doubts in the minds of Chinese as to the motives of the Peiping regime in dealing with the USSR.

9. Fostering American solidarity through exploitation of such actions as the visit of the Secretary of State to Brazil, the conversion of Puerto Rico to Commonwealth status, and through efforts to expose the threat to Latin American countries inherent in Soviet Communism.

10. Operational activities listed in the report include approval of a project for the establishment of an IIA Regional Service Center in Beirut; inauguration of a new series of Information Policy Guidances known as "Information Guidance Bulletins," initiation of radio programs in nine languages by the ship-borne transmitter "The Courier," stationed at Rhodes; production and distribution of a film showing participation of the individual American voter in the process of choosing presidential candidates, and scheduling of another film showing the voter's participation in the election of the President.

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B. Summary of the Report of the Department of Defense*

During the reporting period the Department of Defense and the military services have continued to make noteworthy contributions, incident to their primary military mission, to the national psychological effort. However, one of the considerable difficulties noted within the Department of Defense in engaging in cold war activities (except in a supporting role) continues to be the fact that the Department's role in such activities is principally implied. There exists no specific delineation of authority and responsibility upon which military psychological operations in peace-time may be based. Some such specification for the Department of Defense would contribute to more effective participation of the military services in the national psychological effort. This observation applies both to operations designed to attain an independent psychological effect, and to operations in which, although their primary purpose is military, political or economic, psychological factors must be considered.

During the period under review, military and naval maneuvers and statements of high military officials have served psychological ends, primarily in Western Europe. Although the potential psychological impact of maneuvers at home and abroad is not yet wholly integrated into operational plans, continuing attention is being devoted to this matter.

The Department of Defense has joined in combatting anti-

American sentiments, particularly in the United Kingdom.

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The Department of Defense has joined in combatting anti-American sentiments, particularly in Europe, by various means within its area of responsibility. The Department of Defense feels, however, that we are still on the defensive in regard to the "Hate America" campaign generally.

In the

* The full text of the Department of Defense report is appended as

APPENDIX E.

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In the Middle East, the Beirut-Jidda airlift and several other operations involving the Department of Defense have contributed materially to the creation of a psychological climate more favorable to the West. In Korea, notable actions include the North Korea target warning operations and continuous and effective leaflet drops.

Research and forward planning in the psychological field continue, directed for the most part to the contingency of general war. Efforts are continuing to define the specific role of the Department of Defense as an active participant in the cold war.

Operations by Areas

1. In the European area, contributions to reduction of neutralism and anti-Americanism include participation in U.S.-French military maneuvers east of the Rhine and U.S.-British-French ground and air maneuvers in Germany; alert drills of the U.S. garrison in Berlin; the large-scale NATO naval maneuvers in the North Sea and the Baltic; fleet visits to Yugoslavia and elsewhere; and statements by General Midway and other senior U.S. commanders re-emphasizing the need for, and practicality of, an unremitting collective effort to build a position of strength against aggression. In the field of troop-civilian relations, a marked degree of closer cooperation and collaboration between U.S. commanders and local government officials has been achieved and will be pressed forward. A trend toward greater acceptance of U.S. military personnel can be noted throughout Western Europe. The continued policy of offshore procurement of supplies from European sources contributes indirectly to these ends by stimulating the European economy and fostering understanding among North Atlantic defense forces.

2. In the

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2. In the Middle East, two operations during the reporting period, involving Defense Department action, have contributed to the psychological effort. These were the airlift of 3,854 pilgrims from Beirut to Jidda, and the airlift of 4 tons of hybrid seed corn to Lebanon. In addition, new evidence has emerged of the favorable impact obtained from the good-will tour of Lebanese-born U.S. jet ace Major Jabara (previously reported). These actions, undertaken specifically for their psychological effect, have made a significant contribution to the U.S. cold war effort in the area.

3. In Latin America the Department of Defense continued to assist in the training and equipping of national military forces, thus contributing to the support of U.S. national policy and to the stability of existing governments.

4. In Korea the conduct of a program to warn civilians residing in 78 North Korean cities of the impending bombing by the United Nations Command expresses the intent to save non-combatant lives, and at the same time is designed to increase the pressure on the communist negotiators at Panmunjom. The continued refusal of the United Nations Command to use force in repatriation of prisoners of war has gained wide support in the free world. Leaflet, radio, and loudspeaker operations, directed at North Korean soldiers and civilians and Chinese communist soldiers, were continued at a high level. Reports continue to indicate wide readership of the leaflets (of which nearly 3 billion have been dropped to date) despite harsh reprisals and scare propaganda used by communist authorities against the individuals involved. In the radio field, a series was initiated

exploiting

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exploiting the statements of Chinese communist prisoners who oppose forcible repatriation. On the debit side, publicity on agitation in prisoner-of-war camps has provided the communists with additional effective propaganda material, despite U.S. attempts to present a contrary interpretation.

Other Activities

1. Psychological exploitation of military power: Certain atomic weapons tests have been exploited psychologically in conjunction with the Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission. The Department of Defense has promulgated a comprehensive policy on the release of public information regarding atomic weapons, guided missiles, and new weapons. Shows of military force have continued, primarily in Europe (as noted above).

2. In addition to various activities indirectly countering the communist "Hate America" campaign, the Department of Defense has cooperated closely with the Department of State and other agencies concerned to coordinate the release of information on biological and chemical warfare by the Department and its components; and has joined in the interdepartmental planning task concerned with countering the BY charges and other "Hate America" propaganda.

Forward Planning and Research

1. The Department of Defense continues to conduct a broad program of research and development in strategic intelligence and psychological warfare operations.

2. To further the wartime national psychological effort, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a psychological warfare plan to

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support

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support the "Joint Emergency War Plan," using as guidance for this purpose the "National Overt Propaganda Policy Guidance for General War" approved by the Psychological Strategy Board. The military services and major subordinate commands are currently developing or modifying existing plans accordingly. Planning is progressing on a "Transfer Plan" to facilitate the wartime transfer of U.S. foreign information equipment and personnel to military control.

3. A psychological plan to support the U.S. forces in Japan is being developed.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have under study a paper setting forth the views of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, on his wartime psychological warfare responsibilities.

5. Initial plans for the wartime conduct of psychological operations in Alaska, developed by the Commander in Chief, Alaskan Forces, have been submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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C. SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

During the past quarter, CIA activities in Europe have had a noticeable impact in key countries in combatting Communist influence and in countering neutralism in non-orbit countries. Public support for European unity was strengthened, especially in France. Moves against Communist influence in labor unions and cooperative organizations in Italy, while far from decisive, showed appreciable results.

Counter-subversive controls in Soviet orbit countries are so strong that the establishment of significant resistance organizations has been extremely difficult. Nevertheless, CIA is continuing its efforts to establish contacts and facilities in the USSR and other Soviet-controlled countries which can be expanded for cold-war purposes or utilized in the event of a hot war. Organized resistance on a national scale in Poland continued to receive support in funds and equipment. Working relationships have been established with the Yugoslav clandestine services which may facilitate the conduct of future operations against Soviet-orbit countries.

In the Middle East, the issue of colonialism, as well as political developments in Egypt and Iran, have had an adverse effect upon U.S. capabilities. Despite this unfavorable situation, CIA operations resulted in limiting the Tudeh Party to some extent.

During the reporting period, CIA has increased considerably its activities and capabilities in Latin America, where the problem of counteracting Peronism as well as Communism is of primary importance.

Despite the serious problem of developing adequate cover for personnel, progress was noted in three important Asiatic areas-- China, Japan, and the Philippines. Contacts have been established

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with isolated resistance groups in China, but development of general resistance has yet to be realized. Mechanisms have been developed for influencing political, labor, and other groups in Japan. Efforts are being directed toward eventual assumption by the Philippines of the role of ^a leading anti-Communist force in Southeast Asia. In Burma, Thailand, Indochina, and Indonesia, political complexities make a delicate approach imperative but acquisition of high-level allies for long-range projects makes the picture hopeful.

In general, the limited number of qualified personnel will prevent any over-all expansion of the covert effort for the immediate future.

(1) Western Europe

Throughout Western Europe CIA-supported groups have conducted extensive propaganda aimed at organized student groups in 17 countries. On the adult level, CIA established certain facilities for, and has begun, a pro-NATO, pro-European Unity propaganda effort. This contributed substantially to the recent progress toward unification made by the Schuman Plan Assembly under the leadership of M. Spaak.

CIA effort in France has emphasized covert support, through a wide variety of propaganda media, of the strong moves initiated by the French Government in June against Communist Party subversive activities. This action presently is showing results in that the French Government is sufficiently assured of popular backing to request lifting parliamentary immunity from several key Communist deputies prior to further prosecution of the Party for illegal activities. Concurrently, CIA has taken the initiative in exposing the Soviet-puppet nature and negating the effectiveness of

DISSEMINATION "Fighting Democracy"

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"Fighting Democracy," a major new front organization developed in France to push the Soviet peace propaganda. During September, CIA concentrated its efforts on further discrediting this new Communist line by exploiting Communist Party internal purges by propaganda directed at both Communist and non-Communist groups. Anti-Communist effort in trade unions continues, with slight gains made toward unifying the non-Communist unions, particularly in the movie industry. A beginning has been made in the religious field to counteract neutralism among the French clergy.

In Italy a plan of covert political-psychological activity in connection with 1953 national elections has been prepared and is being put into motion.

Significant progress has been made in pulling together a group of independent Italian cooperatives into a new national organization, which gives promise of attracting to it cooperatives presently associated with the Communist-dominated cooperative organization.

The strength and influence of the non-Communist trade union federations supported covertly by CIA is making it increasingly difficult for the Communist trade unions to call effective political strikes. This is evidenced by the failure of the recent nationwide railway strike, the cancellation of the nation-wide tram and bus strike and the failure of the 44-hour maritime strike called throughout all Ligurian ports, including Genoa. The non-Communist maritime unions have been of particular assistance to the U.S. Logistical Command, Leghorn, in establishing a responsible port organization capable of meeting U.S. military requirements.

In Denmark

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In Denmark an organization was founded to utilize existing mass media as an instrument of anti-Communist Propaganda. This group succeeded in procuring the dismissal of pro-Communist elements in the State Radio.

(2). Germany and Austria

Germany has been, and will continue to be, CIA's principal target in Central and Eastern Europe. Emergence of the Federal Republic as a sovereign state, however, has required a reassessment of operations based in Western Germany in order to coordinate some of them with appropriate German authorities, to transfer others to bases outside Germany, and to tighten security precautions on those operations which will be continued in or from Western Germany without the concurrence of the Federal Republic.

In West Germany, during the reporting period, an intensive campaign was undertaken through a large number of controlled outlets to explain and justify ratification of the contractual agreements and the participation of Western Germany in the EDC.

In East Germany, despite a temporary setback from new East German border control measures, the volume of propaganda distribution has again reached the high levels attained before the imposition of the border controls.

All appropriate facilities in Berlin and Western Germany were used in the psychologically delicate effort to strengthen the firm morale of West Berlin. A highly successful Congress of International Jurists was convened in Berlin in July. Leading figures in the legal profession from 42 countries attended this Congress

whose theme

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whose theme was to expose the injustice and the illegality of Communism as a system of government. The Congress received considerable publicity and resulted in the formation of an International Committee of Jurists in The Hague which may constitute a significant body to perpetuate the work of the Congress and to counteract the Communist-controlled International Association of Democratic Lawyers.

New facilities and capabilities were under development to induce the defection and exploitation of Russian and key satellite personalities.

Austria

Following the U.S. Ambassador's recommendation, anti-Communist propaganda activities in Austria have been augmented during the past quarter and the covert propaganda outlets expanded under CIA influence. Similarly, CIA wartime preparations have been expanded in this period.

(3) Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia

Black radio broadcasts directed at Czechoslovakia were initiated in August. Border crossing operations into Slovakia were started during the same period. Little CIA psychological activity has been undertaken in Hungary. The underground organization in Poland was considerably strengthened and two-way radio contact was maintained with this organization. The political program for Poland continues to aim toward forming a coalition of the various Polish emigre groups.

Southeastern

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(4) Southeastern Europe (Operations against the Orbit)

Major emphasis during the quarter was directed at organizing and mounting various types of penetration missions against Albania, Bulgaria, and Rumania. The most successful of these were the operations against the Albanian Communist regime. Supported by an extensive psychological warfare campaign conducted through periodic leaflet and newspaper drops over the country and daily clandestine radio broadcasts, these operations have begun to threaten seriously the existence of the Albanian regime. Gradual but continued progress was made in the establishment of closer working relations with the Yugoslav clandestine services which permit CIA to mount operations from their territory, and which may make possible the development of joint or complementary political programs directed against the Soviet satellites.

Clandestine operations against Bulgaria consisted primarily of a continuation of daily clandestine radio broadcasts and limited penetrations, with continuing efforts to improve the existing political front organization. The program against Rumania was initiated during this period with penetration of the country by an exploratory team.

(5) USSR

CIA psychological operations aimed at the Soviet Regime are

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(5) USSR

CIA psychological operations aimed at the Soviet Regime are gradually gaining momentum. Because of the inaccessibility of the USSR itself, a large part of these operations are currently aimed at Soviet occupation troops in Germany and Austria. The strengthening of border controls along the Soviet sectors has made propaganda distribution more difficult. However, there is evidence that a small portion

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portion of CIA controlled propaganda distributed in East Germany to Russian troops has reached as far as Poland. NTS sponsored Radio Free Russia continues daily broadcasts beamed at Soviet military personnel despite increased Soviet jamming. The Society of Postwar Emigres is being established as an added inducement to defection in Germany.

In July, significant gains were made in the effort to unify Russian and minority emigre groups. This effort is being continued and there are strong indications that the major differences between the various emigre groups will be resolved, thus permitting the establishment of an emigre political center, which will conduct radio broadcasts to Soviet personnel in Eastern Europe and ultimately to the Soviet Union.

(6) Middle East

In Iran, U.S. aims and objectives have suffered under the major handicaps resulting from the continued absence of an oil settlement, the relative weakening of Prime Minister Mossadegh's political position with the increasing strength of both Communist and rightist extremist elements, and the progressive deterioration of Iran's economic-financial situation. Although CIA's covert activities, along with other interested agencies, have manifestly failed to convince the Iranian Government of the necessity for forceful action against the Communists, covert operations have increased the dissemination of anti-Communist propaganda and increased the public awareness of the dangers inherent

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Considerable progress has been made in developing plans and in

stockpiling

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stockpiling materiel for use in the event of a Tudeh coup in Iran.

In Egypt there are grounds for cautious optimism. Despite the loss of certain of CIA's agents, influential contacts, and operational opportunities with the rapid shifts of political power in Egypt during the period, the maintenance of law and order, maintenance of United States prestige at a high level, and the cordiality of American-Egyptian relations are promising developments. With the exception of certain ad hoc psychological warfare operations, CIA has engaged primarily in exploring effective means of penetrating the important politico-religious extremist Moslem Brotherhood and of penetrating and influencing all significant political groups.

Elsewhere in the Arab States, CIA resources and facilities have not been commensurate with the potential dangers produced by rising nationalist pressures, the increased resort to totalitarian regimes, and the repercussions from the Iranian and Egyptian situations. In general, CIA operations have been of an opportunistic nature in the field of psychological warfare, pending the arrival and establishment in the field of certain key personnel late this autumn. An American society dedicated to friendship with the Near Eastern peoples has made significant progress, particularly in establishing itself as a major cover facility and in organizing Near Eastern students for agent recruitment purposes.

Activities looking toward implementation of the NSC 26 series for oil conservation and denial in the Persian Gulf area were brought virtually to a standstill, pending clarification of the divergence between State Department's and CIA's interpretations of the latter's role and responsibility for implementation of the NSC 26 directive.

The Turkish

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The Turkish Government has been reluctant to permit certain projected activities primarily connected with cross-border operations, which have accordingly been cancelled or delayed. However, paramilitary stay-behind preparations for Turkey have progressed significantly.

In Pakistan, covert collaboration with senior government officials is already playing a significant part in CIA undertakings, with much of the effort known to these officials. In India, the effort has been entirely covert insofar as the government is concerned in utilizing indigenous personnel and organizations already desirous of combatting communism and requiring only direction and financial assistance. In Pakistan and India, because of their vast populations and CIA's limited resources, CIA efforts have been highly selective, directed to the intellectuals and nascent labor groups. In India selected politicians are also targets for covert political action.

(7) The Asiatic Area as a Whole

Throughout this area the major limiting factors have been the shortage of suitable cover for qualified personnel and policy inhibitions against developing assets in countries where the political balance is precarious.

(8) Southeast Asia

A tabulation of gains and losses in this area indicates considerable progress in developing psychological warfare assets. The limiting factors, particularly in Indochina and Burma, are noted below:

In Burma

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In Burma the development of a balanced program directed at Burmans and key racial minorities has been limited by lack of essential cover for a few Americans charged with developmental projects, and the fear that such programs will upset the precarious stability of the present non-Communist Government. CIA has had marked success, however, in developing and working with an anti-Communist group among the Overseas Chinese.

In Thailand considerable progress is being made in the psychological warfare field utilizing indigenous publication and rumor network assets. Although the political situation contains elements of instability, high level contacts within the government have been continued, providing reasonable expectations for the continued development of necessary programs. (X)
EC

In Indochina, present policy limitations, arising largely from the attitude of the French, prevent the exploitation of numerous opportunities. However, within these severe limitations, steps have recently been made to develop a joint US-French-Vietnamese psychological warfare and troop information program. In addition, press media are being continually utilized covertly and a rumor net behind Viet Minh lines continues to function.

In Indonesia contacts have been made with political leaders in and out of the government providing the basis for covert political action and psychological warfare activities. These assets are not expected to result in rapid gains, but rather are designed to provide ultimately the means of realigning the overwhelmingly neutralist sentiments of the Indonesian Government.

China

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(9) China, Japan, Korea, and the Philippines

In China contacts with resistance elements in certain limited areas on the mainland have been established and a program of development is in progress. In addition there has been a new high in the number of anti-Communist leaflets dropped by air. There is evidence that a program for the denial to Communist China of qualified Chinese through their employment in the U.S. is effectively conditioning Chinese students to favor the U.S., as well as building a manpower reservoir for a future non-Communist Government. The anti-Communist psychological warfare complex in Hong Kong has continued to publish effective literature which already is reaching the mainland and some overseas Chinese communities.

In Japan the joint U.S.-Japanese psychological program has developed from the planning stage to the point where several projects are currently underway. In addition, CIA has continued to build up its assets for activities within Japanese political, labor, youth, and intellectual groups to combat Communist influence and to assure the continued pro-Western orientation of Japan.

In Korea CIA activities, due to the pressing requirements of the tactical situation, have been largely in support of the Eighth Army. However, with the expansion of CIA capabilities, definite progress is being made toward the development and support of an integrated political-psychological-resistance program in North Korea.

In the Philippines the first phase of operations, namely, the reduction of the Huk threat, can be considered accomplished. Efforts are now being re-directed to provide political action programs designed to overcome the internal weakness of the government and build-up Philippine morale with the hope, not only of consolidating present gains

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present gains against the Communist-led rebels, but also to enable the Philippines to assume the role of a leading anti-Communist force in Southeast Asia.

(10) Latin America

The volume of anti-American propaganda presently pouring out of Buenos Aires into Latin America is, perhaps, greater than that coming from Moscow; there are indications that Moscow may be giving priority to anti-Americanism propagated by Peron and allied nationalistic elements. Counteracting Peronism has, therefore, become a task of CIA in Latin America comparable to that of fighting Communism, and in every country attention is being given to both opponents. (H)(1)
C

During the last several months, CIA has appreciably increased its psychological activities and capabilities in this region.

In Mexico, posters distributed through covert media have done harm to Communist plans in several instances. Control of the Federation of Students is being shifted from Communists to anti-Communists. The provincial newspapers are carrying large amounts of anti-Communist material. A militant anti-Communist women's group has been formed. Guatemalan refugees have been organized and are supplementing work being done by an indigenous group within their country.

In Panama an intensive campaign before the recent Presidential elections not only prevented the Communists from gaining office, but also succeeded in discrediting them thoroughly, at least for the time being. The student organization in Panama has been changed from Communist to non-Communist control with the result that several teachers have been discharged by the University.

In Brazil liaison has been established with an important anti-Communist organization and considerable quantities of propaganda are flowing

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are flowing through this channel. In Uruguay a large civic group has been developed, and has succeeded in producing and distributing quantities of pamphlets, radio broadcasts, and press bulletins. CIA was effective in preventing the holding of a Communist-run continental peace conference in Rio de Janeiro and later in Montevideo.

On the west coast of South America, indigenous fronts are being developed and an important religious group is being used. Periodicals and pamphlets of CIA origin are being circulated in Chile, Bolivia, and neighboring countries.

To support other areas, an important organization for the rehabilitation and resettlement of defectees and agent casualties from behind the Iron Curtain has been set up in Latin America and is in operation.

(11) International Activities

Organizations of labor, veterans, women, youth, student, racial groups, cooperatives, "peace," science, and intellectuals which cut across national boundaries in their appeals are now actively being penetrated and influenced in furtherance of U.S. objectives.

Although the Soviet orbit no longer has a monopoly in this field, the scale of the U.S. effort is still only a small fraction of that of the Communists. However, measurable progress is being made.

Chief among the organizations and activities of international scope which have shown significant development in the reporting period are:

The Committee for a Free Asia, which has carried on some useful direct activities but whose basic principles have been revised to foster the creation of an Asia-wide movement that will be only loosely assisted by the Committee; expansion of radio activities has been approved. Other programs are under way in 7 Asian countries.

The National

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The National Committee for a Free Europe, still one of CIA's most valuable assets, with responsibility for extensive broadcasting to the European satellites; a recently expanded Free Europe University in Exile; an active Research and Publications Service servicing emigres and other important groups; a Division of Intellectual Cooperation emphasizing long-range studies and training for the post-liberation period; and a National Councils Division devoted to creating unity and fostering leadership among emigre groups.

The International Veterans Organization, now expanded by inclusion of two British and one Pakistani veterans' organizations.

A number of youth and student organizations, notably the International Students Coordinating Secretariat which enjoys new support from a number of national student groups in Europe, and the World Assembly of Youth, now under vigorously anti-Communist leadership.

The Congress for Cultural Freedom, which is planning for expansion, especially to the Far East, and expects soon to gain the valuable asset of UNESCO recognition.

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D. Summary of Reports by Field Staff Representatives of the
Mutual Security Agency*

Western Europe

The defense build-up and its attendant problems continued to dominate the psychological climate in Western Europe during the period under review. Although the period closed with a short-term upswing in optimism, new and aggravated psychological factors were among the major obstacles to the attainment of U. S. policy objectives in the area.

Following are the significant psychological factors noted:

1. Renewal of the Mutual Assistance Program by the U. S. Congress served to reassure Europe as to the stability and continuity of U. S. policy. However, the relationship of rich benefactor to needy beneficiary, inherent in the "foreign aid" concept, remained the most important single obstacle to favorable psychological exploitation of U. S. programs in Europe. A new concept, geared to the partnership approach, would provide a much healthier climate for psychological operations.

2. The defense build-up was accompanied by further swings in the pendulum of popular attitudes. By mid-summer the noticeable lift in European confidence and morale which had followed the Lisbon Conference had sagged badly. Late in the quarter there were signs that progress in the placing of offshore procurement contracts, change in political leadership in Germany, and the Pinay Government's success in holding the price line had contributed to some alleviation of the earlier pessimism. However, the fear of

war,

* This summary is based on reports of field representatives reviewed by the Information Division of MSA.

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war, Soviet pressures and the economic burdens of defense continued to bode trouble for the rearmament effort:

3. Progress toward ratification and realization of the European Defense Community, particularly in France, ran afoul of diminished public enthusiasm.

4. NATO, while maintaining general support as a defensive alliance, continued to lose its grasp on the popular imagination. It is now viewed as a military alliance and nothing more. The NATO Information Service has remained ineffective.

5. The impression is spreading in Europe that the economic situation is not getting any better. As the quarter ended, employment was high and inflationary pressures had been checked in some places. On the other hand, pressures on living standards and general economic development, growing out of the defense program, were causing visible restlessness. Some progress was achieved by MSA programs for economic education, particularly in the field of productivity and technical assistance. But U. S. tariff and trade restrictions remained a definite psychological drawback to our general efforts abroad.

6. Neutralism, in its "third force" context, continued to give ground in the face of Europe's growing military strength, the developing sense of unity and possibly the Soviet peace offensive. At the same time, opposition to the defense build-up from the Bevanites and other European Socialists remained a very serious problem, for which a better substantiated and documented rebuttal needs to be made.

7. Anti-Americanism remained on the increase. Contributing factors were the inevitable problems arising out of the growing number of U.S.

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of U. S. troops abroad, the current U. S. election campaign, Congressional cutbacks in aid, the growing impression abroad that American officials tended to be more blunt and insistent in their relations with European governments. Economic pressures of the defense program, the generalized European unhappiness with the state of the world, and the feeling in some quarters abroad that America is taking too strong a line against Russia have also been contributory causes of anti-Americanism.

In assessing the effectiveness of the MSA information program in dealing with the foregoing psychological problems, the report points to further progress during the quarter in the integration of MSA and State information operations, and to increasing acceptance of the idea within the U. S. government that our information operations should be somewhat decentralized. At the same time, the report draws attention to serious shortcomings in organization, procedure and direction:

1. MSA has relied almost entirely on the Mutual Security Act for guidance as to "national objectives,"
2. There is increasing need for improved liaison and policy and operations coordination between military and civilian information elements. This is evident in such programs as offshore procurement and the delivery of military end-items to Europe.
3. The NATO information services have not developed an effective positive program, and remain weak.
4. Recent experience has underlined the effectiveness of indirect propaganda techniques and suggests the need for further development in this field.

5. In view

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5. In view of the great size and psychological impact of the annual influx of American tourists in Europe, more should be done to study and influence this particular movement.

Southeast Asia (Philippines, Thailand, Indo-China, Formosa, Malaya)

Favorable psychological results accrued during the quarter from MSA programs in the fields of agriculture and public health. The use of DDT in anti-malaria campaigns and of aureomycin in treating trachoma helped greatly to increase awareness of American aid. Distribution of fertilizer and other agricultural programs made a noticeable impact in the area. Installation of community radio receivers widened the audience available for information programs.

At the same time, it was reported, attempts to achieve the maximum psychological impact from U. S. programs in the area were impeded by conflicting policy interests. The U. S. position, in the belief of peoples of this area, continued to suffer from too close an identification with Western colonial interests and indigenous ruling groups, in the face of a rising tide of revolutionary nationalism.

The report concluded with the following suggestions:

1. Local personnel should be trained to take over from American personnel as quickly as possible in our various information, economic and social programs.

2. A special effort should be made to influence and support intellectuals, professional people and upper income groups, since their influence is disproportionately large throughout the area. Possibly a team of American specialists could be assigned to establish close liaison with these individuals.

3. A strenuous effort should be made to recruit the highest caliber of U.S. personnel for assignment to Southeast Asia.

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Annex A
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THE FOREIGN INFORMATION PROGRAM

(Prepared by the Department of State)

(Quarterly Status Report, June 30, 1952 to September 30, 1952)

1. The tasks of the foreign information and educational exchange program of the Department of State, carried on by the International Information Administration, continued to be those set forth in Annex V to NSC 114/2, in order of priority as follows:

(i) "The first task is to multiply and to intensify psychological deterrents to aggression by Soviet Communism, whether in the form of outright action by the armed forces of the Soviet Union, of Communist China or of the satellites of the Soviet Union, or in the form of the subversion of existing free governments by civil forces acting on behalf of Soviet Communism."

(ii) "The second task is to intensify and to accelerate the growth of confidence in and among the peoples and the governments of the free world, especially in Western Europe, including Western Germany, in their capability successfully to deter aggression of Soviet Communism or to defeat it should it nonetheless occur and to inspire concrete international, national and individual action accordingly."

(iii) "The third task is to combat, particularly in the Near and Middle East and South and Southeast Asia, extremist tendencies threatening the undermining of the cohesion and the stability of the free world and the withdrawal of governments and peoples into neutralism."

(iv) "The fourth task is to maintain among the peoples held captive by Soviet Communism, including the peoples of the Soviet Union, hope of ultimate liberation and identification with the free world and to nourish, without provoking premature action, a popular spirit disposed to timely resistance to regimes now in power."

(v) "The fifth task is to maintain among peoples and governments traditionally linked with the United States, particularly in Latin America, a continued recognition of mutual interdependence and to promote national and individual action accordingly."

2. During the period June 30, 1952 to September 30, 1952, the following actions were taken, in accordance with plans for every country and with special plans as noted, to intensify psychological deterrents to aggression and subversion by Soviet Communism:

(a) The growing strength and unity of the free world continued to be projected to the peoples and the governments of nations dominated by Soviet Communism. This involved substantive action

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soberly to exploit particularly

(i) The development and the maintenance of defensive military strength on the part of the free world, as demonstrated by Operation Mainbrace, maneuvers on the continent of Europe, the ANZUS Conference, and the continuing successful resistance to aggression and subversion in Korea, Indochina and Malaya. (IA-PC-2-ANZUS)

(ii) The development of new weapons by the United States and other free nations, particularly tactical atomic weapons by the United States and the explosion of an atomic bomb by the United Kingdom.

(iii) The diplomatic, economic, cultural and other supporting actions given to the people of West Berlin in order that they might the more strongly resist the harassing tactics of Soviet Communists.

(iv) The conclusion of the contractual agreements with the German Federal Republic and its planned inclusion in the European Defense Community.

(v) The exposure in the joint replies of the United States, the United Kingdom and France of the deceitful nature of the proposals of the USSR concerning the unification of Germany.

(b) The friendly disposition and the peaceful intentions of the United States were concurrently projected. This involved substantive action to exploit particularly

(i) The continuing efforts of the United States to promote the balanced reduction and limitation of armed forces in the Disarmament Commission of the United Nations.

(ii) The patient efforts of the United Nations Command to reach an armistice in Korea and the justice of its refusal to repatriate prisoners of war.

(iii) The manifest absurdity and the malign purpose of propaganda designed to arouse hatred of the United States, particularly charges that its forces engaged in bacteriological warfare in Korea.

(c) Aggravation of the internal weaknesses of Soviet Communism continued to be sought. This involved substantive action to exploit particularly

(i) The strengthening of the tyranny of the Kremlin over the people of the USSR implied in the plans for the Communist Party Congress. (IA-PC-53-20, Interim Guidance re Nineteenth Communist Party Congress)

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(ii) The renewed purges of party leaders both in the satellites and in France and Italy. (IA-PO-53-17; Italy, 1953)

(iii) The implication of the refusal of large numbers of Chinese captured in Korea voluntarily to return to China. (IA-PO-7, Use of Prisoners of War in Propaganda)

(iv) The continuing support by the United States of the United Nations as an instrumentality for the adjustment of differences and the relaxation of tensions among nations and the rehabilitation of victims of aggression. (IA-PO-53-16, Rehabilitation of the Republic of Korea)

(v) The unsoundness of the fundamental communist economic thesis that the capitalist world is now entering a period of economic crisis which will ultimately and inevitably lead to its collapse.

(d) Particularly in areas not under the domination of the Kremlin, efforts continued to expose the myths surrounding and inspired by Soviet Communism and minimizing fears of fifth columns acting on its behalf. This involved substantive action to exploit particularly

(i) The schisms within local communist parties; especially the plight of Marty and Tillon in France.

(ii) Through indigenous channels the fellow-travelling tendencies of the authors of the report of the International Scientific Commission on bacteriological warfare. (IA-PO-4, International Red Cross Conference in Toronto)

(iii) Through calculated silence, the insignificance of the impending peace conferences in Peiping and Vienna. (IA-PO-Asia Peace Conference, September, 1952)

(iv) The proceedings of the Ad Hoc Committee on Forced Labor of the Economic and Social Council of the UN in a "Red Book" on forced labor. (IA-PO-53-20-Forced Labor: UN Hearings, October 14, 1952)

(v) The refusal of the USSR to join in further efforts to negotiate a treaty concerning Austria.

(vi) Among Chinese overseas, the nature of the regime now in power in China and its threat to freedom in Asia.

3. The following actions were taken to accelerate the growth of confidence of the free world in its capability to deter aggression or to defeat it should it nonetheless occur.

(a) Convincing the peoples and the governments of the free world of the need and the possibility of building ready military capabilities as a deterrent to war and of the progress made in achieving them. This involved substantive action to exploit particularly

- (i) The developing military strength of the free world as revealed in Operation Mainbrace and other maneuvers in Europe, with emphasis on the contribution and participation of the Europeans, in the continuing successful resistance to aggression and subversion in the Far East, in the development of new weapons and new techniques by nations of the free world.
 - (ii) A balanced understanding of the problems created regarding the pace of rearmament by the domestic economic pressures and the reduction of economic and military assistance on the part of the United States.
 - (iii) The interest of nations in the Near and Middle East, particularly the Arab States, in mutual defense arrangements.
 - (iv) The interest of the Philippines and Japan in developing indigenous defense capabilities.
- (b) Encouraging the peoples and the governments of Europe in the development of common institutions for mutual welfare and defense. This involved substantive action to exploit particularly, largely through indigenous means
- (i) The establishment of the European Coal and Steel Authority.
 - (ii) Developments within the Council of Europe.
 - (iii) The need to proceed rapidly with the ratification of the contractual agreements with Germany and the protocols establishing the European Defense Community. (IA-FO-53-14, EDC and European Integration)
- (c) The maintenance of confidence in the peaceful intentions, the consistent policies and the reliable leadership of the United States. This involved substantive action to exploit particularly
- (i) A balanced understanding of developments, especially affecting foreign policy, growing out of the presidential election, with a view particularly to encouraging confidence in the continuity of basic policy regardless of the outcome. (IA-FO-1, The Presidential Campaign)
 - (ii) The patience and the reasonableness of the United States in its role of agent of the United Nations with regard to negotiating an armistice and limiting hostilities in Korea.
 - (iii) The motives animating the United States when, as with the United Kingdom concerning Iran and with France concerning North Africa, the United States has undertaken to follow policies differing from theirs. (IA-FO-5, Self-Determination)

(iv) The cultural maturity of the United States as an indication of the depth of its perceptions and the sophistication of its people, for example, the tour of "Porgy and Bess," the participation of artists representing the United States in the conference of Venice sponsored by UNESCO and the presentation of typical musical compositions, ballets and performances at the Congress for Cultural Freedoms in Paris.

(v) The development by the United States in the Disarmament Commission of the United Nations of a comprehensive program for the balanced reduction and limitation of arms and armed forces.

(vi) The readiness of the United States, together with the United Kingdom and France, to discuss the unification of Germany with the USSR on suitable terms.

(vii) The dangers of neutralism as a means of safeguarding individual liberty and freedom.

(viii) The interests of indigenous groups understanding of and sympathetic with the objectives of the United States.

4. The following actions were taken to combat, particularly in the Near and Middle East, tendencies nationalistic and religious threatening to undermine the stability and the cohesion of the free world. This involved substantive actions to exploit particularly

(a) The respect of the people and the government of the United States for the religion and the culture of the peoples of the Middle East, as demonstrated primarily by the readiness of the United States Air Force to carry thousands of pilgrims to Mecca who otherwise would have been stranded at Beirut and by the attentions shown to Feisal of Iraq during his visit to the United States. Exploitation of the airlift to Mecca has been left largely to indigenous mechanisms, but it is the subject of a pictorial pamphlet produced in Beirut, a film and a series of statements by members of the crews of the planes involved.

(b) Actions taken by the United States to promote a fair and reasonable settlement of the dispute between Iran and the United Kingdom over the nationalized properties of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.

(c) The efforts of the United States to promote direct negotiations between France and the colonial peoples for the achievement of popular aspirations in Tunisia and Morocco.

(d) The encouragement given by the United States to reconciliation between Israel and the Arab States.

5. The following actions were taken to maintain, without provoking premature deeds, hope of ultimate liberation among peoples held captive by

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Soviet Communism. This involved substantive action, carried on almost entirely by the Voice of America and by RIAS in Berlin, to exploit particularly

- (a) The balanced interpretation of statements made in the course of the presidential campaign concerning the policy of the United States toward the satellites of Eastern Europe.
- (b) Interpretation of the significance of the Nineteenth Communist Party Congress.
- (c) Exposure of the campaign of hatred against the United States.
- (d) The manifest impracticality of the proposals of the USSR concerning the unification of Germany.
- (e) Portrayal of the Sino-Soviet meetings in Moscow in a light calculated to raise doubts in the minds of Chinese on the mainland as to the motives of the Peiping regime in their dealings with the USSR.

6. The following actions were taken to maintain among peoples traditionally linked with the United States, particularly in Latin America, a continued recognition of mutual interests. This involved substantive action

(a) To foster Latin American association with U.S. objectives and policy especially through exploitation of

- (i) The visit of the Secretary of State to Brazil.
- (ii) The conversion of Puerto Rico to Commonwealth status.
- (iii) The performance of Puerto Rican and Colombian troops in Korea.

(b) To interpret the position of the United States with regard to issues involved in Latin American nationalism, including nationalization of resources (PO-53-10, Alleged International Oil Cartel, PO-53-5, Self-Determination, and continuous information guidance on Ecuadoran, Bolivian and Chilean elections, on U.S. tin and copper purchasing policy, etc.)

To develop attitudes and methods for meeting the anti-U.S. propaganda of the Argentine Government (Circular instruction of August 26, 1952, and PO-53-13).

(c) To demonstrate the dangers to Latin America of Soviet Communism. This involved

- (i) Successful conclusion of the special project in Panama initiated in fiscal 1952.
- (ii) Preparation of special programming to meet the deteriorated political situation in Chile.

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(iii) Stimulation of awareness in Latin American countries of the Communist danger in Guatemala.

(iv) Encouragement of intellectual movements in defense of Western value (Circular airgram, September 30, 1952).

(v) Counteraction of the Communist BW campaign in Latin America (Circular instruction, September 17, 1952).

(vi) Counteraction of propaganda in Latin America related to the Peiping "Peace" Conference (IA Special Instruction, August 18, 1952 and Latin American Supplement).

7. The following actions of an operational nature were taken in support of the actions listed above.

(a) Administrative.

(i) Approval was given to a staff study providing for the establishment of the IIA European Regional Service Staff, whose purpose is to provide USIS missions in Europe and elsewhere, especially Greece and Turkey, with materials originating in Europe, to provide advice as to the effective utilization of media and to cooperate with Office of Information of the Special Representative in Europe in servicing US information offices in Europe.

(ii) Approval was given to a staff study providing for the establishment of the IIA Near East Regional Service Center in Beirut. Authorization has been given for the shipment of equipment and the assignment of personnel to the Center.

(iii) The Department of State has under executive order assumed from the Mutual Security Agency responsibility for administering the Information Media Guaranties.

(b) Policy Formulation.

On July 10, 1952, the Current Information Policy Staff, Office of the Assistant Administrator for Policies and Plans, inaugurated a new series of information policy guidance known as Information Guidance Bulletins. The great majority are transmitted by telegram to posts having an interest in the subject matter. As of September 30, 1952, 114 Bulletins had been issued.

(c) Evaluation.

Evaluation studies completed include detailed studies of problems in Turkey and Iran, of the placement of USIS materials in foreign newspapers, of the use of the USIS transcripts on

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foreign broadcasting systems, of non-theatrical film distribution in foreign countries and of key words in propaganda of the United States and the free world.

(d) International Press Service.

On August 11, 1952, responsibility for the preparation of the four regional editions of the Wireless Bulletins was assumed by the Regional Branches of the International Press Service.

(e) International Broadcasting Service.

(i) The ship-borne transmitter, the Courier, on September 7, 1952 began operations at Rhodes. Programs in nine languages --Turkish, Persian, Hebrew, Arabic, English, Armenian, Georgian, Azerbaijani and Tartar--are broadcast in short and medium wave lengths during a period of 5-3/4 hours daily. Monitoring reports thus far available indicate excellent reception.

(ii) A fifteen minute broadcast in Tartar was inaugurated at the local programming center at Munich on September 21, 1952.

(iii) A study of the transmitters located in the United States was made by Booz, Allen and Hamilton with a view to providing a stronger short-wave signal to relay bases overseas.

(iv) Alfred Hammond Morton assumed charge of the International Broadcasting Service with the title of Deputy Administrator of the International Information Administration.

(f) Information Center Service.

Franklin Publications, Inc., a private corporation formed by a group of publishers and private interests, was formed in July to undertake, on behalf of foundations and universities as well as the Government, the publication and distribution of noteworthy American books in translation in foreign countries. The first efforts will be made in the Arab States. The sum of \$500,000 has been made available to it by the Department of State.

(g) International Motion Picture Service.

(i) A film showing the participation of the individual voter in the process of choosing presidential candidates has been completed and distributed. Another showing his participation in the election of a President is scheduled for completion immediately after the election.

(ii) The first conference of film officers, involving representatives from posts in the Near and Middle East, was held on Cyprus from August 11 to August 15, 1952, with the purpose of determining how films could be produced with sharper focus on local problems.

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(h) International Educational Exchange Service.

A tendency has been noted on the part of certain foreign governments to undertake unilateral control of the selection of their citizens who may be offered exchange grants by the United States and other governments. The trend appears to be motivated by (1) the heightened nationalism common to Asian states since the war, and (2) a desire to control closely any exchanges that might occur with the Soviet Union and Communist China and at the same time not to make it appear that these governments are being singled out in any way. The Burmese Government has made formal representation in this matter to the United States Government, exempting only the Fulbright program, since it is founded on a formal agreement between the governments. The Department has taken the position that even at the cost of a temporary cessation of exchanges with Burma, the principle must be maintained that this government has final responsibility for selecting grantees financed through congressional appropriations. While Burma is the clearest case in point at the moment, similar situations have developed in Indonesia and in Syria and are nascent throughout most of Southeast Asia and the Middle East.

(i) Cooperation with Private Enterprise.

Projects are under way with various private agencies, social, commercial and philanthropic, to provide foreign groups with books and magazines, to assist Americans travelling abroad, to provide radio facilities to underdeveloped areas, to project a balanced picture of Wall Street, to promote the exchange of persons and to develop bi-national community relationships.

(j) Cooperation with Other Governmental Agencies.

Integration of Information activities of the International Information Administration and the Mutual Security Administration in other countries has taken place in the United Kingdom, Denmark, Austria, Germany, The Netherlands, Belgium-Luxembourg, Italy, Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey. Integration had already taken place in Iceland, Switzerland and Trieste.

(k) Cooperation with Other Governments.

(i) Bi-national committees to promote the ready acceptance by local populations of troops of the United States established on their soil have been formally established in France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy and Iceland. Similar committees are functioning on an informal basis in Libya and Morocco.

(ii) Negotiations are under way for limited cooperation in foreign information activities with the government of Australia. Cooperation would chiefly concern broadcasts to Southeast Asia.

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(1) Electromagnetic Warfare.

No significant change took place in the overall level of Soviet jamming, although minor changes took place from time to time in the application of the jamming mechanism to the various language broadcasts.

Sufficient information has been received through governmental intelligence sources to warrant the conclusion that the Soviets have in the process of construction, probably in the final states, somewhere between eight and twelve high powered transmitters either designed for or capable of jamming in the medium frequency and low frequency bands. These are generally distributed around the European periphery of the Iron Curtain. An East German intelligence source heretofore found to be reliable, reports the establishment within the government structure of East Germany of an office for radio warfare. A powerful East Zone broadcasting station moved on to the frequency used by the Armed Forces Network in Berlin. Whether this was intended as a deliberate interference measure, or whether it represented a Soviet need for a frequency is not now known.

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SIGNIFICANT PSYCHOLOGICAL ACTIVITIES OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DURING THE PERIOD FROM
1 JULY THROUGH 30 SEPTEMBER 1952

SECTION I

What activities has your agency engaged in during the period under review which are psychologically significant for the attainment of national objectives? With respect to the following current psychologically significant problems, situations and objectives, the Department of Defense activity was as indicated below.

1. The problem of neutralism and anti-American sentiments in Western Europe, including the United Kingdom? To assist in combatting neutralism and anti-American sentiments in Western Europe, including the United Kingdom, the Department of Defense through the military Services engaged in the following activities:

a. Reduction of neutralism:

(1) Shows of military force in Western Europe have been staged. The participation of U.S. military forces in national and international maneuvers in this area has expressed U.S. determination to assist in the defense of Western Europe from all aggressors. The following major military demonstrations have realistically portrayed U.S. intentions in this area:

(a) The U.S. Navy participated in the allied fleet maneuvers in the North Sea and Baltic areas, involving some 160 warships of seven nations, demonstrated the capability of the allied naval forces to defend Western Europe.

(b) Significant among the activities of the military forces in achieving psychological advantage was the conduct of the combined U.S.-French maneuvers east of the Rhine River and the alert drills of the U.S. garrison in Berlin. The U.S.-French maneuvers served to demonstrate military capabilities and the efficacy of combined operations. Also such maneuvers helped to overcome Western European's lingering belief that SHAPE defense would be west of the Rhine or further back in the event of attack. In Berlin, the U.S. military activities have been most valuable in reaffirming the stated U.S. position to the West Berliners, the "Free World" and the Soviets, that any attack directed at West

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(c) During the reporting period, the Skyblazers, a USAF aerobatic team of four jet fighters, on behalf of CINCLSAFE gave approximately 30 air demonstrations to foreign military and civilian audiences throughout Mediterranean and European countries. In a continuing program to

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rotate combat-ready units of the Strategic Air Command to foreign stations, USAF medium and heavy bombers visited countries in Europe.

(2) Statements by General Ridgway and other Senior U.S. commanders have reemphasized the need for collective effort to build a position of strength as the means of deterring Soviet aggression. Significant among the themes stressed by U.S. military leaders were the following:

- (a) Warnings that critical defense minimums must be met.
- (b) Warnings that the threat of aggression had not lessened.
- (c) Praises of great progress made within the NATO military structure toward our common goal.
- (d) The need for West German contribution to West European defense.
- (e) The allies plan to hold their ground in Germany should the Reds attack.
- (f) Indications of the use of atomic arms for the joint defense of Western Europe.

b. Reduction of anti-American sentiments. Although a certain amount of progress has been made in solving the problem of anti-American sentiments in Western Europe, much remains to be accomplished. The Department of Defense feels that we are still on the defensive in combatting the "Hate-America" campaign but attempts are being made to seize the initiative through the following measures:

(1) Troop-civilian relations committees organized in Western Europe early this year continue to function. Department of Defense participates on these interdepartmental committees organized by Department of State Public Affairs officers, by providing representatives for areas where U.S. military personnel are stationed. A marked degree of closer cooperation and collaboration between U.S. commanders and local government officials has contributed to the success of the program. While no definitive evaluation can be made of the effectiveness of materials and methods used in Service information programs, continuing effort is made to establish trends and indications with a view to improving subject matter presented and to keep it current. The program continues to have a favorable effect and a trend toward greater acceptance of U.S. military personnel can be noted throughout Western Europe. This trend is presumably due to firmer action by host governments against communist propaganda and obstructionism, more favorable local press and better orientation of U.S. military personnel. At a July meeting called by Ambassador Draper to consider troop-civilian relationships in NATO countries, it was decided that formal committees should be established throughout the NATO area.

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It is felt that the activities of such interdepartmental committees, as already exist, have had notable effect upon neutralism and anti-American sentiments in Western Europe, and have assisted in countering Soviet "Hate-America" propaganda by keeping U.S. military personnel better informed and adjusted to local conditions, thereby reducing the number of incidents. Detailed reports as to the effectiveness of the program as it pertains to the indigenous populations are submitted by Public Affairs Officers through Department of State channels.

(2) In the continuing effort to establish and maintain U.S. good-will in areas of national interest, U.S. defense forces have promoted friendship and understanding by:

(a) Visits to European ports and contacts with local populace by units of the U.S. Navy, including a four day visit by eleven ships to Yugoslav waters.

(b) Scheduled appearances in West European capitals and other principal cities by U.S. military bands before foreign military and civilian audiences.

(3) By sending special teams to indoctrinate NATO forces in the use of U.S. equipment, the Defense Department has increased the confidence of the NATO forces in their capabilities to defend Western Europe.

(4) With the view of promoting defense production, stimulating the economy and fostering understanding among North Atlantic Defense forces, the Department of Defense has continued its policy of off-shore procurement of supplies from European Defense sources. Whenever feasible, this form of economic assistance is so oriented as to benefit the non-communist segments of the countries involved.

2. The problem of securing ratification and implementation of the Bonn "contractual agreements" and the European Defense Community Treaty? To assist in securing ratification and implementation of the Bonn "contractual agreements" and the European Defense Community Treaty, the Department of Defense through the military Services has supplied military assistance or advice as to military matters involved.

3. Soviet "Hate-America" propaganda? To assist in combatting the Soviet "Hate-America" propaganda, the Department of Defense through the military Services has taken the following steps:

a. The Department of Defense Office of Public Information cooperated closely with the Department of State and other agencies involved in psychological activities in coordinating information released by the Department of Defense and its components on biological and chemical warfare. As this was a period of intense communist propaganda on biological warfare against the United States, this coordination was significant in assisting the countering of such propaganda. Through the Interdepartmental Committee to Combat Communist Propaganda, on which the Department of Defense Office of Public Information is represented, progress was made in developing plans and means for setting forth United States position regarding the false charges of using germ warfare in Korea. The

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Interdepartmental Committee to Combat Communist Propaganda has conducted a constant analysis of the Soviet "Hate-America" propaganda campaign and has sought immediate and long range means of countering such propaganda. The Department of Air Force has undertaken production of a film entitled "Brain-washing", counteracting Soviet charges against U.S. forces in Korea that United Nations Command is conducting germ warfare.

b. The Department of Defense has provided the Department of State with advance notice of troop movements in certain overseas areas in order to minimize communist propaganda against them and to make most effective psychological use of their presence. In addition, these committees have continued to monitor and direct the activities of coordinating subcommittees set up in each country in which there are American troops. These subcommittees consist of representatives from the Armed Forces, Mutual Security Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, and the Department of State. Reports indicate that their work has been effective.

c. See references made to paragraphs 1 b and 4 for other examples concerning activities conducted to combat "Hate-America" propaganda.

4. National Policy Objectives in the Middle East. In support of the national policy objective to improve U.S. relations in the Moslem world the Department of Defense has cooperated in establishing good will by:

- a. The airlift of 3,854 pilgrims from Beirut to Jidda.
- b. The airlift of 4 tons of hybrid seed corn to Lebanon.

As a result of these operations as well as the Major Jabara, USAF, visit, reported in August 1952 annual report, friendly relationships have been established between key Arab leaders and U.S. government representatives in Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria. It has been suggested that the Jabara visit alone made a more significant contribution to the U.S. cold war effort in the Middle East than any other single act undertaken in the area up to that time.

5. The Allied Position in West Berlin. In support of national policy objectives in Germany, the allied position in West Berlin has been strengthened by:

- a. The maintaining of U.S. military forces in West Berlin and demonstrating the determination to support and protect the city by force if necessary. The recent conduct of maneuvers in West Berlin by U.S. military forces was a dynamic expression of our intention to defend the city.
- b. Continued use of the U.S. military approaches to Berlin reaffirm U.S. policy to keep the approaches to West Berlin open. By interdepartmental action contingency plans for the psychological exploitation of a second Berlin Airlift were developed.

6. The International Role of Japan in the Post-Treaty Era: Department of Defense has rendered support through routine military advice and assistance and by providing training and equipment for the Japanese National Police Reserve. Through the Security Treaty the U.S. has again demonstrated its belief in the efficacy of collective security and has attempted to awaken

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Japan to the communist threat to its national survival. The utilization of Japan as a military base for the support of the Korean Campaign has served to demonstrate the need for collective effort against aggression and the closeness of danger to the Japanese "Home Islands".

7. National Policy Objectives in Latin America. The Department of Defense has contributed to the support of our national policy in Latin America and to the stability of existing governments by assisting in the training and equipping of military forces of the Latin American countries. This has been accomplished by sending U.S. military teams and personnel to various Latin American countries and by inviting Latin American military forces to participate in specialized training programs being conducted in the U.S.

8. The Korean Campaign and Truce Negotiations. The Department of Defense activities in this area are conducted by the Commander in the Far East, who is responsible for the conduct of psychological operations in Korea in accordance with national policy. In the accomplishment of this mission, the Commander has participated in the following significant activities:

a. The conduct of target warning operations in North Korea of impending bombing of 78 North Korean cities expresses the intent of the United Nations Command to save as many lives as possible of non-combatants in target areas. Psychologically, these warning operations are also designed to increase the pressure brought to bear by United Nations Command on the Chinese Communist Forces and North Korean Army negotiators at Panmunjom, and to contribute a satisfactory termination of the Korean conflict.

b. Provision of military representation to the inter-departmental committee which prepares and transmits the Special Korean Information Guidance. This guidance provides CINCUNC with information not readily available in Tokyo, including digest of U.S. and foreign press comments and reactions, and substantive materials and suggestions to be used in maintaining the propaganda initiatives in Far East Command. There are a number of examples in which the U.S. (UN) delegates to the truce negotiations have used information provided them through this means.

c. The U.S. (UN) policy that it will not use force in the repatriation of prisoners of war has had wide psychological repercussions. Although the U.S. adherence to the principle of non-forcible repatriation has gained for it wide "Free World" support, the continuing firmness in this position has blocked the achievement of an honorable armistice.

d. An attempt has been made to establish the fact that agitation in prisoner of war camps was inspired and provoked by "hard core" communists. However, the publicity accorded such incidents has provided the communists with additional material for their propaganda campaign and raised some doubt as to U.S. (UN) intentions.

e. The leaflet, radio and loudspeaker operations directed at the North Korean soldiers and civilians and Chinese communist soldiers continued. A new commentary series exploiting the statements of Chinese Communist Forces prisoners who oppose return to communist control was begun in September. Themes stressed are: Soviet exploitation of China and North Korea; communist brutality and oppressions, and subservience

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of the communist puppet regimes to the USSR. In leaflet operations, now nearing three billion disseminated, theme emphasis is on good treatment, non-forcible repatriation, nostalgia and support of operational plans such as DEADLOCK (armistice negotiations), FRAUD (to discredit communist regimes of China and North Korea) and ERIS (EUSAK plan to create or aggravate friction between CCF and NKA).

9. Psychological Results of Presence of U.S. Personnel Abroad. The stationing of U.S. military and civilian personnel abroad has raised psychological problems, many of which are still unsolved, but, in spite of these problems, it is believed that the presence of such personnel in areas abroad has been of value in reaffirming and demonstrating U.S. intentions to assist in the collective security effort.

a. All U.S. military personnel selected for assignment overseas receive a course of instruction prior to embarkation. In addition, upon arrival at their destination, all personnel are oriented on their mission; proper standards of conduct; cooperation with our Allies; local history, geography, and customs; and other subjects considered essential by the unit commander.

b. To orient and condition psychological warfare personnel of the 580th and 581st ARC Wings, the Department of Defense requested the Department of State to brief unit personnel on the scope of U.S. national psychological programs and the significance of U.S. psychological warfare interests abroad. It is particularly significant that personnel of military psychological units receive such information prior to being deployed to overseas areas.

10. Shows of Military Force. Although the programs and activities of the Department of Defense both at home and abroad are designed primarily to achieve military ends, it is recognized that many if not all of these activities have an inherent psychological impact. In recognition of the natural psychological effect of such Defense activities, both advantageous and adverse, added consideration to the proper exploitation of the following activities is warranted.

a. The continuous program of maneuvers by U.S. military forces both at home and abroad engenders a feeling of confidence in the capabilities of the U.S. to assist in the defense of free nations from communist aggression. However, the potential psychological impact of such maneuvers is not generally integrated into operational plans.

b. In the latter part of September, at the request of the Department of State, action was taken to conduct a flight of USAF B-29's to Malaya, a neutral South East Asia country. Flights such as this, as well as the continued appearance of U.S. aircraft and naval vessels throughout the world, support U.S. position of world leadership by demonstrating military striking potential, technical excellence of equipment, and military preparedness of U.S. Government.

c. Recent expansion of military interests in foreign areas has resulted in the establishment of a strategic air base in Greenland. Such expansions illustrate the scope of U.S. military planning and free-world cooperation and determination to defend against communism in the event of general hostilities.

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d. In conjunction with the Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission, exploitation of certain atomic weapons tests has been made. The Department of Defense has promulgated a comprehensive policy on the release of public information regarding atomic weapons, guided missiles and new weapons. This policy provides that agencies concerned with psychological operations coordinate fully whenever public information is to be released on these weapons.

11. What new evidence has emerged during the quarter concerning the psychological effectiveness of activities conducted before the reporting period?

a. As a result of U.S. psychological operations in the Arab World, such as the good-will tour of Major Jabara (Jet Ace) (reported in August 1952 annual report) relationships between key Arab leaders and U.S. government representatives in Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon and Syria have been improved. This has contributed to a psychological atmosphere favorable to U.S. interests in the Middle East and significantly contributed to the U.S. cold war effort in this area.

b. The UN psychological warfare effort is providing valuable support for the Korean campaign. Reports continue to indicate that a majority of the people in a leaflet drop area read UN leaflets, including some party members, and that the leaflets or information contained therein are passed on. The North Korean civilians in general believe the information. Reports still indicate that the North Korean civilian is waiting for and apparently expects a UN offensive. Most local authorities in North Korea are continuing efforts to prevent UN propaganda from reaching the soldier and civilian. Leaflet drop areas are declared "Off Limits", inhabitants are confined to their homes until leaflets are disposed of, the people are told that leaflets are poisoned and all people are threatened with "cruel punishment" if they pick up UN leaflets. Most prisoners state that there is a continuous campaign to minimize effectiveness of UN psychological warfare operations. Communist officers refute UN propaganda statements, the soldiers are subjected to unannounced inspections, leaflets are turned in and burned, men apprehended with leaflets are subject to disciplinary action including confinement.

12. Included in current activities and separate from plans and capabilities is the program of research and development in strategic intelligence and psychological warfare operations. Fundamentally, this program is concerned with rendering maximum assistance to the achievement of national objectives by (1) in times of "cold war", reducing the power and influence of potentially hostile nations, (2) in case of hostilities, defeat of the enemy, and (3) at all times countering threats to our national security. Research and development support of national objectives is rendered by research programs classified under the following technical fields:

a. Strategic Intelligence programs to improve through social science research techniques the collection and military utilization of basic, comprehensive data on foreign areas and peoples, including:

(1) Potentially hostile groups and peoples.

(2) Potential allies.

(3) Strategic areas and peoples which are subjected in times of "cold war" to intense international pressures and tensions.

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b. Psychological warfare research programs to render maximum assistance to achievement of national objectives by affecting (through means other than destructive weapons) the will and capacity of individuals and groups to support their leaders and national policies.

c. Psychological warfare material research programs to develop equipment and devices to facilitate communication with peoples in potentially hostile and inaccessible areas.

d. Civil Defense research programs to maintain high morale at home in case of hostilities by such means as increasing efficiency of security measures, adequate defense against enemy psychological warfare, and effective disaster control.

e. Military Government and Military Relations (in Foreign Areas) research programs to increase the effectiveness of techniques for:

(1) The control and management of enemy areas occupied by our military forces.

(2) The indoctrination in democratic principles of enemy nationals in areas occupied by our military forces.

(3) The fostering of better relationships between our military forces abroad and the nationals of host friendly nations.

SECTION II

What significant progress has been made in developing plans, capabilities and organizational means for contributing further to the national psychological effort?

13. Preparation of Psychological Warfare Plan. To further the wartime national psychological warfare effort, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a psychological warfare plan to support the "Joint Outline Emergency War Plan." The "National Overt Propaganda Policy Guidance for General War," approved by the Psychological Strategy Board was used as guidance in the preparation of this plan, which now puts wartime psychological warfare plans and objectives in phase with approved policy guidance. The military Services and major subordinate commands are in the process of developing or modifying existing plans in accordance with current guidance.

14. Specific Planning for Psychological Warfare.

a. In the psychological warfare field planning is progressing toward the development of a "Transfer Plan" which will facilitate the wartime transfer of U.S. foreign information equipment and personnel from other agencies to the military control, for the execution of U.S. psychological warfare operations in military theaters of operations.

b. For the Far Eastern area a psychological plan to support the U.S. Forces in Japan is being developed.

c. An ~~ad hoc~~ committee has been formed to develop a program for promoting the ~~surrender of enemy air crews.~~

d. To meet the communist threat in Europe, two plans for the reduction of communist power in France and Italy are presently under consideration.

e. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also have under study a SHAPE paper which sets forth the views of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), concerning his wartime psychological warfare responsibilities,

f. Initial plans for the conduct of wartime psychological operations in Alaska, developed by Commander in Chief, Alaskan Forces, have been submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for consideration and review.

15. Planning for Unconventional Warfare. In the field of unconventional warfare, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recently approved a paper establishing a delineation of responsibilities between the Services and the Central Intelligence Agency in the field of Escape and Evasion. In addition, a SHAPE paper concerning the delineation of responsibilities of the clandestine services and SACEUR to include organization and definitions is presently under study and review by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

16. Planning for Guerrilla Warfare and Covert Operations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, during the period covered by the previous paper, delineated the responsibility of the Services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for guerrilla warfare, and covert operations. A study is now being made of the command relationship between CIA/DPC (new title: PMS) organization and the armed forces, in active theaters of war where U.S. forces are engaged.

17. General Planning on Continuous Basis. In addition to activities involving current psychological problems, the Department of Defense, in accordance with national policy, prepares plans and makes preparations for the wartime conduct of psychological and unconventional warfare, and in these fields participates on a continuing basis in:

- a. Interdepartmental and international planning,
- b. Orientation and training of personnel.
- c. Coordination with other agencies and departments,
- d. Support of other agencies and departments as required.

18. Research and Development Emphasis on Psychological Warfare. The Research and Development Board has reactivated a Panel on Psychological Warfare, whose responsibility will be to plan an integrated program of research and development for military psychological operations and periodically review the progress of the departments in implementing this goal. As in the case of all R&DB panels, associate memberships on the Panel on Psychological Warfare will be available to interested non-military agencies.

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PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD

Washington

STATUS REPORT ON THE NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFORT

AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1952, and PROGRESS REPORT OF THE

PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD

Submitted to the President and the National Security Council

by the Psychological Strategy Board

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PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD

Washington

STATUS REPORT ON THE NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFORT
AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1952, and PROGRESS REPORT OF THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD

Submitted to the President and the National Security Council
by the Psychological Strategy Board

WARNING

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, U.S.C., the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

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PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
WASHINGTON, D. C.

STATUS REPORT ON THE NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFORT AS OF
DECEMBER 31, 1952, and PROGRESS REPORT OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
STRATEGY BOARD

NOTE BY THE SECRETARY

This report was approved by the Board at its Seventeenth
Meeting, January 15, 1953.

Charles E. Johnson
Charles E. Johnson
Secretary to the Board

03:00:00
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PSB D-35
January 5, 1953

STATUS REPORT ON THE NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFORT AS OF
DECEMBER 31, 1952, and PROGRESS REPORT OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
STRATEGY BOARD

Submitted to the President and the National Security Council by the
Psychological Strategy Board

pursuant to the memorandum dated December 12, 1952 addressed to the
Director of the Psychological Strategy Board by Mr. James S. Lay, Jr.,
Executive Secretary of the National Security Council

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* The Report of the Central Intelligence Agency is specially classified.

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I. PURPOSE and FRAMEWORK

PURPOSE

To provide for the more effective planning, coordination and conduct, within the framework of approved national policies, of psychological operations.

The Psychological Strategy Board is responsible for the formulation and promulgation, as guidance to the departments and agencies responsible for psychological operations, of over-all national psychological objectives, policies, and programs, and for the coordination and evaluation of the national psychological effort.

- condensed from The Presidential Directive of April 4, 1951

FRAMEWORK OF NATIONAL POLICY

To develop throughout the world positive appeals superior to those of communists.

To block further expansion of Soviet power.

To induce a retraction of the Kremlin's control and influence.

To foster the seeds of destruction within the Soviet system.

To promote internal stability in critical areas outside the Soviet orbit.

To create stronger support for United States foreign policy.

- condensed from NSC 135/3 "Reappraisal of United States Objectives and Strategy for National Security."

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II. SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT PSYCHOLOGICAL ACTIVITIES

1. The Board presents below a brief evaluative summary of the status of our national psychological programs as of December 31, 1952, based on the appended Progress Reports of recent significant activities by the departments and agencies responsible for psychological operations.

GENERAL COMMENTS

2. U. S. capabilities for psychological action, within the limits of the world power position, are slowly but steadily improving, but they remain inadequate for taking immediately effective psychological action contributing to a retraction of the Kremlin's power and influence.

3. Progress has been made in planning and coordinating interdepartmental and inter-agency action, [in making use of indigenous resources for "gray" or unattributed operations, in building up potentialities for increased "black" or covert activity,] and in expanding under existing programs technical facilities for radio broadcasting.

4. Our national psychological effort is at greatest disadvantage in the USSR and Communist China. In these areas, radio broadcasting remains almost the only weapon we are now employing on any significant scale. Even here, Russian jamming presents a very serious problem, although evidence continues to appear that broadcasts are heard by a limited audience on whom they have some effect. In Communist China listening facilities for the masses are severely limited.

5. In the Soviet satellite states of Eastern Europe also, radio broadcasting constitutes the major active element at our disposal. In these countries, too, jamming constitutes an obstacle, although at present a less serious one, perhaps, than in the USSR. In the case of some of the satellites, however, some progress has been made in building up other capabilities for psychological activities.

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6. More positive psychological action directed against the Soviet orbit necessarily awaits a greater development of our over-all capabilities, and an accompanying adjustment of our basic national policy. In the present interim position, until a more aggressive strategic concept becomes feasible, psychological planning and programming against the orbit has gone ahead on the basis of doing everything possible to aggravate its internal conflicts in the hope that this will subsequently help to bring about a retraction of Kremlin control and influence.

7. U. S. psychological programs outside the Iron Curtain, where the major portion of the national psychological effort has been applied, have moved with moderate success toward the achievement of our objectives in certain areas. The psychological impact of American aid programs has, despite some difficulties, in most respects been favorable. With regard to the psychological problems arising from the large numbers of American personnel abroad, considerable progress has been made in respect to U. S. troops. Some progress is recorded toward meeting the "neutralist" menace. The US-UN stand against forcible repatriation of Korean prisoners of war has gained general acceptance with good psychological effect. There is closer and more effective cooperation between the various agencies carrying out American psychological programs abroad, and steadily increasing recognition of the role of psychological operations in world affairs.

RELATED ACTIVITIES

8. Certain related activities are covered in a specially classified section of this report, ANNEX C.

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RELATED ACTIVITIES

8. Certain related activities are covered in a specially classified section of this report, ANNEX C.

AFPA SUMMARY

9. In Western Europe there have been set-backs, such as the delay in ratification of the European Defense Community accords and the decision of the European member governments to cut their defense contributions under NATO. But the over-all picture contains bright elements as well. The reports of all PSB reporting agencies indicate that, as 1952 ends,

communism

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communism is on a slow but definitely perceptible decline (with the possible exception of Italy). Furthermore, there is agreement that U.S. psychological programs have made an effective if modest contribution to this decline. Communism remains the major long-term threat, of course; but other forces tending to disrupt free world solidarity, and other forms of anti-Americanism, such as "neutralism," constitute more immediate problems.

10. In the Middle East the picture is not so bright. Iran is an obvious danger spot and a classic example of the difficulties and potential dangers confronting the continued existence of freedom in countries where extreme nationalism exists as a major problem in itself, and one that is aggravated and complicated by the fact that it can be easily inflamed and exploited by communism. Tension arising from some of the same elements that are found in Iran is growing in Iraq. In both these cases, as in the other Arab countries of the area, it can not be confidently asserted that there has been progress in the psychological field. In North Africa, nationalist ferment presents increasingly complex problems of a psychological character, rendered more acute by the presence of important American air bases within the area.

11. This does not mean, however, that the picture in the Middle East is entirely dark. Favorable effects continue from such psychological initiatives as the Mecca airlift, and the visit of the Fleet to the area. Our economic and military aid programs, and their active psychological exploitation, have produced good results, particularly in Turkey, which represents an encouragingly stable and friendly factor.

12. In South and Southeast Asia, all the problems and potential dangers in the situation are still present; but from the reports emerges the impression that gradually U. S. capabilities for holding our own in the psychological struggle there are being improved. Both on the overt

information

information side and in non-attributable activities significant gains have been registered, particularly in the Philippines, Indo-China, and Thailand. In the Indian sub-Continent too, slow progress continues. Wise exploitation of the psychological possibilities of our aid programs, the agreement to extend military aid to Pakistan, and U. S. acceptance in the UN of the Indian Resolution on Korea - subsequently rejected out of hand by the Soviet bloc - have all had a favorable effect.

13. In the Far East, psychological activities are steadily if slowly expanding. A psychological plan to deal with the problems raised by the presence of U. S. troops in Japan is now being prepared. Better use is being made of Japanese indigenous organizations and other resources in combatting communism. New psychological activities under the Far East Command include moves to build up escape operations in Korea and strengthen and improve the organization responsible for unconventional warfare. A number of psychological programs designed to take advantage of the proximity of U. S. and communist forces in Korea have been undertaken.

Efforts to penetrate Red China were being slowly developed, with a significant increase in leaflet dropping, radio broadcasting, and some other activities of a non-attributable nature.

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14. In Latin America, likewise, the spread of communism and the growing threat of Peronism have led us to increase our capabilities for combating these and other anti-American forces. Overt information efforts are combining with TCA aid programs and non-attributable activities on an increasing scale. It is evident from current reports, however, that more will be required before we can take care of the dual Communist-Peronista threat to hemisphere unity.

SPECIAL PROBLEMS

15. Coordinated efforts of all the departments and agencies concerned had, by the year's end, been undertaken to minimize the impact of the communist germ warfare charges. Similarly, the Soviet "Hate America"

campaign

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campaign, as well as the so-called Campaign of Peace, seem to be declining in effectiveness outside the Iron Curtain, thanks, in part at least, to persistent and better-coordinated U. S. efforts to counteract them. The long-term implications of these campaigns remain serious, however. There are manifest indications of the effectiveness of the "Hate America" campaign inside the Iron Curtain countries, and the need for more effective counter measures continues great.

16. Major psychological problems continue to be raised by our commercial and immigration policies. The repercussions of our trade and tariff restrictions tend in some countries to diminish the psychological effects of our economic aid programs. The restrictions on immigration and the complications of our visa policy continue to offset some of the best efforts of our psychological operations.

17. Quietly effective use appears to have been made of the psychological possibilities inherent in our development of novel atomic and other weapons.

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III. THE WORK OF PSB

PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION ACTIVITIES

Out of fifteen plans completed or under development during the year, five are aimed primarily at contributing to the national objective of reducing the power and influence of the Soviet Union. A number of other staff studies emphasizing psychological attack upon the USSR and its satellites were in preliminary stages of development at the year's end.

Plans Completed and Being Executed:

- (a) A Strategic Concept for a National Psychological Program with Particular Reference to Cold War Operations under NSC 10/5 (PSB D-31)

This paper, which focusses on the problem of reducing Soviet power, was distributed on November 26, 1952, to interested departments and agencies for implementation. Coordination of this work rests with PSB's 10/5 Committee.

- (b) Program of Psychological Preparation for Stalin's Passing from Power. (PSB D-24)

This paper was approved by the PSB on November 1, 1952. Principal points of contact have been established in the member agencies and the Director's staff for carrying the program forward. An intelligence collection effort has been organized. An implementation plan and a contingency guidance for the event of Stalin's sudden death have been drafted.

- (c) Psychological Operations Plan for Soviet Orbit Escapees - Phase A. (PSB D-18a)

Implementation of this plan for Soviet orbit escapees was a major activity carried out under the auspices of the Board during 1952. A program, coordinated both in Washington and overseas, was developed in all major European countries of asylum with the purpose of affording Iron

Curtain

Curtain escapees better opportunity for resettlement and a higher standard of interim care. Firm contractual relationships have been entered into with the several voluntary agencies cooperating in the local implementation of the program, complementing the transportation arrangements with the Migration Committee.

Some 2,600 escapees had been resettled overseas or were awaiting departure by December 31, 1952. A number of projects have been undertaken to facilitate movement of escapees, such as aid in obtaining visas and supporting documents, counselling to assist in developing suitable emigration opportunities, and language, orientation, and vocational training. As these intensive efforts on an individual basis reach full potential, it is expected that the number of departures will increase substantially.

Supplemental care projects have been initiated to improve conditions of reception, and to furnish additional food, clothing, medical and dental care, and similar supplies and services for escapees awaiting resettlement. It is estimated that over 9,000 escapees are receiving direct assistance from this activity, and many more are benefitted indirectly through common-use facilities, such as the improvement of living quarters and sanitary conditions.

Psychologically, the potential impact of this program can hardly be overstated. It means that "at last it is safe to escape" - that for the first time the U. S. is able to substantiate, in a practical way, its position that defectors and escapees will be better off in the West than behind the Iron Curtain.

(d) Psychological

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- (d) Psychological Operations Plan for the
Reduction of Communist Power in France
(PSB D-14/c)
- (e) Psychological Operations Plan for the
Reduction of Communist Power in Italy
(PSB D-15/b)

The Washington Interdepartmental Committee and its counterparts in Paris and Rome have continued to coordinate U.S. activities under these plans. U. S. CINCEUR has been directed to take all feasible actions in support of these two programs as requested by the Department of State.

In France, the Pinay government, while in power, had made considerable progress toward the reduction of the power of the Communist Party in France. The Pinay government's campaign to expose the foreign and subversive nature of the party combined with the increasingly nationalistic sentiment in France served to create an atmosphere particularly appropriate for such a policy. Success of the current legal proceedings against the communist leaders would crystallize this situation. With respect to this situation, the Embassy in Paris reports its conviction that the U. S. government should and will continue to utilize every opportune occasion to reiterate concern with the problem and to make suggestions that are discreet and appropriate. However, the Embassy continues to feel that it still behooves the U. S. Government to remain as invisible as possible and to let the French proceed on their own.

In Italy, an official report is expected soon from the Italian panel. The Ambassador is taking a keen interest in the implementation of this paper and meets on a regular weekly basis with a "strategy board" within the Embassy.

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(f) National Psychological Strategy With
Respect to Germany. (PSB D-21)

This plan was approved by the Board on October 9, 1952. Implementation has begun, with interdepartmental coordination designees in Washington and the field coordinating panel at HICOG, working together to bring its provisions into effect.

(g) Staff Study -

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- (g) Staff Study - Preliminary Analysis of
the Communist BW Propaganda Campaign
with Recommendations (PSB D-25/b)

Implementation of the conclusions and recommendations of this study, which called for a vigorous coordinated psychological counter-offensive to nullify the Soviet "Hate America" propaganda, was assigned by the Board to the Psychological Operations Committee of the Department of State on August 7, 1952. On December 30, 1952, the Director wrote the Chairman of POC requesting a report on the progress so far achieved.

Plans Completed But Not Yet Being Executed -- Stand-by Plans:

- (a) Psychological Operations Plan Incident to
Korean Cease-Fire Negotiations (PSB D-7/c)
and
(b) Emergency Plan for Break-off of Korean
Armistice Negotiations (PSB J-19-d)

The first of these plans is designed to establish special psychological objectives with respect to our allies as well as to our adversaries, to be implemented in the event of successful cease-fire negotiations. The second plan established guidances for governmental departments and agencies engaged in psychological operations, outlining courses of action in preparation for, and in the event of, a breakdown in the Korean armistice negotiations. Overt operational planning under both plans is substantially complete. [Covert operational planning is currently being revised.]

The PSB staff is currently reviewing all aspects of these plans in view of the present situation.

- (c) Plan for Conducting Psychological Operations
During General Hostilities (PSB D-8/b)
and
(d) National Overt Propaganda Policy Guidance for
General War (PSB D-11/b)

Both the plan and the guidance have been distributed to the various departments and agencies for their use, and have been integrated by the military services with their war planning. Planning on interdepartmental

problems

problems relating to psychological policies and operations in the event of war is currently being accomplished by an X-Day Committee under the Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee.

Plans Authorized and In Process of Development:

- (a) A National Psychological Program with
Respect to Escapees from the Soviet Orbit:
Phase B (PSB D-18a/1)

The second phase of the program is designed to apply affirmative psychological pressures upon the enslaved populations in order to undermine and contribute toward destruction of control of the Kremlin, while strengthening and enhancing the power of the non-communist world with the psychological and subsidiary military advantages which would result from the stimulation of defection and proper utilization of such escapees. A final draft was submitted to the Board for approval. Phase "A", concerned with care, resettlement, and possible utilization of current escapees, is reported upon above.

- (b) Doctrinal (Ideological) Warfare Against
the USSR (PSB D-33)

A PSB staff study, which emphasized communist use of the ideological appeal to win influence with the intellectual elite in critical areas and thereby gain pro-communist predominance in the education of youth, led the Board to authorize the establishment of a panel to study and recommend a program for Doctrinal Warfare. Panel investigations indicate that American psychological operations must not limit themselves to the defensive exploitation of the inconsistencies, contradictions and vulnerabilities of the communist doctrine, but that the positive United States-Free World ideology must be used as a revolutionary weapon to turn the followers or captives of communism against their leaders on both sides of the Iron Curtain. The panel has prepared a progress report briefly contrasting communist activity and American inactivity in doctrinal warfare.

(c) Psychological

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(c) Psychological Strategy Planning for
The Middle East (PSB D-22)

This plan is intended to provide a national psychological strategy designed to prevent the extension of Soviet influence while at the same time strengthening Western influence in the Middle East. It is also designed to help make the resources of the area available to the U. S. and its allies for use in strengthening the free world. It seeks to accomplish these objectives by psychological measures aimed at combatting instability within these countries, strengthening the will and ability of these countries to resist aggression, and establishing a new relationship with these states which will recognize their desire to achieve status and respect for their sovereign equality. This plan is expected to be submitted to the Board for approval at their January 15 meeting.

(d) Psychological Strategy Planning for
Southeast Asia (PSB D-23)

This plan is designed to assist by means of coordinated psychological operations in preventing the free countries of Southeast Asia from passing into the communist orbit and in developing in these countries the will and ability to resist communism from within and without. A final draft of the plan was prepared for submission to the Board at their January 15 meeting.

(e) Psychological Strategy Program for
Japan (PSB D-27)

Within the framework of NSC 125/2, "U. S. Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Japan," a PSB Panel completed a draft program which will provide basic guidance for coordinated psychological operations to carry out the objectives of NSC 125/2 necessary to maximize Japan's contri-

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(f) Psychological Strategy for Economic
Security Vis-a-Vis the Soviet Orbit
(PSB D-28)

The terms of reference provide a national psychological strategy and specific courses of action with respect to the psychological aspects of

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U. S. economic security programs concerned with the Soviet orbit by increasing the degree of acceptability in the free world of U. S. economic security objectives vis-a-vis the Soviet orbit.

Studies in Preparation for Future Planning

[Continuing the emphasis on psychological action directed at the Soviet orbit, a study is under way for the development of a plan for "Exploitation of Dissidence in the Soviet Bloc," with particular stress being placed on the armed forces of the Soviet bloc.] Studies have also been undertaken to determine the feasibility and psychological desirability of developing strategy plans or programs for [Communist China], the East European satellites, French and Spanish North Africa, Africa South of the Sahara, and the Indian sub-Continent.

Two functional studies are in preliminary stages of development by the Director's staff. One deals with the role of religious and moral forces in the struggle against communism, and the other explores the possibilities of realizing a fuller and more dynamic participation of U. S. non-governmental bodies in the struggle.

In consultation with member agencies, particularly the Department of State, a preliminary staff study to determine the most fruitful approach for a psychological strategy plan for Western Europe has been prepared indicating that in order to attain progress towards the reduction of Soviet power and influence in Europe, ways and means must be developed to increase the effectiveness of psychological operations aimed at the reduction of Western European antagonisms to the United States and its purposes.

EVALUATION

Further progress has been made in meeting PSB's responsibility for "Evaluation of the national psychological effort." In collaboration with the departments and agencies concerned, an evaluation of the psychological effort

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effort directed at Italy, and an evaluation of the psychological impact of U. S. foreign economic policies in the United Kingdom were nearing completion at the year's end. The results of these evaluations are to be made available to the Board at its January 15 meeting. An evaluation of the psychological impact of U. S. foreign economic policies in France has also been drafted. These are the most intensive projects carried out to date under PSB auspices to evaluate major aspects of the national psychological effort.

Evaluative work is also being done in connection with preparation for future planning (see above), and a study of "Possible Soviet Vulnerabilities as Revealed by Defensive Soviet Reaction to Certain U. S. Policies" has been undertaken.

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THE FOREIGN INFORMATION PROGRAM
(Prepared by the Department of State)

1. During the period under review, the Department of State continued, through the foreign information and educational exchange programs conducted by the International Information Administration, to seek the fulfillment of the mission defined in Annex V to NSC 68/3 and the execution of the tasks set forth in Annex V to NSC 114/2.

2. The mission was defined as follows:

"The frustration of the design of the Kremlin will result primarily from concrete decisions taken and vigorous measures executed in the political, military and economic fields by the peoples and the governments of the free world under the leadership of the United States. The task of the United States foreign information and educational exchange programs is to assure that the psychological implications of these actions are, first, fully developed and, second, effectively conveyed to the minds and the emotions of groups and individuals who may importantly influence governmental action and popular attitudes in other nations and among other peoples."

3. The tasks were set forth in order of priority as follows:

"The first task is to multiply and to intensify psychological deterrents to aggression by Soviet Communism, whether in the form of outright action by the armed forces of the Soviet Union, of Communist China or of the satellites of the Soviet Union, or in the form of the subversion of existing free governments by civil forces acting on behalf of Soviet Communism.

"The second task is to intensify and to accelerate the growth of confidence in and among the peoples and the governments of the free world, especially in Western Europe, including Western

Germany

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Germany, in their capability successfully to deter aggression by Soviet Communism or to defeat it should it nonetheless occur and to inspire concrete international, national and individual action accordingly.

"The third task is to combat, particularly in the Near and Middle East and South and Southeast Asia, extremist tendencies threatening the undermining of the cohesion and the stability of the free world and withdrawal of governments and peoples into neutralism.

"The fourth task is to maintain among the peoples held captive by Soviet Communism, including the peoples of the Soviet Union, hope of ultimate liberation and identification with the free world and to nourish, without provoking premature action, a popular spirit disposed to timely resistance to regimes now in power.

"The fifth task is to maintain among peoples and governments traditionally linked with the United States, particularly in Latin America, a continued recognition of mutual interdependence and to promote national and individual action accordingly."

4. Although the priorities among the tasks have not formally been altered, during the period under review efforts were made with regard to the second and the third tasks equal to, if not surpassing, efforts made with regard to the first. In addition, increased efforts were made with regard to the fifth task.

5. These efforts were inspired primarily by specific circumstances developing in areas in which the execution of the tasks are of primary importance. These circumstances included, among others, the difficulties arising in both France and the Federal Republic of

Germany

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Germany with regard to ratification of the contractual agreements and the treaty establishing the European Defense Community, the problems confronted by the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in achieving the goals set at Lisbon in February, 1952, and increased questioning in Europe of policies and actions of the United States. They also included the continued differences between the United Kingdom and Iran arising from the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, the increased tension between France and its protectorates, Tunisia and Morocco, and the persistent political instability throughout much of the Near and Middle East and Southeast Asia. They further included the dissemination to other countries in Latin America from Argentina of propaganda hostile to the United States and continuing political instability and economic deterioration in some countries in Latin America. Finally, the unresolved conflicts in Korea, Indochina and Malaya continued to impose strains on the confidence and the cohesion of the free world.

6. Propagandists in the service of Soviet Communism undertake vigorously to exploit all such differences within the free world and particularly between the United States and the rest of the free world. Their chief instrumentality was the campaign of hatred against the United States, which consisted of three primary elements, allegations concerning its imperialistic designs, allegations concerning the barbarity practiced by its soldiers in Korea toward prisoners of war and civilians and allegations concerning its use of bacteriological weapons in Korea. Into the campaign of hatred were geared the campaign of peace and the campaign for trade. The evidence is that such propaganda found fewer credulous listeners and had

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and had less impact than did similar campaigns two and more years ago. The psychological impact of differences originating and continuing within the free world itself therefore required major efforts on the part of the official propaganda of the United States.

7. Efforts to counteract the situations briefly described did not involve lessened concern with regard to the first task. Rather, to the extent that confidence and unity may be promoted in Western Europe, stability and cohesion advanced in the new states of the Near and the Middle East and Southeast Asia and traditional bonds maintained by the United States with the republics of Latin America, deterrents to aggression and subversion by Soviet Communism are multiplied. To the same extent, the purpose openly avowed by Stalin at the Nineteenth Congress of the Communist Party to profit from dissension and discord within the free world may be frustrated. Moreover, to the extent that progress is made in carrying out the second, third and fifth tasks, additional progress is made in carrying out the fourth, the maintenance among peoples captive to Soviet Communism of hope of their ultimate liberation.

8. Efforts to promote confidence and unity among the peoples and the governments of the free world were attended, particularly in Western Europe, by a peculiar difficulty. Whereas, two years ago, lack of confidence in the determination of the United States to contribute to the security of the area was widespread,--and was signally diminished by the tour of General Eisenhower following his designation to be Supreme Commander, Allied Powers in Europe,--in recent months the United States has been accused of interfering too much in the internal affairs of the nations of Western Europe. The

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circumstances therefore required that the United States avoid intensive overt advocacy, that it seek to emphasize the leadership of Europeans in various undertakings and that it endeavor to exert necessary pressures through diplomatic and indigenous rather than public and overt channels. Such tactics were called for especially in connection with the contractual agreements and the still unratified treaty establishing the European Defense Community, the Seventh General Assembly of the United Nations and the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council.

9. More active exploitation was possible with regard to the series of notes on the unity of Germany exchanged by the United States, the United Kingdom and France with the Soviet Union. In order further to eliminate sources of friction between the United States and its allies, bi-national programs concerning the presence of US troops were carried forward in France, the United Kingdom, Germany and North Africa; a similar program has also been undertaken in Japan. Films documenting the role of other than US troops in Korea have been widely shown, and foreign journalists, particularly from South-east Asia, have been enabled to visit the United Nations forces in Korea. The efforts of the United States to promote the balanced reduction and limitation of arms and armed forces were the subject of continuous exploitation. In Japan, the capabilities of the United States Information Service are being steadily developed. In Greece, institutional advertising was tested as a means of extending the audiences for USIS material.

10. The maintenance of confidence in the United States as an indispensable condition of mutual confidence among the free nations also required

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also required moderate, careful and detailed exposition of domestic events affecting judgments of the United States by foreigners. These included especially the presidential election during the campaign for which an effort was made to build confidence in the personality and the policies of the leaders of both parties. The legal processes involving the Rosenbergs, actions taken under the Internal Security Act of 1950 and the application of the terms of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1950 were developments requiring exposition. The maintenance of confidence in the United States further required the discrediting, by others than Americans to the maximum possible extent, of the charges that the United States has sanctioned the use of biological warfare in Korea, a major item in the campaign of hate against the United States undertaken by Soviet Communists during 1952. Material countering the charges of bacteriological warfare is being supplied on a continuing basis to missions abroad for their use as local circumstances require. The campaign of hatred against the United States is being treated positively rather than defensively by exposition, among other things, of historical acts of international friendship by the United States; its alleviation of disease and hunger abroad and its support of international relief in various forms. Finally, the maintenance of mutual confidence required the frustration of the disruptive purpose of the Congress of Peoples for Peace held in Vienna. As in the case of the Moscow Economic Congress, the tactic here employed, with evidence of relative success, was to avoid giving the Congress advance publicity.

11. Efforts to maintain stability and cohesion in the Near and Middle East and Southeast Asia contended against virtually undiminished nationalism

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nationalism in much of the area, particularly in Egypt, Iran, Tunisia and Morocco. Notwithstanding its effort to serve as moderator and mediator, the United States incurred some of the popular and governmental antagonism hitherto directed almost solely, in the case of Iran, against the United Kingdom and, in the case of Tunisia and Morocco, against France. The headquarters of the United States Information Service have been attached both in Damascus and in Baghdad, but the evidence suggests that the attacks were not inspired by purely local reasons but were undertaken in response to the desire of Communists to diminish the effectiveness of those outlets. Exploitation of a variety of actions was undertaken in order to effect hostile attitudes. One instance was exploitation of the support ultimately given by the United States in the Seventh General Assembly to the resolution on Korea sponsored by India. Coupled with the violent rejection of the resolution by the Soviet Union in the person of Mr. Vishinsky, the recognition by the United States of the leadership of India in this matter produced favorable psychological consequences in the subcontinent and elsewhere in the near and Middle East and Asia which are likely to be felt for a long time, the more so because the United States refrained from self-congratulation with regard to the development. Within India efforts to combat neutralism proceeded with the increase in the circulation of the "American Reporter" from 300,000 to 600,000 biweekly and the distribution of 200,000 copies of 33 books in the local language. Their acceptance within India may be regarded as evidence of a decline in neutralism. A steady utilization of the exchange of persons program helped to make Indians acquainted with the culture and the intellectual quality of the United States. In Burma, the United States

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Information Service inspired and assisted in the establishment under indigenous auspices of a bookstore selling textbooks in Chinese and broke a monopoly hitherto maintained by the Communists. The principal distributor of Communist publication in Burma has applied for the right to distribute translations made available by USIS on the grounds that they are "more profitable." The transfer in Beirut to a committee of Muslims of the sum of \$200,000 representing the fares of pilgrims carried to Mecca by the United States Air Force permitted continued modest exploitation of the air-lift. In Egypt, in addition to the inauguration of an overt weekly newspaper in Arabic, assistance was given to the government in carrying out a special information program directed at the army. The visit of the Sixth Fleet to Beirut was widely exploited. Programs in Equatorial Africa, West Africa and India have been expanded. Broadcasts from the Courier, anchored at Cyprus, have resulted in clearer signals throughout the Middle East.

12. The most significant efforts recently undertaken to maintain continual recognition of the interests showed by the United States and the governments and peoples of Latin America have been made in Chile. In order to combat the nationalistic trend manifested in the presidential elections in September, in consequence of which the Communist Party may again be legalized, diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and its satellites resumed and propaganda emanating from Argentina gain wider circulation, additional funds have been allocated for an intensified program in Chile. Elements of the program include thrice-weekly radio commentaries, a pictorial pamphlet on "North Americans in Chilean History," the supply of

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supply of books and pamphlets for six indigenous labor libraries, the local production of documentary film on Point IV in Chile and discreet assistance to the preparation of a pamphlet, "The Truth About Copper," to be published and distributed by United States copper companies operating in Chile. Other significant efforts in Latin America, particularly in Brazil, Chile and Uruguay, included counteraction of criticism, largely inspired by Communists, of agreements under the Mutual Security Act and clear definition of the facts concerning the rationalization of the tin industry in Bolivia. Additionally, some success was achieved in exposing the domination of the impending Continental Cultural Congress in Santiago by Communists and in preventing the capture by Peronists and Communists of the World Congress of Journalists at Santiago. For general distribution in Latin America there has been released a documentary film concerning the tenth anniversary of the extension by the United States of technical assistance to the nations of Latin America.

13. Undertaken primarily through radio broadcasts, efforts to deter aggression and subversion by the Soviet Union and its satellites, and, within the Soviet Union, between the people and the regime. The Nineteenth Congress of the Communist Party provided an opportunity to demonstrate how far Stalinism had departed in precept and practice from the principles laid down by the founder of the party. Initially, the chief effort in dealing with the trial of Rudolf Slansky was to pin-point the effort to find scapegoats for the failure of Soviet policy and the diminishing Czech contribution. Further consideration developed a more fundamental attack, exposing the total insecurity of satellite peoples and their exploitation by Moscow in the withdrawal of goods and supplies. The refusal of the United Nations

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command in Korea to agree to the forcible repatriation of prisoners of war was exploited in order to encourage potential dissidents under the control of Soviet Communism. The protracted negotiations between Chou and Stalin were exploited as evidence of the present subservience of China to the interests of the USSR. Broadcasts from Hong Kong to the mainland satirized themes used on the mainland in indoctrination courses. The determination of the United States and its allies to defend Berlin against aggression has continued to be exploited. The growth of allied military strength, particularly the development of new weapons, has been projected soberly and factually to audiences behind the Iron Curtain.

14. Efforts to maintain hope among peoples now captive to Soviet Communism of their ultimate liberation were complicated in Korea by the advocacy on the part of leaders of the Republic of Korea of the immediate unification of Korea by military action. Jointly with the Psychological Warfare Section of the United Nations and the Far East Command, the United States Information Service in Korea has endeavored to make plain that, although the unity of Korea is a fixed objective of the United States and the United Nations, the essential first step is the defeat of aggression, on the achievement of which unification can be sought by political means. Broadcasts to the mainland of China have continued to exploit the traditional friendship of the United States for China, the determination of the United States and the United Nations to continue resistance in Korea until a fair and reasonable armistice is negotiated and the continuing resistance to subversive forces in Indochina and Malaya. Similarly, broadcasts to the satellites of Eastern Europe have continued to exploit

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exploit the growing strength and unity of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the sympathetic understanding of the United States for the plight of the people of the satellites. The most effective demonstration of such sympathy is the progress made in implementing the program for defectors authorized by Congress in 1951, which program has been exploited modestly, in order to maintain hope but not to precipitate defection on an unmanageable scale.

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ANNEX B

REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SECTION I

Department of Defense actions in support of approved plans and guidances cited below are as indicated.

1. National Security Council

a. NSC 59/1, "The Foreign Information Program and Psychological Warfare Planning," 9 March 1950: No major developments resulted during this quarter except for general support as indicated in Section II.

b. NSC 127/1, "Plan for Conducting Psychological Operations During General Hostilities," 25 July 1952: Support of this plan is as indicated in paragraph 3, Section I.

c. NSC 10/2, "Office of Special Projects," 18 June 1948: Substantial progress has been made towards resolving major coordination problems with Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) during present period.

d. NSC 10/5: Continuous coordination has been effected in Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) review staff planning (see Section II), and operational and logistical support has been furnished as required.

2. Psychological Strategy Board

a. Presidential Directive of 4 April 1951: The Department of Defense has appointed a member and a military advisor to the PSB review staff, and has acted upon PSB guidances as indicated below.

b. PSB J-19-d, "Emergency Plan, Breakoff of Korean Armistice Negotiations," 18 September 1951: Supporting plans promulgated during previous quarters have been distributed to appropriate commanders.

c. PSB D-7/c, "Psychological Operations Plan Incident to Korean Cease Fire Negotiations", 25 October 1951: Supporting plans promulgated during previous quarters have been distributed to appropriate commanders.

d. PSB D-11/b, "National Overt Propaganda Policy Guidance for General War", 15 November 1951: Supporting plans have been incorporated in war plans as previously reported; detailed themes are now being developed.

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e. & f. PSB D-14/c, "Reduction of Communist Power and Influence in France", 31 January 1952, and PSB D-15/b, "Reduction of Communist Power and Influence in Italy": The Commander in Chief, U. S. European Command, has been directed to provide cooperation to the U. S. Ambassadors to France and Italy in implementation of subject plans.

g. PSB D-18/a, "Psychological Operations Plan for Soviet Orbit Escapees (Phase 'A')", 20 December 1951: Hongkong field representatives of a subcommittee of the Interagency Defector Committee have been provided with intelligence targets for the exploitation of White Russians now being expelled from the Manchurian area of Communist China. Additional interpreters and support have been made available from station ship Hongkong.

h. PSB D-21, "National Psychological Strategy with Respect to Germany", 9 October 1952: The Secretary of Defense has approved the objectives of this plan and Department of Defense actions in implementation are under study.

3. Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee

a. FOC D-38/1, "Information Operational Plan Concerning U.S. Military Forces in Europe", 11 February 1952: This is being utilized by Department of Defense in the preparation of appropriate plans:

b. A suggested over-all outline plan for psychological warfare during general hostilities, together with a proposal to consider the establishment of a national psychological warfare operations center which would function during general hostilities, was forwarded to the Chairman, Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee.

SECTION II

Significant progress of the Department of Defense in the development of plans, capabilities and organizational means for contributing further to the national psychological effort.

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1. Intradepartment activities, including plans, forces, training programs and indoctrination courses.

a. Office of the Secretary of Defense

(1) Psychological Advantage of MDAP: On 10 October, the Secretary of Defense provided policy guidance and assigned responsibility for publicizing unclassified information about MDAP activities. The purpose of this directive is to ensure favorable psychological exploitation of these activities.

(2) U. S. Government Foreign Information Policy: A directive issued on 31 October provided for the coordination and dissemination within the military, of foreign information policy guidances, prepared by Department of State. This ensures that military spokesmen will be kept aware of the agreed U. S. position to be used in discussing matters of current interest.

(3) Role of Department of Defense: The Secretary of Defense is appointing a committee to formulate policies and procedures for the Department of Defense in the cold war. The Department is also considering organizational changes which may be required.

(4) Department of Defense Policy:

(a) The Office of the Secretary of Defense has promulgated a comprehensive unclassified policy on the release of public information regarding atomic weapons, guided missiles and new weapons, which directed that all information concerned with these weapons would be released by the Office of Public Information (OPI).

(b) The Mecca Airlift: On 1 October, the Acting Secretary of Defense cited the Mecca Airlift as resulting in favorable reactions throughout the Arab world, and pointed out that the airlift is but one example of the many additional ways in which the Department of Defense agencies could contribute to the successful conduct of the cold war.

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(5) Research and Development: Since last year's program guidance was issued, several significant developments have taken place. Authoritative estimates of the situation indicate that the "cold war", in addition to short-term emergency connotations, has a potential long-range aspect that is significant in plans and objectives. This change of emphasis means that research and development programs must be sustained by an adequate level of fiscal support and be thoroughly coordinated among Defense departments and with other agencies so that a well-integrated program in the national interest results. The present status of the Research and Development Board (R&DB) is as follows:

(a) Under authority delegated by the Secretary of Defense, the Advisory Group on Psychological and Unconventional Warfare was established on 14 November 1952, for a period of six months, as an organization of the R&DB. Within its field of interest, the Advisory Group will review military research and development activities and recommend a balanced program.

(b) In-Service projects were begun by the Army and the Air Force on the pressing problem of troop-community relationships in Europe. Human Resources Research Office (HumRRO) and Human Resources Research Institute (HRRI) have undertaken to survey research needs and facilities in Germany and France.

(c) HumRRO at the request of FECOM surveyed plans for a psychological-sociological study of the hard core Communist POW's in Korea.

b. Joint Chiefs of Staff

(1) War Plans: A psychological warfare plan and an unconventional warfare plan have been approved and distributed to the commanders under the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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(2) Action on Kersten Amendment: The Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted a plan to the Secretary of Defense for the implementation of the Kersten Amendment.

(3) Evasion and Escape:

(a) The Joint Chiefs of Staff and other government agencies have agreed on the delineation of responsibility in the field of evasion and escape.

(b) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have agreed to the dispatch of another UN ally's evasion and escape element to Korea.

(4) Unconventional Warfare in the Far East:

(a) The Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE), is taking steps to expand and improve the theater organization responsible for unconventional warfare.

(b) CINCFE has been authorized to employ the 581st Air Resupply and Communication Wing in combat.

(5) Psychological Warfare Matters: The Joint Chiefs of Staff are taking steps to strengthen that part of their organization which deals directly with psychological warfare matters.

c. Significant Service Activities

(1) Troop I & E: The Troop Information and Education program was continued on a world-wide basis to orient Service personnel in the language, habits and customs in the various countries in which they serve. Allied with this, committees composed of Service representatives and native civilians continued efforts to bring about closer harmony between military and civilian populations. A campaign entitled, "Tell it to your Friends", was inaugurated in Europe to furnish to the American soldier factual information relative to false Soviet-Communist inspired claims.

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(2) Enemy Defection:

(a) [A defection program aimed at Communist air crews in Korea was submitted to CINCFE for consideration. CINCFE has concurred and plans are under way to obtain final approval to initiate the program.]

(b) Action has been started to obtain clearance for use of Russian language in broadcasts and leaflet drops in Korea.

(3) Counter Measures Against Enemy Psychological Warfare:

The following measures have been taken to expose and counter the Communist propaganda techniques:

(a) Service study of the Communist indoctrination technique known as "Brainwashing" continues. This study envisages a campaign to expose this practice to the free world, thereby weakening the effect of Soviet propaganda.

(b) In a planned release Air Force Secretary Finletter publicly condemned Communist methods and techniques used in extracting forced confessions from USAF POW's.

(c) Service action is being taken for the production of a film on Communist methods of interrogation. It is intended for In-Service training.

(d) A definite program continues in the UN POW camps in Korea to orient and educate the North Korean and Chinese prisoners.

(e) A study has been initiated dealing with problems inherent in the eventual release of American POW's. Some of our personnel may choose not to return to this country due to Communist brainwashing, and secondly, those who do return may be held for a substantial period to undergo a de-indoctrination phase.

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(f) Communist propaganda circulars and publications with subscription offers are being received by next of kin of American prisoners of war in an obvious attempt to extort money. A letter to the next of kin which exposes this Communist plan and cites the law which bars the shipment of money to Communist China is in draft form.

(4) Psychological Warfare:

(a) A Service study to expose Communist euphemisms has been initiated.

(b) A plan in support of the deployment of chemical munitions is in Service staff channels for consideration.

(c) A Psychological Warfare Seminar was held at the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, N. C., 17-19 December 1952. This served the two-fold purpose of informing selected personnel in all Services as to the capabilities and methods of Psychological Warfare and orienting Service school instructors toward a common program of instruction.

(d) A Psychological Warfare conference was held during the first week of December at Headquarters of Commander in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet for the purpose of acquainting key staff officers of LANTFLT relative to the importance of psychological warfare operations during hostilities and during the cold war.

(5) Intelligence: Efforts were continued to determine Soviet vulnerabilities, which may be exploited by psychological means; and similar efforts were directed toward determination of resistance potentials within the Soviet bloc.

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2. Interdepartmental activities of the Department of Defense, including plans, forces, training programs and indoctrination courses.

a. Psychological Strategy Board (PSB)

Participation on PSB panels continued. There has been continued staff processing of working drafts of PSB papers on Southeast Asia, Germany, Japan, Middle East, and Soviet Orbit Escapees. E
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b. Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee (POC)

(1) Participation continued on the interdepartmental committee which prepares and transmits to the Far East Command the Special Korean Information Guidance. This guidance provides that command information which is not readily available in Tokyo relative to U. S. and foreign press reaction to current events, and supplies substantive material and suggestions pertinent to retaining the propaganda initiative in that Theater.

(2) Acceptance of Americans Abroad

(a) The Department of Defense continues to participate in interdepartmental planning of this endeavor.

(b) Collaboration in the preparation of a plan to support the presence of U.S. troops and civilian personnel in Japan continues.

c. Department of State

(1) The bi-monthly UN activities report issued by the Department of Defense was revised, eliminating quotations of the Communist propaganda line emanating from Panmunjon and substituting therefore the UN peace delegation rebuttal speeches. This denied Communists the use of the UN as a sounding board for their propaganda, while at the same time informing the world of the UN stand.

(2) Army and Air Force personnel continued to receive on-the-job training with Voice of America, both in the United States and in Europe. This serves the dual purpose of training military personnel and, at the same time furnishes necessary and valuable assistance to the Department of State.

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(3) Efforts were continued in coordination with Department of State to finalize the agreement between the U. S. and Grand Duchy of Luxembourg for base rights to include the use of Radio Luxembourg for propaganda broadcasts in the event of general hostilities.

(4) Plans have been developed in cooperation with Department of State for the establishment of a two-week psychological warfare orientation course for Air attaches, senior Air Force members of Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAG's), and representatives from major air commands and Headquarters, U. S. Air Force. The plans call for initiation of this program about 1 March 1953.

(5) An Interdepartmental Committee to Combat Communist Propaganda

(a) The Department of Defense continues to collaborate in the analysis of the Soviet "Hate America Propaganda Campaign", and in seeking immediate and long-range means of countering such propaganda.

(b) The group has now reached general agreement on conclusions and recommendations regarding the position which the U. S. should adopt toward the "Hate America" campaign.

(6) Germ Warfare

(a) The Office of Public Information continued to cooperate closely with the Department of State, the military Services, and other government agencies involved in psychological activities in coordinating information released by the Department of Defense and its components on biological and chemical warfare. This coordination was significant in the countering of intense Communist propaganda against the United States on biological warfare.

(b) Through an interdepartmental committee to combat communist propaganda, the Department of Defense assisted in developing plans and means for setting forth the U.S. position regarding false charges of using germ warfare in Korea.

(c) Through the Department of State, direct assistance was provided by the Department of Defense to the U.S. representative to the UN for the purpose of combating germ warfare charges.

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(d) As a positive information program, the Department of Defense has cooperated with leading American magazines and newspapers in providing a consistent release of material on biological and chemical research.

SECTION III

Military activities having psychological implications conducted by Department of Defense agencies during the reporting period.

1. Joint Maneuvers and Exercises

Exercise WARMWIND, a joint Army-Air Force Arctic field exercise, was conducted in November by the Commander in Chief, Alaska. The air lifting of a regimental combat team to Alaska for participation in this exercise demonstrated the wide range and mobility of U. S. forces.

2. Displays of Strength

a. During this period, several news releases were made relative to U. S. strength and technical ability, and attempts were made to secure the maximum favorable psychological effects regarding the release of this data. Significant among these were:

- (1) The atomic explosion at Eniwetok.
- (2) The production of the 280 mm gun capable of firing an atomic warhead.
- (3) The development of guided missiles.
- (4) The formation of guided missile anti-aircraft units.
- (5) The purchase of new F-102 jet aircraft.

b. Between 26 November and 1 December 1952, a fleet visit was made by Commander, Sixth Fleet aboard the cruiser COLUMBUS, accompanied by the carrier ROOSEVELT, and a Destroyer Division to Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. The visit was requested by the U. S. Ambassador to Lebanon who had indicated earlier in the year that the next fleet visit to Near

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Eastern ports should be so planned as to give desirable evidence as far east as Baghdad of the nearness and strength of American power. Activities included static display of carrier aircraft at Damascus civil air terminal and an overflight of Syria, Lebanon and Jordan undertaken by two 50-plane waves of jet carrier aircraft on 1 December 1952. In the course of the overflight, the planes failed to reach Amman, Jordan, as planned and were reported in a verbal protest by the Israeli Foreign Minister to have violated Israeli territorial air space by overflying to Jerusalem. The charge was broadcast by Jerusalem radio the same evening. The American Consulate in Jerusalem reported that the unexpected flight caused a momentary panic on both sides of the city, evidently because the sound of the jets recalled the dropping of bombs during the recent Israeli-Arab warfare. (See Section VI, paragraphs 5 b - d, for evaluation.)

3. Combined Maneuvers and Exercises

- a. Longstep. A NATO exercise in the Mediterranean from 3 to 13 November 1952 was participated in by 100,000 men, 170 ships, and 500 aircraft of the military forces of the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, Turkey, and Greece. Objective of the exercise was to test ability to maintain the sea link between French North Africa and Europe with emphasis on protecting sea lanes used by troop conveyers. Staging areas extended into the Eastern Mediterranean.

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SECTION IV

Implications of Department of Defense psychological activities in foreign areas, including good-will efforts and related activities of the Services in such areas.

1. Psychological Results of Presence of U. S. Personnel Abroad:

a. Through the Committee on Acceptance of Americans Abroad, the Department of Defense continues to provide, as appropriate, the Department of State with advance notice of troop movements in overseas areas in order to gain maximum beneficial psychological effect.

b. This interdepartmental committee has continued to monitor and direct the activities of coordinating subcommittees set up in certain European countries where there are American troops stationed. These subcommittees consist of representatives from the Armed Forces, NSA, CIA, the Department of State, and in some areas officials of the governments concerned. Close coordination has been effected, and the problems still unsolved continued to receive committee action.

c. Subcommittees are now being set up in Japan and a Joint State-Defense agreement covering these activities is being prepared.

2. MDAP Programs: Actual deliveries of military equipment to allied powers were more than doubled for the last quarter of Fiscal Year 1952. In Europe, emphasis is being placed on growing national pride in new military units as a means of offsetting neutralist and defeatist attitudes. The Department of Defense has supported and encouraged all overseas Military Assistance Advisory Groups to plan and develop in coordination with USIS a positive information program based on the aims and accomplishments of the Mutual Security Program.

a. Military Aid to Pakistan: The Chief of Information has prepared information releases on this subject, coordinating them with the Department of State. The purpose of these releases is to gain the maximum psychological benefit to the U. S.

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b. Military Aid to Lebanon: The Department of Defense has concurred in a Department of State view that Lebanon should receive MDAP aid. This decision was taken largely for psychological reasons.

3. Offshore Procurement: At the start of the Offshore Procurement Program in 1951 its possibilities as a lever to reduce the communist hold on European industries were foreseen and pertinent instructions were issued through joint Defense-State-MSA-DMS-Treasury channels to procurement officers in the field. Guide lines to be used in the letting of contracts abroad were provided, and the primary responsibility for the evaluation of these problems was given to the procurement officers. The country teams were requested to advise procurement officers relative to communist-controlled manufacturing plants and to offer assistance relative to labor problems. These measures have aided U. S. efforts to combat communism abroad. More than six-hundred million dollars of off-shore procurement contracts were let under the Fiscal Year 1952 program. Fiscal Year 1953 contracts are expected to approximate one-billion dollars. Particular efforts are being made to negotiate contracts in Italy prior to the April 1953 elections.

4. Support to Friendly Nations:

a. A voicecast equipped plane (C-47) was lent to the Governor General of Malaya to assist in psychological warfare operations against the Communist Guerrillas. [It was specified that U. S.

exterior identification be removed, and that it not be operated by a U. S. crew. This plane was lent also to Indo-China under similar restrictions.]

b. The ROK Army, now increased in size to twelve (12) Divisions and six (6) Separate Infantry Regiments, was widely publicized as a vastly improved fighting machine, and is an indication of U. S. ability and desire to support its Allies.

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5. Training of Foreign Nationals: Under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program more than 4,000 foreign nationals are now receiving military training in the U. S. In addition more than 13,000 have completed training at installations in the U. S. and more than 5,000 at U. S. installations overseas. As a by-product of the actual training program, special efforts are made to establish most friendly relationships with the trainees to assure lasting goodwill towards the U. S.
6. Tours by NATO Editors: During the month of October, the thirteenth group of Nato editors visited this country under joint sponsorship of State and Defense. The group included leading writers and editors from Italy, France, United Kingdom, Denmark, The Netherlands and Norway. The objective of this trip, as preceding ones, was to improve the knowledge and understanding in Europe of the American defense buildup of both manpower and productive power, as well as to show a broad panorama of American life. Reports from Europe indicate this series of projects to be a most effective aspect of the overseas information program.
7. Resident Foreign Correspondents: Numerous special interviews, feature story material and occasional special trips to U. S. military installations have been arranged for foreign correspondents residing in the U. S. During the current quarter, this service was provided to foreign correspondents of The Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, France, Italy, United Kingdom, Greece, Turkey, Egypt, Germany and Japan. In each instance, in addition to general interest stories, attempts were made to give special material pertinent to the problems of a particular country or area.
8. Overseas Information Coordination: The Department of Defense also continued support and development of plans for a number of speeches and public appearances, ships' transfer ceremonies, and numerous information

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activities in connection with the servicing of U. S. and foreign media. Numerous hometown releases and photos of MDAP trainees in this country were provided through State Department information channels to hometown provincial papers in Europe. Special guidances were worked out with Department of State and representatives of the foreign liaison branches of the three Services to assist military escort officers accompanying foreign military officials on trips around the U. S. Specific examples of Service overseas information coordination are as follows:

- a. At the request of the Department of State, the Air Attache in Lebanon has been authorized to fly eight Lebanese correspondents to the Island of Rhodes to observe Voice of America activities from the U. S. Coast Guard cutter COURIER.
- b. A USAFE-conducted tour of German press correspondents at the bases at Erding, Furstenfeldbruck, and Neubiberg in Germany received favorable reports in the German press.

9. Goodwill Efforts: The problem of implementing a policy of "impartiality of treatment" was highlighted with respect to Arabs and Israelis by the visit of the Sixth Fleet to certain Arab states of the Middle East as reported in Section III above. The results of this operation would indicate that unfavorable reactions among audiences peripheral to, and strongly inimical to, the primary target groups should be anticipated and offset by appropriate actions.

10. Emergency medical aid rendered by U. S. Air Force medical personnel during the worst train wreck in England's history received wide public appreciation.

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SECTION V

Lessons learned through evaluation of Department of Defense psychological activities conducted during this period.

1. Problems which, if resolved, would assist in the development of a more effective contribution of the Department of Defense to the national psychological effort.

a. More definitive charters for FSB and FOC would enable participating agencies to make better contributions to the national psychological effort. The present charters are subject to wide interpretations which result in conflicting endeavors.

b. There should be an authoritative statement of over-all national psychological responsibilities, including psychological objectives and supporting tasks, during the "cold war" on which to base psychological operations including Department of Defense participation.

c. Responsibilities for psychological warfare operations in an area wherein U. S. forces are engaged in combat, although such area is not declared a military theater of operations, should be clarified.

d. It is believed requirements should be placed upon Intelligence organizations of participating agencies to provide consolidated up-to-the-minute, detailed, and evaluated analyses of target and peripheral group attitudes, the psychological situation developing with respect to U. S. objectives, and of the psychological results obtained during "cold war" operations.

2. Psychological opportunities brought to light by analysis of quarterly activities and their relationship to future courses of action.

a. [Informal analysis of our relations with Italy in the recent past has revealed a number of psychological opportunities which might have been exploited had they been foreseen. Suggestions, based on this analysis, have been passed to appropriate agencies for their consideration] (t)(u) ED

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b. Future reports might well include such analyses, thus giving each contributing agency an opportunity to put hindsight at the service of foresight.

SECTION VI

Reported effectiveness of actions cited in Sections I through IV, inclusive.

1. Military Aid to Pakistan (reference Section IV)

The agreement to extend this aid to Pakistan is reported to have had favorable psychological effect in that country, as was to be expected.

2. Military Aid to Lebanon (reference Section IV)

As with Pakistan, the expected favorable psychological reaction has been achieved in Lebanon. However, certain unfavorable, though not unforeseen, effects were observed in Israel.

3. Troop-Civilian Relationship Program (reference Section IV)

Continued adverse comment in the press would indicate that, in England, this program has not yet had time to show favorable results. In other areas, improved relations are reported (despite some communist-inspired incidents) and are directly attributed to the program.

4. Improvement of ROK Forces (reference Section IV)

Extensive and favorable coverage in the Allied press indicates that this action has had a desirable psychological impact.

5. Visits of Sixth Fleet

a. With reference to the psychological impact upon the French in the locale of routine Sixth Fleet operational schedules, the Chief of the Bureau of General Information and Psychological Action of the French Ministry of National Defense reported on 15 October 1952 that visits of warships are very impressive and can have a very valuable strengthening effect, but that displays of American forces on French soil appeared to create unfavorable reactions

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because of the sensitivity of French public opinion with respect to matters touching upon national sovereignty and prestige.

b. The U. S. Ambassador to Lebanon reported that the Sixth Fleet visit to Lebanon had been an unqualified success and "served as welcome indication of the realness and nearness of American power . . ." He recommended that a similar visit, including a jet overflight, be scheduled for late September 1953.

c. On 9 December 1952, the American Embassy in Jordan reported that the then predominant popular feeling in Jordan seemed to be one of pleasure that the Israelis were annoyed by the alleged violation of their air space which tended to make the Jordanians forget their disappointment over the failure of the planes to fly over Jordan cities as had been announced.

d. The American Consulate in Jerusalem reported on 2 December 1952 that the initial panic in the city was quickly dispelled. Once the planes were identified, the spectacle was enjoyed by the population of the entire city.

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SECTION VII

New evidence of reactions to activities conducted during previous reporting periods.

1. During the current period, there have been recurring reports in U. S. newspapers concerning existing relations of U. S. troops and civilians abroad with indigenous populations. Particular attention has been devoted to correcting this problem as it pertains to military personnel in the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and other U. S. stations abroad. However, the Communists continue to exploit this situation wherever possible.

2. Reports indicate that the program of warning 78 North Korean cities of impending bombings has been effective.

3. NATO reports indicate that off-shore procurement has resulted in more satisfactory economic conditions within member nations which greatly improved national psychological attitudes in our favor.

4. The ANZUS meeting, while creating a spirit of cooperation and coordination among the participants, developed a feeling of resentment in other Pacific area nations and Great Britain because they were not included. This attitude was expressed through diplomatic channels as well as in press releases.

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ANNEX C

"REPORT OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY"

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ANNEX D

REPORT OF THE MUTUAL SECURITY AGENCY

1. What activities are you engaging in which are psychologically significant for attaining national objectives?

EUROPE

MSA information services, largely integrated with USIS in Western Europe, stressed the following themes during the period under review:

1. Confidence in the strength of the United States and in the permanence of the NATO alliance.
2. That the United States seeks peace with freedom through collective security and with armed readiness as a necessary barrier to Soviet aggression.
3. That local Communists are tools of the Soviet which seeks to use them to create economic dislocation, to retard defense build-up and to manipulate neutralists to the Soviet advantage.
4. Encouragement of the support of European bodies such as the Coal and Steel Community and the EDC.
5. Continuing maximum utilization of MSA economic support and productivity campaigns as evidence of American concern for economic as well as military security in the Free World.

2. (a) What is your estimate of the psychological effectiveness of MSA and the key reasons therefor?

While it is difficult to evaluate the direct effectiveness of MSA psychological operations, our missions report the following points as of possible psychological significance:

(1) A continuing slow decline in Communist strength in all MSA countries with the possible exception of Italy and Greece. Even in France and Italy there is no indication of the Communist Party's ability effectively to disrupt NATO defenses or political programs or to attract new members.

(2) A noticeable increase in the confidence of the NATO powers to deter aggression.

(3) The continued inability of neutralist elements unwilling to work directly with the Communists to achieve effective organization, although

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in France and Germany their strength, particularly among intellectuals, is significant.

(4) A general increase in the acceptance by European media of information materials on the Mutual Security Program.

(5) Increased availability and use of unattributed U.S. information materials.

(6) A general increase of non-inspired comments of a generally pro-western anti-Russian nature.

(7) Increasing favorable results from the use of non-political, semi-technical information services, especially connected with European productivity programs.

(8) Uncertainty about the future U.S. foreign policy, particularly the continuation of economic aid, during the Presidential electoral campaign, somewhat handicapped psychological operations during the period. This, however, was somewhat offset by the high regard for both candidates among Europeans, and coincidences such as the Slansky trial and Russian rejection of the Indian resolution on Korea.

2. (b) What new evidence emerged during the quarter concerning psychological effectiveness of activities occurring before period reported?

None.

3. What significant progress was made in developing plans, capabilities and organizational means of contributing to the national psychological effort?

Integration of USIS and MSA information activities in most European countries has improved the potential of our psychological objectives.

Good results have been obtained from the increased use of European employees, increased use of unattributed material, and the adaptation of pamphlets, articles and other materials written for one country in other nations.

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There has been an improvement in planning and operations with respect to U.S. troop-community problems.

The information services of the official Representative for Europe, in cooperation with HICOG, Public Affairs Division, is completing one major public opinion study and planning another to ascertain the reasons for European attitudes, and is also planning a more effective program to evaluate techniques in this field.

4. What need is felt for change in policies, plans, capabilities or organization with a view to more effective conduct of the national psychological effort?

MSA suggests no major changes. However, the continued availability of counterpart funds is essential for the success of increased use of local materials which are usually more effective than those produced in the United States.

More adequate orientation of U.S. personnel, civilian as well as military, prior to departure for Europe is urged by several of our missions.

SRE is planning to establish, in cooperation with other agencies, a Europe-wide information research service center. Administrative difficulties in connection with this project are numerous. Systematic information programming would be helped materially by such a service center.

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SPECIFIC QUESTIONS

1. What psychologically significant activities have been carried out and with what effect on (a) the problem of neutralism and anti-American sentiments in Western Europe, including the United Kingdom?

Most MSA missions have not attacked neutralism directly. Where neutralist groups or personalities have been used directly by the Communist Party, information officers have pointed this out, using indigenous channels. In the cases of sincere neutralists who avoided contact with the Communist Party, we have felt that even indirect American counterattack would be harmful and certainly would be considered improper interference. The program of identifying the USSR as the aggressor, and the US as the organizer of peace, plus exposes of Soviet totalitarianism and emphasis on US-European common liberal cultural tradition, is designed to minimize neutralism, and as previously noted, it has contributed to the inability of neutralists to organize politically. The Slansky trials, full reports and analyses of which SRE has circulated through an independent international news agency, was the most severe blow of the quarter to neutralism in intellectual circles. Two important new programs are the USIE/Italy-SRE anti-Communist Party exhibit for the Italian 1953 elections and the new much-needed labor information program in Iceland.

(b) problems of encouraging European unity and securing ratification and implementation of the Bonn "contractual agreements" and EDC treaty?

Information support of the general theme of integration was kept at a high level with editorial, newsreel and radio output as well as the continued success of the Train of Europe (under OEEC sponsorship). In Yugoslavia, which is not involved in integration projects, US information has helped to popularize recent Yugo-Greek-Turkish agreements. SRE and mission support of EDC and German contractual agreements in specific terms has been limited in accordance with State Department directive. In general, the

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integration keynote was effectively sounded in Germany in output for the trade-union and general press with regard to the Schuman Plan. Five travelling exhibits were paid for by MSA and sponsored by the "European Movement," an unofficial organization with the objective of fostering European unity.

(c) Soviet "hate-America" propaganda?

The "Hate America" campaign was answered primarily through positive content of SRE information programs and USIS activity. USIS also has primary responsibility for answering Russian charges based on distortion of events in the Korean war. The Vienna Peace Conference, in accordance with State Department's guidances was given "deep freeze" treatment except in Austria, where integrated USIS-MSA Information Division did an effective job of exposing its Kremlin inspiration and contributed to keeping local support minimal.

(d) Allied position in West Berlin?

Nothing significant to report outside of Germany and Austria, where all media gave full publicity to Linse case. (Linse, an anti-Communist West German, was kidnapped by Communists and dragged across the border to East Germany.) In the rest of Europe, press coverage was generally good.

2. (a) What changes occurred in level, character, or effectiveness of US propaganda activities on both sides of the Iron Curtain in broadcasting?

In Austria new transmitters in Vienna and Linz were put into operation, with some listeners in satellites. The Yugoslav national radio has been using MSA material increasingly in its broadcasts which penetrate the iron curtain. Some reception of MSA Greek radio programs in limited areas of Albania and Bulgaria is reported.

(b) In unattributed propaganda?

MSA use of unattributed propaganda has always been high. There has been no marked change in level, except for a sharp decline in Iceland. All

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newsreel and radio materials are unattributed. Pamphlet publishing arrangements have been made with the European Movement. Trade union production included insertion of articles in the labor press of all countries and regular contracts with free union federations for a specified amount of space in Germany, Austria and Italy. Distribution throughout Europe of non-inspired but sharply useful publications is increasing. Special issues of the British magazine "Twentieth Century" on the Soviet system, and on European integration, are distributed by SRE in cooperation with MSA's UK mission. This is believed to have been particularly successful.

3. To what extent have psychological objectives been furthered through your activities in collaboration with (a) major international organizations, NATO, UN and SHAPE?

Virtually all non-press work for NATO and SHAPE was done by MSA -- production of newsreels, film series, radio shows and NATO caravan by SRE. Primary concentration was on NATO, including full coverage of NATO maneuvers in member countries. Success of the "NATO Caravan" was attested by such facts as its being visited by 800,000 people in Athens and Salonika alone. The psychological impact on NAC December meeting cannot yet be definitely estimated. MSA fears that it will encourage relaxation of support for NATO defense program and criticism of forthcoming country budgets, particularly if the current European assumption of a sharp reduction in US economic and military assistance is confirmed.

(b) Non-governmental organizations and individuals in US?

None.

(c) Federal agencies other than MSA and member PSB agencies?

Not significant.

4. What attention has been paid to obtaining optimum psychological results from the presence of US personnel (civilian and military) in foreign countries? Particularly to what extent have personnel selection and indoctrination been adapted to this purpose?

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Good working relationship with the military exists in Germany, and the newly created USIE-MEC-armed force committee promises improvement in Austria, where hitherto presence of American armed personnel in Salzburg area has been a major psychological problem. The necessity for more state-side orientation of American personnel is stressed. In the UK, extensive use has been made of visiting Americans such as Fulbright students, but it is felt there that nothing should be done to call any more attention to presence of US troops. Extensive indoctrination of American personnel is a regular part of the work of the Embassy and MSA Mission in Greece and Yugoslavia. In Paris, the Franco-American Troop Relations Committee under a French Chairman has been eminently successful.

5. What use has been made of show of military force (including atomic weapons test) as psychological device?

While the importance of the "strength of the West" theme, and assurances of permanent American military guarantees, is universally appreciated, the "show of force" approach is viewed as a possible boomerang in most posts. The Report from UK states: "The British are aware and confident of US strength; a danger exists that over-emphasis of this strength will further the notion that US intentions are basically military rather than peace-preserving." Almost identical comment came from French mission. On the other hand more publicity for increasingly efficient local forces was encouraged by all missions, and European governments generally were cooperative in this respect. Continued emphasis on this and on NATO is urged. HICOG and MSA/Germany have already prepared plans for popularizing the proposed German contribution to EDC as a contribution to defense of democratic Europe, to go into effect upon ratification of the accords. Additional comments:

Continuance of economic support, and concern for economic stability in OSP administration has been of major psychological value in countering

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Communist propaganda about US aims. MSA has also been successful in stimulating unattributed articles showing that Russia, not US, is responsible for decline of East-West trade in non-strategic materials. The contrary theme remains an important one in Soviet propaganda. Where productivity programs have been administered in good faith by local governments and private groups, attention to industrial efficiency has continued a useful demonstration of US concern with living standards. Unfortunately, during the past quarter, the failure of local governments and industrialists to conduct the program along MSA-encouraged lines has weakened its appeal in some countries. However, in the UK, the MSA mission has assisted in the establishment of a universally accepted British Productivity Council to replace AACF. In Austria, one of the countries where the local program is under labor attack, the unions have made it clear that it is the local administration of the program, not its American intent, that is at fault.

FAR EAST

1. What activities are you engaging in which are psychologically significant for attaining national objectives?

In Formosa we have publicized the activities of MSA and the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction (staffed by Chinese and Americans), and the economic gains made on the island through effective utilization of U.S. aid. In Formosa, as well as Thailand, Indochina and the Philippines where MSA also operates, we have supported the objectives of MSA programs which are designed to strengthen local governments and people. We have stressed the importance of attaining national strength through improving the economies of the nations.

In Indochina we pushed to 100,000 a month the circulation of an MSA country journal which stressed better living through the use of local government and American agricultural aid; helped to strengthen the leadership

of local officials in agriculture and public health, in conjunction with French psychological warfare assistance; strengthened communications with radio and graphics, and, in conjunction with the USIS, helped to plan psychological materials that furthered American objectives.

In Thailand we have assisted the Government in its information activities that are oriented toward the free world and are anti-Communist.

In the Philippines we have supported economic development programs and technical assistance which has helped materially the Philippine Government's peace and order campaign.

2. (a) What is your estimate of the psychological effectiveness and key reasons therefor?

In Formosa, considerable psychological effect results from mission information activities which improve morale, help to maintain hope among the captive Chinese on the mainland, and help to rally international opposition to Communism.

In Thailand, an indication of the effectiveness of our work is the increasing production of Thai government information materials that credit the United States with unselfish assistance to the Thai people's welfare in health, agriculture, education and irrigation.

In Indochina, written responses to our country journal and our radio programs increase and we have discovered wide-spread interest and awareness of American support in isolated communities.

(b) What new evidence emerged during the quarter concerning psychological effectiveness of activities occurring before the period being reported?

In Formosa there is increasing evidence of improved morale among the people and continuing reports of interest in the mission's information activities not only on Formosa but among Chinese prisoners of war in Korea, who, it has been reported, have requested the United Nations Command to supply them with materials produced by MSA's Formosa Information Office, such as its rural publication called "Harvest".

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3. What significant progress has been made in developing plans, capabilities and organizational means for contributing to the national psychological effort?

The capabilities of MSA's Formosa mission will be increased by the provision of 6,000 low-cost radio receiving sets. These will be distributed to Formosan farmers associations and other organizations in rural areas as a part of the Joint (American-Chinese) Commission on Rural Reconstruction project to improve communications between the Chinese government and its people.

In Indochina, plans have been completed for the training of 352 propagandists for use with mobile units in information halls and other places.

4. What need is felt for changes in policies, plans, capabilities, or organization with a view to effective conduct of national psychological effort?

MSA's information officer in Formosa suggests that the effectiveness of the American psychological effort could be considerably enhanced by the use of the Communists' own tactics against them in propaganda warfare. He recommends that we lower our sights from the intellectuals to the masses, that we use down to earth language and that we aim at the pocket-books of the people in order to capture their minds.

Our information officer in Bangkok believes that MSA's information program is moving strongly and well and suggests no change in policies, plans or capabilities.

MSA's information officer in Saigon recommends that we take an active role in encouraging joint US-French-Vietnamese participation in all propaganda and educational dissemination activities. The US and France would be in a supporting role to the Vietnamese.

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SPECIFIC QUESTIONS - Far East

1. The international role of Japan in the post-treaty era?

The Thai people are unwilling to see Japan dominate Southeast Asia politically and economically.

In the Philippines the Japanese treaty has become a domestic political football and Philippine-Jap relations are touchy.

In Indochina Japan is sought as a source of material supply and there is a general attitude of respect for Japanese technical progress and a desire to emulate it.

2. What changes have occurred in level, character and effectiveness of U.S. propaganda activities?

There has been little change except in Indochina where techniques and objectives have become sharpened with experience and increasing emphasis has been placed upon the dissemination of educational material and the support of local institutions.

3. What new evidence is there on hand concerning the psychological impact of U.S. technical assistance in under-developed areas?

Evidence continues to accumulate along lines similar to those in the past that indicate U.S. technical assistance has a strong psychological impact on the people of the Far East.

Increasingly large numbers of farmers on Formosa have requested technical assistance with its concomitant psychological impact. In Indochina, villages have presented scrolls of thanks to MSA. More applications for technical training in the United States have been received.

4. To what extent have psychological objectives been furthered through your activities in collaboration with (a) major international organizations such as the United Nations?

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In Formosa, UNESCO is just beginning to operate. MSA's mission in Manila works closely with United Nations agencies, particularly in health, agriculture and education. In Cambodia, one of the Associated States of Indochina, our mission cooperates with UNESCO and the World Health Organization.

(b) Non-governmental organizations and individuals in the United States?

In Formosa, U.S. press and radio interest is increasing and this is judged to be psychologically helpful by our mission there.

(c) Federal agencies other than MSA and member PSB agencies?

None, except USIS with which our missions feel cooperation is worthwhile.

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PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD

Washington

STATUS REPORT ON THE NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFORT

AS OF JUNE 30, 1953, and PROGRESS REPORT OF THE

PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD

Submitted to the President and the National Security Council

by the Psychological Strategy Board

PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD

Washington

STATUS REPORT ON THE NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFORT

AS OF JUNE 30, 1953, and PROGRESS REPORT OF THE

PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD

Submitted to the President and the National Security Council

by the Psychological Strategy Board

WARNING

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, U.S.C., the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

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PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
WASHINGTON, D. C.

STATUS REPORT ON THE NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFORT
AS OF JUNE 30, 1953, AND
PROGRESS REPORT OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD

NOTE BY THE SECRETARY

This report was approved by the Board at its Meeting, July 29,
1953.

Charles E. Johnson
Charles E. Johnson
Secretary to the Board

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STATUS REPORT ON THE NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFORT
AS OF JUNE 30, 1953, and PROGRESS REPORT OF THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD

Submitted to the President and the National Security Council by the
Psychological Strategy Board

pursuant to the memorandum dated May 27, 1953 addressed to the Acting
Director of the Psychological Strategy Board by Mr. James S. Lay, Jr.,
Executive Secretary of the National Security Council.

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I. STATUS OF THE PROGRAM ON JUNE 30, 1953

1. The Board presents below a brief evaluative summary of the status of our national psychological programs as of June 30, 1953, based largely on the appended Progress Reports by the departments and agencies responsible for operations.

GENERAL

2. While the President's Committee on International Information Activities studied the whole problem of the world struggle with a view to basic improvements in the U.S. position, the struggle, on the psychological as on other fronts, was conducted with increased vigor. The most far-reaching opportunity came with Stalin's death. The President's speech of April 16 was signally successful in capitalizing on the situation by appealing to the new leaders for an era of worldwide peace and friendship. The world at large received the speech with great enthusiasm, and the follow up support through psychological exploitation added to the initial success.

3. Further exploitation of events behind the Iron Curtain has been guided by the requirement that psychological operations must be keyed in with political action. After Stalin's death, the next major occasion for such action followed the outbreaks in Czechoslovakia and East Germany. Plans and operations were stepped up accordingly, with prospect of conducting a major campaign in the long-range contest to take full advantage of the consequences of Stalin's death.

4. Outside of the Soviet orbit the developments on the psychological front have been characterized by a disappointing deterioration in the attitudes towards the U.S. Non-Communist press and public opinion in Western Europe has reflected mounting criticism of U. S. foreign policy

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(the possible trend back to isolationism), and alleged anti-Communist "hysteria". These unfavorable attitudes in combination with a generally more receptive reaction among Western European peoples to the Soviet "peace offensive" now constitute an intensification of anti-American feeling among significant elements of European opinion.

5. World opinion has also been markedly unfavorable towards the development of U. S. foreign trade policies. At the same time that we are sharply reducing our programs for economic assistance, it has felt that we are providing little indication that our markets are to be opened up to foreign goods. Congressional criticism of our allies for their practices in the field of East-West trade, in combination with the new Soviet line on expansion of trade with the free world, has begun to have an adverse psychological impact around the world.

6. Urgent planning for stronger psychological measures based on Thailand was set in motion as the result of the invasion of Laos and the accompanying threat of Communist aggression in Southeast Asia.

7. While our overt psychological capabilities have been reduced by personnel difficulties, pressures in the Congress and appropriations cuts, covert capabilities continued to make sound progress, and faster and more energetic teamwork was secured through closer relations with the NSC and the operating agencies.

AREAS

8. Within the USSR itself, radio still constitutes the only important means used currently to reach the Russian people. Jamming by the Russian radio of our broadcasts continues to present a major problem. There was

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however, a perceptible increase in effectiveness of our radio resources in the last six months due to the inauguration of Radio Liberation and the stepped-up activity of Radio Free Russia. In addition to the radio, leaflet distribution was utilized to reach Soviet military forces stationed outside the USSR.

9. Similarly, in Communist China, the major psychological activities presently available are radio and leaflet drops. Both of these are being substantially increased. Through Hongkong, increased use is being made of overt, grey and black propaganda channels with the Chinese mainland.

10. In the European Satellites likewise, radio is our major propaganda communications medium. RIAS, RFE, and VOA have contributed to the building up of pressures that may be instrumental in weakening the Kremlin's control of the satellites. In most of these Satellite States, progress in other forms of psychological activity, mainly unattributable, has been slow, and has centered on the build-up of operating potential. There has, however, been increased action, including leaflet drops, in certain satellites - notably Albania, Bulgaria, and Rumania.

11. A high degree of access to East Germany was maintained despite increasing Soviet security restriction. Virtually the entire area has been continuously subjected to U. S. psychological programs through mainly indigenous channels.

12. In Western Europe, the presence of U. S. Armed Forces and the Military Aid program provided a significant psychological impact. Increased emphasis on troop acceptance programs enlisting the positive cooperation of the governments and the local authorities has brought about a definite improvement in most areas in the problem of avoiding friction between U. S. military personnel and foreign populations.

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13. Among the principal problems that have confronted U. S. psychological efforts in Western Europe during the past six months are increased criticism of the U. S. and, especially since Stalin's death, the Soviet "Peace Offensive". It is evident that many, if not all, Western European governments have been influenced to some extent by the Kremlin's tension-reducing tactics. The effect has been to retard progress toward a number of our objectives, including the build-up of Western defenses, the ratification of EDC, and attainment of European integration.

14. The U. S. counter-offensive has included fullest exploitation by the Department of State's Information Program of the President's Inaugural address and of his April 16 speech challenging the new leaders of the USSR to prove their peaceful professions by deeds, not words. Copies of the latter were presented to Foreign Offices all over the world in advance of delivery and kinescopes of the entire speech were sent to seventy-three posts within a day of its delivery. One of these was shown over BBC television on April 20 to an estimated audience of 6,000,000. Five million pamphlets, handbills, and leaflets on the speech were prepared and distributed, and a documentary film of it in thirty-five languages had been produced and shipped by May 2.

15. [In Italy, U. S. efforts to aid the reelection of the Democratic Center Parties fell considerably short of their objective. The DeGasperi Coalition was returned to office by a slender margin and the Communists and extreme Rightists registered significant gains.]

16. In France, the municipal elections in May showed that the Communists had suffered a slight set-back in rural areas, but had maintained their position in the industrial areas in larger cities. Governmental instability was a troublesome factor during the period and a relaxation of earlier French official measures to reduce the power of the

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Communist Party in France resulted. The repercussions of some Congressional investigations, as well as of the Rosenberg executions, in conjunction with the Kremlin's peace campaign, appear to have contributed to an increase in neutralism.

17. In the United Kingdom also, there appears to have been a marked increase in neutralism in its special British form of Bevanism. Although the belief is still widely held that Western unity must be preserved, three major elements contribute to the growth of anti-American feeling:

- (1) The belief that the U.S. is deeply divided on basic international policies,
- (2) The development of the Soviet "peace offensive", and
- (3) The desire to exercise a more positive and independent initiative in international affairs.

18. In West Germany and Berlin, the recent riots touched off greatly increased pressures for unification, complicating the problems of German ratification of the EDC. With this exception, however, U. S. psychological programs in Berlin and West Germany, as well as their projection into East Germany, appear to have been fairly effective in promoting progress toward our major goal of a Democratic Germany integrated into Western defense efforts. Since late March German press opinion has reflected a decline in confidence in U. S. leadership. This was temporarily halted by the President's April 16 speech, but has since been resumed. The two major factors contributing to this are: (1) the Soviet "peace offensive" and (2) lack of agreement within the U. S. on policy towards Germany.

19. In the Near and Middle East and South Asia, neutralism, and the tendency to associate the U. S. with "colonialism", continued to present a major obstacle to the attainment of U. S. psychological objectives. In the Arab States, the alleged pro-Israel bias on the part

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of the U. S. remained a major handicap, although the visits to Middle Eastern capitals by Secretary Dulles and Mr. Stassen may have alleviated this problem, at least temporarily. IIA has continuously exploited the beneficial aspects of these visits in its output to the area. Turkey, Pakistan, and Greece appear to be the brightest spots in this area, psychologically speaking.

20. In the Far East, the resumption of Korean truce talks raised major psychological problems. The exchange of sick and wounded prisoners necessitated special measures to deal with "brain washing". Steps were taken to achieve more effectively coordinated guidance on information matters concerning Korea through the channels of the Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee. The offer of a reward to MIG pilot defectors was followed by an immediate and significant shift in Communist air tactics over the Korean battle area.

21. In Japan, severe economic problems and growing neutralist resistance to the U. S. objective of Japanese rearmaments have been trouble spots in a picture otherwise fairly satisfactory. ["Grey" and unattributable activities have progressed favorably.]

22. In Latin America, our capabilities for effective psychological action increased in a number of countries, for the most part in the field of unattributable activity. There has been growing dissatisfaction in many Latin American countries directed mainly against American economic policies. To help offset this, a major psychological move was Dr. Milton Eisenhower's goodwill tour of South America initiated late in June.

SPECIAL ITEMS

23. Emergency assistance provided by U. S. Armed Forces in cases of national catastrophe has made material contributions to U. S. psychological efforts in The Netherlands, England, Turkey, Greece, Iran,

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Ecuador, and Japan.

24. A grant of 1,000,000 tons of wheat to Pakistan has had a similarly favorable effect.

25. Carefully planned exploitation of U. S. leadership in the atomic field, with a coordinated public information program on the Nevada weapons tests and other special weapons, as well as certain news leaks that gave rise to widespread speculation as to the explosion of a thermo-nuclear device at Eniwetok atoll, contributed to the U.S. psychological effort.

II. THE WORK OF PSB

During the first half of 1953, the work of PSB was marked by a vigorous shift in emphasis from long-range planning to include more immediate implementation and operational activities. This change reflected the advent of a new Administration, and especially the assumption of the Presidency by General Eisenhower. The President's stature made his inauguration on January 20 a major factor in the world psychological struggle, doubly so because of the strong views which he was known to hold on the importance of seizing the initiative in the cold war.

This found direct expression in the designation of Mr. C. D. Jackson as Special Assistant to the President, and his appointment, along with Mr. Harold E. Stassen, new Director of the Mutual Security Agency, to membership on the Psychological Strategy Board. Mr. Jackson was elected Chairman of the Board.

MAJOR ACTIVITIES

The impact of these organizational changes on the work of PSB was further heightened by important psychological developments in the international field during this period, including the death of Stalin, the intensified "peace offensive" of the successor regime in the Kremlin, the renewal of armistice negotiations in Korea, and the outbreak of large-scale anti-Communist and anti-Soviet rioting in East Germany.

A number of special projects were undertaken by PSB as a result of these events and changes, some at the request of the National Security Council, others on the initiative of the new Chairman of the Board. These special projects included the following major activities of the staff undertaken in cooperation with representatives of the Departments of State and Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Mutual

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Security Agency:

Program of Psychological Preparation for Stalin's Passing from Power
(PSB D-24)

Plan for Psychological Exploitation of Stalin's Death (PSB D-40)

During the early months of the reporting period, preparatory planning in anticipation of Stalin's eventual death continued under PSB D-24, including the drafting of a contingency guidance. When Stalin's illness was reported, the National Security Council requested the preparation of a plan for psychological exploitation of Stalin's death (NSC Action No. 728 b.(3), March 4, 1953). The resulting PSB D-40, "Plan for Psychological Exploitation of Stalin's Death", was finally approved on April 23, superseding PSB D-24. The Presidential address of April 16 was the major initial move provided for in the Plan. Such an address had been agreed upon by the NSC, and PSB was assigned the task of coordinating appropriate follow-up by departments and agencies of the Government (NSC Action No. 734 d, March 12, 1953). To assist it in complying with this assignment, as well as in implementation of PSB D-40, the Board established an inter-departmental working group which reports twice monthly to the Chairman.

Volunteer Freedom Corps

NSC Action No. 724 (February 25, 1953) approved in principle NSC 143, "Proposal for a Volunteer Freedom Corps", and directed that a detailed plan be prepared by an ad hoc committee composed of representatives of State, Defense, CIA and PSB staff. A "Proposed Basis for Psychological Operations Planning to Exploit the Volunteer Freedom Corps," dated March 20, 1953, and "A National Psychological Strategy Plan for the Volunteer Freedom Corps," dated March 30, 1953, submitted by the PSB staff representative, were intensively utilized by the ad hoc committee in preparing the relevant sections of its report to the Council. The Psychological

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Supporting Plan for Implementing NSC 143 was included in the ad hoc committee report of April 14 to the NSC Planning Board. After the rioting broke out in East Germany in mid-June, the PSB recommended to the NSC that consultation with the United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic of Germany be initiated by the State Department immediately with a view to implementation as soon as possible of the Volunteer Freedom Corps plan. The Joint Chiefs of Staff point out that the feasibility of implementation is directly dependent upon continued fiscal support by the Congress and successful negotiations by the Department of State with the foreign governments concerning the recruiting and stationing of these VFC units in their respective countries.

Interim U.S. Psychological Plan for Exploitation of Unrest in Satellite Europe (FSB D-45)

NSC Action No. 817-e (June 18) directed ISB to prepare recommendations as to policies and actions to exploit the unrest in the satellite states. A summary statement of the recommendations was approved by the Board on June 24, and by the NSC on June 25. The comments of the member agencies on the complete plan (FSB D-45) were coordinated through normal staff procedures and approved by the Board on July 1. This plan provides for an integrated and phased exploitation of actual and latent unrest in the satellite states to embarrass Soviet Control in those areas without jeopardizing fundamental American objectives.

U. S. Psychological Strategy with Respect to the Thai Peoples of SEA (FSB D-23)

Shortly after the Viet Minh invasion of Laos, the NSC directed the FSB (NSC Action 788 b, 13 May) to develop a plan for coordinated psychological operations based on Thailand, and to submit this plan to the NSC for consideration.

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A FSB panel was already working on an over-all psychological plan for Southeast Asia. Using this background, a new plan was developed, calling for a more vigorous exercise of U.S. leadership in Southeast Asia in two phases, (1) consolidation of Thailand as a secure base, and (2) eventual extension of U.S. psychological programs beyond the Thai boundaries if and when conditions permit. By June 30, the plan had been approved in principle and was nearing readiness for submission to the NSC.

Korea

Emergency Plan - Break Off of Korean
Armistice Negotiations (PSB J-19-d)

This contingency plan provides psychological objectives and courses of action in the event of the breakdown or break off of armistice negotiations.

Korean Cease-Fire Negotiations (FSB D-7c)

This plan covers the period immediately following the conclusion of an armistice and the Department of State has already begun work on the preparation of a new guidance dealing with the period of UN General Assembly approval of the proposed armistice agreement and the opening of a Korean political conference.

Guidance on Prisoner of War Exchange in Korea

At the request of the Department of Defense, the PSB staff undertook to prepare a coordinated interdepartmental guidance on the POW problem in Korea and in particular on the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners. This guidance was submitted to the Chairman of the FSB and transmitted by him to the members of the Board as a checklist of relevant psychological considerations.

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Communist Brainwashing

As a result of a letter of February 19 from the Secretary of Defense to the Under Secretary of State and the Director of Central Intelligence and of subsequent conversations between the last-named and the PSB staff, an Ad Hoc Interdepartmental Committee was set up to work with various scientific advisers to ascertain what counter-measures can be undertaken against so-called communist "brain-washing" techniques. A member of the PSB staff, who chaired the committee, remains in close contact with the military officers in charge of repatriation of the first American prisoners of war, and he has certain continuing responsibilities in connection with the foreign and domestic psychological aspects of the problem.

U. S. Doctrinal Program, PSB D-33

In September 1951, the Board authorized the establishment of an inter-departmental panel to study and make recommendations about "doctrinal (ideological) warfare against the USSR". At that time, the Board approved a paper which noted the Soviet ideological efforts which had gained influence upon the intelligentsia throughout the world and had predisposed them towards communist viewpoints. The panel, studying the Soviet approach and possible U.S. counter-action, developed a U.S. Doctrinal Program (PSB D-33) as a means of restoring U.S. influence and minimizing communist influence among the world's intellectuals. This Doctrinal Program visualizes a long-term intellectual movement, employing a permanent literature and a series of scholarly activities to break down the doctrinaire thought patterns which have aided Communism and to foster greater understanding and acceptance for the traditions and viewpoints of America and the Free World. As of June 30, the proposed program had been circulated for Board approval.

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President's Emergency Immigration Program

On April 22, 1953, President Eisenhower recommended to the Congress emergency legislation to admit 240,000 immigrants into the U.S. during the next two years. The President indicated the categories of people to be covered were escapees from Communism and the victims of economic conditions in the countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. On the initiative of the Chairman of F&B, members of its staff intensively supported this recommendation by assistance in the preparation of legislation to be introduced into Congress and by other means necessary to bring about its enactment. This was a completely coordinated staff effort, bearing in mind the potential impact of the program on the Italian General Elections which were to occur on June 7th and 8th, the objectives outlined in PSB's Escapee Program, and the possibilities such legislation would have in helping to bring about greater solidarity within NATO. Through the PSB Coordinating Committee for D-15b, the operating agencies were able to make particularly good use of the introduction of the bill in the Senate and the introductory statement by Senator Watkins as well as of the supporting testimony of Cabinet members.

Armaments Publicity Policy

A member of the PSB staff is representing Mr. C. D. Jackson in the deliberations of an Ad Hoc Committee on Armaments and American Policy. This group was designated by the NSC Planning Board in March to develop a Government publicity policy for the benefit of the American public on the subject of the armaments race with the USSR.

On May 8 an Interim Report by the Ad Hoc Committee (NSC 151) went to the Council which considered it on May 27, and its action on that date (NSC Action No. 799) included a direction to PSB

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"...to prepare for Council consideration an outline plan of the specific steps, including speeches by Government officials, which should be taken to carry out the recommendations contained in NSC 151".

A Presidential speech on this subject was in draft on June 30.

Procedural Guidance for Famine Relief Projects

A FSB staff paper setting forth an operational plan for exploitation of possible psychological advantages which might be derived from gifts of U.S. surplus food to countries within the Soviet orbit was submitted for Board consideration.

President's Flood Relief Committee

A FSB staff member served in an advisory capacity on the Inter-Agency Working Group on Flood Relief.

IMPLEMENTATION ACTIVITIES

The increased emphasis on special projects and short-term plans of a quasi-operational nature, as well as the maturing of more and more long-range FSB plans, led to a sharp increase in the follow-up work of FSB in cooperation with the Departments of State and Defense, the CIA and the NSA. In addition to coordination activity on plans and projects described above, the following approved FSB plans were in the process of active implementation by government departments and agencies during the reporting period:

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- (a) Psychological Operations Plan for the Reduction of Communist Power in France (PSB D-14c)
- (b) Psychological Operations Plan for the Reduction of Communist Power in Italy (PSB D-15b)

Coordination of the implementation of these two plans has been carried out by a Washington Interdepartmental Committee working with counterpart Committees in Paris and Rome acting under the immediate supervision of the respective Ambassadors. USCINCEUR has appointed a Liaison Representative who has met with the Paris Committee.

Municipal elections held throughout France in May indicated a slight over-all decline in communist electoral strength, but future prospects for effective anti-communist action were not bright as the reporting period closed with a prolonged French political crisis. Efforts started some months ago to lift parliamentary immunity from six communist deputies have not yet been successful.

Prior to the national elections in Italy, the Washington and Rome Committees undertook a number of actions designed to further the objectives of the plan, including psychological exploitation of the President's proposed emergency immigration program. The precarious majority obtained by the Center parties, and the gains of both Left Wing and Right Wing extremists, underline the continuing gravity of the situation. In the light of post-election comment from the U.S. Embassy in Italy, the plan to reduce communist power in that country is to be reviewed for the purpose of preparing a revised post-election strategy.

- (c) Psychological Operations Plan for Soviet Orbit Escapees (PSB D-18/a)

The Escapee Program was established in implementation of U.S. defector policy as set forth in NSC 86/1 with respect to improving the conditions of reception and care afforded recent escapees from Communism, and promoting

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their permanent resettlement. The Program which was administered by the Department of State during the reporting period also provides opportunity for meeting and confuting, with evidences of friendship and practical concern for the victims of Communism, the damaging Soviet propaganda which has in the past exploited inadequate conditions and the general neglect which greeted escapees on their arrival in the Free World.

During the past six months, the Program has achieved substantial results at a minimum cost to the Government. In Europe, care and maintenance activities are carried on in each of the major countries of first asylum, benefiting 14,890 currently registered escapees through the provision of supplemental food, clothing, medical and dental care, sanitary and living facilities, and amenity supplies. Resettlement is promoted by documentation, training, counseling and similar services performed in Europe, immigration opportunity searches undertaken in Canada and several Latin American countries, and the provision of funds for transportation for escapees qualifying for movement. Through these methods 4,709 escapees had been resettled or were awaiting passage by June 1, 1953.

United States assistance has directly brought about a marked improvement in the conditions of asylum and opportunities for resettlement offered escapees, and has also stimulated increased contributions by local government authorities and voluntary agencies. These activities have afforded material for utilization through information media abroad, have contributed to intelligence acquisition and related programs, and have provided a basis for successful rebuttal in the General Assembly of Czechoslovak charges of subversion under the Mutual Security Act.

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Soviet and satellite sensitivity to the fact of continued escape from behind the Iron Curtain, and of assistance to this group on the part of the Free World has been demonstrated by repeated press and radio attacks on the Escapee Program, by internal propaganda designed to conceal or minimize the continuing outward flow of escapees, by increasingly severe security measures and border controls, by the bringing of charges before the General Assembly, and by legal measures directed at particular individuals and groups of emigres.

During the year, program activities were extended under the authority of Section 303(a) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended, on a limited basis to South Asia and the Far East. Some 300 Kazakh refugees from Sinkiang Province who escaped to Kashmir are being assisted either to resettle in rural Kashmir or to move onward to Turkey. A select group of trained and educated refugees from China now stranded in Hong Kong will be assisted to resettle in Formosa or other suitable areas of the Far East under contractual arrangements with Aid Refugee Chinese Intellectuals, Inc.

(d) National Psychological Program with Respect to
Escapees from the Soviet Orbit: Phase "B"
(PSB D-18a/1a)

Approved by the Board on January 15, 1953, this Plan is essentially a program for encouragement of escape from the Soviet orbit for psychological purposes and for psychological employment of key satellite personnel.

On the recommendation of the Board, the NSC amended NSC 86/1 to insure that the term "key satellite personnel" includes any satellite national whose escape would be of significant psychological value to the Free World. An observer from the staff of PSB has been designated to meet, as the agenda requires, with the Inter-Agency Defector Committee

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which functions under CIA to execute NSCID 13 and 14. Plan D-18a/1a provides for military use of escapees to derive psychological advantages. Incisive action in this regard resulted from appointment of a special committee by the NSC at the direction of the President. This task group, carrying forward the work of the Phase "B" panel, made a comprehensive study and developed plans for the creation of a Volunteer Freedom Corps (NSC 143).

In addition, overt programs such as those under IIA have given increased attention to escapees. Other uses of escapee personnel encompass such activities as the Free Europe University in Exile (sponsored by the National Committee for a Free Europe), and certain of the operations in its appropriate area of the Committee for Free Asia, which offer opportunities for special exploitation of the potential for non-communist leadership among these people. The program in Europe has the capability of absorbing profitably more qualified candidates than have appeared thus far. Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberation have increased their propaganda exploitation of escapees and are using in their programming current escapees offering substantial value.

- (e) Plan for Conducting Psychological Operations
During General Hostilities (PSB D-8/b, NSC 127/1);
National Overt Propaganda Policy Guidance for
General War (PSB D-11/b)

The substance of these plans has been integrated into the current war plans of both JCS and CIA. The Department of State chairs an inter-departmental subcommittee of the Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee consisting of representatives of State, Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Mutual Security Agency for the purpose of drafting an "X-Day" Plan in implementation of NSC 127/1.

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- Work on this project was in effect taken over by the President's Committee on International Information Activities.

- and

- (h) National Psychological Strategy with Respect to Berlin (D-21/2) (Supplement to FSB D-21 dated October 9, 1952)

A supplementary psychological plan for Berlin was approved by the Board on February 3, 1953. Supporting Plans for implementing this program as well as the Plan for West Germany as a whole, were developed by the Department of State and Department of Defense, coordinated and approved by other member agencies. A special Coordinating Committee has been established in Bonn under the auspices of the U.S. High Commission. Under the active chairmanship of the HICOG Public Affairs Officer, the Committee brings together representatives of State, Defense, MSA, and CIA. Reports from this Committee outline detailed action taken and indicate progress in implementing the German and Berlin Plans, which have now become, in effect, the charters for the Government's information and other psychological programs in the area.

Possible revision of these plans is under preliminary staff consideration as a result of recent developments in Germany and in Europe generally, as well as of modifications of U.S. policies.

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(i) Psychological Strategy Program for Japan
(PSB D-27)

Follow-up work on the Japan plan, which was approved by the Board on January 15, 1953, has resulted in the setting up of two Committees in Tokyo for the coordinated implementation of this program. The first Committee is a high-level group chaired by the Ambassador himself. The second is a working-level Committee headed by the Public Affairs Officer and including also representatives of Defense and CIA. Preparation of supporting plans, however, has been slow. The State Department is now working on a revision of the U.S. country paper for Japan which follows very closely the content of PSB D-27. The preliminary steps have been taken to include MSA in the coordinated implementation of the Plan if and when an expected FOA program for Japan is approved.

(j) Psychological Strategy Program for
the Middle East (PSB D-22)

Implementation of this Plan is proceeding under the active supervision of the Middle East Coordinating Panel in Washington. After the visit of the Secretary of State, accompanied by the Director of MSA, to the Middle East, the Panel held a special meeting toward the end of the reporting period to take into account the resultant new policy attitudes toward Middle Eastern problems. A request for comments on D-22 from the field resulted in replies from five of the ten Diplomatic Missions in the area. The comments received were uniformly favorable and several of them were enthusiastic. The Washington Panel is considering the problem of establishing in the field the necessary coordinating mechanism to implement this regional program.

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PLANNING ACTIVITIES

Plans Authorized and in Process of Development:

Plans in various stages of preparation on June 30 included the following:

- (a) Psychological Strategy Plan for Western Europe
(PSB D-38)

A regional psychological strategy plan to increase the willingness of Europeans to support mutually agreed security goals in Western Europe by reducing anti-U.S. attitudes was completed and sent to the Board members on June 30 for approval by vote slip action.

- (b) Program for Support of the Orthodox Church
(PSB D-39)

Possible ways of utilizing the world-wide influence of the Orthodox Church as a means of checking increasing Soviet influences in the Eastern Mediterranean and as a method of weakening Soviet control within the Soviet Orbit is the basis for this plan. A program for the non-attributable support and assistance to non-Russian leadership of the Orthodox Church was informally concurred in by the member agencies and forwarded to the Board members for vote slip approval.

- (c) Plan for Exploitation of Dissidence in the Soviet Bloc: USSR Armed Forces
(PSB D-43)

This plan to exploit the bases for schism between the regime and the military establishment of the Soviet Union and to increase dissidence within the Soviet Armed Forces where significant vulnerabilities are indicated, awaits final clearance prior to early submission to the Board.

- (d) Iranian Contingency Plan

A PSB chaired interdepartmental panel will coordinate psychological planning in relation to the possible partial or complete loss of Iran, a contingency which had not been assumed in the approved psychological strategy plan for the Middle East.

(e) Indo-China

A special program for the use of U. S. Influence in Support of U. S. Objectives in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos was drafted and in the process of interdepartmental clearance at the end of June.

(f) Psychological Strategies in North Africa

This paper, including a study of the Psychological Data, a report on the Status of Power Relations, and an illustrative plan for U. S. psychological action in the area, was in the process of clearance and completion on June 30.

Review and Revision of Approved Plans

A procedure was developed during the period, under which all completed plans are regularly reviewed by the staff with a view to determining whether revision is required. Early revision of the French and Italian plans is now contemplated.

EVALUATION AND INTELLIGENCE

Evaluation Methods

Work was continued with Government research offices engaged in developing techniques for evaluating psychological operations. Progress in this field has been made through:

- a. examining current evaluation research projects in the Government to determine their relevance to PSB needs.
- b. alerting Government research units to the continuing need for research, particularly on evaluation criteria for psychological operations, and assisting them in fixing priorities for major research projects.
- c. holding conferences on evaluation techniques and criteria.

- d. suggesting specific evaluation projects for Government research units, such as a Handbook on Statistics for Psywar.

Evaluations and Pre-planning Situation Estimates

During the reporting period, the following projects in this category were carried out:

- a. An Evaluation of the Psychological Effect of the U. S. National Effort in Italy. (PSB D-29): This paper, which was drafted during the final quarter of 1952, was noted by the Board on January 15, revised, and distributed for information. It concluded that U. S. policies and programs have contributed substantially to the attainment of our national objectives in Italy, but that the situation was still grave and that withdrawal of our support might well lead to the collapse of the Government then in power (February 1953). Accordingly, it concluded that there should be no slackening of our effort in the crucial period ahead.
- b. An Evaluation of the Psychological Impact of U. S. Foreign Economic Policies in the U. K. (PSB D-36): This paper identified some adverse psychological results of certain aspects of our economic policies towards the U. K.; especially in the military aid and tariff areas. It was approved by the Board on January 15, and, after further coordination, it was transmitted to the NSC, and, through the State Department, to other interested agencies.
- c. Evaluation of the Psychological Impact of U. S. Foreign Economic Policies in France (PSB D-37): The completed paper was accepted as a reference document by the Board on January 15. It outlines the psychological causes behind the difficulties encountered by France in pursuing free world objectives, notes

the psychological obstacles raised by our policy towards France, and proposes actions to obtain French cooperation.

- d. Psychological Plan for the reduction of Communist Power in France (PSB D-14/c): An evaluation of this plan, including suggestions for its revision, was ready for consideration on June 30.
- e. Psychological Operations Plan for Soviet Escapees (PSB D-18a): An analytical report on the first year's operation of the United States Escapee Program is nearing completion.
- f. Soviet Sensitivities: An evaluative report on this subject, prepared in an interdepartmental committee, was completed and submitted to the Acting Director for approval and interdepartmental circulation for information as a staff study.
- g. A review of the psychological situation and related factors in Yugoslavia involved the assembly of basic intelligence and strategic considerations, for possible use in planning.
- h. The Malenkov Test Case: Before the death of Stalin and in conjunction with PSB D-24 an extensive review of classified and other data on Malenkov was completed. It was decided that data were inadequate for an intensive psychological analysis of the man; but other Malenkov studies were recommended. The project uncovered deficiencies in the organization and coordination of biographic information in the Government.
- i. Latin America: A pre-planning estimate of the psychological situation in this region was nearing completion at the end of the reporting period.

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Intelligence Support

Staff members continued to work in liaison with the intelligence-producing agencies of the Government to provide intelligence support and guidance to the Board and the Staff. This function includes selecting from, and, in some cases, synthesizing the output of the agencies, arranging for new research where necessary, and setting up staff briefings by experts from outside the staff.

In this period, similar services were also developed to meet the needs of the Chairman of the Board for Government intelligence on such psychological subjects as foreign opinion trends, and international reactions to particular programs, actions, and statements of the United States Government or its officials. This mission for the Chairman has required a greater emphasis upon the rapid procurement and processing of current intelligence from the agencies on a daily basis.

Psychological Support for USUN

As a result of discussions between Ambassador Lodge and Mr. C. D. Jackson, and subsequent PSB action at the informal meeting of June 3, a PSB-chaired committee of the member agencies was established to organize an anti-communist psychological campaign focussed upon the General Assembly scheduled to convene on the 15th of September. At the close of the reporting period, the committee was in action and early documentation had been supplied to Ambassador Lodge.

ATTACHMENTS

- Annex A Report of the Department of State
 - Annex B Report of the Department of Defense
 - Annex C Report of the Mutual Security Agency
 - * Annex D: Report of the Central Intelligence Agency
 - Annex E: Psychological Program - Expenditures
- *The report of the Central Intelligence Agency is specially classified

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
COUNSELOR

SEP 4 1951

PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD

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2 July 1951

Minutes
of

Meeting held in Director's Conference Room,
Central Intelligence Agency, 2 July 1951

PRESENT

Lieut. General W. Bedall Smith, Director of Central
Intelligence
Mr. Robert Lovett, Deputy Secretary of Defense
Mr. Edward Barrett, for the Under Secretary of State
Mr. Gordon Gray, Director, Psychological Strategy Board
Mr. Allen Dulles, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. James Q. Reber, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Allen Dines, Central Intelligence Agency

FUNCTIONS OF THE BOARD AND STAFF

1. Initial discussion was based on the agenda proposed in the memorandum of 1 June 1951 from Mr. Dulles to the Director of Central Intelligence. In view of Mr. Gray's appointment, discussion of the proposed interim procedure (TAB A of that memorandum) was not necessary. The proposed functions and organization of the Staff (TAB B) was passed over as it was considered a non-controversial paper. The basic difference of view brought out in General Magruder's and Mr. Sargeant's papers was discussed briefly but no decision or recommendation was made. It was agreed that Mr. Gray should have an opportunity to discuss the matter with various interested people before forming an opinion.

2. General Smith stated his view that the principal factor missing in our psychological set-up at the present time is a "master plan" similar to the plan of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the last war when it was decided to concentrate first on Germany and then turn on Japan. He pointed out that everything else would logically flow from such a plan and that economic programs, covert missions, and VOA policies should be related to it.

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3. General Smith felt that the PSB and its Staff should work on the preparation of this master plan and act as a high-level project review board to allocate missions to the various agencies and to survey the effectiveness of operations in progress.

FUNDS, SPACE, AND PERSONNEL

4. The Board agreed that Mr. Gray and his Staff should be physically located on "neutral ground" apart from any one of the participating agencies.

5. It was understood that Mr. Peel of CIA would assist Mr. Gray in working out with Mr. Finsen of the Bureau of the Budget and representatives of State and Defense the necessary arrangements regarding funds and office space for the Board and Staff. General Smith agreed to try to make certain slots available for the immediate hiring of some high-level consultants to be assigned to the PSB.

RELATIONS WITH OTHER GROUPS

6. The relation of the Board to the NSC was discussed briefly, and it was understood that the Board would occupy a position somewhat similar to that of the Senior Staff, reporting directly to the NSC. Coordination with the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be effected through their representative with the Board, Admiral Stevens. ✓

7. The supporting role of the O/PC Consultants and Mr. Barrett's Psychological Operations Coordinating Board was mentioned and the possibility was raised of combining these two groups while preserving separate overt and covert staffs. It was agreed, however, that no change should be made at the present time inasmuch as both groups were operating satisfactorily.

SCOPE OF "PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS"

8. The point was made that the scope of the Board's responsibility is very broad and covers every kind of activity in support of U. S. policies except overt shooting and overt economic warfare.

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PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD

MINUTES

2:30 p.m. - 4:30 p.m., Monday August 13, 1951
Director's Office, Psychological Strategy Board building

Present:

Members:

Lt. General W. Bedell Smith, Director of Central Intelligence,
Acting Chairman
Mr. James E. Webb, Under Secretary of State
Mr. Robert Lovett, Deputy Secretary of Defense

Others:

Mr. Gordon Gray, Director, Psychological Strategy Board
Col. Armand Hopkins, JCS Representative
Major General John Magruder, Department of Defense
Mr. Frank Wisner, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Charles E. Johnson, Acting Executive Secretary, Psychological
Strategy Board
Mr. Robert G. Efteland, Secretary

PROGRESS REPORT BY THE DIRECTOR (PSB D-1)

1. In addition to his statement in Progress Report by the Director (PSB D-1), Mr. Gray commented that efforts are being made to recruit individuals for permanent appointment to the staff of the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB). He noted that Task Panel "A" (PSB D-1/1) was the outgrowth of a meeting at the White House in which Assistant Secretaries of State Rusk and Barrett had participated.

PROCEDURE FOR CONDUCT OF BOARD BUSINESS

2. The Board agreed that it would meet only when there are important problems to discuss. The Acting Chairman and the Director will schedule meetings on a rotation basis at any one of the three Agencies at the convenience of the Board. The members are free to bring their alternates as they deem desirable.

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3. In the matter of briefing, Mr. Gray suggested that his staff brief the members' alternates a few days before meetings of the board. The alternates would then brief the members in advance of board meetings. General Smith and Mr. Lovett favored this procedure. Mr. Lovett urged that papers be held to a minimum for security reasons. Mr. Webb stated that he had not decided how to handle the briefing problem.

4. To prevent problems being placed before the board for decision until the members have had a chance to study them, it was the consensus that the Director should determine whether a problem is within the competence of the board and whether it is necessary for the PSB staff to present its views to the PSB.

LIST OF PROBLEMS OF INTEREST TO THE BOARD (PSB D-2)

(BLUE TAB 2)

5. Mr. Gray, in presenting his views on List of Problems for the Director and Staff in Order of Work Priority (PSB D-2), called the Board's attention to paragraph 4 in which he states his concern that the board should not assume too many problems without careful consideration. He said this document is an effort to translate NSC papers into action. It is necessary to convert NSC policies into specific objectives and formulate plans which will achieve these objectives. As the problems listed in Sections II-A, II-B and II-C on page 2 are solved, the remaining problems will become clearer. The staff intends to give top priority to the substantive problems I through II-C which fall generally into a category of psychological strategy planning not previously initiated. Section II-D will then be considered. Section II-E will be considered concurrently inasmuch as these problems are largely concerned with relationships. Mr. Gray explained that it is not necessary to reconcile differing definitions as to what psychological operations mean because the same work is necessary under either concept. Consequently, it was decided to list the problems facing the PSB to provide the board with specific terms of reference which would enable it to get on with its work. Therefore, the list of problems (PSB D-2) illustrates the area of interest of the PSB and the Staff. At the same time it provides for Mr. Gray the basis for planning a functioning staff organization.

6. General Smith said that the list of problems appears to be monumental. He asked Mr. Gray how he expected to accomplish these projects and still attack current problems. Mr. Gray replied that the Staff intends to use ad hoc groups whenever necessary on new problems. General Smith said that in his opinion the PSB staff would require many reinforcements to accomplish the work outlined in PSB D-2. He believed that completion of the problems listed would require two years of effort by the PSB staff and that there was not that much time available. He said that the problems listed in Sections I-A (4), I-A (5), and I-A (7) are enough to keep the PSB staff busy for quite some time.

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In addition, as he looked over the list of problems, it appeared that many others were going to require work by the staff in the very near future. He noted, as an example, that the problem in Section II-K had not yet been assigned a work priority. However, it is a problem which must be met right now.

7. Mr. Webb said that the Kremlin has a special group which devotes all of its efforts to maximize the strength of the USSR to fractionate and weaken that of the United States. He hoped that the members would conceive the function of the PSB as drawing together U. S. efforts in the same way as the Kremlin group does for Russia. Moreover, he believed the board should discuss further many of the problems listed in PSB D-2 before the Staff completes its work and reaches a final position on the problems. He said surveys take time and that we should not overlook each board member's ignorance of the work of other agencies. He looked upon the PSB as a central place for the members to meet, discuss problems and make policy. The PSB should be a central place where guidance would be available. It would give Mr. Webb the feeling that here is a group of knowledgeable Government Officials who can meet our major problems in the psychological area.

8. Mr. Lovett said that this list is an encyclopedic approach and gives the Board something to shoot at. He suggested that the board approve the document (PSB D-2) as an identification of problems which call for discrimination as to which should be undertaken first. He suggested that the board undertake as a matter of urgency the problems listed in Section I-A (4), I-A (5) and I-A (7). This will enable the board to find out what is being done by Government agencies, what general directives they are following and what they plan to do. Mr. Webb agreed with Mr. Lovett and said that if these three problems were worked out, the PSB would then know what the agencies in the U. S. Government are working on. It could bring together whatever additional resources are necessary to achieve our goals and could make the necessary plans for any gaps which might be found to exist. General Smith agreed with: a) the above, b) that the staff of the board should undertake the necessary work in connection with these three points; and c) that the board should consider at a later date the other problems listed in the document. Mr. Gray said that the list will naturally be subject to constant revision. He suggested that the staff, in addition to the study of Sections I-A - (4), I-A - (5) and I-A - (7), be allowed to take up any urgent matter which the Board might direct.

SECTION II-D of PSB D-2

9. The board discussed at length the problem stated in this section of the paper. It was the consensus of the board that the Russians are planning some disruptive action to embarrass us. Possibly they will reaffirm their disarmament suggestions and intensify their peace drive.

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It will have the same old sugar coating and will attempt to show that the United States is preventing disarmament in the world. The Shvernik letter possibly gives a guide to the Russian attitude. No doubt the Russians will say to small countries "if you don't go along with us and accept our position, you must bear the consequences". The Board agreed that the United States must take action to meet these Russian maneuvers both abroad and in the United States.

SECTION II-E of PSB D-2

10. Mr. Gray said that he planned to have a Special Assistant handle the relationships of PSB with congressmen and representatives of private agencies who are interested generally in psychological developments. He does not anticipate any problems in this connection. The main thing will be to keep others from doing things we don't want them to do rather than the need to encourage cooperation by outsiders. Mr. Webb asked Mr. Gray if he intended to use other executive agencies of the Government to talk to representatives of private groups. Mr. Gray said that he would use Government agencies but that it would be necessary to have someone available in PSB to talk with them so that they feel they are being given consideration. General Smith believed it would be desirable for Mr. Gray to have such an officer to deal with interested private agencies. Mr. Lovett said that the Department of Defense would handle most inquiries itself but that it would push off general inquiries to the PSB. It was the consensus of the Board that the procedure outlined by Mr. Lovett should be followed.

ORGANIZATION, FUNCTIONS, AND BUDGET (PSB D-3)

11. The Board's consideration was limited to page 5 of PSB document D-3. In explaining this estimate, Mr. Gray said that he expects that the staff will be increased somewhat to meet the problems the PSB must handle. However, he believed that any increase would be reasonable and in no case would the staff be increased to anywhere near double the size called for in the document. The Board agreed that the necessary funds would be provided from appropriate Agency budgets.

OTHER BUSINESS

12. Mr. Gray discussed two papers as examples of problems which contain psychological implications. He asked that the members caution their Agencies to make available to the PSB copies of papers of importance to the work of the Board and its Staff. The members agreed that they would instruct their agencies to cooperate in this matter.

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13. General Smith discussed the question of preventing uncontrolled activity in the psychological field now that the PSB has been organized. He said that there is a need to develop an over-all psychological strategy plan. Other Agencies and the Army, which is concerned only with the tactical military phase of operations would then be able to carry out assigned missions. General Magruder stated that he would discuss the Army's role with Mr. Lovett (who had left the meeting) and that the Department of Defense would handle the matter internally. He said that the Services would deal with the Board through the JSPD which was established for this purpose. General Magruder said that two papers are being prepared concerning the Army's interpretation of its function and that copies will be submitted to the PSB. It was the consensus that an over-all psychological strategy plan should be developed so that all activity in the Government is in consonance with it.

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MINUTES

Third Meeting of the
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
September 27, 1951, 2:00 p.m.

Mr. Gordon Gray, Director of the Psychological Strategy Board,
presiding

MEMBERS:

Mr. James E. Webb, Under Secretary of State
Mr. William C. Foster, Deputy Secretary of Defense
Mr. Allen Dulles, acting for Director of Central Intelligence

OTHER PARTICIPANTS:

Special Assistant to the President - Mr. W. Averell Harriman
Department of State

Assistant Secretary Edward W. Barrett

Department of Defense

Major General John A. Magruder (Retired)

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Brigadier General Desmond Balmer

Psychological Strategy Board Staff

Mr. Robert Cutler (Present for the early part of the meeting.)

Colonel Charles W. McCarthy

Colonel Paul C. Davis

Mr. Joseph B. Phillips

Mr. John Sherman

Mr. Charles E. Johnson

Mr. Albert P. Toner, Acting Secretary


Charles W. McCarthy
Colonel, USA
Executive Officer

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1. Role of Psychological Strategy Board (NSC 5412, 12-11-54)
Directive (FSS Gen. Revised 15 Sept. 1954)

The document was approved with the amendments suggested below:

MR. GRAY called attention to the revised language in the last paragraphs of pages 1 and 2. He noted that the Presidential Directive is so broad with respect to the evaluation function that it is necessary to emphasize that evaluation will be limited to the most important programs.

MR. WEBB said that the State Department generally approves the paper, but that he wished to make several suggestions for the sake of greater precision. The amendments follow, and the approved document is attached:

A. Page 1, paragraph 1, line 1 - Delete "an agency (Psychological Strategy Board)" and add the Psychological Strategy Board. ✓

B. Delete the second sentence of page 1, paragraph 2 and add A Director, appointed by the President, sees that the decisions of the Board are carried out. ✓

C. Page 1, paragraph 3, line 2 - Delete "single office" and add final point. ✓

D. Page 1, paragraph 3, line 7 should read "assessment of these psycholgocial . . ." ✓

E. Page 1, last paragraph, line 2 - Delete "comprehensive" and change "a" to an. ✓

F. Page 1, last paragraph, line 4 - Delete "National Security Council" and add appropriate agencies of the government. (MR. WEBB pointed out that the President personally makes the National Security Council agenda selections and carefully controls the contents of agenda items. Mr. Webb is especially concerned that papers should originate in the agency of major interest in the subject, and that the FSS should not now be considered as such an originating agency since its component members discharge that function. He would prefer that the FSS request the appropriate agency to propose NSC agenda items through, for example, the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of State.) ✓

G. Page 1, last paragraph, line 5 - Delete "and" and add or, so as to read, adoption or development . . . ✓

MR. GRAY explained with respect to items F and G above that the desired meaning is that the Board would ask for a policy should policy gaps be encountered, and that in some cases the Board might be in a better position to recommend a policy than one of the agencies. He did not believe that all policy involving psychological operations

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should originate with the Board but felt that the Board should be able in particular cases to recommend policy.

With reference to the last clause in paragraph 2, the question was raised as to whether the Board actually could "add to its number . . ." It was pointed out that the language in the paper is taken almost verbatim from the Presidential directive, from which it was read. It was the consensus that the intent of the language is not to provide permanent additions to the Board.

2. Report of Progress by Panels Working Under Psychological Strategy Board

Task Panel "A":

COLONEL DAVIS explained that the Korean contingency paper is undergoing condensation and emphasizing psychological activities rather than just propaganda. He indicated that the paper should be ready for submission to the Board in the near future.

Task Panel "B":

COLONEL DAVIS described the selection as number one priority of the development of strategic plans in the cold war. Task groups have been activated to inventory cold war weapons and to study degree of adequacy or gaps in the means of implementing these weapons.

MR. WEBB asked how items in the inventory are classified. He noted the difficult decisions with which we are confronting the Russians, for instance, the restoration of Japan to the community of nations. He also asked whether our practical ability to use the weapons is taken into account, such as, availability of personnel, political feasibility, etc.

COLONEL DAVIS replied that these practical factors will be taken into account.

MR. WEBB suggested that the Panel should include some one familiar with the domestic political process. With respect to covert activities, for example, in order to secure funds, it is necessary to have people in whom the Congress has confidence and who can handle the task properly. He also stressed the importance of good public relations planning.

MR. GRAY observed that perhaps one member could handle both the public relations and political feasibility elements, and indicated that he would give attention to those aspects.

COLONEL DAVIS added that another task group is studying the intelligence problem relating to strategic planning and a preliminary paper on intelligence support has been prepared. Also, a codification and analysis of NSC policies bearing on psychological operations is in preparation.

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3. Consideration of Communist Activity in France and Italy (PSB D-5)

The Board agreed to proceed with the problem as proposed in the paper, A-36, "To prepare psychological strategy plans describing specific courses of action for the reduction of Communist power in France and Italy" (PSB D-5).

MR. GRAY gave the background of the meetings called by Mr. Harriman on this subject, at which it was urged that the PSB should take cognizance. He noted that the language of the agenda deliberately questioned whether the PSB should "undertake responsibility" in view of the general realization that the Board cannot "do everything." It was his opinion that the Board would likely approve this project, and he believed that Board action generally will assist in guiding the proper selection of problems for the staff.

MR. GRAY summarized his conversation with Italian Minister of Defense Randolfo Pacciardi. The Minister fears the possibility that the Communist Party could win the next administrative elections or succeed later in the year in forcing a general election. Without endorsing the judgment of the Minister, Mr. Gray passed it along as possibly useful.

MR. WEBB stated his belief that it is important to maintain the authority of the Ambassadors in both France and Italy.

MR. HARRIMAN agreed with the last point. He added that if about two years ago some organization similar to the PSB had been available for the exchange of views along the lines of the current problem, a more favorable situation might prevail in those countries today.

MR. GRAY also called attention to the excellent and comprehensive report which Mr. Dulles had prepared on this subject upon his return from abroad.

COLONEL DAVIS indicated that the new Task Panel "C" proposed in the paper would have guidance from a member of PSB staff and that representation would include ECA, the Department of State (with an MDAP specialist), CIA, each of the military services and the Department of Defense office for liaison with SHAPE, as well as consultants from the Departments of Commerce, Treasury (for foreign funds control problems), Agriculture, and Labor (for labor organization questions). The objective will be to develop specific projects in terms of feasibility and availability of resources. He added that an over-all plan would not be presented to the foreign governments concerned, which might alarm them, but rather a series of separate but consistent steps is planned.

The question of the population problem was considered and MR. WEBB suggested that a population expert therefore be included.

MR. DULLES believed that much will need to be done on the problem outside of governments, especially in France. He indicated that various

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groups are ready to assist with covert support. The degree of participation or interest in such activities by the Ambassadors would have to be determined case by case.

It was agreed the State Department will be consulted on the extent to which coordination with the British on the problem might be desired.

The point was made that a group in Washington removed from the scene might make mistakes unless strengthened by experts returned from France and Italy to assist in the project.

It was agreed that the group should concentrate upon hitting the enemy at the source of his strength, including, for example, Communist schools, printing presses, etc. It was stressed that there is little time left and agreed that existing activities of the government dealing with this problem should not stop while Panel "C" is getting underway. It was indicated that Mr. John Sherman will be getting in touch with the participating agencies to assist in co-ordinating current actions.

4. Budget for Fiscal Year 1953, and New Staffing Table

MR. GRAY explained that he was not yet prepared to make a firm proposal for fiscal year 1953.

He recalled his statement at the last meeting to the effect that in the future in no case would the staff be increased to any where near double the approved staff of 52 positions. (PSB M-2, paragraph 11) A more accurate statement would have been that no doubling of the current projected fund requirement was expected. He believed that the maximum staff for fiscal year 1952 would be about 79 people, with an outside total for fiscal year 1953 of 99. It is anticipated that current allocations of funds from the agencies should be sufficient for fiscal year 1952, with the possible exception of new requirements necessitated by the acquisition of additional space. He stated he hoped to keep the staff to the minimum required strength. In response to a question from MR. WEBB, he indicated that a new budget proposal and staffing table would be made available to the members.

5. Responsibility of Department and Agency Representatives Working as Members of Panels under Psychological Strategy Board Staff

MR. GRAY expressed the opinion that in order to avoid rigidity and a tendency toward the lowest common denominator of departmental views, "instructed delegates" should not be sent to Panel meetings. He observed that the members should be fully cognizant of the views, limitations and capacities of their agencies in order that they may apply intelligent judgment in meetings. MR. WEBB inquired if there had been any difficulty of this kind in the operation of the panels, and MR. GRAY replied that he did not consider it a current problem.

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6. Information on Significant Unusual Developments (Postagenda Item)

MR. CRIT said that for the protection of the Board, the Board should be kept advised of pertinent current developments in order to advise the Director of the Board with respect to crises in the psychological field. He asked the designation of specific contact points in the various agencies to which requests for such information can be addressed. MR. CRIT asked Mr. William J. McWilliams for this purpose in the State Department. The Department of Defense contacts in OSD and in JCS (JSPD) will be designated likewise in CIA. The need is primarily for spot reporting rather than "intelligence." Since the Board may be looked to, properly or not, as responsible in a number of psychological situations, this centralized information system is required.

GENERAL ROBINER observed that the situation is particularly difficult in the Department of Defense because the sources of information are so scattered.

MR. BARNETT commented that this arrangement will also call for internal machinery in the agencies so that the contact people are in fact being kept informed.

7. Minutes of the Meeting of August 13, 1951 (Postagenda Item)

MR. WEBB explained that he had not intended to draw a direct analogy with the Kremlin's "special group" in the statement attributed to him in paragraph 7. His intent rather had been to conceive of the PSB function as providing a focal point at which it can be determined where the responsible people are in the Government and what they are doing. With the agreement of the Board he submitted the following language, which more accurately reflects his meaning:

"7. Mr. Webb said it appeared from following the actions of the USSR that the Kremlin has a number of able people so positioned as to devote practically their full effort with great effectiveness to finding ways and means to maximize the strength of the USSR and break up that of the United States and its allies. He hoped that the members would conceive the function of the Psychological Strategy Board as that of drawing together in a more effective way the efforts of our own able people working in the psychological field. He thought the Psychological Strategy Board might do something both to improve the positioning of these able people which he feels sure are working in various governmental departments, and to provide a central place or focal point through which each group of specialists could get better acquainted with what the others were doing and develop working habits that would form the basis of better coordination and more effective results. Moreover, he believed the Board should discuss further many of the problems listed in PSB D-2 before the Staff completes its work and reaches a final position on the problems. He said that surveys take time and that we should not overlook each Board member's limited knowledge of the work of other agencies. He looked upon the Psychological Strategy Board as a central place for the members to

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meet, discuss problems and agree upon coordinated action, and also to keep themselves informed of what the other governmental agencies having responsibilities in the psychological field were doing. He pointed out that he and other officials with executive responsibility had to make many decisions every day which related in one way or another to the psychological field; that a knowledge of what the various governmental agencies were doing in this field would provide a most useful background for improving the quality of these decisions; and that a knowledge of who the people were who could furnish information which might be needed in a hurry to help in arriving at the proper decision would be of great value. He felt that a close working relationship among Board members would provide a background of information that would greatly improve the present situation."

8. Briefing for Board Members (Postagenda Item)

MR. WESB commented that the briefing planned after the meeting was an excellent idea and proposed a similar presentation of the total State Department effort in the information and education field. It was therefore agreed that the next meeting of the Board would be held at the Department of State, followed by a briefing.

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M I N U T E S

PSB M-4

Fourth Meeting of the
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
October 25, 1951, 2:30 p.m.
Room 5104 New State Building

MEMBERS:

General Walter B. Smith, Chairman; Director, Central Intelligence
Agency

Mr. James E. Webb, Under Secretary of State

Mr. William C. Foster, Deputy Secretary of Defense

Mr. Gordon Gray, Director, Psychological Strategy Board

OTHER PARTICIPANTS:

Department of State

Assistant Secretary Edward W. Barrett

Department of Defense

Major General John A. Magruder (Retired)

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Brigadier General Jesmond D. Balmer, USA

Psychological Strategy Board Staff

Mr. Robert Cutler

Captain Richard Antrim, USN (Present for items 1 and 2)

Colonel Charles W. McCarthy, USA

Mr. Albert P. Toner, Acting Secretary


Charles W. McCarthy
Colonel, USA
Executive Officer

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Agenda Item 1. - Psychological Operations Plan Incident to
Korean Unification Negotiations (PSS D-476).

Action: The Board approved this paper, as amended at the meeting,
leaving to the discretion of the Director any changes in task assign-
ment in section VI, Task Assignments.

MR. GRAY called attention to a few points in the paper upon which agreement had not been reached:

(1) JSPD had expressed the wish to eliminate par. 5 on page 8 on the grounds that the activity described therein was already underway, whereas CIA desired its retention. It was agreed to retain this paragraph amended as follows: "5. Intensification of psychological preparation . . ."

(2) JSPD had felt that par. 6 b, page 8, could be interpreted in several ways. CAPTAIN MATHIS explained that the provision was included in order to improve the South Korean attitude toward the Japanese and that CIA would coordinate its planning responsibility in this regard with the Department of Defense. GENERAL SMITH said that the paragraph was in effect a directive and should be retained in the paper. Whereas he thought the action proposed should be carried out, the magnitude, timing, and other details would depend upon the availability of funds for the purpose. MR. WEBB asked that caution be observed with respect to any covert activities which might not be consistent with our diplomatic agreements. GENERAL SMITH said that this operation would be handled through careful techniques. He believed that economic and cultural assistance was contemplated by the language of the paragraph.

(3) With reference to par. C 1, page 8, GENERAL BARKER stated that JSPD now concurred in the paragraph as written.

(h) Par. C 2, page 8, was amended to read, "and ceremonies, etc., incident to any redeployment of forces which might occur following a cease-fire . . ."

Agenda Item 2. - Plan for Conducting Psychological Operations
During General Hostilities (PSS D-5)

Action: It was agreed that this paper should be submitted for
further consideration at the next meeting.

MR. GRAY introduced the paper, stating that the subject had been given long consideration within the government. He called attention to the urgent need for such a plan in order to allocate responsibilities for operational planning.

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GENERAL SMITH then referred to the just-published NSC 10/5 and to the responsibilities for covert operations now assigned to CIA. He said that the expenditures necessary to finance these responsibilities were approaching such magnitude that it would be difficult to obtain the funds from Congress without detailed justification, a course which might result in a reduction of security sufficient to militate against the effectiveness of CIA as an intelligence agency. He said that he wished more time to consider this paper in the light of the considerations mentioned.

It was agreed that "NSC 10/5" should be included: under "Reference", page 1; in II. DEFINITIONS, page 3; and in VI, 5, Page 4 (following "NSC 10/4"). It was also agreed to insert the word "originating" in the first line of VI, 6, page 5, after the words "psychological operations."

Par. 6, section VI, page 5, was discussed. GENERAL SMITH thought the clause "when such operations will directly affect . . . future military actions" was so broad as to have little practical meaning, and suggested "projected" in lieu of "future." He commented on the delays encountered in existing coordinating mechanisms, the wide inclusiveness of the phrase "psychological operations," and the need for immediate action by commanders in the field in time of war.

It was pointed out that if the word "projected" were substituted in this paragraph, a similar change should be made in the following paragraph.

Referring to the definition of "MILITARY THEATER OF OPERATIONS," page 2, GENERAL BALMER questioned whether this term was appropriate in view of multi-nation military operations and commented on the difficulties of planning for theaters where no American commander had been named. GENERAL SMITH, citing World War II experience, stated that all American troops in wartime must report to an American Theater Commander, although for administrative purposes the American and the Joint Theater might be identical. He thought that the necessity for, and relationship of, a U.S. Theater Commander in current planning for future warfare should be clarified by the JCS.

MR. BARRETT proposed, in view of the length of time the paper has been in draft and because of the serious need for a war contingency plan, that it be approved at the next meeting, subject to future Board amendment if necessary.

Agenda Item 3. - Psychological Strategy Board Liaison with the British.

Action: It was agreed that the type and scope of any liaison between the staff of PSB and British representatives in Washington should be left to the discretion of the Director.

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MR. GRAY stated that Mr. Adam Watson, of the British Embassy in Washington, had initiated the suggestion that liaison be established between the PSB and the British representatives in Washington. Remarking that his staff was divided on the subject, he asked for guidance from the Board.

MR. WEBB suggested that the decision be left to the Director, but requested that the State Department be kept informed of any contacts in the field of overt psychological operations; suggesting that CIA be similarly informed in the event of any discussions of covert matters.

Agenda Item 4. - Preliminary Report on Situation with Respect to Repatriation of Prisoners of War (PSB D-30)

Action: Presented for information only.

MR. GRAY stated that after the PSB, in accordance with a request of NSC, had undertaken to investigate the existing situation with reference to the repatriation of prisoners of war in Korea and a memorandum had been prepared by the PSB Staff through panel procedure, it was learned that the Departments of State and Defense and the JCS were undertaking to work out the problem on a mutually satisfactory basis. In view of this situation, which appeared to have been facilitated by the action thus taken by the PSB staff, the Director had sent a memorandum to the NSC, dated October 22, 1951, advising to the changed situation and advising that copies of the Staff memorandum referred to had been sent to the Departments of State and Defense and to the JCS, for information.

Agenda Item 5. - Policy Governing Statements by Senior Government Officials on Novel Weapons.

Action: The Director was asked to have prepared a staff study on this problem for consideration by the Board.

In the discussion, it was observed that while some clearance machinery already exists, certain areas will always remain beyond executive branch control. MR. BARRETT reported that the POC had unanimously agreed to ask the PSB to consider the problem in an affirmative way; feeling that now as in the last war good psychological opportunities were not fully exploited. Material available in this field could be used to deter the Soviet aims and to build Western European morale. Some high-level mechanism would be required to obtain the maximum results. MR. FOSTER felt that the PSB, on appropriate occasions, could provide a focal point for useful, informal clearances and provide affirmative direction for statements to be made. GENERAL MACGRUDER cited the need for guidance by operating people, with respect

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SECURITY INFORMATION

both to public information and security considerations. MR. GRAY explained that this item had been brought up because of his desire that the staff should become involved only in problems in which the Board wished to become interested. It was obviously desirable that the PSB should not become a speech-clearing mechanism.

Agenda Item 6. - Approval of 1952 (Revised) and 1953 PSB Budget.

Action: The Board approved the revised budget for fiscal year 1952, as presented by the Director, totaling \$453,100. Action on the proposed budget for fiscal year 1953 was deferred until a later meeting.

MR. GRAY commented on the budget figures for 1952 and 1953. He said that he would like approval of the revised 1952 budget estimate, increasing the total figure from \$408,000 to \$453,100; but explained that the 1943 budget estimate was a projection only and that approval of the 99 staff positions indicated for that year was not now requested.

GENERAL SMITH referred to increasing difficulties in obtaining budget authorization for new projects. These difficulties would be lessened to the extent that PSB could draw upon the member agencies for personnel, as CIA did in preparing NIE estimates. MR. WEBB said that the question was whether the member agencies could handle the various projects under PSB staff guidance or whether it would be necessary for the PSB staff to do much of the work because the agencies would be unable to handle it.

MR. GRAY pointed out that under the Presidential Directive, the Board has three functions: coordination, and evaluation, as well as planning, and that these follow-up responsibilities appeared to go beyond what was required of the NSC or the NIE system.

GENERAL SMITH explained that he did not mean that the proposed budget envisaged too large a number of personnel. He suggested that more than 100 people might be required in the future, but he wondered if they would be all needed at one time under one roof. He suggested the concept of a permanent cadre, to be augmented by draft from the departments as required. He conceived of the Board as providing policy guidance, assisted by a Director at the head of a steering group, with a small coordinating staff. The member agencies should be ready to provide people on call on a contributed basis. In other words, the contributing agencies would provide part in cash and part in kind (personnel).

MR. WEBB expressed his desire to support the Director in anything required to do the job, but wished to be satisfied that the Board had fully checked on the assets already available in the agencies.

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GENERAL SMITH said that if the key positions on the staff were filled by detail from the member agencies, it would not be necessary to include their compensation in the PSB Budget, which it was desirable to keep as low as possible.

MR. GRAY said that the existing procedure for administering and paying the staff of PSB had been worked out by the chiefs of administration of State, Defense, and CIA.

GENERAL SMITH estimated that half of the PSB staff might be permanent in order to provide continuity, with a further 25% on detail from the agencies, and the final 25% obtained by calling upon the agencies as required and by employing outside consultants.

MR. GRAY explained that his primary concern, apart from economical administration, was to make it possible to accomplish effectively the job set forth in the Presidential Directive.

MR. WEBB said his intent had not been to question the funds proposed.

Agenda Item 7. - Report on Psychological Operations Presentation at the American Legion Convention.

MR. CUTLER outlined briefly the presentation made to the Security Committee of the American Legion at the Annual Convention in Miami, 12 October 1951, by a group made up of himself (as Chairman), a Far East civilian expert, and representatives of the Department of State, of the Psychological Warfare Staff of the Department of the Army, and of Radio Free Europe.

Agenda Item 8. - The Question of the Role of the PSB in the Use of Special Funds Provided in the Mutual Security Act of 1951.

Action: In view of the importance to psychological strategic and operational planning, and to obtaining intelligence necessary thereto, of arranging for the care of escapees from the Iron Curtain countries and of developing a program or programs therefor, and methods of financing the same, with minimum confusion and waste-time, the Board approved the following actions, proposed by MR. WEBB:

- (1) That the Psychological Strategy Board call a joint meeting of all agencies concerned with the problem of defections, refugees, and potential guerrillas now resident in the Iron Curtain countries for the purpose of considering what, if any, concrete projects and programs

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might be undertaken by the United States Government with respect to such defectors, refugees and potential guerrillas if funds therefor were available.

(2) That the Psychological Strategy Board provide a steering member to a panel which is directed (a) to consider what, if any projects and programs of the foregoing character might further national strategic objectives; (b) to monitor the development of specific projects and programs that meet this requirement; (c) to coordinate any such project or program with national strategic objectives; and (d) to consider all possible sources for the financing thereof.

(3) In the event that the studies contemplated under (2) above should indicate that certain specific programs and projects having merit cannot be financed without recourse to section 101 (a) of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, that the Psychological Strategy Board or such of its constituent agencies as may be primarily involved submit such projects and programs for the consideration of the Director of Mutual Security.

Discussion: MR. CUTLER reported that several agencies had expressed to the PSB staff concern over the manner in which escapees from the Iron Curtain countries were being received and cared for in the areas into which they escaped, and had inquired whether PSB would take cognizance of the problem. It was true that the handling of such escapees had a very important bearing on such areas of psychological interest as future defection, the attitude of potential guerrillas now resident in Iron Curtain countries, and the reception in those countries of free world propaganda addressed to audiences therein. MR. CUTLER indicated that attention had been focussed on the problem by the recent enactment of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, under one section of which (the Kersten amendment) certain funds might be made available, within Presidential discretion, for the organization of defectors and for other purposes. He gave certain reasons why doubt existed as to the extent of the funds, if any, which might be made available under this new statute for the purposes indicated.

GENERAL SMITH emphasized the need for a solution of the non-defector refugee problem and its interrelation with the obtaining of satisfactory intelligence. GENERAL MAGRUDER stressed the importance to strategic and operational psychological planning of adequate programs for handling the stream of refugees from the Iron Curtain countries, and though the action taken now by the Board might avoid confusion and waste-time in bringing matters to a head.

NOTE: Further information relevant to this action is contained in PSB D-12.

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Briefing of the Board.

The State Department briefing for Board members was postponed because of the lateness of the hour. MR. WEBB expressed the hope that it could be arranged at a luncheon meeting in the following week.

Adjournment: 5:15 p.m.

(End)

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PSB M-5

M I N U T E S

Fifth Meeting of the
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
November 15, 1951, 2:30 p.m.
Room 3E924, Pentagon Building

MEMBERS:

General Walter B. Smith, Director of Central Intelligence, Chairman
Honorable William C. Foster, Deputy Secretary of Defense
Honorable Edward W. Barrett, Assistant Secretary of State
(Acting for Mr. Webb)
Mr. Gordon Gray, Director, Psychological Strategy Board

OTHER PARTICIPANTS:

Department of State

Mr. Vincent C. Wilber

Department of Defense

Brig. General John A. Magruder (Retired)

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Brig. General Jesmond D. Balmer, USA

Central Intelligence Agency

Mr. Frank G. Wisner

Colonel F. R. Zierath

Economic Cooperation Administration

Mr. Richard M. Bissell, Acting Administrator

(Present for the early portion of the meeting.)


Psychological Strategy Board Staff

Colonel Charles W. McCarthy, USA

Captain Richard N. Antrim, USN, (Left after Item #5)

Mr. J. Wallace Carroll

Mr. Albert P. Toner, Acting Secretary


Charles W. McCarthy
Colonel, USA
Executive Officer

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Agenda Item 2.- Progress Report on Panel B (Inventory of Cold War Weapons.
Review of Psychological Operations, etc.)

Mr. Carroll reviewed the objectives of Panel B as stated in the list of problems, August 13, 1951. The inventory of cold war weapons is in draft and is intended for early presentation to the Board. By November 21, the Panel's intelligence study on aspirations of the peoples of the Soviet orbit and possible tensions between them and Soviet policies will be submitted by the State Department for coordination as a National Intelligence Estimate. A study on free world aspirations and possible tensions is expected to be available by November 21. The group also has completed a catalog of sources of national policy, objectives, derived psychological policy and psychological programs, with respect to the Soviet Union. A similar analysis with respect to Soviet satellites has been partially completed.

Agenda Item 1 - Reduction of Communist Power and Influence in France and Italy (PSB D-16; D-16/1) (Two Sections)

Section II

"Report, Actions Taken, Underway or Immediately Practicable
... etc.":

Action: The Board approved the Report Section for transmittal to the agencies and Ambassadors concerned, with the following changes:

- a. accept the proposals by representatives of the Department of Defense in PSB D-16/1;
- b. in page 5, para. 4, line 1, and page 10, para. e, line 1, delete "select" and substitute "as far as possible influence selection of";
- c. in page 5, para. d, last line, and page 10, para. d, last line, change final period to a comma and add "Agriculture".

Section I

Statement of Policy

Action: This section was approved subject to post-meeting clearance by the Board of new language for paragraph d, page 1, to be drafted by the Department of State in accordance with the discussion. It was further agreed to amend paragraph b on page 2 as follows: delete the final period and add "and to the Director of the Psychological Strategy Board".

Discussion: Mr. Gray called attention to page 1, paragraph d, as the only instance of policy difference which had arisen in Panel C's preparation of this section.

Mr. Foster proposed "general direction and coordination of the Ambassadors ...". Mr. Bissell observed that this phrase was consistent with a long legislative history and covered activities which cut broadly across the interests of State, Defense, and ECA.

Mr. Barrett felt that in the special situation at hand centralized control is necessary, and that it is unlike some other occasions where the coordination problem has arisen, since it involves the internal affairs of other countries and impinges upon delicate diplomatic and political judgments. These factors, he thought, made it necessary for the Ambassador to have unquestioned authority. The Chairman expressed his personal belief that responsibility for activities would not be acceptable to an Ambassador unless he had the authority to coordinate.

The prevailing view favored language to give the Ambassadors the coordination and general direction of the contemplated activities with the provision that they shall have the right, as in other matters, to suspend action pending referral of the issue to Washington.

Mr. Barrett favored use of the single word "direction" but reserved his position until he could consult further in the State Department.

The Chairman raised the question as to the responsibility in Washington for the activities contemplated. It was generally agreed that this was a matter for the Psychological Strategy Board. The Chairman pointed out that the Board is not organized for quick action at the operating level and said that close, deck-to-desk relationships are required interdepartmentally. Mr. Gray added that the PSB Director and staff are responsible for the coordination of actions directed by the Board and for insuring that such actions are carried out.

Agenda Item 3 - Plan for Conducting Psychological Operations During General Hostilities (PSB D-8a)

Action: 1. Final action was deferred until an early meeting of the Board. After PSB approves the paper, the Director will return it to the NSC for approval.

2. Paragraph 11 was revised to read as follows: Strike the version at the bottom of page 5 and retain the version at the top of page 6,

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with these changes: in 11a delete "guidance" and add instructions. Retain 11b as it is and amend 11c as follows: "Conduct their operations in the field under the senior US military commander in military theaters of operations, and coordinate their operations in the field with chiefs of US diplomatic missions in areas other than theaters of operation".

Discussion: It was fully understood that all official personnel in a military theater in time of war are under the theater commander. Mr. Barrett explained that the second portions of paragraphs 11b and 11c are considered necessary by the State Department and represent normal government procedure.

Mr. Foster asked that final action be withheld until the receipt of JCS comments, which he said would be expedited. The Chairman pointed out that every effort had been made to take into account the interests of the JCS in the drafting of the paper.

Mr. Barrett suggested that the paper could be subject to future amendments, if required. He also reported that legal advisers in the Department of State believe that guidance is adequate for 11a, page 6, and that "instruction" is inappropriate. The Chairman said that the question goes back to the genesis of the Board itself. He said that the President wanted a level of membership which would mean ipso facto that actions of the participating agencies would follow upon Board agreements. The Chairman also believed that the work "instructions" should be specified in 11a to insure the proper relationship with non-member agencies, particularly any new agencies which might be established in time of war.

Mr. Barrett stated that he would like to point out for the record that there has been a little confusion as a result of the use of the word "guidance" in several places in this paper (e.g. paragraph 6 1 (a)). Within the government psychological operating fields the word guidance has a common usage as applied to the regular documents which are put out daily, weekly and on special occasions to guide operators on what they should and should not say in output. This, of course, is different from the use of the term "guidance" in the President's directive. Further, he would like the minutes to show what the Director said informally the other day: That the use of the word in this document is not intended to affect in any way the present procedures for issuing information policy guidances to the Voice of America and other operators in this field.

Agenda Item 4 - National Overt Propaganda Policy Guidance for General War
(PSB D-11/a)

Action: The Board approved this paper with the substitution of reconstruction for "stability" in page 11, paragraph 2.

Discussion: Mr. Gray introduced the paper and called attention to changes made since the previous draft. Mr. Barrett proposed reconstruction rather than "stability" in page 11, paragraph 2.

Agenda Item 5 - PSB Staff Draft of Paragraphs on "Psychological Strategy in the Ensuing Years" submitted to Senior NSC Staff for Consideration of Inclusion and Reappraisal in NSC 68 and 114 Series

Copies of this paper were distributed to the members and alternates for information at the time the draft was forwarded to the Senior Staff of NSC. No action was required.

Agenda Item 6 - Report on Foreign Reaction to the President's Proposal for an Arms Reduction Study

Mr. Barrett said that the effect of the speech within the United Nations has been generally good. Its propaganda impact on free countries was materially aided by the Vishinsky response, which drew criticism in about half of the speeches of representatives of the free countries. Outside of the UN, the President's speech has also been of benefit to the cause of peace.

Some experts see in the Vishinsky reaction and the recent Beria speech indications of uncertainty and lack of confidence in the Kremlin. Other signs in support of this hypothesis include the unusually slow reaction time of the Kremlin to outside propaganda initiatives.

Agenda Item 7 - Report on the Work in which the PSB Staff is now Engaged.

Mr. Gray presented a brief status report for the information of the Board. The staff study on publicity with respect to novel weapons was to be distributed to the Board following the meeting and he hoped that it might be considered at the next meeting. Preparation of plans for integrated operations for the reduction of Communist power in France and Italy is in progress.

Mr. Gray also raised the possibility of a long-range study by the Board of the subject of a major relaxation of East-West tensions. It was the consensus that this subject should be investigated further before it can be determined whether to undertake the study.

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Agenda Item 8 - Briefing of Functions and Organization of the PSB Staff

This item was postponed.

Postagenda Item:

Mr. Gray stated that after making a careful review of the requirements for staff for the balance of Fiscal Year 1952 and for Fiscal Year 1953, he proposed a staff of 73 for FY 1952 and 79 in FY 1953. He further stated that these figures represent reductions from the staff of 79 previously authorized by the Psychological Strategy Board for FY 1952 and from 99 previously proposed by the Director for FY 1953. The revised dollar estimate for FY 1952 is now \$407,687 and for FY 1953 is \$536,050. However, both of these figures are subject to analysis by the Bureau of the Budget and may require some amendment as a result of such analysis. Moreover, neither figure includes the supplemental pay costs resulting from Public Law 201.

Action: The Board approved the proposed level of staffing for FY 1952 and FY 1953 and approved the financial estimates for presentation by the Director to the Bureau of the Budget.

(End)

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PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
708 Jackson Place, N.W.
Washington 25, D.C.

Corrigendum
to PSB M-7

18 January 1952


NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE

to the

Holders of PSB I-7, Minutes, Seventh Meeting,
Psychological Strategy Board, 20 December 51.

CORRIGENDUM

Holders of the above document are requested to substitute the inclosed Page Three revised to reflect statements made by The Undersecretary of State at this meeting. The superseded page is to be destroyed by burning. This correction is being made at the personal request of Mr. Webb.


Charles W. McCarthy
Colonel, USA
Executive Officer

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Revised Page 3.

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Agenda Item 2. - Program for Soviet Orbit Escapees, Staff Study
Reviewed by a Psychological Strategy Group Panel
(PSG 204)

Action

A. The Board approved PSB D-18 as a basis for further action with the following amendments:

1. Add new paragraph "b, 2" to the Recommendations to read as follows, "To provide the necessary guidance for planning and effecting access to escapees in connection with covert U. S. programs".

2. Make all changes as are necessary in the amounts relating to sources of financing and objects of expenditure set forth in the Discussions and Recommendations to conform with the amounts set forth in the statement provided by the Department of State as follows:

"The subject budget covers the collection in camps and registration of the 18,000 persons, their interim care, and the resettlement abroad of 14,000 of them. The Department considers that \$7,200,000 is needed for this purpose, including \$4,300,000 from MSA funds. The draft PSB budget totals \$5,950,000 and includes only \$2,500,000 from MSA funds. In both budgets the sources of the needed funds other than MSA are (a) ECA and GARIOA counterpart funds, (b) the Brussels migration agency, and (c) voluntary welfare agencies.

The Department's budget breaks down as follows:

Resettlement	-	\$3,500,000 (14,000 persons at \$250 each)
Care	-	\$2,700,000
Administration	-	\$1,000,000

The PSB budget breaks down as follows:

Resettlement	-	\$2,800,000 (14,000 persons at \$200 each)
Care	-	\$2,400,000
Administration	-	\$ 750,000

The lower MSA dollar figure in the PSB budget than in the Department's budget results chiefly from the lower per capita estimate for resettlement plus an estimate for available counterpart funds,

\$750,000 higher than the Department's estimate. On the basis of past experience the Department is very skeptical as to the availability of counterpart, and the Department's estimate of \$1,450,000 in this respect is considered high.

The Department's budget is considered a minimum one. The figure for MSA funds is also a minimum, unless an absolutely firm commitment is forthcoming from MSA as to the availability of counterpart funds. In such event it could be agreed to reduce the request for MSA funds to \$3,500,000 provided that the Department's figure of \$1,450,000 counterpart funds were raised to \$2,250,000. The administrative budget is high in view of the great amount of necessary individual case work".

B. The Board requested the Department of Defense, in coordination with other responsible agencies, to complete and submit to the Board as a matter of urgency a study of the possible military potential in the utilization of escapees for military purposes other than those set forth in the Lodge Bill.

Discussion: Mr. Gray stated that the subject program was being developed, first, to meet the present extremely critical situation and, second, to meet the need for positive means of maximizing the psychological benefits in the escapee situation.

Mr. Sherman presented the staff study. In presenting the study he emphasized the urgency of the recommended action and stressed the fact that the carrying out of this program is a prerequisite to the success of present as well as any new future policies and programs for the utilization of escapees.

Mr. Webb stated that the State Department was prepared to accept responsibility for implementing the U. S. objectives in this program and, in so doing, for assuring that a suitable organization is established to administer the program. He further stated that the State Department required greater assurances with respect to financing than those now proposed and suggested that the Psychological Strategy Board itself should request the Director of Mutual Security for an allocation of \$4,300,000. He also reserved discretion with respect to revising the plans for expenditures and means of financing. He observed that the State Department may arrange with a special organization to assist in administering the program.

Mr. Ohly pointed out that any funds made available by the Director of Mutual Security would be from Title I - Military End Item Funds - as authorized by the terms of the Kersten amendment. He raised the question of the Congressional intent with respect to the use of these funds for an escapee program, indicating that the program might be interpreted as a welfare program. He

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General Smith said that the Board had not thought through the second phase of the program and was not able at this time to state such further requirements.

It was generally agreed that it was highly important that a thorough study be made of the potential military usefulness of the program, both for the purpose of supporting allocation of funds by the Director of Mutual Security and the defense of such allocation in the Congress and also for the purpose of developing the second phase of the program.

General Smith asked that the staff study be amended to change the language of paragraph 23-b-1 as noted in the action above.

Agenda Item 1. - Staff Study on Publicity with Respect to Certain Weapons (PSB D-18/C)

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to proceed with the drafting of its terms of reference for the approval of the Psychological Strategy Board. The Committee should then address itself as a matter of urgency to the preparation of a national information policy.

Discussion: Mr. Gray presented the staff study indicating that the title now referred to "certain" weapons pursuant to a suggestion by the Department of Defense. The kinds of weapons covered are defined in the text of the study. Mr. Gray pointed to the difficulties involved in dealing with this subject due to the presence of both domestic and foreign information aspects and the fact that the Psychological Strategy Board is not in any way concerned with the domestic aspect. Further there are interdepartmental difficulties due to divided statutory responsibilities with respect to the release and treatment of classified information. There are other problems arising from the responsibility of the State Department under NSC-59/1.

Mr. Webb suggested that the proposed committee be established with instructions to proceed immediately with the drafting of its terms of reference for the review and approval of the Board. He noted that the Board at this time could not deal with all the complications involved. He further proposed that the committee could be next instructed to prepare a national information policy guidance under which the Department of Defense and the State Department could issue their respective types of guidance bearing on those matters for which they have statutory or executive responsibility.

Mr. Foster thought that through the use of the committee the responsibilities now divided between the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission could be coordinated.

It was agreed that the committee would be organized as proposed in the staff study and that it would be requested to draft its terms of reference for the approval of the Board and further that it would prepare a national information policy as a matter of urgency.

General Smith designated Colonel Chester Hanson as the CIA representative. Mr. Foster designated Mr. Clayton Fritchey as the Department of Defense representative. Mr. Webb stated that he would designate the Department of State representative at a later time.

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Agenda Item 3. - Plan for Conducting Psychological Operations during General Hostilities (D-8/a)

The Chairman inquired as to the status of the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, receipt of which are needed before the Board takes final action on the plan.

General Balmer reported that the matter is still under consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and that he has been attempting to expedite completion of the comments. The Chairman requested General Balmer to inform the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Board hopes to receive their comments some time during the month of January. Mr. Foster said that he would expedite action and attempt to secure the final comments early in January.

Agenda Item 4. - New Projects Approved by the PSB for Staff Action.

Mr. Gray reported that this agenda item is for the information of the members of the Board. These three plans have already been approved as projects for work by the PSB staff. He reported that with respect to agenda item 4-B the Department of State has suggested that the study take the form of an evaluation of the psychological results obtained from the President's original proposal to the United Nations General Assembly with respect to the reduction and limitation of armaments and with respect to the manner in which it has been exploited up to this time. This evaluation would precede any further planning of further exploitation of the proposal. Mr. Gray further reported that agenda 4-C is not considered to be a matter of high priority and it will be so treated. Mr. Gray also stated that another project was considered by the Board members which does not appear on the agenda, i. e., the East-West Trade Problem in connection with the forthcoming Moscow Economic Conference which is set for next April. This matter is also under study as authorized by the Board's members.

Agenda Item 6. - Suggestion for a new project by General Walter B. Smith.

Action: The Board approved this proposal as a new project under the leadership of the Department of State with the assistance of the PSB staff. General Smith's proposal is as follows:

"I suggest that the Board consider on a priority basis a Psychological Warfare Plan for Germany, which will define

strategy in regard to two major interlocking problems:

- (1) The integration of Germany into the Western European orbit,
- (2) The relationship of German Unity to European Union."

Discussion: The Chairman suggested that the problem of planning with respect to Germany is similar to that with respect to Japan, and suggested that planning for Germany might be handled along the same lines as that already under way for Japan. Mr. Webb agreed that a panel study of the German situation would be useful and that it is central to the whole problem of Europe. He suggested that the State Department's Bureau of German Affairs should participate in the planning. The Chairman agreed to this and suggested that a representative of the Bureau of German Affairs should head up the panel and he felt that Mr. Webb could take the leadership in developing the other personnel in the panel.

There was discussion of Colonel Henry Byroade as possible chairman and general agreement that he should be the chairman of a panel to be organized under his leadership in cooperation with the staff of PSB.

Agenda Item 7. - Status Report on Panel B (Inventory of Resources Presently Available for Psychological Operations Planning.

Mr. Gray reported that there is substantial agreement within the panel with respect to a checklist of resources available to planners and that it will be submitted to the members of the Board before the next meeting. It will, however, not be submitted for the Board's approval but be made available for the use of planners in the respective Departments and agencies.

Agenda Item 5. - Briefing by Department of State Staff on Psychological Operations Plan to Assure the Continuing Orientation of Japan Toward the West.

Mr. John M. Allison in charge of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs presented a briefing covering the salient facts with respect to Japan. He stated that Japan, although sovereign after

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the occupation ends, will still not have the ability to defend herself and the defense of Japan for an indefinite period will be an American responsibility. This will create difficult psychological problems. We will have to use great tact and patience in guiding them. The Japanese are afraid of rearmament, both because of economic reasons and due to their fear of a resurgent military caste. Neutralism is also to be combatted because the Japanese feel the Russian menace. Another very serious problem is due to Japan's felt need for trading with China. There must be a reorientation of trade to reduce the pull toward the Continent. In addition the unsolved problem of China complicates our problem in Japan.

Mr. W. Bradley Connors presented a paper setting forth in more detail a psychological plan for Japan. This paper has been distributed to PSB members.

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MR. BARRETT

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MINUTES

Ninth Meeting of the
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
January 31, 1952 2:45 p.m.
Director's Conference Room
Administration Building
Central Intelligence Agency

MEMBERS:

General Walter B. Smith, Director of Central Intelligence,
Chairman
Honorable William C. Foster, Deputy Secretary of Defense
Honorable James E. Webb, Under Secretary of State
Honorable W. Averill Harriman, Director for Mutual Security,
Executive Office of the President
Dr. Raymond B. Allen, Director, Psychological Strategy Board

OTHER PARTICIPANTS:

Department of State

Mr. Edward W. Barrett, Ass't Secretary of State for Public
Affairs

Department of Defense

Brig. Gen. John Magruder, USA (Ret'd)

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Brig. Gen. Jesmond D. Balmer, USA

Central Intelligence Agency

Colonel F. R. Zierath

Office of Director for Mutual Security, Executive Office of
The President

Mr. Samuel Berger, Ass't to Mr. Harriman (Agenda Item 2 only)

Psychological Strategy Board

Mr. C. Tracy Barnes, Deputy Director

Mr. Edmond Taylor

Col. Charles W. McCarthy, Executive Officer

Major Edmund J. Bennett, Secretary

U. S. Senate

Senator Brien McMahon (for Agenda Items 1 through 3)

Charles W. McCarthy
Colonel, U.S.A.
Executive Officer

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Approval of Minutes of Seventh Meeting

Minutes of the seventh meeting were approved. Amendments to the minutes of the eighth meeting were suggested by Mr. Foster and Mr. Webb. General Smith asked that these be inserted and underlined and then circulated for approval.

Agenda Item No. 2. - Psychological Operations Plan for the Reduction of Communist Power in France (PSE D-14/b)Action:

Approved as amended. Amendments proposed by Mr. Harriman and General Smith were accepted. Mr. Webb offered some observations on Group B actions for inclusion in the minutes; these will be considered at the next meeting.

Discussion:

Mr. Harriman proposed the following amendments to Section III, all of which were unanimously approved by the Board:

- a. Par. 1, lines 1 - 3. Strike out "westward" and "in Europe".
- b. Par. 1, lines 3 to 7. To be rewritten as follows:
"It has strategic significance as the instrument through which the Soviet Union is harassing French economic recovery, weakening the French and NATO defense effort, and encouraging neutralism, all with the object of making France an undependable ally of the West in times of peace or war. The French communist party thus constitutes a serious threat to American foreign policy and to NATO plans for the defense of Western Europe."
- c. Par. 10, second sentence, eliminate "and appropriate guidance and support by the French Government" and insert a new sentence between the first and second to read, "The most important actions that could be taken to reduce communist power in France are for the Government to give positive support to the democratic unions in their struggle against communist domination of organized labor, to stop subsidizing the communist unions and stop dealing with them, and to work towards a more equitable share of the national income for labor."

General Smith then proposed the following amendments, which were also unanimously approved by the Board:

- a. Section VI. Administrative Matters, par. I.A., 4th line. Delete "including" and insert in lieu "where appropriate chaired by a member of the Psychological Strategy Board staff cleared for covert activities and which will include"

- b. Add a par. C to par. I, Section VI:
"The reports of the various members shall be made available to the others except on matters affecting the security"

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of CIA operations. The CIA member may make his report available only to the Chairman and, in the field, to the Ambassador."

General Smith stated that his staff had recommended the phrase "CIA to support" be added in:

Items a through g, i and j on pages 12 - 14; par. 1b, page 15 and at the end of the last paragraph, page 22.

General Smith, however, did not propose these additions. He felt CIA was required to give enough support on other items. Where it is not otherwise specified, he said, CIA will support to the extent of its capabilities.

Mr. Webb indicated his willingness to accept the Plan but requested that the following observations be incorporated in the minutes:

"The Department of State agrees with the purposes and objectives in PSB D-14/b. Because of the novelty of many of the proposed courses of action in the new fields under which we would be taking U.S. Government operations, we accept this report as guidance to planners and as permissive rather than mandatory. The judgments of the Ambassador and of the policy officers here will have to be resorted to for decisions to initiate, carry out or suspend the actions concerned, and to time them.

"The courses of action in particular which are specified in Group B of Section V of the report are of a nature so novel in the operations of one sovereign government within the jurisdiction of another sovereign government that a few words of comment to emphasize and fortify the preface of Group B are necessary.

"The actions in Group B reveal a recognition on our part of basic structural distortions and inequalities in French society. The reforms proposed are designed to bring about a stability within France which will strengthen it against communism and enhance our security.

"However, there is a great gap between stating praise-worthy objectives dealing with reform in the field of labor management relations, in the distribution of income, in business and social practices, etc. in France, and realizing such objectives. Without a proper appreciation of the width of this gap we expose ourselves to frustrating experiences, if results do not measure up to intentions. To put through such reforms requires political power. Political power has been lacking in French Governments. The margins of power to enable the French Government to push through such wide and basic reforms, on the assumption that the French Government desires them, have not been available. The question arises whether the programs proposed in the report does not presuppose a political vitality which if it existed would of itself constitute an answer to problems of French society.

Moreover, the adoption by the French Government of a good many of the programs outlined presuppose a high degree of governmental control of economic activity. This would necessarily call for a significant shift to the left of the basis of political power in France

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while we are striving for free enterprise and freer competition. We would therefore constantly have to bear in mind whether such a shift in French political direction would be entirely an unmixed blessing from the standpoint of the objectives we are seeking.

"It therefore becomes obvious that each of the courses of action suggested must be weighed in relation to political factors requiring the most acute exercise of political judgment and timing. We cannot enter into them uncritically and unreservedly without taking into account both the negative and the positive implications bearing upon our political interests. Ultimately the question becomes not one of effecting reforms in the French system but of developing and maintaining in power elements of sufficient strength and desirable orientation to accomplish the reforms and at the same time to continue French collaboration with us toward our common security objectives. There is no easy formula or quick attainment of a political undertaking of this magnitude.

"If the foregoing considerations are kept constantly in mind by both the planners and the officials who will be responsible for implementation, the courses of action flowing from this paper should lead us in the right direction and should enhance our security."

The other Board members asked that they be given an opportunity to study these observations and then discuss them at the next meeting before formal incorporation in the minutes.

Agenda Item No. 1. - Plan for Conducting Psychological Operations During General Hostilities (PSB D-8a)

Action:

To be considered at the next meeting at which time the views of the Department of Defense will be presented.

Discussion:

Mr. Foster advised that Defense's views were being cleared. These views had been discussed informally by the alternates, but certain points are still unsettled. General Smith indicated his concern over the Joint Chiefs' proposal to use "theatre of war" instead of "theatre of operations". He observed that the "theatre of war" definition would probably mean "global" which, in relation to the paper at hand, would give the Joint Chiefs of Staff responsibility for virtually the entire job. Such a definition would not be acceptable, General Smith declared, since, in his opinion, the military responsibility should, generally speaking, be limited to areas where fighting is occurring or about to occur.

Agenda Item No. 3. - Terms of Reference for PSB Weapons Information Guidance Committee (PSB D-17d/1; previously unnumbered, but dated 17 January 1952)

Action:

Approved as amended.

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Discussion:

General Magruder proposed and the Board accepted the following changes:

- a. Omit "for the National Security Council", page 1, par. 1a under "Problem".
- b. In second sentence of par. 3 "Procedure", change the phrase "the NSC may issue" to "may be issued".
- c. In par. 4, insert after the word "chairman", "Department of Defense", in parentheses.

General Smith proposed, and the Board concurred in a suggestion that the phrase "in the United States" at the end of par. 2c be inserted after "understanding" in the same sentence.

Agenda Item No. 4. - Program for Soviet Orbit Escapees - Phase "B"
(PSB D-1E/a) (National Psychological Strategy
Plan Prescribing Specific Courses of Action with
respect to Defectors, Escapees, Refugees, and
Potential Guerrillas from and in the Soviet Orbit)

Action:

Approved. The Board stipulated that the Panel should initially narrow the scope of the actual study to immediately probable U. S. capabilities.

Discussion:

Dr. Allen reported the PSB staff view that the terms of reference for Phase "B" were essentially an extension of the terms of reference for Phase "A" and were not an elaboration.

Mr. Webb observed that the proposed terms of reference were somewhat broad and should be more restrictive. He cautioned against a study that would develop plans for mass defections. Mr. Foster and General Smith replied that they did not construe the terms of reference as in any way inferring a plan for mass defections.

General Smith reported his staff's view that the terms were rather general and therefore the panel should establish definite limits within the context of the problem from which a feasible and phased plan can be evolved. The panel, General Smith suggested, should carefully formulate, as a first order of business, its concepts and outline the immediate practical limits around which a study can be built.

Dr. Allen suggested that rather than attempt to rewrite the terms of reference, the panel be requested to review them and develop necessary modifications to keep the study within manageable and realistic limits. Mr. Harriman urged early action to implement the Defector-Escape Program, since he had to account to Congress shortly on the \$100,000,000 of MSA funds from which support will be drawn for this Program.

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Agenda Item No. 5. - Terms of Reference for Sub-Panel B-1 (Inventory - Second Stage)

Action:

Approved. The Board directed that a PSB panel: (a) undertake the strategic aspects of this job; and (b) delineate the specific tactical tasks and indicate their allocation to operating agencies.

Discussion:

Mr. Webb approved the paper and suggested that the PSB panel make use of the studies and information on this subject and on economic warfare which are available in State and other agencies. General Smith suggested that since the study to be undertaken involved operations and tactics, consideration should be given to transferring it to the PCCC. Dr. Allen also favored considering such a move.

General Magruder and Mr. Barrett, members of PCCC, reported that PCCC is concerned primarily with propaganda. [There is a good deal of international covert work and strategy involved in the subject study which PCCC is not equipped to handle, they said.]

[Mr. Webb said since covert work was involved in the study a PSB panel should be used for it.] Mr. Barrett suggested the job of developing detailed tactics could be given to PCCC and CIA.

General Smith commented that since the problem states "to recommend concrete steps which the United States (and its Allies) can take in the future to frustrate Soviet blackmail tactics," it is out of the realm of strategy. General Magruder and Dr. Allen suggested the phrase "concrete steps" be omitted and the Board agreed. Dr. Allen offered to have the FSB staff aid in developing the specific tasks under this problem. The Board accepted this offer.

Agenda Item No. 6. - Guidance for the Director in Dealing with Congressional Committees

Action:

Mr. Webb was designated to give guidance to the Director on Congressional relations.

Discussion:

General Smith reported that this item had been discussed at the luncheon preceding the meeting.

Mr. Webb offered to develop some guide lines for the Director to follow in dealing with Congressional committees. Dr. Allen said he would like very much to have such guidance.

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Agenda Item No. 7. - Effectiveness of the US-UK-French Disarmament
Proposal in the United Nations (PSB D-20 (DRAFT))

Action:

Accepted the paper for its information.

Discussion:

The Board members complimented the PSB staff on the fine job they had done on this paper and expressed the hope that similar evaluation papers would be forthcoming from the PSB staff in the future.

Mr. Webb reported that Mr. Phillips had some comments on the paper which he would pass on to the PSB staff.

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M I N U T E S

Tenth Meeting of the
 PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
 February 21, 1952 2:30 p.m.
 Director's Conference Room
 Administration Building
 Central Intelligence Agency

MEMBERS:

General Walter B. Smith, Director of Central Intelligence,
 Chairman
 Honorable William C. Foster, Deputy Secretary of Defense
 Honorable James E. Webb, Under Secretary of State
 Dr. Raymond B. Allen, Director, Psychological Strategy Board

OTHER PARTICIPANTS:

Department of State

Mr. Joseph B. Phillips

Department of Defense

Brig. Gen. John Magruder, USA (Ret'd)

Mr. Clayton Fritchey, Director, Office of Public Information

Central Intelligence Agency

Mr. George Brewer

Joint Chiefs of Staff -

Brig. Gen. Jesmond D. Balmer

Mutual Security Agency

Mr. Samuel D. Berger - Items 1 through 4 (as considered) only

Mr. Theodore Tannenwald, Jr. - Items 1 through 4 (as considered)
 only

Federal Civil Defense Administration

Mr. James J. Wadsworth, Deputy Administrator - Item 1

(as considered) only

Mr. John A. DeChant - Item 1 (as considered) only

Atomic Energy Commission

Dr. Henry D. Smyth - Item 1 (as considered) only

Mr. Shelly Thompson - Item 1 (as considered) only

Psychological Strategy Board

Mr. C. Tracy Barnes, Deputy Director

Mr. Mallory Browne

Mr. Richard Hirsch

Mr. John Sherman

Mr. Edmond L. Taylor

Col. Charles W. McCarthy, USA, Executive Officer

Charles W. McCarthy
 Charles W. McCarthy

Colonel, U.S.A.
 Executive Officer

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Approval of Minutes:

Minutes of all previous meetings have been approved.

Agenda Item No. 3. - Memorandum on Public Statements with Respect to
Certain American Weapons (PSB D-17d/2)

Action:

Approved as amended.

Discussion:

Mr. Foster indicated desirability of the note, inviting attention to the President's Directive of 5 December 1950, "Public Discussion of Foreign and Military Policy", being included.

Mr. Fritchey (Chairman of the panel appointed to draft the paper) pointed out the difficulties faced by his group in avoiding preparing a paper which might be too restrictive. Members of the Board were unanimous in agreeing that at best the task assigned the panel was a most difficult one and that extensive delineation of "do's" and "don'ts" would destroy practicability of the paper as a guidance for government representatives speaking at the highest levels. It was agreed that further study on the part of the panel was not indicated since the guidance already afforded by the President's Directive of 5 December 1950, as well as the requirement that statements dealing with atomic weapons development be cleared with the Atomic Energy Commission, provided additional safeguards.

Agenda Item No. 4. - Psychological Operations Plan for the Reduction of
Communist Power in France (PSB D-14/b)

Action:

The Board approved a Resolution to record its views with respect to certain aspects of the above titled Plan. This Resolution was made an integral part of the Plan. The basic paper was approved at the Ninth Meeting.

Discussion:

The Board considered a draft resolution embodying the observations introduced by Mr. Webb which were incorporated in the Minutes of the Ninth Meeting. The draft resolution was amended by the Board to embody certain suggestions for improvement offered by Mr. Tannenwald.

Mr. Tannenwald stated that Mr. Harriman wished to strengthen the language of the resolution in order to remove any doubt that the United States must make it clear to the French Government that the continued strength of the Communist movement in France is a source of continued concern to the United States and, further, that Mr. Harriman feels that we must ascertain French intentions with respect to the Communist movement.

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General Smith cautioned against including language which might be construed as a directive to any particular department. All were agreed that Mr. Harriman's first suggestion should be adopted as made but that the second suggestion should be modified to indicate that it is extremely desirable that French intentions be ascertained rather than having language which appears mandatory with respect to ascertaining French intentions.

The Resolution as passed is as follows:

"RESOLVED: The Board's approval of PSB D-14c is with the understanding that the specific actions set forth in that paper are permissive rather than mandatory, and are to be carried out at the discretion of the Ambassador and the Department of State. However, the fact that these actions are permissive in no way detracts from the Board's position: first, that the continued strength of the Communist movement in France is a source of continued concern to the United States, which must be made clear to the French Government at every appropriate opportunity; second, that the United States will make a determined effort to reduce this strength through the courses of action set forth in PSB D-14c; and third, that it is extremely desirable that French intentions in this connection be ascertained."

Agenda Item No. 2. - Psychological Operations Plan for the Reduction of Communist Power in Italy (PSB D-15/a) *King*

Action:

The Board approved the paper subject to the incorporation therein as a note of the observations introduced at the meeting by Mr. Webb and certain editorial changes to be made by the Director. (These observations were in general similar to those introduced at the Ninth Meeting in connection with Psychological Operations Plan for the Reduction of Communist Power in France (PSB D-14/b)). The Director circulated certain minor changes to the paper. These changes to be embodied in the paper by the Director following the receipt of changes of a similar nature suggested by Mr. Webb. ✓

Agenda Item No. 5(c). - Progress Report on Psychological Operations Plan for Soviet Orbit Escapees (Phase "A") (PSB D-18/a) *Warren*

Mr. Sherman reported that the State Department was prepared to initiate action under Phase "A" of this paper subject to the Director of the Mutual Security Agency providing the necessary funds. He understood that there might be some difficulty in securing congressional approval for the use of funds made available under the Kersten Amendment for this purpose. Mr. Tannenwald advised that in a conversation with Congressman Vorys, Mansfield and Ribicoff, all of the Foreign Affairs Committee, and Representative Kersten, a strong objection was encountered on the part of Congressman Vorys to the use of MSA funds for re-settlement of escapees. Speaking for Mr. Harriman, he felt it inadvisable for representatives of the Mutual Security Agency to seek authority for the use of

the necessary 4.3 million dollars from MSA funds for the defector program in the face of the imminent presentation in the House of the 1953 MSA budget. He felt that the whole matter should be deferred pending further study of the situation in the Congress.

It was agreed that Mr. Harriman's office would undertake to prepare a presentation of the entire project to be used in the Congress. The staff and resources of the three member agencies, plus the staff of the Psychological Strategy Board, are at Mr. Harriman's disposal in developing the presentation. The presentation would be made as a part of the hearing on the MSA appropriation. Meanwhile, it was agreed that implementation of the 4.3-million-dollar program would be temporarily deferred.

Agenda Item No. 1. - Plan for Conducting Psychological Operations During General Hostilities (PSB D-8a)

Action:

The Board noted and concurred in certain changes and language, proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the above titled Plan, which had been approved by the Board at its Fifth Meeting on 15 November 1951. (The final approved Plan will be transmitted by the Director to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council.)

Discussion:

The Board noted with appreciation and praise the exemplary staff work that resulted in an agreed paper acceptable to all interested parties.

Agenda Item No. 5(a) and 5(b). - Progress Reports on Psychological Operations Plan Incident to Korean Cease-Fire Negotiations (PSB D-7/c) and Emergency Plan Break-Off of Korean Armistice Negotiations (J-19-d)

Mr. Sherman reported that the operational planning under these two strategic contingency plans is substantially complete. The only item remaining is the receipt of certain assurances from the Far Eastern Command with respect to logistic support, which assurances are expected. He also reported that an alert network has been established among the affected agencies so that the appropriate contingent plan can be put into effect without delay as developments make it necessary.

Post-Agenda Item. - The Strategic Significance of Involuntary FW Repatriation in Korea.

The Director stated that he had transmitted his views on the above suggestions to the Board members with the thought that the Board might wish to discuss the matter in light of the importance of the issue in the current stage of the Korean armistice negotiations. The Board did not discuss the paper but suggested that it be considered by the Departments of State and Defense who have the current action responsibility

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on policy with respect to the Korean armistice negotiations. The Director stated that his reason for bringing this matter again to the attention of the Board was his concern over the long-range strategic impact of the eventual U. S. decision on this subject and his hope that it would be possible that negotiations could be continued in such a way that this particular issue would not be the single issue on which the negotiations would succeed or be broken off.

The Board adjourned at 4:15 P. M.

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M I N U T E S

Eighth Meeting of the
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
January 10, 1952 2:00 p.m.
Room 3E928, Pentagon

F O R A P P R O V A L

MEMBERS:

General Walter B. Smith, Director of Central Intelligence,
Chairman
Honorable William C. Foster, Deputy Secretary of Defense
Honorable James E. Webb, Under Secretary of State
Dr. Raymond B. Allen, Director, Psychological Strategy Board
Mr. Gordon Gray, former Director, Psychological Strategy Board

OTHER PARTICIPANTS:

Department of State

Mr. Edward W. Barrett, Assistant Secretary of State for
Public Affairs

Department of Defense

Brig. Gen. John A. Magruder, USA (Ret'd)

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Brig. Gen. Jesmond D. Balmer, USA

Central Intelligence Agency

Frank Wisner, Deputy Director

Max Miller

George Brewer

Clifton F. Von Kann

Psychological Strategy Board

Tracy Barnes, Deputy Director

Col. Charles W. McCarthy, Executive Officer

Capt. Richard N. Antrim (for Agenda Items 1 and 2)

Major Edmund J. Bennett, Secretary

Charles W. McCarthy
for Charles W. McCarthy
Colonel, U.S.A.
Executive Officer

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Approval of Minutes of Sixth Fifth Meeting

Action:

At the request of the Chairman, the minutes of the ~~sixth~~ fifth meeting were approved without discussion.

Agenda Item 1. - Plan for Conducting Psychological Operations During General Hostilities (PSB D-8a)

Discussion:

Mr. Foster reported that the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the subject Plan had just come to him for review so that he had not as yet had an opportunity to analyze them thoroughly. These comments included some points which will require consideration of the Board. He advised that there would be a presentation of the points of difference at the next meeting of the Board.

General Balmer briefly discussed the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff which proposed certain changes to the Plan. Since such changes involved matters of substance the Board decided to defer action until a future meeting in order to permit each member to study the proposed changes and their effect on the Plan.

Agenda Item 2. - Plan to Assure the Continued Orientation of Japan toward the West.

Action:

The Board requested the Director to make recommendations to it at the next meeting concerning the assignment of responsibility for the development of the subject Plan.

Discussion:

Mr. Webb proposed that State Department staff should take the lead in drafting the basic Plan, which would contain annexes developed jointly with CIA and JCS. Mr. Webb stated his belief that the responsibility for preparing a Plan such as this should be assigned to the member agency having the major interest. Consequently, such agency rather than PSB should chair the panel or study group preparing the Plan.

Mr. Foster recognized that the primarily interested department must make a major contribution to the preparation of a Plan, as State will have to do in the subject Plan. He suggested, however, that PSB should retain the responsibility for preparation in order to discharge its duty under its directive of coordinating the efforts of all interested departments. Mr. Foster then mentioned the possibility of having the chairman chosen from the agency with the primary interest but having him discharge his duties as chairman as a representative of PSB. Dr. Allen indicated that this might be a proper solution.

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General Smith said that his staff had commented that the present State Department paper is more of a general treatise than a workable national psychological plan; it is, however, a good point of departure for the preparation of such a plan. The CIA staff recommended that the Plan be evolved by a PSB panel, but General Smith indicated no preference for either of the two approaches presented.

Progress Report:

PSB D-18 - Program for Soviet Orbit Escapees.

Dr. Allen inquired of Mr. Foster as to Defense's position on the questions reported in the PSB Minutes of the Seventh Meeting. Mr. Foster stated that Defense had no objection to the transfer of \$4.3 million from MSA funds provided this transfer of funds will contribute to the basic purpose of the Kersten Amendment. Mr. Foster expressed some doubt as to the existence of an overall plan which met the specifications of the Kersten Amendment, the view, however, that this action on the first phase of the plan was insufficiently responsive to the Kersten Amendment and indicated the importance of pointing the second phase of the plan more directly to the Act.

Mr. Foster indicated his intention of writing a letter to Mr. Ohly of MSA along the foregoing lines.

General Smith observed that the language of the Kersten Amendment was pretty elastic: "either to form such persons into elements of military forces supporting NATO or for other purposes". (Underlining supplied). It was his belief that the escapee program would easily fall within the intent of this language.

Mr. Webb advised that the Department of State had been in contact with Mr. Walter and others who has had been in close touch with Mr. Vorys Kersten. These gentlemen are agreed that the proposed escapee program was envisaged by the Congress in passing the Kersten Amendment. This view, said Mr. Webb, is also borne out in the position Mr. Vorys took at the recent UN meeting when the Russians raised the escapee matter. Mr. Webb believes there will be no problem in obtaining Congressional assent to using the MSA money.

Mr. Webb reported that the State Department had gone ahead with its responsibilities under PSB D-18. He advised that the Ford Foundation is prepared to provide \$500,000. The Department has located responsibility for carrying out this program, Mr. Webb said, in the Bureau of United Nations Affairs.

Mr. Barnes reported that MSA had indicated preliminarily that the transfer of the \$4.3 million was an appropriate expenditure of funds. He also advised that MSA, as soon as it learns from Defense, is prepared to talk with Senators and Representatives concerning the proposed transfer of MSA funds.

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Post Agenda Items:

1. Mr. Webb reported that Mr. Ralph Block had been designated to represent the State Department in the group concerned with development of policy on statements concerning certain novel weapons. (Subsequently, Mr. Joseph B. Phillips was designated by State to replace Mr. Block due to internal workloads in the State Department.)

2. Representatives of the JCS, Army, Navy and Air Force presented a briefing entitled: "The Organization and Operations within the Military Establishment in the Field of Psychological Operations."

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MINUTES

Eleventh Meeting of the
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
March 27, 1952 2:30 P. M.
Director's Conference Room
Administration Building
Central Intelligence Agency

MEMBERS:

Honorable William C. Foster, Deputy Secretary of Defense,
Presiding
Honorable Allen W. Dulles, Deputy Director, Central Intelligence
Agency, for the Director
Honorable Howland H. Sargeant, Assistant Secretary of State,
for the Under Secretary of State
Dr. Raymond B. Allen, Director, Psychological Strategy Board

OTHER PARTICIPANTS:

Department of State

Mr. Joseph B. Phillips

Department of Defense

Mr. Townsend W. Hoopes

Central Intelligence Agency

Mr. Frank Wisner, Assistant Director

Mr. George Brewer

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Brigadier General Jesmond D. Balmer

Psychological Strategy Board

Mr. C. Tracy Barnes, Deputy Director

Mr. Charles E. Johnson, Executive Officer

Major Edmund J. Bennett, Deputy Executive Officer

Captain Richard N. Antrim, USN

Mr. Arthur Macy Cox

Col. Paul Davis, USA

Mr. William Godel

Mr. John MacDonald

Mr. John Sherman

Mr. Edmond L. Taylor

Charles E. Johnson
Charles E. Johnson
Executive Officer

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The Minutes of the Tenth Meeting, February 21, 1952 were approved.

At the suggestion of Dr. Allen, the Board directed Dr. Allen to write letters of appreciation to Col. Charles W. McCarthy, retiring Executive Officer of the Board and to the Department of Defense concerning Col. McCarthy.

Agenda Item No. 1 - Staff Study on Psychological Strategy Planning for the Middle East; PSB D-22

Action:

A task panel shall be created whose first act shall be the drafting of its terms of reference for submission to the Board at its next meeting. The Board requested short-range actions also be considered in the planning.

Discussion:

Col. Paul Davis of the PSB staff presented a briefing on the background of the Middle Eastern problem.

Mr. Sargeant recommended that the task panel to be created should draw up its terms of reference and submit them to the Board for approval at the next Board meeting. Mr. Dulles, Mr. Foster and General Balmer, in approving Mr. Sargeant's recommendations, requested that appropriate attention be given, in addition to long-range plans, to the immediate, short-range problems in the area.

Mr. Sargeant reported that the Department of State had a paper, in advance draft form, dealing with the objectives, the tasks, the needs and operating procedures for overt propaganda in the Middle East. He offered to send this over to the PSB staff. Dr. Allen said he would be happy to have it.

Agenda Item No. 2 - Staff Study on Psychological Strategy Planning Tasks with Regard to South East Asia; PSB D-23

A task panel shall be created whose first act shall be the drafting of its terms of reference for submission to the Board at its next meeting. The Board considers this plan a matter of high priority.

Discussion:

Captain Richard Antrim, USN, presented a briefing on the factors confronting us in South East Asia. He emphasized the need for expeditious planning action in view of the rapidly deteriorating and potentially volatile situation there. The Board, at Mr. Sargeant's suggestion, approved the same approach for organizing the task panel and drafting and approving terms of reference as for

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the Middle East Plan above. The Board also concurred in the need for planning on an urgent basis.

Agenda Item No. 3 - Progress Reports on Current Work

1. Japan Plan

The PSB staff reported that the Japan Plan, on which work was authorized February 7, had not yet met. The Director, Mr. Dulles and Mr. Foster expressed a strong interest in seeing it get underway without further delay. Mr. Sargeant commented that it would be desirable to have the panel get underway while Ambassadors Robert Murphy and William Sebald were still here so that they could attend at least one meeting of the task panel. Mr. Taylor said he had been assured that the panel would meet immediately.

2. Soviet Orbit Escapee Program

Action:

The Board agreed to send a letter of comment to the Budget Bureau opposing the inclusion of Title II in the DPC draft bill "Special Migration Act of 1952". The majority of the Board and the Director agreed that the letter to the Budget Bureau recommend that the Kersten Amendment be changed to avoid any ambiguity as to its defensive military purposes. However, if in the judgment of the Congressional leaders, this change might lead to legislative difficulties, the Amendment should remain unchanged.

The Defense and CIA members and the Director agreed that the letter to the Bureau should state that, in any event, adequate legislation apart from the Kersten Amendment covering the non-military aspects of the program is desirable so that there is no question as to the intent of Congress that these programs are authorized. Language for this purpose was approved.

Mr. Sargeant wished to have the letter indicate the State Department's view that the Kersten Amendment should remain unchanged and that additional language is not required.

Discussion:

Mr. Arthur Cox reported the need for a Board position on the DPC draft bill "Special Migration Act of 1952" in response to a request for comment by Friday, March 28 from the Bureau of the Budget. Mr. Cox reviewed the possible alternative positions the Board could take as follows:

- (1) Provide legislative history through the Committee Reports, indicating that the clear intent of Congress is that funds derived from the authority of the Kersten Amendment be expended to finance the Phase A program and non-military aspects of the Phase B program during the next year.

- (2) Provide new language in a separate section of the Mutual Security Act to authorize Phase A and non-military aspects of Phase B programs.
- (3) Authorize the carrying out of these programs under Title II of the proposed Bureau of the Budget bill with funds to be appropriated therefor.

He stated that the PSB staff had recommended alternative (2) above to the Director.

The Board members agreed with Mr. Dulles' suggestion that the views of Congressional leaders should be ascertained as to whether the language of the Kersten Amendment should continue to be used next year. However, it was the consensus that, in view of the President's desire to send up a bill shortly, the Board would have to indicate its position to the Bureau of the Budget before talking with Congressional leaders.

Mr. Foster reported the Department of Defense had mixed feelings on the Kersten Amendment. He noted that whatever funds are used for the escapee program reduces the amount which can be used for military end items. Therefore, he suggested new language be recommended to (a) clarify the proposal to provide for a program which, in Defense's opinion, is not contemplated in their interpretation of the Kersten Amendment and (b) to provide funds for such a program. Mr. Foster said that Defense went along on the use of the \$4.3 million on the basis that it would lead later to a broader utilization of funds for the buildup of military units. He made clear, however, that Defense would oppose the use of funds from this source in the future for any non-military purposes.

Mr. Sargeant said that State would like to see Title II of the DPC draft bill omitted and would prefer to leave the Kersten Amendment unchanged.

Mr. Dulles reported that the House Committee members with whom he had talked were looking to the Executive Branch for suggestions for alternative language for the Kersten Amendment. He noted that all three members of the Psychological Strategy Board had been asked by the Bureau of the Budget to comment separately on the DPC bill and urged that each take consistent positions.

Mr. Foster and Mr. Sargeant both observed that any effort to revise the language of the Kersten Amendment directly might cause difficulties with the Congress. Mr. Sargeant, however, said the Department of State did not favor proposing any additional language in the MSA Act to clarify the Kersten Amendment. General Balmer stated his belief that the Kersten Amendment was not intended to be used for resettlement purposes and therefore some new language is necessary to provide for any new program envisaged. He also noted that funds used for the escapee program would reduce those available for military end items.

Mr. Godel remarked that any failure to continue Phase "A" of the program would probably result in failure of Phase "B" to get underway, too.

3. General Balmer reported that JCS had just approved two papers:

- (a) The Responsibility of the Services and the JCS with respect to Covert Operations and
- (b) The Responsibility of the Services and the JCS for Guerrilla Warfare

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M I N U T E S

Twelfth Meeting of the
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
May 8, 1952, 2:15 P. M.
Room 5104, New State Building
Department of State

MEMBERS:

General Walter B. Smith, Director of Central Intelligence,
Chairman
Mr. David K. E. Bruce, Under Secretary of State
Mr. William C. Foster, Deputy Secretary of Defense
Dr. Raymond B. Allen, Director, Psychological Strategy Board

OTHER PARTICIPANTS:

Department of Defense

Brig. Gen. John Magruder, USA (Ret'd)

Central Intelligence Agency

Mr. George Brewer

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Brig. Gen. Jesmond D. Balmer

Psychological Strategy Board

Mr. C. Tracy Barnes, Deputy Director

Mr. Palmer Putnam

Mr. Charles Norberg)

Mr. Charles E. Johnson)

Major Edmund J. Bennett)

For Agenda Item No. 2 only

(Signature)
Charles E. Johnson
Executive Officer

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Agenda Item No. 1 - Discussion of PSB's Responsibilities under NSC 10/5

A PSB staff paper presenting certain issues which had arisen in planning PSB's review responsibilities under NSC 10/5 was discussed. (Mr. Foster left at conclusion of this item.)

Agenda Item No. 2 - Progress Reports

- a. Psychological Strategy Plan for the Reduction of Communist Power in France (PSB D-14c)
- b. Psychological Strategy Plan for the Reduction of Communist Power in Italy (PSB D-15b)

Mr. Charles Norberg, PSB staff member who is chairman of the coordinating committee for the subject plans, gave an oral review of the first progress report of his committee. Mr. Norberg commended the Washington committee members -- Mr. Walmsley, Dept. of State; Mr. Hoopes, Dept. of Defense; Mr. Oakes, CIA, and Mr. Berger, MSA -- for their cooperation and energetic work on this project since last summer.

It was also suggested by Mr. Norberg that after full indoctrination, a person be sent to each of the Paris and Rome committees to work closely with them for a period of one month or so.

- c. Psychological Strategy Plan for Japan

Dr. Allen reported that work on the Japan, German, Middle East and Southeast Asia plans was continuing and satisfactory progress was being made.

Adjourned at 3:40 P. M.

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PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD

Item 3 of the Thirteenth Meeting

Held at 2:30 p. m., June 12, 1952, Room 5104, New State Bldg.

21st St. and Virginia Ave., N. W.

Washington 25, D. C.

#321

Reported by:

C. Hedges

Code 131, Ext. 55175

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PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD

Item 3 of the Thirteenth Meeting

Held at 2:30 p. m., June 12, 1952, Room 5104, New State Bldg.

21st St. and Virginia Ave., N. W.

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UNDER SECRETARY BRUCE: Item No. 3, "PSB Procedure for Evaluation of National Psychological Effort."

DR. ALLEN: This is the third of our major functions of the Board and probably one of the most difficult. We've been going through the staff exercise for sometime of trying to work up a proposal for consideration of the Board as to approaches to the problem of evaluating the national psychological effort from the standpoint of the effect of its impact, and you have a paper which is prepared. This was done after rather extensive consultations with evaluation experts and social scientists, both in and out of the Government. We regard it as a minimum program and an experimental one. We feel that we must make a beginning on this -- it's late at that -- a beginning on an approach of some sort. The staff would welcome suggestions from the Departments beyond what we have already received as to how to go about this. We are just very flexible on it.

Mr. Mallory Brown has given most attention to this

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because that is under his office and he'd be glad to respond to questions or comment further on it, as you like.

UNDER SECRETARY BRUCE: Well, may I say something on that point? I must say I am prejudiced and very much opposed to the task force technique which means that members of any government agency must absolutely believe it essential to go to our missions abroad and question, investigate, and whatnot, not only those in the missions, but the officials of the foreign countries concerned. I realize from my own experience, having been confined to Paris, where you may have it presented in acute form, it is an absolute curse. It's a task force representing some member of the Government asking to see foreign officials and then spending the rest of their time talking to American officials in the mission.

DEPUTY SECRETARY FOSTER: I have seen you subjected to it too.

UNDER SECRETARY BRUCE: Is the journey necessary?

DR. ALLEN: It strikes me, Mr. Chairman, if I may comment at that point, that we are then in a position of each Department represented here doing its own evaluating. That's what we are presently doing, so I take it then that the joint concern of these Departments seems to me as something more than the addition of the three Departments -- cannot go beyond that. It would seem to me that there must be other combined

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ways of going at this than simply departmental evaluation. My conception of this particular responsibility under our directive is that it is a joint responsibility of the three Departments.

Now, I have no brief for this particular type of spot-check, but I don't know what else to think of as a constructive possibility on coordinated evaluation of the impact and effect of our various operations overseas.

DEPUTY SECRETARY FOSTER: Mr. Chairman, may I comment on that? It seems to me that you can be useful in carrying out that evaluated function by setting up the questions or background which you want the agencies in the field to produce. In other words, I think that you can establish the ground rules and, if the reports or the evaluations which are coming in are not suitable to make the kind or to develop the kind of conclusions that you and your staff are charged with, that you can then through those agencies in the field get the kind of information which will allow you to make a proper evaluation. I think you can do a good deal on that because agencies in the field get in a rut -- they do it in a certain way, and it may well be that you want to shake them out of that rut. I think you can do that without putting one more load on the field agency.

Now, in saying that, David, all stations are not like France, Paris, and there may be occasions where none of

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us have people in the field who can come up with the kind of raw material that is necessary to develop what we want. I should think in those instances you could put it up to this group as to whether it wasn't desirable to send somebody from your staff out and I think in that situation you could get agreement that it probably was under the chief of mission's doctrine.

UNDER SECRETARY BRUCE: Well, what you mean, in effect, is that the Board would consider specific projects after investigating whether the information already exists.

DEPUTY SECRETARY FOSTER: Or the means to get --

UNDER SECRETARY BRUCE: -- at it through existing channels. Then you would consider it on that basis..

DEPUTY SECRETARY FOSTER: That would be my suggestion.

UNDER SECRETARY BRUCE: It's the general procedure which I don't like.

DR. ALLEN: Suppose we reword it a little then and discuss it with you informally?

Mr. Brown, have you any comment?

MR. BROWN: I might comment for a moment, sir. Having worked abroad for three and a half years, I am also sympathetic to the point that Mr. Bruce made about always getting requests for one kind of evaluation or another. One thing I always swore I would never do was evaluation work, and now I am doing it!

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I would like to make one or two points briefly. While I appreciate the point Mr. Bruce made, I think it is also true that from my own experience it is almost worse to be asked for a report by mail or by dispatch and not really know what the Department, this time, is trying to get at. We have sent 19 others just like this before. We'd like to have someone come around who at least knows what the Department, or these present, is trying to do and who can sit down at lunch or dinner and get the main ideas and get them clearly.

I also think that it's not easy in a number of cases to ask a departmental person to put on paper the answers to questions in such form that it is sometimes critical of the Department's own work or in some cases his own work. On the other hand, I found -- I may be mistaken in this; I don't believe so -- that if the people in the missions understand what the purpose of the inquiry is, they're generally helpful in trying to give the picture of what's going on.

I would like to emphasize too that I don't believe -- I think if we are to evaluate the national psychological effort and if we are to do it in terms, as I think we must do it, of effectiveness -- that is to say, the degree to which we are achieving or not achieving our national psychological objectives -- I think it must be done at least by trying to get as much as one can of the feeling and impressions of what the impact is and

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how close we are getting to those objectives, and I think that it is to say the least very difficult to conceive of attaining that goal by just a series of separate reports from each agency.

I'd like also to emphasize that it seems to me that one of our major functions and one of the main responsibilities assigned to us on the evaluation field of PSB is precisely to show, not just what each agency is doing -- it is not our primary course -- it is each agency has its own function for evaluating what it is doing, but to get at the over-all picture -- the question, for example, of whether, to be precise, what CIA is doing is counteracting quite unconsciously what State is doing, or whether MSA is contradicting what USIS is doing and what some of the private agencies are doing too. After all, the national psychological effort of the U. S. can't exclude certain things such as, for instance, the work of the Ford Foundation in India or the work of the friends in some countries.

In other words, I believe that we do face a problem in trying to get a picture of the over-all effectiveness of our effort which I must have some skepticism about as whether we can do it through the means which have been mentioned. I wouldn't be truthful if I didn't emphasize my conviction of that fact. I would certainly, as the Director said, welcome most greedily some more suggestions which seem to me are needed to meet those points or points of that type.

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UNDER SECRETARY BRUCE: Well, Mallory, wouldn't it meet what you have in mind if a case could be made for each specific project and presented to the Board for a discussion and deliberation on its individual merits? This is really a blanket procedure which is suggested here.

MR. BROWN: I just wonder whether it isn't postponing the issue, frankly. I wouldn't, of course, disagree with it. I just wonder if it just means raising the same question again -- that's all.

DR. ALLEN: We'd be glad to do that, of course, if that's the Board's request.

I think one of the problems that I've got more sympathy with the Departments' difficulty in this regard is that the evaluation departmentalwise has to be worked up in such a way as to be impressive on the Hill or else domestically, whereas our problem as a board now, not as individual Departments but as a board, is how we are doing with all these operations? Are they coordinated? Are they not partially self-defeating? and so forth. And it does seem to me that our experience with reduction of French Communist power through the coordinating committees -- that the Government of the United States is sitting right there with the Ambassador and is free to interchange back and forth. There is no time lag, and that this moves in the evaluation area much the same way -- people coming

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out of Washington, no junkets involved here, just a few specifically, carefully selected people for a specific mission. There will be some two-way-street communication that will take place and help in the programs and give us rather an immediate feel of the over-all impact and effectiveness in that particular country or region.

I agree with Mr. Brown that this is one of the more difficult problems and, as far as I'm concerned, I think in the long pull for PSB over the years that in evaluation we have our major opportunity, to do it well, of effecting the actual program and actual accomplishment of PSB in Government missions in cold war.

UNDER SECRETARY BRUCE: Well, in regard to the case that you have mentioned, the French anti-Communist drive which is now apparently proceeding, I can only tell you my personal opinion. I couldn't feel more strongly than that a task force arriving in Paris and beginning to contact the French Government to be helpful to it or to give any advice regarding what they're now doing would be absolutely disastrous.

DR. ALLEN: That's right. I quite agree with you. That's where the specific casing of the situation under evaluation would be very important, yes, sir.

UNDER SECRETARY BRUCE: General Smith, what are your views on this subject?

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mark to shoot at. Maybe everybody concerned takes violent exception to what they say, but we can hoist it up to the National Security Council or some policy-making body with a certain amount of authoritative opinion behind it.

Just to have the PSB staff or our various assistants contributing toward an evaluation I don't believe is going to get us anywhere, Doctor, and I grant you that that is the most important thing that we can do. But the departmental obstacles and the local obstacles will be such that you won't get anything except a paper which will be the subject of endless debate, compromise solution, which means nothing.

If we want something evaluated, all right; then let's go out and hire about three people that will come down and work for consultants' fees, for \$50 a day and expenses -- give them \$150 or \$200 a day for expenses and send them out and let them evaluate it, without going to the mission particularly, but if you want to know what our national psychological effort in France has been able to do to reduce the potency of the French Communist Party, they can get that without going to Ambassador Dunn or anybody else, by going to France and making some local inquiries. And I can think of two or three people that can go over there and give you a pretty good evaluation of that too. They might not be people that you'd want to associate with on the street, but I don't think that this one, having the PSB

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staff do it would ever get you beyond the realm of a departmental argument, to be quite honest.

Just see what happens when the poor devoted fellows come back with a little report after having been kicked in the face in Paris -- come back here and try to get agreement with each Department dissenting and finally a compromise is hoisted up here and referred to various Departments. Then nothing happens. I have seen too much and tried to do too much myself. When I want something evaluated, I go out and get a Brownell or a Jackson or a somebody of the caliber of the chap who's coming down from New York to join me very shortly, that big public relations outfit, and have them evaluate it and pay them for it.

I don't believe that you are going to get anything here but just agreement. And yes, I admit it's the most important thing we can do. It looks perfectly hopeless to me. My people looked it over and they proposed as a compromise that the Board authorize the Director to proceed on a test basis with the evaluation procedure outlined above. Since I have been unable myself really to get an accurate evaluation of my own work -- that is, the work of my own agency -- and I have sent good people out too. I've got a couple of men over there now who are in the \$75,000-a-year class. Maybe they'll bring back something, but I can see what happens if

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I were to send one of my staff officers or two of them or a group of staff officers over to try to evaluate.

That's the way I feel about it, Mr. Chairman. I'm sorry that I can't take a more optimistic view of the proposal, because we are spending an awful lot of money and I don't think this method is going to get anywhere. I have no objection to having it tried.

DR. ALLEN: I think you have made a very constructive suggestion, General. I think we'd like very much for the staff to come up with something on the possibility of the consultant type. I am very much impressed with an occasional report I get from friends who are able to contact certain groups overseas that lie in this field of general evaluation and impact and problems that are not currently being dealt with.

GENERAL SMITH: There is one possibility. Let's take a concrete example. They have just completed the Italian municipal elections. We have not an analysis of the result of that election. The most recent report we got from an Italian, the head of the Fiat Company who's over here, contradicts our first estimate. In his opinion, De Gasperi's stock has gone up considerably instead of gone down. He is much more optimistic about the elections which are coming up.

Now, on the decision that we make with regard to our effort and the effort of the De Gasperi government in the

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municipal elections, it will depend on how much money we will spend or whether we are going to spend something like five or ten or possibly even fifteen million dollars on the general elections which are about to come up. Now, fifteen million dollars is not an inconsiderable sum and it is worth spending some money to get an accurate evaluation of the effect of these last elections on the Christian Democrats and whether, indeed, De Gasperi is now about to do as he's been saying he's going to do for a long time, take the drastic moves which will put him in solid position.

There are two ways of doing it. One is to ask a commission what they think about it, how we will evaluate their evaluation. The other is to let these people take a fly at that one and see what they produce. If they do, it might be necessary for them to go to Italy. If they go to Italy, they'd have to be assured against providing irritation to the mission and the mission's staff and, conversely, of being obstructed by the mission or the mission's staff. I don't know to what extent you can provide that. It might be worth trying because we are going to spend a lot of money and have to make a decision pretty soon. We are making an estimate on it on an NIE basis, but it is for that reason that evaluation is important. I don't think you can depend entirely on the evaluation of the mission there.

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UNDER SECRETARY BRUCE: Yes.

GENERAL SMITH: My people said they'd do as well if you gave us 2½ million. We are not so bad. Somebody ought to have a look at it. I don't know who's to do it.

UNDER SECRETARY BRUCE: Wouldn't it be possible to consider that, for example, on a specific project basis? I wouldn't personally have the same feeling about the present Italian situation than I would about the immediate French situation.

GENERAL SMITH: The immediate French situation is something we ought to keep beautifully away from right now for awhile. As a matter of fact, we got a report this morning which indicates that the outcome is not going to be as happy as we thought it might be, as you know -- some of the evidence which was seized and didn't constitute real evidence.

The Italian thing is one which I offer as a test case if you want to take it on, but if you do, you'd better pick the best people you've got and they'd better have a careful understanding with the mission and with the military, not only the diplomatic, but military and naval and air personnel and everybody, and the contacts with the mission should be limited to the absolute minimum -- that is, the information should be produced by observation, by contact with Nationals. They're the people that can tell you whether De Gasperi's stock is going up or down. And in the last analysis, they've got as

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much chance of coming back with a completely accurate analysis of what's happening there as you have of sending somebody on a two weeks' tour telling us who's going to be elected as the next President of the United States.

DR. ALLEN: That's extremely helpful.

Bill, have you something to kick in?

DEPUTY SECRETARY FOSTER: That is consistent with my early recommendation. There will be instances where you want to do it.

I think the point I disagree with or weasel on is I do think before you send a team over there you ought to at least appraise what you can get through the normal channels. From that you find what the gaps are. Then you send your mission to pick up only the gaps. I admit what you get from this may not be worthwhile. I hope if our evaluators see gaps in it they will raise questions on it.

GENERAL SMITH: I didn't say you have to send people. I said might have to.

DEPUTY SECRETARY FOSTER: You've got to look at them practically -- in spite of Mr. Brown's reservations, I think you're going to have to do it on a piece-by-piece, trial-and-error basis. I think any broad-scale approach to this thing, as Bedell says, will be a waste of time and effort and they'll come out with a highly negative addition to our knowledge and

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to our effectiveness.

DR. ALLEN: Well, I would not like today for the Board to make final judgment on this. We welcome heartily what has been said.

DEPUTY SECRETARY FOSTER: I think you should evaluate these remarks and come back again.

DR. ALLEN: I thought I might pursue this with you informally.

GENERAL SMITH: If you want to undertake an evaluation of one phase of the national psychological effort, I think my people would be quite happy to cooperate with the State Department in making a quick appraisal -- and when I say "quick," I mean sometime next month -- of just what is the answer to these municipal elections in Italy. Have we backed a horse that can't run or, as the Director General of the Fiat Company said last week, a horse that is running better than we ever hoped it would? We don't know. I think there is a fruitful opportunity for well-placed bets with long odds.

DEPUTY SECRETARY FOSTER: We had the same difficulty on the previous Italian election, as I recall it, which was appraised up and down and backwards with all appraisers in the room coming out with a different appraisal.

GENERAL SMITH: I am giving you a tough one, but it isn't as tough as to attack general approval of the national

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psychological effort. There are two ways to go about it. One is to take a year and come up with a voluminous paper. The other is to take mine right now, which I will give you in one well chosen word!

UNDER SECRETARY BRUCE: Tracy, did you have something you wanted to say?

MR. BARNES: Yes. We are kind of on the horns of a dilemma here. If we do get two decisions, one is we've got a directive. The other is we have this letter from NSC which is the next agenda item, which you see calls upon us to come up with an evaluation of the effort in terms of objectives, policies, capabilities, and limitations. That is the effort as a whole.

Now, if we could agree today, perhaps, that we could go back to the NSC and say, having talked to the Board, it was the Board's feeling that that sort of broad-scale effort was simply too big a load to take and we felt the only sensible approach would be on a more specific basis. If we could go that far, that would help us a lot in going back and treating with them. The pressure is coming from the outside on us. We had no thought this was something that could be any more than a "guesstimate" at best, and we are simply trying to come up with some method, and No. 2 is, if we could get agreement today, which I think perhaps has been reached, that at least in

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some cases some form of task force approach, whether it be staff or whether it be the kind of task force General Smith referred to, then we will have something to work with there, in other words, keeping it open, but at least in certain instances we might suggest a task force rather than saying a task force is out altogether.

GENERAL SMITH: Very well, I move the following, that the Board record as its opinion that the evaluation of our over-all national psychological effort by the staff or by any group which the staff might assemble at this time is beyond its capabilities pending decisions which must be made with regard to projects which are now under way. That, (b) the staff be authorized to select a project or an area and to recommend its investigation as a test attempt for appropriate evaluation and that if it is something which we believe it can attack successfully, we authorize it to do it on a test basis.

DEPUTY SECRETARY FOSTER: Authorize them for another look.

GENERAL SMITH: They select an area or project for evaluation, propose it and recommend the method which they propose to use. If we agree, it is something which can be attacked successfully. We authorize them to do it.

UNDER SECRETARY BRUCE: Would you be willing to

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amend the latter part after using your initial language, that they recommend to the Board for its further consideration the advisability of proceeding with this specific project?

GENERAL SMITH: Yes.

DEPUTY SECRETARY FOSTER: It's all right with me.

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PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD

REPORT BY HON. CHESTER BOWLES

U. S. AMBASSADOR TO INDIA

MADE DURING THIRTEENTH MEETING

Held June 12, 1952, Room 5104, New State Bldg.

21st St. and Virginia Ave., N. W.

Washington 25, D. C.

UNDER SECRETARY BRUCE: We have Ambassador Bowles with us. We are very happy to have you, sir. If you would give us the benefit of some of your, shall I say, observations on questions of India, we'd be very happy.

AMBASSADOR BOWLES: Well, I might for a few minutes. Perhaps it would be more worth while if you brought up things you'd like me to talk about. I could talk about India for three hours and I might talk about the wrong part of it rather than the part you'd like to hear.

DEPUTY SECRETARY FOSTER: I'd like to ask a question, if I may. How good were these three journalists who just returned from Peiping and gave us this resume recently here, Chet, of the great virtues of the new Commie regime in China? This is a little off India, as such.

AMBASSADOR BOWLES: Well, I have only seen in the paper some reports.

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There was one that came in from two journalists.

One of them I saw was a very confidential, very extremely anti-Communist report that he made to Nehru before he left on previous trips. [That is Nehru's brother-in-law and Frank (?) ^{Yonnes?} the rest of the times in India whom I worried about a little bit.] He seemed very solid so, occasionally, a column would run in the paper that was very slanted. He'd make up for it by another one very pro-American a few days later. I haven't seen anything since September 1st. There was a report by Bob Campbell (?), last Sunday, which I thought was about what I expected. He said he thought China had made a good deal of material progress but deplored the manner in which it had been done. He thought the methods were vicious and definitely not suited to India and it was very clear to them what the Chinese operation seemed to be. That is all I have seen.

DEPUTY SECRETARY FOSTER: One of the things they have commented on was the fact that the Russian Advisory Commission was kept separate from the Chinese and then, obviously, were not dominated, the policies of the Chinese Communists, that they were advisers and were cooped up, segregated, kept away from them and I didn't know how good their powers of observation were.

AMBASSADOR BOWLES: That is in line with the report
[of Nehru's brother-in-law] that went there before. (X) ED

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DEPUTY SECRETARY FOSTER: He's just gone again, hasn't he?

AMBASSADOR BOWLES: Yes.

GENERAL SMITH: [We had a report in from him this morning.]

AMBASSADOR BOWLES: I haven't seen him. You know more about this than I do.

There were two reasons why they went. In the first place, they went because they didn't know how to get out of it. The Chinese sent down a delegation to go all over India. The second reason was they wanted to get a more balanced view before the Indian people picked a very carefully group that would give that and carry some weight.

We analyzed the group very carefully. I don't know any pro-Communist in it. I know one person who might be called a very faint fellow traveler. The rest of them are very specifically and definitely anti-Communists. There were several Socialists there who bitterly hate and detest Communism and have often stated so.

Mrs. Pandit was chosen as chairman.

Nehru talked to me very freely and openly about this. She felt she had some understanding what Russia was like, having been there. It was very pleasant. She always refers to you, General Smith, as one of her good friends. At that time, you

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knew her there when she was there.]

They, of course, had this view that, sooner or later, it may be possible to open up some ground between China and Russia. I think the last six months -- five months ago they thought the ground was open anyway. I don't think there are many illusions on that subject now. However, they feel that, basically, the Red Army is no influence in China, that can't be a threat to China, that it was, for instance, to satellites and to Yugoslavia, that that is not an influence there; the Chinese basically dislike foreigners and basically have many reasons to not be particularly pleased with the Russians. They say many of the jokes in China are Stalin's effort to demonstrate that he was really for them at the time he was really supporting the Nationalist government in 1945 and '46. There are lots of wisecracks about the deviationists that must have been at work.

Of course, it wasn't Stalin's fault. They feel and express it over and over again that the one big factor that can bring about a change some day, if that is possible ever in Soviet strategy and Soviet attitude -- not "attitude," but "strategy" -- is an independent China. I don't mean a pre-West China. They're not naive enough to think that is ever possible, but a China that is at least independent of Russia. They say, today, that perhaps Russia has a whole

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looking from quotes from Lenin during this period, quotations from what Lenin said when this change took place.

It is important too, in understanding India, the fervency which they hold they would agree with her is quite a faint hope. They don't think it is an active hope now. They say history takes a long time and if anybody could have possibly foreseen some of the wild happenings of the last ten years, they'd only say, "We will add this to the list. This could happen." As I say, Nehru would come back and say, "Tell me any event that would bring about a basic change in Russian strategy. I don't know what it is. If somebody knows, tell me."

On Korea -- they are clear on Korea. Both Mrs. Roosevelt and I covered this backwards, forwards, up and down with Nehru. He agrees fully on the position we have taken on the armistice. He does not agree with the publication of the prisoner numbers. He says in his opinion that was a bad blunder. He said, "If you had simply led them on -- as far as we know, all these people will go back -- we have no knowledge they won't go back. Why wouldn't they go back? But they're going to be darned certain if any number of them don't want to go back, they're not going to be forced. If you concentrate on that and concentrate on the screening method, you might have gotten agreement but when you threw the number in their face, you

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made it difficult." If they put a feeler down from Peiping, would we be willing to send back Chinese if they agree to keep North Koreans? he said. Of course, they missed the point. He thought it was a cynical thing. They understand that very clearly. I don't think you are going to find them making any abrupt or critical statements publicly to any great extent against the Chinese unless the Chinese goad them or move into Southeast Asia. They're not going to do that. They're going to try to keep currency to some kind of semblance of reasonable living.

However, I think you will find them being fairly rough on the Soviet Union increasingly. They're very aware today that the Soviet Communist Party in India is financed from Moscow, which was something they didn't know a few months ago. I asked his Minister, "You've got good ^{anti-Soviet} men around India. Why don't you put them to work and find out how they're financed?" You see, Indian Communists are a bad lot of people. Maybe there is no connection. Well, there is a connection. It is through the books there. There are many ways, of course. One specific way is the books that are published free in Russia, sent to India and sold by the Communist Party there with the proceeds going into the coffers of the Indian Communist Party. I said, "The attacks on you are financed right out of Moscow. The whole plan, the whole deal is financed there through these

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books and through other ways too." He discovered that was true and a light began to dawn. They began to look around for a law to ban these books. They're still looking for it. Whether there is courage to pass a law to ban them I don't know. They asked me what that would do to us. We've got some books that we put out through Indian publishers. I went to Nehru and Bajpai. Both of them said they'd like to admit to this; they think it will be discovered anyway; they'll be perfectly frank and hold nothing back; they appreciate it. I said, "You know we are publishing these books. I'd like to print an advertisement in the AMERICAN REPORTER, our weekly paper, and say the American Government is making it easier for the Indian people to buy these books at cheaper prices." He said, "My God, don't do that. We don't want you to get hit by what may happen."

I brought it up with Nehru before I left. He said, "I'll find out about it. I've missed it. I'll let you know when you get back."

The Tass representative out there who is head of the Russian Information Service has upset them by some of the things he's done and said from Moscow and the things he's fed back, the attacks on the Indian government. They told me they were throwing him out of the country.

They told me that the conversation that the Indian

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Ambassador had with Stalin was 25 to 50 per cent on the subject of propaganda being put out of Moscow against Nehru that they did not like. They told me this man would be gone by the time I get back. I don't know whether he will be gone or not, but that is what they said.

The Communist Party there has -- I think we have it in reasonable shape at the moment. As you know, they've got about five per cent of the vote, a little more than that, of the number of Representatives of the Parliament. They have been completely vicious, reckless, ruthless and come out in fairly true colors.

A lot of the Indian press is fairly conservative. Maybe they'll be a healthy element. The Indians are full of that thing. Maybe there will be healthy opposition. Today, it is very clear that they're not. They're completely vicious in irresponsibility and opposition to the credit of the Socialists. A non-Communist Party's united front idea has not worked. That is one of the few places in that situation where it hasn't worked. They have not gone along with it. Now, I don't think the Socialists ever will go along with it. I worried about the KMP and get the feeling they'll begin to get insignificantly drawn in. I don't think so. I think it is possible, not probable. If this effort in Parliamentary disturbance fails, they may resort to violence again. If they do, I hope they

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will handle it better than last time. Last time, they moved in and shot a lot of the wrong people. The result was that everywhere in the elections this year the places where the Communists had taken over, where revolts had taken place, were places where the Communists got the heaviest vote, which is not healthful. I hope, if it does come again, they'll handle it a little bit more rationally. They were pretty rough last time on a lot of people who were not Communists at all.

I keep saying over and over again that we sometimes make the mistake of thinking too much in terms of governments and failing to think in terms of people. You can develop most friendly relations with Nehru. You're going to have your ups and downs with him, but I am always ready to take the one step back that I think we are going to have to take. I am always expecting to get a rap sometime that will put us back. It hasn't come yet, but probably will. By and large, it will be three steps forward and one step back. If the Nehru government fails, it is not going to do much good to have good relations with them back in 1952 or '53. If they fail, that's that. You are not going to get anything else there that you can work a deal with in my opinion.

...The Nehru government is working hard. They have done more, as I think you know, than any country in the world to help themselves. They handled a huge refugee problem without foreign

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aid. They got the biggest water development program in the world without foreign aid. They've got one river valley development, irrigation program, that is bigger than Grand Coulee by eighty per cent, and Grand Coulee is the biggest in the world. It is Bhakra. They've got Damodar and Hirakud that are almost as big. They've got a lot of smaller ones pushing hard. They're scraping in an effort to find rupees to carry forward their program. They have reduced or eliminated subsidies on grain. As a result, rice prices went up 55 per cent in Bombay, Delhi, and other cities. The Communists have always been weak in the cities. They stage mass demonstrations. You can call the action of the government in freeing up that money for internal development courageous or just a little foolhardy. I think they would have been better to go only partway. The Russians, of course, would have done it in a ruthless way, but in a democracy you don't operate that way. They went too far. As a result, the Communists have now got a hand in the cities. I think they'll backtrack to get food prices down as much as they can.

I won't bore you with my views on the aid program. I can only say, if we don't keep this ball rolling out there, we are making a fundamental mistake that we are going to deeply regret. The ball won't roll our way unless there is enough aid to keep it rolling.

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I have a mythical man set up for me out there, twenty-eight years old. He's very much for us on the side of democracy. He wants democracy to win but also wants to be on the winning side. He's very conscious of this deep world conflict. He feels he'd better watch his step and he wants his Communism to appear to be on the winning side. He's got thirty or forty years ahead of him and he's going to place his bets there and rationalize and say maybe it will be different in India; maybe we can change it; maybe the Gandhi influence will make a difference. He, by the tens of thousands, will start to place their bets the other way. If you wait until the bets are placed the other way, Congress can vote us a billion dollars out there and it will just be down the drainpipe. If they come through with moderate amounts now, it will be as good as any money we are spending anywhere. It is very hard to get the viewpoint understood. People seem to understand many of our assumptions and disagree with the final step. I think this may be a little like China in '47 or '48. It didn't make much difference what you did; the ball game was lost. I think in '55 or so if this ball game is lost, then you can spend your money until the cows come home. Then it won't do you any good. I hope this won't burst out in flames because it is coming. There's no question about it.

I am not one of these people who say all you have to

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do is fear people and they're going to vote against the Communists. That is extremely naive. There was more radicalism in 1935 in America and in 1932 when people began to get jobs and go ahead. It was then when the sitdown strikes came. You've got to do more than help them meet economic problems. You've got to put something in their hearts, something in their minds. You've got to make them share in the building of India. It can't be our job. It's got to be their job. If when they get through they say, "That America -- America did this for us," I don't think it would be a great success. On the other hand, if they say, "Look at what we did ourselves. We're grateful to America for the assistance. We've got an answer to Communism. We've got something better than the Chinese," then you've got a democratic partner in Asia.

You've also got to hit the intellectuals, a frustrated, middle-class group, most of them. They haven't had a hungry day in their life, but they get frustrated. The universities turn them out by the thousands. We've gone to work on them and have a big program that we hope to start in August. It is terribly essential to hit them too.

In my pleas for aid I don't say all you have to do is give them aid and the ball game is won. It's not that simple. You could give them all the money for aid and the ball game might be lost. Assuming we are wise enough to do

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it in the right way to build up their confidence in themselves, build up some concepts in their own minds of democracy, what it can do, then I think the ball game can be won.

I don't have to add if this ball game is lost out there, I'd hate to take a look at the French Chamber of Deputies the following morning, or any of these Western European countries. When these people decide to place their bets the other way, they're going to do it by the thousands and it will have a snowballing effect here. If we look on the losing side, a lot of our friends are going to jump on the fence. Some of our friends will jump the fence completely. Psychologically, you are going to be in a losing situation. I feel very keenly and deeply about it. I think we are playing for very, very great stakes.

I don't think enough people have been to India and I know the top people in the State Department have hardly been to India. They haven't been able to get there for one reason or another. They go to Tokyo, Manila, Formosa, then Istanbul, Cairo, and sometimes get there. We are in the middle. I have had two Congressmen visit us this year. They stayed six days. You say I'm lucky. I wish I had a hundred because they would better understand it. Newspapermen don't get there. It's in the middle. It gets forgotten.

In my opinion, it is the basic key to Asia. We've got the formula. We're moving in the right direction. We need support.

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UNDER SECRETARY BRUCE: Any other questions?

May I ask one? You spoke of Southeast Asia. What is the present Indian attitude about that portion of the continent? Would they regard with a great deal of apprehension the loss of any of the states in Southeast Asia to the Communists?

AMBASSADOR BOWLES: Oh, yes. It is fascinating to talk to Nehru on this. If you talked to him four months ago -- I did many times -- about Indo-China, he would start out giving you a twenty-minute lecture on imperialism, colonialism, the French hanging on to a rich forthold, etc., when supporting Bao Dai. You'd get it for twenty minutes. Now, you get it for thirty seconds. You get it still for the record. Then they say, "What are the French doing? Are they going to hang on there?" And they're worried. They're not worried enough to quite make the jump. But I go over this over and over again with them. They say, "All right; you don't like Bao Dai. We (?) don't like the French." The French are playing a losing game. It's a terrific training cost. There is only one reason they're there and that is to dam up this, to keep this cork in the bottle. "You know perfectly well," I said this to Nehru two and a half weeks ago, "a few days after the Communists move into French Indo-China, Thailand will change its government, like a suit of clothes. They have a file, an index of governments ready to pull out." I said, "How long is Burma going to stand up? You've

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got them on your boundary line. What do you prepare to do about it?" Well, they change the subject, but they're very, very deeply concerned, deeply concerned. I find the best approach I have out there is to try to make them think it out our way by saying, "What are we doing wrong? How would you do it differently? It's no use for you to come around and Monday-morning-quarterback on us. If we are handling the Korean situation wrong, you've got an obligation to tell me how to handle it, how to handle Indo-China -- that was your solution, the Indo-China. You have no right to come around and criticize America the day after something goes wrong. I want your help." I asked Nehru one day if he'd take a half hour out and tell me what he'd do if he were Secretary of State. I said, "Go ahead and be Secretary of State and give me your policies." We had some great fun. He started out to do a lot of things. I said, "My friend, you are in a political year. You can't do that." He said, "What's politics have to do with it?" I said, "What did it have to do with it when you were running for election? Remember all the things you said you couldn't do because you were in an election? We are in an election and can't do that. We can't handle this colonial situation quite the quick easy way we'd like to do it." When he got all through -- there were a great deal of gags about it -- it wasn't too different from what we were doing. He said,

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"Would you try to out-Vishinsky Vishinsky?" He said, "You've got a good case but you talk too loud and sound too smug." When you talk to them about our failure to join the league or their implications about our failure to join the league, what it costs us and costs the world, then you're on common ground with them. You say you're not going to repeat that mistake again and allow the vacuum that developed in Europe.

The whole colonial question is very keen. I think we kept them from breaking out too hard on Tunisia. I wouldn't be surprised if they did break out unless some reasonable solution could be had in the next two or three months.

You sent back a letter to the Secretary, suggesting that we may find ourselves liquidating colonialism mob by mob over a period of the next ten or twelve years. Wouldn't it be right to try to look at it squarely now and begin to find a means of liquidating it without the mobs and on a more orderly basis through some proposal to UN?

I suggested associate members of UN as a status for possibly Morocco, Tunisia, and others, intermediate status, give them the right to talk, be free enough to vote, some device.

It seems to me we've got to have ideas somewhere there. I'm feeling for something. I know I haven't got it.

But if we could do that, maybe an extension of the commonwealth

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idea. I know the troubles with France. I know they're very grave. We simply, it seems to me, have got to get -- by assuming that always our crisis comes in the next year, we sometimes fail to do the things, it seems to me, that must be done for the five- and ten-year period. I am just suggesting that that is something always to think about. We can't lose this moral position we have. Of course, we have lost it to some degree, but I know that compromise is necessary. I am perfectly aware of the problems.

I'd like to add just one thing on the information programs. I think there are just two points on that. No. 1, I think there is a danger sometimes that we talk too much to each other and to people who are already convinced. Some of our statements find a ringing response from people who already agree with us. That is valuable because those people must be kept in line. It is also good to give them arguments to give their friends.

I am wondering always if the target shouldn't be more the man on the fence, the confused person who doesn't quite go along with it. I think we are a little wrong here. The Russians would go somewhere else -- that in-between man who must be persuaded. Sometimes information work that looks successful may not be as successful as it appears because the success may be among people already convinced.

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No. 2, I feel perhaps one of our biggest weapons in the propaganda world is the attitude of our people themselves abroad. It is very trite to say to everybody abroad he is an American ambassador, etc., but it is nevertheless true. One discontented stenographer with three martinis can do you more harm with a bad remark that can reverberate all over a city and be exaggerated with each step than you could make up. I don't think people should be sent to posts if they don't want to go to them. I told our people if they don't feel their job is one of the most important they've had, I'd try to get them transferred. I tried to get them to learn Hindi. The white man's always been told he doesn't have to learn the language. Now they're free and feel entitled to that courtesy. I feel every person whom those embassies consult and everything else ought to get a better indoctrination and really feel a responsibility for doing the right thing, making Indian friends, Burmese, or wherever they happen to be. I think that the personal contact is something we don't do as well as we should. Now, we don't do it at all perfectly in India, but we are trying desperately to improve it. Even a cruise ship which goes around the world -- why not make sure every person taking that cruise ship gets information about our problems with those countries? One of them came into Bombay, a prohibition port, and the first thing he had to

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have drinks there. After reverberations, he said, "To heck."
It's a little thing.

All in all, I think we are going better but not well enough. I think there are high hopes. I think there are also great dangers and great opportunities.

UNDER SECRETARY DRUCE: Thank you very much, Mr. Bowles.
It has been extremely interesting to us.

GENERAL SMITH: Did you ever have any opportunity of talking to Nehru about the possibility of approaching the Burmese government with regard to a more tolerant attitude toward indigenous tribes?

AMBASSADOR BOWLES: Yes, I did. He said they agreed very definitely. They already talked with them; we couldn't be more right; he thought the Burmese government was much more aware of it. We talked about this three or four weeks ago. The KMP, of course, is a great source of excitement. I have given them my word, based on the State Department's word, that there is nothing in it. They have accepted that. At a press conference, Nehru said, "I have the word of the American Ambassador this is not so and I accept that word."

UNDER SECRETARY DRUCE: Thank you, sir, very much.

Nice to see you.
AMBASSADOR BOWLES: Good to see you.

. . . Ambassador Bowles then withdrew . . .

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August 7, 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BRUCE:

Subject: Fourteenth Meeting of the Psychological Strategy Board

The agenda for the fourteenth meeting of the PSB is attached under the tab "Agenda".

Also attached are the following:

Agenda Item No. 1 Psychological Objectives in Latin America

Assistant Secretary Miller will present a briefing on psychological objectives in Latin America and discuss current information activities and problems in the area. Mr. Miller will attend your 11:00 briefing this morning in preparation for the PSB meeting.

Agenda Item No. 2 REVISED DRAFT Staff Study - "Preliminary Analysis of the BW Propaganda Campaign, with Recommendations". (PSB D-25a)

Included under the tab is a memorandum, prepared in P, containing appropriate information and recommendations on the subject paper, which is also included.

TAB A

Agenda Item No. 3 Psychological Strategy Plan Prescribing Specific Courses of Action with Respect to Germany. (PSB D-21)

Included under the tab is a briefing memorandum, prepared in GER, containing certain background information and recommendations you may wish to make on this item. Also included are memoranda from P and S/P.

TAB B

Agenda Item No. 4

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Agenda Item No. 4 PSB Annual Report to NSC. (PSB D-30)

Included under the tab is a briefing memorandum, prepared in S/P, containing appropriate comments and recommendations you may wish to make on the item. Please note that Annex A has already been cleared by the Department and formally submitted through regular channels to the NSC.

TAB C

Agenda Item No. 5 Progress Reports

- (A) Progress Report to the PSB on Psychological Operations Plan for Soviet Orbit Escapees, Phase A. (PSB D-18a/2)

Included under the tab is a briefing memorandum, prepared in P, containing additional information on the progress of the escapees program and making certain recommendations for your use.

TAB D

- (B) APPROVED "Psychological Operations Plan for the Reduction of Communist Power in France". (PSB D-14/c)

- (C) APPROVED "Psychological Operations Plan for the Reduction of Communist Power in Italy". (PSB D-15b)

Included under the tab is a briefing memorandum, prepared by Mr. Walmsley, C, containing certain information and recommendations on the status report, which is also included.

TAB E

For Reference Only

1. Presidential Directive, April 4, 1951
2. Bureau of the Budget Report and Presidential Letter, June 21, 1952
3. Minutes of 12th and 13th PSB Meetings.

TAB REFERENCE

W. J. McWilliams

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Fifteenth Meeting of the
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
September 11, 1952 2:55 p. m.
Director's Conference Room
Administration Building
Central Intelligence Agency

MEMBERS:

General Walter Bedell Smith, Director of Central Intelligence,
Chairman
Mr. William C. Foster, Deputy Secretary of Defense
Mr. Howland H. Sargeant, Assistant Secretary of State
Dr. Raymond B. Allen, Director, Psychological Strategy Board
Admiral Alan G. Kirk, USN (Ret.), Director-Designate,
Psychological Strategy Board

OTHER PARTICIPANTS:

Office of the Director of Mutual Security

Mr. Averell Harriman, Director (For Item 1 only)

Department of State

Mr. Evron M. Kirkpatrick, Chief, External Research Staff,
Office of Intelligence Research

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Brig. General John Magruder, USA (Ret.)

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Brig. General Jesmond D. Balmer

Central Intelligence Agency

Mr. Loftus Becker, Deputy Director (Intelligence)
Mr. Frank Wisner, Deputy Director (Plans)
Col. Fred Zierath

Research and Development Board

Mr. Don K. Price, Deputy Chairman

Psychological Strategy Board

Mr. Charles E. Johnson, Secretary to the Board
Major Edmund J. Bennett, Deputy Executive Officer
Lt. Colonel Tobias R. Philbin
Mr. John Sherman
Mr. Edmund L. Taylor

Charles E. Johnson
Charles E. Johnson
Secretary to the Board

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Agenda Item No. 1. - Doctrinal (Ideological) Warfare Against the USSR (PSB D-33)

The Board accepted the recommendation that a panel be created and accepted revised terms of reference for the panel submitted by Mr. Foster. General Smith nominated Mr. Kenneth MacIntyre as the CIA member.

Agenda Item No. 2. - A Strategic Concept for a National Psychological Program With Particular Reference to Cold War Operations under NSC 10/5 (PSB D-31)

The paper is approved as soon as the comments of the Department of Defense are received by the Director and agreed to by the Department of State and CIA. General Smith and Mr. Sargeant approved the paper as submitted.

Agenda Item No. 3. -

- a. Briefings on Research in the Social Sciences of Use to Psychological Strategy Board Planning and Operations
- b. Report on Social Science Research in Cold War Operations - Prepared by Henry Loomis, PSB Staff Consultant PSB D-32) (This item not on agenda.)

Messrs. Kirkpatrick, Becker and Price briefed the Board on organization and procedures for interagency coordination of social science research.

The Board did not accept the Loomis Report, but instead requested that the PSB staff in consultation with member agency staffs develop recommendations to be submitted to the Board with respect to interagency coordination of social science research of interest to PSB. (Copies of the transcript on this item will be made available to representatives of the member agencies concerned with this problem.)

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October 30, 1952

SIXTEENTH MEETING OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD,
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 30, 1952

Fiscal Year 1954 Escapee Budget

The recommendations of PSB D-18/a5 were approved in principle subject to working out with the Bureau of the Budget what they will concede to be adequate justification.

It was also agreed that the Department of State's support of the inclusion of Yugoslavia is contingent upon the fact that no direct mention of Yugoslavia be made in such legislation.

If and when aid becomes available for Yugoslavia it is agreed that, because of the sensitivity of this question, the various agencies concerned would consult again together as to how this should be handled.

Copies to: Mr. Hickerson (Action)
Mr. Perkins
Mr. Sargeant ✓
Mr. Martin
Mr. Sohn

David Bruce

Following reference papers sent to Mr. Hickerson:

1. Undated memo to Bruce fr Hickerson, Subj. "PSB A-16, Item 3: President's Escapee Program for Fiscal Year 1954."
2. Progress Report on Escapee Program, dtd 10/27/52.
3. Cy 15 Memo 10/23/52 to Bruce, Foster, B. Smith, Harriman, & Young fr Kirk, PSB, Subj. "Fiscal Yr 1954 Escapee Budget."
4. Cy 60 (PSB D-18/a), Subj. "Psychological Operations Plan for Soviet Orbit Escapees - Phase A".

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October 30, 1952

LUNCHEON MEETING OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD,
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 30, 1952

General Smith said that he would send today or tomorrow to the members of the PSB Board a final draft approved by him regarding the changes suggested by his memorandum of Thursday, October 23, relating to making the PSB organization more effective.

He asked that this be considered by the members of the Board as rapidly as possible and returned to him - he hoped, with their concurrence.

Copies to: Mr. Joyce (Action)
Mr. Matthews
Mr. Sargeant ✓
Mr. Sohm

David Bruce

Following reference paper sent to Mr. Joyce:

- (1) Memo to U fr S/P-Joyce, dtd 10/30/52, re "CIA and the PSB".
- (2) Memo 10/30/52 to U fr S/P-Joyce re CIA and the PSB
- (3) Cy memo 10/23/52 fr Bruce re PSB Mtg, Subj. "Stream-Lined Procedure for NSC 10/5 Matters".
- (4) Cy memo 10/21/52 to Mbrs PSB fr Smith Subj. "Streamlined Procedure for NSC 10/5 Matters."
- (5) Cy memo 10/28/52 to Mbrs PSB fr Smith Subj. "Procedure for NSC 10/5 Matters."

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October 30, 1952

SIXTEENTH MEETING OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD,
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 30, 1952

Program for Psychological Preparation for
Stalin's Passing from Power

It was agreed that the preparatory work recommended by the PSB should be approved. It was further agreed that the Governmental position called for in paragraph 6 (c) should be arrived at by coordination through the State Department. After this is done the State Department would be charged with the responsibility of trying to obtain similar agreements from appropriate foreign governments.

I stated that I would designate one State Department officer as a principal point of contact for this work.

David Bruce

Copies to: Mr. Perkins (Action)
Mr. Sargeant ✓
Mr. Sohm

Following reference Papers sent to Mr. Perkins:

- (1) Memo to Bruce fr Phillips, 10/29/52, Subj. "PSB D-24 (Program of Psychological preparation for Stalin's Passing fr Power) w/attachments -
1) Cancellation Paper, 5/21/51;
2) Cy 21 PSB D-24, 10/27/52, Subj "Program of Psychological Preparation for Stalin's Passing fr power".

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October 30, 1952

SIXTEENTH MEETING OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD,
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 30, 1952

PSB Quarterly Report to the President and
the National Security Council

(1) The report was approved.

(2) I cautioned that as a briefing document for the incoming Administration, it is not complete.

(3) I urged that the staff of the Director of the PSB, in consultation with representatives of its member agencies, prepare for the consideration of the Board recommendations as to the format and the content of future reports and as to the procedures to be followed in preparing them. The above was agreeable to all concerned.

Admiral Kirk recommended that the Board approve the suggestion made by Mr. Lay of the National Security Council that these reports be rendered semi-annually instead of quarterly. The members of the Board saw no objection to this.

David Bruce

Copies to: Mr. Sargeant (Action) ✓
Mr. Nitze
Mr. Perkins
Mr. Sohn

Following reference papers sent to Mr. Sargeant:

1. Memo to Bruce fr Sargeant, 10/30/52
Subj. PSB Quarterly Report", w/
Cy 54 PSB Quarterly Report.

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A P P R O V E D

M I N U T E S

Seventeenth Meeting of the
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
January 15, 1953 2:45 P. M.
Conference Room, Deputy Secretary
of Defense
Department of Defense
Pentagon

MEMBERS:

Mr. William C. Foster, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Chairman
Mr. David K. E. Bruce, Under Secretary of State
General Walter B. Smith, Director of Central Intelligence
Admiral Alan G. Kirk, USN (Ret.), Director of Psychological
Strategy Board

OTHER PARTICIPANTS:

Department of State

Mr. Howland H. Sargeant, Assistant Secretary for Public
Affairs

Department of Defense

Brig. General John Magruder, USA (Ret.)
Mr. William H. Godel

Central Intelligence Agency

Col. Frederick Zierath

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Brig. General Millard C. Young, USAF

Psychological Strategy Board

Mr. George A. Morgan
Mr. Edmund L. Taylor
Mr. Mallory Browne
Dr. Horace S. Craig
Mr. Charles E. Johnson, Secretary to the Board

Alan G. Kirk
Alan G. Kirk
Director

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Agenda Item A. A National Psychological Program with Respect to Escapees from the Soviet Orbit: Phase B (PSB D-18a/1, December 17, 1952)

The Board approved the paper with the following amendment. Paragraph 2 was amended to read:

"2. Requirements for Program Development.

Within the framework of NSC 86/1 and with due regard for conditions in specific areas, particularly Berlin and Hongkong:

a. Take action to insure that escapees from the Soviet Orbit will receive asylum and will be assisted in achieving a constructive life in the free world; and to this end enlist the support of governments of the free world." . . . (The balance of the paragraph remains unchanged).

Agenda Item B. Psychological Strategy Program for Japan (PSB D-27, December 22, 1952)

The Board approved the paper, subject to final coordination by the Director of comments from the member departments and agencies.

Agenda Item No. 1 - PSB Status Report to NSC on the Psychological Program as of December 31, 1952 (PSB D-35)

The Board approved the report for submittal to the President and the NSC. Mr. Bruce noted that "the Department of State continues to be wary of attempting to measure, with existing dubious criteria, the effectiveness of a given psychological action in situations in which many other forces, economic, political and military, are at work. To correct such deficiencies was not feasible under the time limits imposed. They will continue to appear until arrangements are made permitting more effective staff work within and among the agencies concerned."

Agenda Item No. 2 - Test Case Evaluation of the U. S. Psychological Effort in Italy (PSB D-29)

The Board noted the paper with interest but did not approve it. Mr. Bruce commented as follows:

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"1. While the paper has indicated that the psychological operations in Italy have contributed to the attainment of our national objectives in that country and indicated that although progress has been made, much remains to be done, the paper does not provide the guidance for policy planners or programmers which an acceptable evaluation might be expected to provide.

"2. The Department considers the subject paper, even as corrected, constitutes a useful first step in the development of acceptable evaluation criteria and procedures."

Agenda Item No. 3a - An Evaluation of the Psychological Impact of U.S. Foreign Economic Policies in the U.K. (PSB D-36)

The Board approved the paper and authorized the Director to coordinate any further comments which the PSB member agencies might wish to make. Upon final coordination of these comments, the Director is authorized to transmit the paper to the President and the NSC.

Agenda Item No. 3b - An Evaluation of the Psychological Impact of U.S. Foreign Economic Policies in France (PSB D-37)

The Board noted the paper with interest and, subject to further staff work, accepted it as a reference document to be transmitted to the PSB member agencies and to the Director of Mutual Security.

Agenda Item No. 4 - Psychological Strategy Plan for the Middle East (PSB D-22, January 8, 1953)

The Board approved the paper subject to coordination of final agency comments by the Director.

Agenda Item No. 5 - Berlin Supplement to the National Psychological Strategy with Respect to Germany (PSB D-21/2, January 7, 1953)

The Board approved the paper and authorized the Director to coordinate any further comments which the PSB member agencies might wish to make. The Board further agreed to delete Paragraph 4 under Contingency B, page 11, in the subject paper.

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Agenda Item No. 6 - Psychological Strategy Plan for Southeast Asia
(PSB D-23, January 5, 1953)

The Board noted this paper with interest as an indication of progress and referred the paper back to the Director for further staff work. The Director brought to the attention of the Board that the development of a plan for Southeast Asia had to be within the context of a wide geographic area extending far beyond Southeast Asia itself.

Agenda Item No. 7 - Staff Study - Psychological Strategy Planning for Western Europe (PSB D-38)

The Board noted the Staff Study and approved the recommendation that the Director undertake the preparation of a psychological strategy plan for Western Europe as set forth in the paper.

Agenda Item No. 8 - This item was deleted from the agenda prior to the meeting.

Agenda Item No. 9 - Progress Report by the Director

The Director presented a report to the Board giving an account of all major items of work not otherwise listed on the agenda. The Board made the Director's Progress Report and the related papers noted in the Report a part of the Minutes of the meeting. The "Progress Report by the Director at the Seventeenth Meeting of the Psychological Strategy Board, January 15, 1953", is, therefore, appended to and made a part of these Minutes. Reports on the following subjects are also a part of these Minutes but have been given separate distribution:

- (1) Psychological Operations Plan for Reduction of Communist Power in France (PSB D-11c)
- (2) Psychological Operations Plan Incident to Korean Cease-Fire Negotiations (PSB D-7c); and Break-Off of Korean Armistice Negotiations (J-19d).
- (3) Doctrinal (Ideological) Warfare Against the USSR (PSB D-33)
- (4) Psychological Strategy for Economic Security Vis-a-Vis the Soviet Orbit (PSB D-28).
- (5) Preliminary Survey for Plan on China.
- (6) Staff Study on European Satellites of the USSR.

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Post-Agenda Item - Periodic Review of PSB Plans

The Board indicated its desire that the PSB Staff develop a schedule for the periodic review of PSB approved plans.

Post-Agenda Item - Approval of Minutes

In view of the time limitations which preclude the normal process of clearing and approving the Minutes, the Board agreed to record its final action at the meeting on each item of the Agenda and authorized the Director to record and issue the Minutes of the meeting without further clearance or approval by members of the Board.

Post-Agenda Item - Statement by Members of the Board Apropos of their Final Meeting

Mr. Foster noted that inasmuch as this was the last meeting he expected to attend, he wished to express his view that he considered the past year and four months during which he had been associated with the Board as being very useful. He felt that there was real promise for the future and hoped that the new Board could go on and strengthen the work. He stated his view that the Board had a devoted, active and useful staff. He further noted that he hoped that out of the work of the Board would come a really well directed psychological effort on the part of the United States which can be very useful in this cold war in which we are engaged. He considered it a real privilege to be associated with his fellow members on the Board, with Mr. Harriman, with Admiral Kirk, with the PSE Staff and with his colleagues in the Department of Defense who have worked with him on the work of the Board. General Smith, Mr. Bruce and Mr. Harriman expressed their wish to be associated with Mr. Foster in his statement.

General Smith observed that it was interesting to him to see how much progress had been made in a completely uncharted field. Mr. Harriman then said that he had been watching the development of psychological warfare in relation to Russia since the war and the advance in government thinking had been really fantastic.

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PSB D-47

PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
WASHINGTON, D. C.

July 20, 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: AGENCY LIAISON REPRESENTATIVES

SUBJECT: Status Report of the Psychological Strategy Board
to the National Security Council

Attached hereto are copies of Working Draft No. 2 of the two sections of the Status Report of the Psychological Strategy Board to the National Security Council, namely, "Summary of Significant Psychological Activities" and the "Work of PSB".

A meeting has been called at 708 Jackson Place, N. W., for Thursday, July 23, at 2:30 p. m. to consider these drafts together with the individual reports of the member departments and agencies.

Charles E. Johnson
Charles E. Johnson
Secretary to the Board

Enclosures:

PSB D-47, July 20, 1953

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I. SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT PSYCHOLOGICAL ACTIVITIES

1. The Board presents below a brief evaluative summary of the status of our national psychological programs as of June 30, 1963, based on the appended Progress Reports by the departments and agencies responsible for operations.

GENERAL

2. While the President's Committee on International Information Activities studied the whole problem of the world struggle with a view to basic improvements, ^{in the 15 years} the actual conduct of that struggle, on the psychological as on other fronts, ^{conducted} was ~~attacked~~ ^{improved} with renewed vigor. The most far-reaching opportunity came with Stalin's death. The President's speech of April 16 was signally successful in capitalizing on the situation by appealing to the new leaders for an era of worldwide peace and friendship. The world at large received the speech with great enthusiasm, and the follow-up support through psychological exploitation added to the initial success.

3. Further exploitation of events behind the Iron Curtain has been guided by the requirement that psychological operations must be keyed in with political action. After Stalin's death, the next major occasion for such action followed the outbreaks in Czechoslovakia and East Germany. Plans and operations were stepped up accordingly, with prospect of conducting a major campaign in the long-range contest to take full advantage of the consequences of Stalin's death.

4. Outside of the Soviet orbit the developments on the psychological front have been characterized by a disappointing deterioration in the attitudes ^{towards the U.S.} Non-Communist press and public opinion in Western Europe has reflected mounting criticism of U.S. foreign policy

however, a perceptible increase in effectiveness of our radio resources in the last six months due to the inauguration of Radio Liberation and the stepped-up activity of Radio Free Russia. In addition to the radio, leaflet distribution was utilized to reach Soviet military forces stationed outside the USSR.

9. Similarly, in Communist China, the major psychological activities presently open to us are radio and leaflet drops. Both of these are being substantially increased. Through Hongkong, increased use is being made of overt, grey and black channels with the Chinese Mainland for propaganda aimed at discrediting Communism and driving a wedge between Communist China and the Soviet Union, as well as between the Chinese people and their Communist government.

10. In the East European Satellites likewise, radio is our major cold war weapon. RIAS, RFE, and VOA have contributed to the building up of pressures that may be instrumental in weakening the Kremlin's control of the satellite, a control which already gives the appearance of weakening under internal strains.

11. In most of the Satellite States, progress in other forms of psychological activity, mainly unattributable, has been slow, and has centered on the build-up of operating potential. There has, however, been increased action, including leaflet drops, in certain satellites - notably Albania, Bulgaria, and Rumania.

12. Access to Eastern Germany, on the contrary, was fully maintained despite increasing Soviet security restriction. Virtually the entire area has been continuously subjected to our psychological programs through mainly indigenous channels.

13. In Western Europe, the maintenance of U. S. Armed Forces within and around the area, combined with the U. S. Military Aid program for helping the NATO nations to build up their own defenses, provided the major positive

psychological impact contributing effectively toward achieving our objective of building up confidence, stability, and strength in the West to deter Soviet aggression. Increased emphasis on troop acceptance programs enlisting the positive cooperation of the governments and the local authorities has brought about a definite improvement in most areas in the problem of avoiding friction between U. S. military personnel and foreign populations.

14. The general public in most Western European countries has been even more strongly influenced than their governments by the Soviet peace bait.
The central problem that has confronted our psychological efforts in Western Europe during the past six months, and especially since Stalin's death, ~~has been~~ the Soviet "Peace Offensive". It is evident that many, if not all, Western European governments have been influenced to some extent by the Kremlin's tension-reducing tactics. *The general public in most Western European countries has been even more strongly influenced than their governments by the Soviet peace bait.* The effect has been to ~~slow up~~ progress toward a number of our objectives, including the build-up of Western defenses, the ratification of EDC, and attainment of European integration.

14. The U. S. counter-offensive has included fullest exploitation by the Department of State's Information Program of the President's Inaugural address and of his April 16 speech challenging the new leaders of the USSR to prove their peaceful professions by deeds, not words. Copies of the latter were presented to Foreign Offices all over the world in advance of delivery and kinescopes of the entire speech were sent to seventy-three posts within a day of its delivery. One of these was shown over BBC television on April 20 to an estimated audience of 6,000,000. Five million pamphlets, handbills, and leaflets on the speech were prepared and distributed, and a documentary film of it in thirty-five languages had been produced and shipped by May 2.

15. In Italy, generally, discreet U. S. efforts to aid the reelection of the Democratic Center Parties fell considerably short of their objective.

The DeGasperi Coalition got back in by the slenderest of margins and the Communists and extreme Rightists registered significant gains.

16. In France, the municipal elections in May showed that the Communists had suffered a slight set back in rural areas, but had fully maintained their position in the industrial areas in larger cities. Governmental instability was a troublesome factor during the period and a relaxation of earlier French official measures to reduce the power of the Communist Party in France resulted. The repercussions of some Congressional investigations, as well as of the Rosenberg executions, in conjunction with the Krenlin's peace campaign, appear to have contributed to an increase in neutralism.

17. In the United Kingdom also, there appears to have been a marked increase in neutralism in its special British form of Bevanism. Although the belief is still widely held that Western unity must be preserved, three major elements contribute to the growth of anti-American feeling:

- (1) The belief that the ~~present~~ ^{French} U. S. Administration is deeply divided on basic international policies,
- (2) The development of the Soviet "peace offensive", and
- (3) The desire to exercise a more positive and independent initiative in international affairs.

18. In West Germany and Berlin, the recent riots touched off greatly increased pressures for unification, complicating the problems of German ratification of the EDC. With this exception, however, U. S. psychological programs in Berlin and West Germany, as well as their projection into East Germany, appear to have been fairly effective in promoting progress toward our major goal of a Democratic Germany integrated into Western defense efforts. Since late March, German press opinion has reflected a decline in confidence in U. S. leadership. This was temporarily halted by the President's April 16 speech, but has since been resumed. The two major factors

contributing to this are: (1) the Soviet "peace offensive" and (2) lack of agreement among U.S. leaders on policy towards Germany.

19. In the Near and Middle East and South Asia, neutralism, and the tendency to associate the U.S. with "colonialism", continued to present a major obstacle to the attainment of our psychological objectives. In the Arab States, our alleged pro-Israel bias remained a major handicap, although the visits to Middle Eastern capitals by Secretary Dulles and Mr. Stassen may have alleviated this problem, at least temporarily. IIA has continuously exploited the beneficial aspects of these visits in its output to the area. Turkey, Pakistan, and Greece appear to be the brightest spots in this area, psychologically speaking.

20. The invasion of Laos and the accompanying threat to Thailand signaled a new phase of Communist aggression in Southeast Asia. But the outlook in the area remained critical.

21. In the Far East, the resumption of Korean truce talks raised major psychological problems. The exchange of sick and wounded prisoners

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necessitated special measures to deal with "brain washing". Steps were taken to achieve more effectively coordinated guidance on information Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee. matters concerning Korea through the channels of the/ The offer of a reward to MIG pilot defectors was / produced by an immediate and significant shift in communist air tactics over the Korean battle area.

22. In Japan, severe economic problems and growing neutralist resistance to the U. S. objective of Japanese rearmaments have been trouble spots in a picture otherwise fairly satisfactory. "Grey" and unattributable activities have progressed favorably.

23. In Latin America, our capabilities for effective psychological action increased in a number of countries, mainly in the field of unattributable activity. There has been growing dissatisfaction in many Latin American countries directed mainly against American economic policies. To help offset this, a major psychological move was the departure of Dr. Milton Eisenhower on a goodwill tour of South America late in June.

24. Special Items

Emergency assistance provided by U. S. Armed Forces in cases of national catastrophe has made major goodwill contributions to our psychological efforts in the Netherlands, England, Turkey, Greece, Iran, Ecuador, and Japan.

25. A grant of 1,000,000 tons of wheat to Pakistan has had a similarly favorable effect.

26. Exploitation of U. S. leadership in the atomic field, with a coordinated public information program on the Nevada weapons tests and other special weapons, as well as certain news leaks that gave rise to widespread speculation as to the explosion of a thermo-nuclear device at Eniwetok atoll, / contributed important elements to the U. S. psychological effort.

II. THE WORK OF PSB

During the first half of 1953, the work of PSB was marked by a vigorous shift in emphasis from long-range planning to include more immediate implementation and operational activities. This change reflected the advent of a new Administration, and especially the assumption of the Presidency by General Eisenhower. The new President's world stature made his inauguration on January 20 a major factor in the world psychological struggle, doubly so because of the strong views which he was known to hold on the importance of seizing the initiative in the cold war.

This found direct expression in the designation of Mr. C. D. Jackson as Special Assistant to the President, and his appointment, along with Harold E. Stassen, new Director of the Mutual Security Agency, to membership on the Psychological Strategy Board. Mr. Jackson was elected Chairman of the Board.

MAJOR ACTIVITIES

The impact of these organizational changes on the work of PSB was further heightened by important psychological developments in the international field during this period, including the death of Stalin, the intensified "peace offensive" of the successor regime in the Kremlin, the renewal of armistice negotiations in Korea, and the outbreak of large-scale anti-communist and anti-Soviet rioting in East Germany.

A number of special projects were undertaken by PSB as a result of these events and changes, some at the request of the National Security Council, others on the initiative of the new Chairman of the Board.

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These special projects included the following major staff activities:

Program of Psychological Preparation for Stalin's Passing from Power
(PSB D-24)

Plan for Psychological Exploitation of Stalin's Death (PSB D-40)

During the early months of the reporting period, preparatory planning in anticipation of Stalin's eventual death continued under PSB D-24, including the drafting of a contingency guidance. When Stalin's illness was reported, the National Security Council requested the preparation of a plan for psychological exploitation of Stalin's death (NSC Action No. 728 b.(3), March 4, 1953). The resulting PSB D-40, "Plan for Psychological Exploitation of Stalin's Death", was finally approved on April 23, superseding PSB D-24. The Presidential address of April 16 was the major initial move provided for in the Plan. Such an address had been agreed upon by the NSC, and PSB was assigned the task of coordinating appropriate follow-up by departments and agencies of the Government (NSC Action No. 734 d, March 12, 1953). To assist it in complying with this assignment, as well as in implementation of PSB D-40, the Board established a working group which reports twice monthly to the Chairman.

Volunteer Freedom Corps

NSC Action No. 724 (February 25, 1953) approved in principle NSC 143, "Proposal for a Volunteer Freedom Corps", and directed that a detailed plan be prepared by an ad hoc committee composed of representatives of State, Defense, CIA and PSB staff.

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A "Proposed Basis for Psychological Operations Planning to Exploit the Volunteer Freedom Corps," dated March 20, 1953, and "A National Psychological Strategy Plan for the Volunteer Freedom Corps," dated March 30, 1953, submitted by the PSB staff representative, were intensively utilized by the ad hoc committee in preparing the relevant sections of its report to the Council. The Psychological Supporting Plan for Implementing NSC 143 was included in the ad hoc committee report of April 14 to the NSC Planning Board. After the rioting broke out in East Germany in mid-June, the PSB recommended to the NSC that consultation with our allies be initiated by the State Department immediately with a view to implementation as soon as possible of the Volunteer Freedom Corps plan.

Interim U.S. Psychological Plan for Exploitation of Unrest in Satellite Europe (PSB D-45)

NSC Action No. 817-e (June 18) directed PSB to prepare recommendations as to policies and actions to exploit the unrest in the satellite states. A summary statement of the recommendations was approved by the Board on June 24, and by the NSC on June 25. The comments of the member agencies on the complete plan (PSB D-45) were coordinated through normal staff procedures and approved by the Board on July 1. [This plan provides for an integrated and phased exploitation of actual and latent unrest in the satellite states to embarrass Soviet Control in those areas without jeopardizing fundamental American objectives.]

U. S. Psychological Strategy with Respect to the Thai Peoples of SEA (PSB D-23)

Shortly after the Viet Minh invasion of Laos, the NSC directed the PSB (NSC Action 786 b, 13 May) to develop a plan for coordinated psychological operations based on Thailand, and to submit this plan to the NSC for consideration.

A P.B. panel was already working on an over-all psychological plan for Southeast Asia. Using this background, a new plan was developed, calling for a more vigorous exercise of U. S. leadership in Southeast Asia in two phases, (1) consolidation of Thailand as a secure base, and (2) eventual extension of U. S. psychological programs beyond the Thai boundaries if and when conditions permit. By June 30, the plan had been approved in principle and was nearing readiness for submission to the NSC.

Korea

Emergency Plan - Break Off of Korean Armistice Negotiations (PSB J-19-d)

This contingency plan provides psychological objectives and courses of action in the event of the breakdown or break off of armistice negotiations. It was originally approved in the autumn of 1951, and was reviewed recently, along with supporting plans and guidances prepared by the Departments of Defense, State and by CIA. Both the basic and the supporting plans were found to be adequate and timely, and a recommendation that they not be rewritten was concurred in by the departments and agency concerned.

Korean Cease-Fire Negotiations (PSB D-7c)

^{Korean}
When a/cease-fire seemed likely,

this contingency plan was reviewed. Although prepared in 1951, it was found that this program and the more recent supporting plans accompanying it provided adequate guidance. This plan covers the period immediately following the conclusion of an armistice and the Department of State has already begun work on the preparation of a new guidance dealing with the period of UN General Assembly approval of the proposed armistice agreement and the opening of a Korean political conference.

Guidance on Prisoner of War Exchange in Korea

At the request of the Department of Defense, the PSB Staff undertook to prepare a coordinated interdepartmental guidance on the POW problem in Korea and in particular on the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners. This guidance was submitted to the Chairman of the PSB and transmitted by him to the members of the Board as a checklist of relevant psychological considerations.

Communist Brainwashing

As a result of a letter of February 19 from the Secretary of Defense to the Under Secretary of State and the Director of Central Intelligence and of subsequent conversations between the last-named and the PSB staff, an Ad Hoc Interdepartmental Committee was set up to work with various scientific advisers to ascertain what counter-measures can be undertaken against so-called communist "brain-washing" techniques. A member of the PSB staff, who chaired the committee, remains in close contact with the military officers in charge of repatriation of the first American prisoners of war, and he has certain continuing responsibilities in connection with the foreign and domestic psychological aspects of the problem.

U. S. Doctrinal Program, PSB D-33

In September 1951, the Board authorized the establishment of an interdepartmental panel to study and make recommendations about "doctrinal (ideological) warfare against the USSR." At that time, the Board approved a paper which noted the Soviet ideological efforts which had gained influence upon the intelligentsia throughout the world and had predisposed them towards communist viewpoints. The panel, studying the Soviet approach and possible U. S. counter-action, developed a U. S. Doctrinal Program (PSB D-33) as a means of restoring U. S. influence and minimizing

communist influence among the world's intellectuals. This Doctrinal Program visualizes a long-term intellectual movement, employing a permanent literature and a series of scholarly activities to break down the doctrinaire thought patterns which have aided Communism and to foster greater understanding and acceptance for the traditions and viewpoints of America and the Free World. As of June 30, the proposed program had been circulated for Board approval.

President's Emergency Immigration Program

On April 22, 1953, President Eisenhower recommended to the Congress emergency legislation to admit 240,000 immigrants into the U. S. during the next two years. The President indicated the categories of people to be covered were escapees from Communism and the victims of economic conditions in the countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. On the initiative of the Chairman of PSB, members of its staff intensively supported this recommendation by assistance in the preparation of legislation to be introduced into Congress and by other means necessary to bring about its enactment. This was a completely coordinated staff effort, bearing in mind the potential impact of the program on the Italian General Elections which were to occur on June 7th and 8th, the objectives outlined

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in PSB's Escapee Program, and the possibilities such legislation would have in helping to bring about greater solidarity within NATO. The PSB Coordinating Committee for D-15b was able to make particularly good use of the introduction of the bill in the Senate and the introductory statement by Senator Watkins as well as of the supporting testimony of Cabinet members.

The PSB staff has continued its assistance on this project and should the legislation pass, which appeared highly probable at the end of the reporting period, a special effort is planned to exploit it further at the time the President signs the bill.

Armaments Publicity Policy

A member of the PSB staff is representing Mr. C. D. Jackson in the deliberations of an Ad Hoc Committee on Armaments and American Policy. This group was designated by the NSC Planning Board in March to develop a Government publicity policy for the benefit of the American public on the subject of the armaments race with the USSR.

On May 8 an Interim Report by the Ad Hoc Committee (NSC 151) went to the Council which considered it on May 27, and its action on that date included a direction to the PSB

"...to prepare for Council consideration an outline plan of the specific steps, including speeches by Government officials, which should be taken to carry out the recommendations contained in NSC 151."

A Presidential speech was in draft at the end of the reporting period, to be finalized by the Special Assistant to the President in cooperation with his PSB representative on the Ad Hoc Committee and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.

Procedural Guidance for Famine Relief Projects

A PSB staff paper setting forth an operational plan for exploitation of possible psychological advantages which might be derived from gifts of U. S. surplus food to countries within the Soviet orbit was submitted for Board consideration.

President's Flood Relief Committee

A PSB staff member served in an advisory capacity on the Inter-Agency Working Group on Flood Relief.

IMPLEMENTATION ACTIVITIES

The increased emphasis on special projects and short-term plans of a quasi-operational nature, as well as the maturing of more and more long-range PSB plans, led to a sharp increase in the follow-up work of PSB in collaboration with the Departments of State and Defense, the CIA and the MSA. In addition to coordination activity on plans and projects described above, the following approved PSB plans were in the process of active implementation by government departments and agencies during the reporting period:

Plans now being implemented

- (a) Psychological Operations Plan for the Reduction of Communist Power in France (PSB D-14c)
- (b) Psychological Operations Plan for the Reduction of Communist Power in Italy (PSB D-15b)

Coordination of the implementation of these two plans has been carried out by a Washington Interdepartmental Committee working with

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counterpart Committees in Paris and Rome acting under the immediate supervision of the respective Ambassadors. USCINCEUR has appointed a Liaison Representative who has met with the Paris Committee.

Municipal elections held throughout France in May indicated a slight over-all decline in communist electoral strength, but future prospects for effective anti-communist action were not bright as the reporting period closed with a prolonged French political crisis. Efforts started some months ago to lift parliamentary immunity from six communist deputies have not yet been successful.

Prior to the national elections in Italy, the Washington and Rome Committees undertook a number of actions designed to further the objectives of the plan, including psychological exploitation of the President's proposed emergency immigration program. The precarious majority obtained by the Center parties, and the gains of both Left Wing and Right Wing extremists, underline the continuing gravity of the situation. In the light of post-election comment from the U. S. Embassy in Italy, the plan to reduce communist power in that country is to be reviewed for the purpose of preparing a revised post-election strategy.

(c) Psychological Operations Plan for Soviet Orbit
Escapees (PSB D-18/a)

The Escapee Program was established in implementation of U. S. defector policy as set forth in NSC 86/1 with respect to improving the conditions of reception and care afforded recent escapees from Communism,

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and promoting their permanent resettlement. The Program which was administered by the Department of State during the reporting period also provides opportunity for meeting and confuting, with evidences of friendship and practical concern for the victims of Communism, the damaging Soviet propaganda which has in the past exploited inadequate conditions and the general neglect which greeted escapees on their arrival in the Free World.

During the past six months, the Program has achieved substantial results at a minimum cost to the Government. In Europe, care and maintenance activities are carried on in each of the major countries of first asylum, benefiting 14,890 currently registered escapees through the provision of supplemental food, clothing, medical and dental care, sanitary and living facilities, and amenity supplies. Resettlement is promoted by documentation, training, counseling and similar services performed in Europe, immigration opportunity searches undertaken in Canada and several Latin American countries, and the provision of funds for transportation for escapees qualifying for movement. Through these methods 4,709 escapees had been resettled or were awaiting passage by June 1, 1953.

United States assistance has directly brought about a marked improvement in the conditions of asylum and opportunities for resettlement offered escapees, and has also stimulated increased contributions by local government authorities and voluntary agencies. These activities have afforded material for utilization through information media abroad, have contributed to intelligence acquisition and related programs, and have provided a basis for successful rebuttal in the General Assembly of Czechoslovak charges of subversion under the Mutual Security Act.

Soviet and satellite sensitivity to the propaganda effectiveness of the fact of continued escape from behind the Iron Curtain, and of assistance to this group on the part of the Free World has been demonstrated by repeated press and radio attacks on the Escapee Program, by internal propaganda designed to conceal or minimize the continuing outward flow, by increasingly severe security measures and border controls, by the bringing of charges before the General Assembly, and by legal measures directed at particular individuals and groups of emigres.

During the year, program activities were extended under the authority of Section 303(a) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended, on a limited basis to South Asia and the Far East. Some 300 Kazakh refugees from Sinkiang Province who escaped to Kashmir are being assisted either to resettle in rural Kashmir or to move onward to Turkey. A select group of trained and educated refugees from China now stranded in Hong Kong will be assisted to resettle in Formosa or other suitable areas of the Far East under contractual arrangements with Aid Refugee Chinese Intellectuals, Inc.

(d) National Psychological Program with respect to
Escapees from the Soviet Orbit: Phase "B"
(PSB D-18a/1a)

[Approved by the Board on January 15, 1953, this Plan is essentially a program for encouragement of escape from the Soviet orbit for psychological purposes and for psychological employment of key satellite personnel.]

[On the recommendation of the Board, the NSC amended NSC 86/1 to insure that the term "key satellite personnel" includes any satellite national whose escape would be of significant psychological value to the Free World. An observer from the staff of PSB has been designated to meet, as the agenda requires, with the Inter-Agency Defector Committee

which functions under CIA to execute NSCID 13 and 14. Plan D-18a/1a provides for military use of escapees to derive psychological advantages. Incisive action in this regard resulted from appointment of a special committee by the NSC at the direction of the President. This task group, carrying forward the work of the Phase "B" panel, made a comprehensive study and developed plans for the creation of a Volunteer Freedom Corps (NSC 143). (See paragraph "Volunteer Freedom Corps" above).

In addition, [overt] programs such as those under IIA have given increased attention to escapees. Other uses of escapee personnel encompass such activities as the Free Europe University in Exile (sponsored by the National Committee for a Free Europe), and certain of the operations in its appropriate area of the Committee for Free Asia, which offer opportunities for special exploitation of the potential for non-communist leadership among these people. The program in Europe has the capability of absorbing profitably more qualified candidates than have appeared thus far. Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberation have increased their propaganda exploitation of escapees and are using in their programming current escapees offering substantial value.

(e) Plan for Conducting Psychological Operations
During General Hostilities (PSB D-8/b, NSC 127/1)

The substance of this Plan has been integrated into the current war plans of both JCS and CIA. The Department of State chairs an inter-departmental ^{sub} committee of representatives from State, Defense, and other agencies concerned for the purpose of working regularly on an "X-Day" Plan in implementation of NSC 127/1.

(f) National Overt Propaganda Policy Guidance for
General War (PSB D-11/b)

The substance of this Plan has also been integrated into the current war plans of JCS and CIA. The State Department feels that the Plan

itself will serve as an adequate guide for its purposes should general hostilities break out.

- (g) A Strategic Concept for a National Psychological Program with Particular Reference to Cold War Operations under NSC 10/5 (PSB D-31)

Work on this project was in effect taken over by the President's Committee on International Information Activities.

- (h) National Psychological Strategy with Respect to Germany (PSB D-21)

and

- (i) National Psychological Strategy with Respect to Berlin (D-21/2) (Supplement to PSB D-21 dated October 9, 1952)

A supplementary psychological plan for Berlin was approved by the Board on February 3, 1953. Supporting Plans for implementing this program as well as the Plan for West Germany as a whole, were developed by the Department of State and Department of Defense, coordinated and approved by other member agencies. Reports received from Bonn outline in detail actions which have been taken to implement these plans. A special Coordinating Committee has been established in Bonn under the auspices of the U. S. High Commission. Under the active chairmanship of the HICOG Public Affairs Officer, the Committee brings together representatives of State, Defense, MSA, and CIA. [CIA's participation is limited by the nature of its work, and its reports are filed separately through the agency in Washington.] Reports from this Committee indicate progress in implementing the German and Berlin Plans, which have now become, in effect, the charters for the Government's information and other psychological programs in the area.

Possible revision of these plans is under preliminary staff consideration as a result of recent developments in Germany and in Europe

generally, as well as of modifications in U. S. policies.

(j) [Psychological Strategy Program for Japan
(PSB D-27)

Follow-up work on the Japan Plan, which was approved by the Board on January 15, 1953, has resulted in the setting up of two Committees in Tokyo for the coordinated implementation of this program. The first Committee is a high-level group chaired by the Ambassador himself. The second is a working-level Committee headed by the Public Affairs Officer and including also representatives of Defense and CIA. Preparation of supporting plans, however, has been slow. The State Department is now working on a revision of the USIS country paper for Japan which follows very closely the content of PSB D-27. The preliminary steps have been taken to include MSA in the coordinated implementation of the Plan if and when an expected FOA program for Japan is approved.]

(k) Psychological Strategy Program for the
Middle East (PSB D-22)

Implementation of this Plan is proceeding under the active supervision of the Middle East Coordinating Panel in Washington. After the visit of the Secretary of State, accompanied by the Director of MSA, to the Middle East, the Panel held a special meeting toward the end of the reporting period to take into account the resultant new policy attitudes toward Middle Eastern problems. A request for comments on D-22 from the field resulted in replies from five of the ten Diplomatic Missions in the area. The comments received were uniformly favorable and several of them were enthusiastic. The Washington Panel is considering the problem of establishing in the field the necessary coordinating mechanism to implement this regional program.

PLANNING ACTIVITIESPlans Authorized and in Process of Development:

Plans in various stages of preparation on June 30 included the following:

- (a) Psychological Strategy Plan for Western Europe
(PSB D-38)

A regional psychological strategy plan to increase the willingness of Europeans to support mutually agreed security goals in Western Europe by reducing anti-U.S. attitudes was completed and sent to the Board members on June 30 for approval by vote slip action.

- (b) ☒ Program for Support of the Orthodox Church
(PSB D-39)

Possible ways of utilizing the world-wide influence of the Orthodox Church as a means of checking increasing Soviet influences in the Eastern Mediterranean and as a method of weakening Soviet control within the Soviet Orbit is the basis for this plan. A program for the non-attributable support and assistance to non-Russian leadership of the Orthodox Church was informally concurred in by the member agencies and forwarded to the Board members for vote slip approval.

- (c) ☒ Plan for Exploitation of Dissidence in the Soviet
Eloc: USSR Armed Forces (PSB D-43)

This plan to exploit the bases for schism between the regime and the military establishment of the Soviet Union and to increase dissidence within the Soviet Armed Forces where significant vulnerabilities are indicated, awaits final clearance prior to early submission to the Board.

- (d) Iranian Contingency Plan

At the request of the Department of State, a PSB chaired interdepartmental panel will coordinate psychological planning in relation to the possible partial or complete loss of Iran, a contingency which had not been assumed in the approved psychological strategy plan for the Middle East.

(e) Indo-China

A special program for the use of U. S. Influence in Support of U. S. Objectives in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos was drafted and in the process of interdepartmental clearance at the end of June.

(f) Psychological Strategies in North Africa

This paper, including a study of the Psychological Data, a report on the Status of Power Relations, and an illustrative plan for U. S. psychological action in the area, was in the process of clearance and completion on June 30.

Studies in Preparation for Future Plans

Continuing the emphasis on psychological action directed at the Soviet orbit, a staff study has been undertaken on the manipulation of communist scientific requirements as a communications channel preliminary to the development of a plan. Research has also been undertaken to discover the major Soviet sensitivities in the psychological field as a preliminary to determining the basic underlying Propaganda Themes for U. S. propaganda.

A staff study on "Africa, South of the Sahara" has been drafted with preliminary analysis on the major factors which must be considered in the development of any psychological plan for this area. Staff studies on Iberia and North Africa have been continued on a low priority basis. Several functional studies are in preliminary stages of development. Among them is a study of the role of religious and moral forces in the struggle against Communism, and a study on the use of the U.N. as a forum and sounding board for attacks on the Soviet communist philosophy.

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Review and Revision of Approved Plans

A procedure was developed during the period, under which all completed plans are regularly reviewed by the staff with a view to determining whether revision is required. Early revision of the French and Italian plans is now contemplated.

EVALUATION AND INTELLIGENCE

Evaluation Methods

Work was continued with Government research offices engaged in developing techniques for evaluating psychological operations. Progress in this field has been made through:

- a. examining current evaluation research projects in the Government to determine their relevance to FSB needs.
- b. alerting Government research units (e.g., the RDB Advisory Group, HumRRO, the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare (Army), the Human Resources Research Institute (Army)) to the continuing need for research, particularly on evaluation criteria for psychological operations, and assisting them in fixing priorities for major research projects.
- c. holding conferences on evaluation techniques and criteria (e.g., with the Evaluation Branch of OCPW, with CIA, and at the Fort Bragg Psywar Center).
- d. suggesting specific evaluation projects for Government research units, such as a Handbook on Statistics for Psywar, which was taken up with OCPW.

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Evaluations and Pre-planning Situation Estimates

During the reporting period, the following projects in this category were carried out:

- a. An Evaluation of the Psychological Effect of the U. S. National Effort in Italy. (PSB D-29): This paper, which was drafted during the final quarter of 1952, was noted by the Board on January 15, revised, and distributed for information. It concluded that U. S. policies and programs have contributed substantially to the attainment of our national objectives in Italy, but that the situation was still grave and that withdrawal of our support might well lead to the collapse of the Government then in power (February 1953). Accordingly, it concluded that there should be no slackening of our effort in the crucial period ahead.
- b. An Evaluation of the Psychological Impact of U. S. Foreign Economic Policies in the U. K. (PSB D-36): This paper identified some adverse psychological results of certain aspects of our economic policies towards the U. K., especially in the military aid and tariff areas. It was approved by the Board on January 15, and, after further coordination, it was transmitted to the NSC, and, through the State Department, to other interested agencies.
- c. Evaluation of the Psychological Impact of U. S. Foreign Economic Policies in France (PSB D-37): The completed paper was accepted as a reference document by the Board on January 15.

It outlines the psychological causes of France's inability to pursue free world objectives, notes the psychological obstacles

raised by our policy towards France, and proposes actions to obtain French cooperation.

- d. Psychological Plan for the Reduction of Communist Power in France (FSB D-14/c): An evaluation of this plan, including suggestions for its revision, was ready for consideration on June 30.
- e. Psychological Operations Plan for Soviet Escapees (FSB D-18a): An analytical report on the first year's operation of the United States Escapee Program is nearing completion.
- f. Soviet Sensitivities: An evaluative report on this subject, prepared in an interdepartmental committee, was completed and submitted to the Acting Director for approval and interdepartmental circulation for information as a staff study. It recommends that OIR 6164 on this subject, which resulted from the work of the committee, be periodically reviewed for the sake of maximum operational exploitation of the sensitivities.
- g. A review of the psychological situation and related factors in Yugoslavia involved the assembly of basic intelligence and strategic considerations, for possible use in planning.
- h. The Malenkov Test Case: Before the death of Stalin and in conjunction with FSB D-24 an extensive review of classified and other data on Malenkov was completed. It was decided that data were inadequate for an intensive psychological analysis of the man; but other Malenkov studies were recommended. The project uncovered deficiencies in the organization and coordination of biographic information in the Government.
- i. Latin America: A pre-planning estimate of the psychological situation in this region was nearing completion at the end of the reporting period.

Intelligence Support

Staff members continued to work in liaison with the intelligence-producing agencies of the Government to provide intelligence support and guidance to the Board and the Staff. This function includes selecting from, and, in some cases, synthesizing the output of the agencies, arranging for new research where necessary, and setting up staff briefings by experts from outside the staff.

In this period, similar services were also developed to meet the needs of the Chairman of the Board for Government intelligence on such psychological subjects as foreign opinion trends, and international reactions to particular programs, actions, and statements of the United States Government or its officials. This mission for the Chairman has required a greater emphasis upon the rapid procurement and processing of current intelligence from the agencies on a daily basis.

Psychological Support for USUN

As a result of discussions between Ambassador Lodge and Mr. C. D. Jackson, and subsequent PSB action at the informal meeting of June 3, a PSB-chaired committee of the member agencies was established to organize an anti-communist psychological campaign focussed upon the General Assembly scheduled to convene on the 15th of September. At the close of the reporting period, the committee was in action and early documentation had been supplied to Ambassador Lodge.

Utilization of Research for Psychological Operations

During this period, significant progress has been made in establishing close ties with appropriate research offices by:

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- a. providing research personnel with indoctrination on PSB objectives through discussion groups and individual meetings.
- b. assisting the Advisory Group of the Research and Development Board on their survey of research goals and needs for psychological and unconventional warfare.
- c. recommending the establishment of a committee to evaluate the contributions made by government-subsidized research studies to the conduct of psychological and unconventional activities and operations. Their recommendation has been accepted by OPE/OSD and will be carried out by the Advisory Group of RDB.

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July 29, 1953

MEMORANDUM OF INFORMAL PSB MEETING, JULY 29, 1953

Place: Office of the Chairman of the Psychological Strategy Board

Present: Messrs. Jackson, Smith, Kyes, Dulles, Stassen and Morgan.

Agenda Item 1. U. S. Psychological Strategy with Respect to the Thai Peoples of Southeast Asia

The Board considered the proposed revision of PSB D-23 and deferred action until the next meeting.

Agenda Item 2. Status Report on the National Psychological Effort as of June 30, 1953, and Progress Report of the Psychological Strategy Board

The Board approved the report for transmission to NSC.

Agenda Item 3. Other Business

Mr. Jackson reported the result of a quick survey of programs and facilities for psychological operations in Korea, which indicated that the principal matter for concern at the moment is dependable control of medium wave radio facilities in South Korea. Several suggestions for immediate action in the post-Armistice situation were mentioned, including material contained in recent letters from Chinese POW's to the President. I was asked to secure the letters from Colonel Carroll at the White House and make arrangements with Mr. Tracy Barnes for proper exploitation. General Smith indicated that State Department assistance in making translations would be available if needed. Mr. Stassen suggested that food parcels for North Korea might be available near the southern boundary of the buffer zone. The Board agreed to set up a working group to handle these and similar suggestions for making the most of the post-Armistice situation in relation to Korea and Communist China. Agencies are requested to let me know the names of their designees as soon as possible.

I called the Board's attention to the memorandum from Mr. Cutler on Communist influence among students and intellectuals, and the one prepared by the PSB Staff in response to it, circulated under my memorandum to the Board of July 27. The Board agreed that I should handle the matter as proposed in my memorandum.

A proposal for sending the New York City Center Ballet to Moscow (State Department memorandum of July 27, circulated to the Board under memorandum of same date) was not favorably considered.

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
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Mr. Jackson took up the problem of Mexican border patrol discussed briefly at the last meeting and said that he had discussed it further with the Attorney General. Mr. Brownell is making an inspection trip to California soon and was interested in taking along someone who could help prepare appropriate psychological plans to fit whatever action is finally decided upon. General Smith felt that no one should be sent from PSB for this purpose. Mr. Kyes offered to send someone from Defense.

An MSA memorandum of July 24 proposing additional facilities in Yugoslavia was considered briefly. The Board felt that the needs mentioned were already adequately prepared for.

Mr. Kyes proposed an idea, which the Board liked, for getting Christmas presents to the East Germans and perhaps to the East Europeans. Mr. Dulles agreed to work out an implementation plan.



George A. Morgan
Acting Director.

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July 29, 1953

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
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George A. Morgan
Acting Director.

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MEMORANDUM OF INFORMAL PSB MEETING, AUGUST 26, 1953

Place: Office of the Chairman, Psychological Strategy Board

Present: Messrs. Jackson, Smith, Kyes, Cabell, Stassen, Streibert, and Morgan.

Agenda Item 1. Increased Radio Facilities for U.S. Programming to China and Korea

The Board approved a proposal to make full power tests of transmitter "John" on Okinawa for one week, with the understanding that if the tests disrupt other essential electronic services in the area, they will be immediately discontinued.

The Board also agreed that unified coordination of radio broadcasting to Korea is needed, and discussed the diplomatic and military considerations involved. It appointed a committee of Mr. Phillips (State), General Erskine (Defense), and Mr. Hamilton (USIA) to work out a mutually acceptable plan for such coordination, subject to the proviso that during the next 90 days every consideration must be given to protecting the prerogative of the military commander with regard to protecting the security of the troops for which he is responsible. If the plan developed by the committee is concurred in by the three principals concerned, it is to go into operation without further reference to the Board.

With regard to Syngman Rhee's request for aid in building new radio facilities in South Korea, it was felt that the matter should be given "sympathetic consideration", but no decision taken for the time being.

Agenda Item 2. Handling of Chinese and North Korean Non-Repatriated Prisoners of War in Korea

The Board stressed the importance of handling this delicate problem with the greatest possible care.

Agenda Item 3 is covered in a separate memorandum.

Agenda Item 4. Other Business

The Board again expressed its firm opposition to the use of Federal troops to control the "wetback" problem.

I called the Board's attention to the early NSC deadline on the study of U.S. prestige (NSC Action 867) and pointed out that it would probably be impossible for the Board to meet this deadline in view of the time reportedly required by CIA for completion of its estimate.

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PRESENT:

Mr. C. D. Jackson

PSB:

Mr. Mallory Browne
Colonel J. Woodall Greene

USIA:

Mr. Theodore C. Streibert
Mr. Abbott Washburn
Mr. Fred Trimmer

STATE:

Mr. Walter P. Guzzardi
Mr. Walter K. Schwinn

DEFENSE:

General Wm. H. Barksdale
Colonel John B. Stanley
Mr. Joseph G. Conley

CIA:

Mr. John E. Baker
Mr. Stanley P. Richardson

1. It was agreed that the first step was to try to get agreement from the authorities primarily concerned on Okinawa to make a test at full power, for directional pattern, in daylight, of transmitter "John." This test would be of one week's duration, with the understanding that if it in any way disrupted the tactical or strategic radio or other operations of the Armed Services or of other essential services, the operators of "John" would immediately drop back to the current level of power transmission on receipt of notice of the disruption. The purpose of the test is to ascertain whether, at full power, "John" lays down a satisfactory daytime signal in Korea on 1180 KC, with the idea of avoiding the complications involved in dropping to a lower wave band.

2. It was the sense of the meeting that in view of the delicate situation existing in Korea, it is essential that U. S. radio programs to Korea should be originated in Tokyo and should be coordinated on the spot. It is felt that one person should be in charge of and responsible for this coordination and should provide tactical guidance on a fast basis under emergency conditions. The coordinator should be a designee of Ambassador Briggs, but he must be fully acceptable to General Clark. He would remain a member of Ambassador Briggs' staff and responsible to him, and presumably would be a specially qualified, high-level, USIA officer. His operational headquarters would be Tokyo.

3. It was, finally, the sense of the meeting that the already available manpower - American, Korean, and Chinese - in this area be utilized as fully as possible; and specifically, that the team which has been broadcasting to Korea from Tokyo from Psywar FECON be used to the greatest extent practical in the development of the proposed program over U. S.-controlled radio facilities in the area.


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The Board concurred in a State Department draft of a reply by the President to Adenauer's letter about clothing for East Germany.

2 | The Board agreed that it would be desirable to make some gestures, particularly with surplus food, in Western Europe at Christmas time. The Chairman asked me to refer this to an appropriate working group for study.



George A. Morgan
Acting Director.

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